army of General McDowell. Before it, the men had been all enthusiasm. They either would not meet the enemy at all, they dreamed, or they would whip him and chase him to Richmond. The enemy had been met, had not fled at the sight of us, and had not been whipped. The enthusiasm, which had been at the boiling point, was chilled by a doubt. The delay of the 19th and 20th, while waiting for the subsistence to come up, spread and increased the flatness.

The original plan was to turn the enemy's right, and so cut off his communication with Richmond. General McDowell had objected to moving by his right to turn the enemy's left, because the movement would be indecisive. At the eleventh hour, this indecisive course was adopted, for the reasons that the roads on the left appeared impracticable, that the enemy's attention had been attracted to Blackburn's Ford by the blunder of the 18th, and that it had now become an object to guard against the expected arrival of Johnston, by occupying his line of railway communication.

On the night of Saturday, the 20th of July, General McDowell issued his orders for the attack. Runyon's Fourth Division was left in the rear near Fairfax Courthouse. Tyler's division-except Richardson's brigade, which was to remain at Blackburn's Ford and report to Colonel Miles-was to march at half-past two o'clock on Sunday morning down the Warrenton road, and threaten the Stone Bridge. Schenck's and Sherman's brigades were encamped on the Warrenton road, about a mile beyond Centreville; Keyes's brigade, which had become separated from the rest of the division, had gone into camp half a mile east of Centreville. Hunter's division, which was about a mile and a half beyond Keyes's, was to move at two o'clock, and close up on Tyler. Heintzelman's division, which was encamped on the Braddock road, two miles east of Centreville, was to march at half-past two, and fall in in the rear of Hunter. Under cover of Tyler's attack, Hunter and Heintzelman were to move to the right, cross Bull Run at Sudley's Springs, and turn the enemy's left. Miles's division was held in reserve at Centreville, to guard

against a movement of the enemy by Blackburn's Ford, to cut off our rear.

These dispositions, except as to Runyon's division, were well made. Had they been executed, the result of the day must have been very different.

At a blacksmith's shop, about a mile in advance of Tyler's position, a branch road leads from the Warrenton pike towards Sudley's Springs. If Tyler had marched boldly forward, the rear of his division should have cleared that point in an hour, or, at the very latest, in an hour and a half. This would have enabled Hunter to file to the right certainly by four o'clock. In fact, the rear of Tyler's division did not pass the junction of the roads until half-past five, or fully an hour and a half later than it should have done. Schenck's brigade, which led the advance, started punctually at the time fixed in orders, but, as General Tyler himself explains, he felt called upon to move slowly and with caution, feeling his way down to the Stone Bridge. Thus occurred a fatal delay.

The head of Schenck's brigade reached the Stone Bridge about six o'clock, and the artillery of his and Sherman's brigades opened fire about half an hour later. Hunter's division could not find the road by which it was to march, and having been led by its guide by a wide detour through the woods, did not reach the ford until between half-past nine and ten o'clock, and occupied more than an hour in passing, so that it was after eleven o'clock before Heintzelman began to cross. The head of Hunter's column became engaged almost immediately after crossing Bull Run, and drove the enemy steadily until about noon. While Hunter was crossing, orders were sent to Tyler to press his attack. Colonel Sherman, with his brigade, accordingly crossed Bull Run at a ford just above the Stone Bridge, and pushed forward down the Warrenton road until he joined the left of Burnside's brigade of Hunter's division, then hotly engaged; Ayres's battery, being unable to cross the ford, was left behind. Sherman came into action about half-past twelve, and was at once ordered by General McDowell to join in the pursuit of the enemy, then falling

back on the left of the Groveton road. Placing Colonel Quimby's Thirteenth New York regiment in front, in column by division, Colonel Sherman ordered the other regiments to follow in line of battle, in the order of the Second Wisconsin, Seventy-ninth New York, and Sixty-ninth New York.

Thus far the tide of success had been unbroken. Our troops had effected the passage of Bull Run, had driven the enemy before them in confusion a mile and a half, and we had succeeded in uniting three divisions under the crest of the hill, which was to be the decisive point of the battle. On the left Keyes was driving back the enemy, enabling Schenck to cross and remove the obstructions in his front, and to turn the enemy's right. The crisis was at hand.

In his official report, Colonel Sherman thus graphically describes the operations of his brigade at this time: "Quimby's regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge, from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made another stand on ground very favorable to him; and the regiment continued advancing as the enemy gave way, till the head of the column reached the point near which Ricketts's battery was so severely cut up. The other regiments descended the hill in line of battle, under a severe cannonading; and the ground affording comparative shelter against the enemy's artillery, they changed direction by the right flank and followed the road before mentioned. At the point where this road crossed the bridge to our left the ground was swept by a most severe fire by artillery, rifle, and musketry, and we saw in succession several regiments driven from it, among them the Zouaves and battalion of Marines. Before reaching the crest of the hill the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible; but when the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of Major Wadsworth, of General McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank and to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced, delivering its fire. This regiment is uni

formed in gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment fled in confusion, and retreated towards the road, there was a universal cry that they were being fired upon by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second time, and was again repulsed in disorder. By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and, in like manner, it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of the ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and the ground was irregular, with small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and musketry was very severe. The Seventy-ninth, headed by its colonel (Cameron), charged across the hill, and, for a short time, the contest was severe. They rallied several times under fire, but finally broke, and gained the cover of the hill. This left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, Colonel Corcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest, and had a full, open view of the ground so severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles incessant. It was manifest the enemy was here in great force, far superior to us at that point. The Sixty-ninth held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in disorder."

The

It was now half-past three o'clock in the afternoon. men had been up since two in the morning, had been on their legs ever since, had been engaged for four hours, and had eaten nothing. The day was intensely hot. The troops, unused to any of these things, were fagged.

There was a slight lull on the extreme right. Porter's brigade of Hunter's division, and Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries were sent forward to occupy the crest of the hill, from which the enemy had been pushed. Hardly had they reached the new position, when a murderous volley was poured into them, at pistol range, from the clump of pines that skirted the hill. Early's brigade, of Johnston's army, had arrived,

and thrown itself on our right flank. Our line began to melt. The movement was taken up reluctantly by some regiments, but soon became general. The retreat became confused, and, beyond Bull Run, the confusion became a rout. The enemy did not pursue. That night, while a council of war was discussing the expediency of holding Centreville, the sea of panicstricken fugitives was making for Washington. Orders were issued for the coherent remains of the army to follow.

Colonel Sherman says, of his own command: "This retreat was by night, and disorderly in the extreme. The men of different regiments mingled together, and some reached the river at Arlington, some at Long Bridge, and the greater part returned to their former camps at or near Fort Corcoran. I reached this point at noon next day, and found a miscellaneous crowd crossing over the aqueduct and ferries. Conceiving this to be demoralizing, I at once commanded the guard to be increased, and all persons attempting to pass over to be stopped. This soon produced its effect. Men sought their proper companies, comparative order was restored, and all are now (July 25) posted to the best advantage."

The loss in Sherman's brigade was one hundred and eleven killed, two hundred and five wounded, two hundred and ninetythree missing; total, six hundred and nine. Our total loss in this engagement, exclusive of missing, was four hundred and eighty-one killed, one thousand and eleven wounded. The loss in killed and wounded in Sherman's brigade was nearly a fourth of that of the entire army. The enemy lost, in all, three hundred and seventy-eight killed, fourteen hundred and eightynine wounded, and thirty missing. His loss in killed and wounded was considerably greater than ours, but he picked up many prisoners from among the wounded and the lagging stragglers.

The prime causes which led to this disgraceful defeat are to be sought in the many delays attending the commencement and execution of the movement, in consequence of which our forces had to contend with the combined forces of Beauregard and Johnston.