are frequently led by the grossest errors, by misinformation, and by passion, would be a flattery, which their own good sense would despise. These truths are not often told in public assemblies, but they cannot be unknown to any who hear me. It follows, that there ought to be two distinct bodies in our Government-one, which shall be immediately constituted by, and peculiarly represent, the people, and possess all the popular features-another, formed upon the principles, and for the purposes, I have before stated." Having pointed out the tendency of the proposed amendments to destroy the stability, permanence, and independence of the Senate, he observed: "The interests of the States and of the United States, have been placed in contrast. This is not a fair view of the subject. They must, necessarily, be involved in each other. What we apprehend is, that some sinister prejudice, or prevailing passion, may assume the form of a genuine interest. The influence of these is as powerful as the most permanent conviction of the public good, and against this influence we ought to provide. There must be a perpetual accommodation and sacrifice of local advantage to general expediency. But, a mere popular assembly would be rarely actuated by this consideration. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary, that the Senate should be so formed as to be unbiased by false conceptions of the real interests, or undue attachment to the apparent good, of their several States."

These observations were followed by others, showing that, the States "were essential component parts of the Union ;" and, that the means they possessed of sustaining

It is related by Benson, that being checked in the full progress of his remarks, Hamilton observed to him in an under tone, "I must state the Con3itution in all its truth and force." "Go on," Benson replied, "you will not lose a vote."

themselves, rendered all apprehension for their safety groundless. He then returned to the considerations in favor of a select and durable Senate. "A government," he remarked, "changeable in its policy, must soon lose its sense of national character, and forfeit the respect of foreigners. Senators will not be solicitous for the reputation of public measures, in which they take but a temporary part; and will feel lightly the burden of public disapprobation, in proportion to the number of those who partake of the censure." "This," he observed in his closing remarks, "This is the first fair opportunity that has been offered of deliberately correcting the errors in Government. Instability has been a prominent, and very defective feature in most Republican systems. It is the first to be seen, and the last to be lamented by a philosophical inquirer. It has operated most banefully in our infant republics. It is necessary that we apply an immediate remedy, and eradicate the poisonous principle from our Government. If this be not done, we shall feel, and posterity will be convulsed by the malady." *

After a defence of the proposed amendment by Lansing and Smith, who insisted, that the States would be gradually extinguished, unless the dependence of the Senate on the State Legislatures should be thus secured; and, that the Senate would otherwise, become a perpetual body, under the influence of a perpetual faction, Hamil

*It is stated, that he occupied two days on the Senate. "Tears were in the eyes of the audience." Colonel Huger of S. C., said, “I did not conceive it possible for man to speak so." And Chancellor Kent remarks-"His two speeches on the organization, powers, and stability of the Senate, were regarded at the time, by the best judges, as the noblest specimens which the debates in that, or any other assembly, ever afforded, of the talents and wisdom of the statesman." How much is to be regretted the bald and inac curate reports of them, from which this outline is drawn.

ton resumed his argument, which was much extended. The leading observations will only be given. "There are two objects," he said, "in forming systems of government-safety for the people, and energy in the administration. When these are united, the certain tendency of the system will be to the public welfare. If the latter be neglected, the security of the people will as certainly be sacrificed, as by disregarding the former. Good constitutions are formed upon a comparison of the liberty of the individual with the strength of government. If the tone of either be too high, the other will be weakened too much. It is the happiest possible mode of conciliating these objects, to institute one branch peculiarly endowed with sensibility, another with knowledge and firmness. Through the opposition and mutual control of these bodies, the government will reach, in its regular operations, the perfect balance between liberty and power. I admit that the aggregate of individuals constitutes the Government. Yet every State is not the Government. Every petty district is not the Government. In our State Legislatures, a compromise is frequently necessary between the interests of counties. The same thing must happen in the General Government between States. In this, the few must yield to the many-the particular must be sacrificed to the general interest. It is proper, that the influence of the States should prevail to a certain extent. But shall the individual States be the judges how far? Shall an unlimited power be left to them to determine in their own favor? Gentlemen go to an extreme. Instead of a wise Government, they would form a fanciful Utopia. Men will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change human nature, as to oppose the strong current of the selfish passions. A wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public good."

CHAPTER LIV.

AFTER the conclusion of the debate, on the structure of the Legislative body, the article, declaring its powers, was considered. It was asserted, that, connecting the preamble with the clause which gave the power of raising revenue, and with that which empowered the making of all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, the powers vested in the Government by the Constitution, Congress "might pass any law it thought proper." An amendment was proposed, prohibiting an excise being imposed on articles, the growth or manufacture of the United States: forbidding the laying direct taxes, until the proceeds from the impost and excise were insufficient; and then, only, after a requisition for the amount upon the States. Smith declared, that the General Government should rest in some degree, not only for its foundation, but operation, on the State Governments; and their respective powers be clearly defined. Unless some specific revenue is reserved to them, their governments, with their Independence, will be totally annihilated. "A consolidation of the States," Livingston observed, "ought to be avoided, but the extent of the country will not admit of a representation upon principles, in any great degree, democratic. We shall become a manufacturing people— Imports will diminish-New sources of revenue be required-Distilled liquors will be a first object of excise,

very productive and favorable to morals." Hamilton took a large view of this part of the Constitution. "After all our doubts-our suspicions and speculations on the subject of government, we must return," he observed, "at last to this important truth-that, when we have formed a Constitution upon free principles, when we have given a proper balance to its different branches, and fixed the Representation upon pure and equal principles, we may with safety confide to it all the powers necessary to answer, in the most ample manner, the purposes of government." He then examined, at length, the structure of the Federal Government, to show how far these purposes had been accomplished. He next considered the objects of the respective governments, in order, to exhibit the necessity of conferring on that of the Union, a command of the revenue; and pointed out the inconveniences of attempting to give to each, exclusive sources of revenue; alleging, that the concurrent system proposed, would, in fact, be most advantageous to the States." The existence of the State Governments, he remarked, "must form a leading principle in the most perfect Constitution we could form. It never can be the interest or desire of the National Legislature to destroy them. It can derive no advantage from such an event, but would lose an indispensable support, a necessary aid in executing the laws, and conveying the influence of government to the doors of the people. The Union is dependent on the will of the States for its Chief Magistrate, and for its Senate-a blow aimed at the members must give a fatal wound to the head-The destruction of the States would be, a political suicide. Can the National Government be guilty of such madness? What inducements, what temptations can they have? Will they attach new honors to their station? Will they increase the National strength? Will they multiply the National