Sumner, commanding a corps, said that a total of 40,000 must be left. Was not General Wadsworth mistaken? Could the information be correct? The President directed Generals Hitchcock and Thomas to investigate the matter. They reported it would require 30,000 men to man all the forts, which, with 25,000 as a covering force, would make a total of 55,000 to render the capital secure. "The requirement of the President has not been fully complied with," they said; whereupon Mr. Lincoln issued an order that McDowell's corps should remain.

In speaking of this action of the President, McClellan says: "It frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It made brilliant operations impossible. It was a fatal error." (")

Yorktown was held by a Confederate force of 11,000 men under General Magruder. His line extended thirteen miles along Warwick Creek. McClellan saw breast works and fortifications with cannon. He sent this despatch to the President:

...

"The approaches, except at Yorktown, are covered by the Warwick, over which there is but one, or, at the most, two passages, both of which are covered by strong batteries. It will be necessary to resort to the use of siege operations before we assault. . . . I am impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest. I shall, of course, commence the assault as soon as I can get up my siege train."

The President replied:

"You now have over one hundred thousand troops. I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. Your despatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it-certainly not without reluctance. After you left I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defence of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

"I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than

twenty thousand unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

“There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over one hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making one hundred and eight thousand then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but eighty-five thousand when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of twenty-three thousand be accounted for ?

"As to General Wool's command [at Fortress Monroe], I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was

away.

"I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time, and, if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you--that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

"I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act."

General McClellan wrote that he wanted McDowell's full corps, but would try to get along with Franklin's division, and would be responsible for results. The President complied with the request. The division arrived, but there was nothing for it to do. The 100,000 soldiers already there were building earthworks and putting heavy guns in position. The artillery threw a few shells into the enemy's works, and McClellan sent this despatch to Secretary Stanton:

"General Smith has just handsomely silenced the fire of the so-called one-gun battery, and forced the enemy to suspend work. Mott's battery behaved splendidly."

Stanton telegraphed :

"Good for the first lick! Hurrah for Smith and the one-gun battery! Let us have Yorktown, with Magruder and his gang, before the first of May, and the job will be over!"

We may regard it as a bit of sarcasm on the part of the Secretary of War.

General McClellan had a large number of mortars and cannon mounted, but telegraphed for more. This the despatch from the President:

"Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?"

McClellan replied:

"Our work going on very well. . . . Our rifle-pits are rightly advancing. Indications of a brush to-night. The time for opening fire is now rapidly approaching. Enemy still in force and working hard."

Nearly one hundred heavy guns and mortars were in position, but McClellan would not allow them to open fire till all arrangements were completed. Then he would astonish the Confederates. He did not mistrust that Magruder's spies were in his camp, and knew everything that was going on-that the enemy was ready to leave at any moment. (*)

When the batteries of McClellan were prepared to begin the bom bardment, not a Confederate soldier was to be seen; all had departed. Exultant the despatch sent by McClellan to Washington:

"Yorktown is in our possession. We have the ramparts, have guns, ammunition, camp equipage, etc. Hold the entire line of works. . . . Gunboats have gone up York River. I shall push the enemy to the wall."

The division commanded by General Hooker overtook the retreating Confederates at Williamsburg. Although confronted by a superior force, he boldly and resolutely began an engagement. McClelMay 5. lan was far in the rear, and did not arrive till the battle was over. Through the following night the Confederates retreated to Richmond. The Union soldiers kindled their bivouac fires and passed the night on the field.

There was commotion in the Confederate capital. "In the Presidential mansion all was consternation and dismay," the words of a Southern historian. (*) Congress adjourned hastily and many people left the city. The public documents were packed in boxes and taken away; the presses which were printing treasury notes were sent to Georgia.

It seems probable that if McClellan had pushed resolutely on he could have made his way at once into Richmond.

The Merrimac was still a menace to the great fleet of vessels in Hampton Roads. Mr. Lincoln believed the time had come when Norfolk could be seized and the Merrimac destroyed. He was conMay 8. fident that with the army moving towards Richmond the Confederates would not leave many troops to hold Norfolk and the batteries.

along the shore. Accompanied by Secretary Chase and Secretary Stanton, he visited Fortress Monroe. He asked Admiral Goldsborough if troops could not be landed on the north shore. If so, they would only have to march eight miles to reach

Norfolk.

"There is no landing-place on the north shore," said the admiral. "We shall have to double the cape and approach the place from the south side, which will be a long and difficult journey."

"Have you ever tried to find a landing?"

"We have not."

"That reminds me," said Mr. Lincoln, "of a fellow out in Illinois who had studied law, but who never had tried a case. He was sued, and not having confidence in his own ability, employed a lawyer to manage it for him. He had only a confused idea of law terms, but was anxious to make a display of learning, and on trial made suggestions to his lawyer. He said: 'Why don't you go at him with a capias, or surrebutter, or something, and not stand there like a confounded old mudum factum?' Now, admiral, if you do not know there is not a landing on the north shore, I want you to find out."

HAMPTON ROADS.

Admiral Goldsborough understood why the President told the story. Accompanied by Secretary Chase and General Wool, he closely examined the shore and found a landing. The troops were put in motion.

The Confederates evacuated Norfolk. The Merrimac was blown up, and the Union gunboats steamed up the James.

The President returned to Washington much pleased with the results. Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, called at the White House to present four gentlemen from England. It was early in the forenoon, and the President had not laid aside his dressing-gown. He rose and greeted them without embarrassment, making no apology for not having completed his toilet.

"You have been fighting great battles," said Mr. Goldwin Smith, one of the visitors.

"Yes."

"Will not your great losses impair the industrial resources of the North and the revenues of the country?"

"That brings to mind 'darkey arithmetic,'" said Mr. Lincoln.

"Darkey arithmetic! I did not know, Mr. President, that you have two systems of arithmetic."

"Oh yes; and I'll illustrate that point by a little story. Two young contrabands, as we now call them, were seated together. 'Jim,' said one, 'do you know 'rithm'tic?'

"No. What is 'rithm'tic?'

"It's where you adds up tings.

When you has one and one and

puts dem togeder, dey makes two. When you substracts tings, if you has two tings and you takes one away, only one remains.'

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"Is dat 'rithm'tic?'

"Yes.'

"Well, 'tain't true; it's no good.'

"Yes 'tis, and I'll show ye. Now spose tree pigeons sit on dat fence, and somebody shoots one of dem, do tother two stay dar? Dey flies away fore tother feller falls.'

"Now, gentlemen, the story illustrates the arithmetic you must use in estimating the actual losses resulting from one of our great battles. The statements you refer to give the killed, wounded, and missing at the first roll-call, which always gives an exaggerated total."

"Is it not unfortunate that such reports should go out? Would it not be better to delay making any report, Mr. President?"

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Perhaps so. But I am surprised at the smallness rather than the greatness of the number missing, when we take into account the dense woods, long marches, and the fatigues of men unaccustomed to military life."

To the astonishment of the gentlemen, the President gave comparisons between American and European wars, and showed by statistics that the missing in the battles fought by the volunteers were less than in the armies of Europe after a great battle.

Mr. William D. Kelley, member of Congress, was present, a silent. listener. As the gentlemen passed from the executive chamber he heard their conversation.

"What are your impressions of him?" one asked.

"Such a person," the reply, "is quite unknown to our official circles. or to those of continental nations. I think his place in history will