rant of the fact, or wanting in appreciation of it, that Lincoln had been supported by the sympathizers of John Brown, the indorsers of the "Helper Book," the founders of the Kansas Emigrant Aid Societies, and their desperate abetters and agents, "Jim" Lane and others, and by the opponents of the Fugitive Slave law. It was known, in a word, that Lincoln owed his election to the worst enemies of the South, and that he would naturally and necessarily select his counsellors from among them, and consult their views in his administration of the government.

Threats of resistance were proclaimed in the South. It is true that a few sanguine persons in that section, indulging narrow and temporizing views of the crisis, derived no little comfort and confidence from the large preponderance of the popular vote in the Presidential contest in favor of the conservative candidates; and viewed it as an augury of the speedy overthrow of the first sectional administration. But those whose observations were larger and comprehended the progress of events, took quite a different view of the matter. They could find no consolation or encouragement from the face of the record. The anti-slavery party had organized in 1840, with about seven thousand voters; and in 1860 had succeeded in electing the President of the United States. The conservative party in the North had been thoroughly corrupted. They were beaten in every Northern State in 1860, with a single exception, by the avowed enemies of the South, who, but a few years ago had been powerless in their midst. The leaders of the Northern Democratic party had in 1856 and in 1860, openly taken the position that freedom would be more certainly secured in the Territories by the rule of non-intervention than by any other policy or expedient. This interpretation of their policy alone saved the Democratic party from entire annihilation. The overwhelming pressure of the anti-slavery sentiment had prevented their acceding to the Southern platform in the Presidential canvass. Nothing in the present or in the future could be looked for from the so-called conservatives of the North; and the South prepared to go out of a Union, which no longer afforded any guaranty for her rights or any permanent sense of security, and which had brought her under the domination of a growing fanaticism in the North, the senti

ments of which, if carried into legislation, would destroy her institutions, confiscate the property of her people, and even involve their lives.

The State of South Carolina acted promptly and vigorously, with no delay for argument, and but little for preparation. Considering the argument as fully exhausted, she determined, by the exercise of her rights as a sovereign State, to separate herself from the Union. Her Legislature called a Convention immediately after the result of the Presidential election had been ascertained. The Convention met a few weeks thereafter, and on the 20th day of December, 1860, formally dissolved the connection of South Carolina with the Union, by an ordinance of Secession, which was passed by a unanimous vote.

On the same day Major Anderson, who was in command of the Federal forces in Charleston harbor, evacuated Fort Moultrie, spiking the guns and burning the gun-carriages, and occupied Fort Sumter, with a view of strengthening his position. On the 30th of December, John B. Floyd, Secretary of War, resigned his office, because President Buchanan refused to order Major Anderson back to Fort Moultrie-Mr. Floyd alleging that he and the President had pledged the authorities of South Carolina that the existing military status of the United States in that State should not be changed during the expiring term of the Democratic administration.

The withdrawal of South Carolina from the Union produced some sensation in the North, but the dominant party treated it lightly. Many of these jeered at it; their leaders derided the "right of secession;" and their newspapers prophesied that the "rebellion" in South Carolina would be reduced to the most ignominious extremity the moment the "paternal government" of the United States should resolve to have recourse from peaceful persuasions to the chastisement of "a spoilt child." The events, however, which rapidly succeeded the withdrawal of South Carolina, produced a deep impression upon all reflecting minds, and startled, to some extent, the masses of the North, who would have been much more alarmed but for their vain and long-continued assurance that the South had no means or resources for making a serious resistance to the Federal authority; and that a rebellion which could at any

time be crushed on short notice, might be pleasantly humored or wisely tolerated to any extent short of the actual commencement of hostilities.

On the 9th day of January, 1861, the State of Mississippi seceded from the Union. Alabama and Florida followed on the 11th day of the same month; Georgia on the 20th; Louisiana on the 26th; and Texas on the 1st of February. Thus, in less than three months after the announcement of Lincoln's election, all the Cotton States, with the exception of Alabama, had seceded from the Union, and had, besides, secured every Federal fort within their limits, except the forts in Charleston harbor, and Fort Pickens, below Pensacola, which were retained by United States troops.

The United States Congress had, at the beginning of its session in December, 1860, appointed committees in both houses to consider the state of the Union. Neither committee was able to agree upon any mode of settlement of the pending issue between the North and the South. The Republican members in both committees rejected propositions acknowledging the right of property in slaves, or recommending the division of the territories between the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States by a geographical line. In the Senate, the propositions, commonly known as Mr. Crittenden's, were voted against by every Republican senator; and the House, on a vote of yeas and nays, refused to consider certain propositions, moved by Mr. Etheridge, which were even less favorable to the South than Mr. Crittenden's.

A resolution, giving a pledge to sustain the President in the use of force against seceding States, was adopted in the House of Representatives by a large majority; and, in the Senate, every Republican voted to substitute for Mr. Crittenden's propositions, resolutions offered by Mr. Clarke, of New Hamp shire, declaring that no new concessions, guaranties, or amendments to the Constitution were necessary; that the demands of the South were unreasonable, and that the remedy for the present dangers was simply to enforce the laws-in other words-coercion and war.

On the 19th day of January, the Legislature of the State of Virginia had passed resolutions having in view a peaceful settlement of the questions which threatened the Union, and

suggesting that a National Peace Conference should be held in Washington on the 4th of February. This suggestion met with a favorable response from the Border Slave States and from professed conservatives in the North. The Conference met on the day designated, and Ex-President Tyler, of Virginia, was called to preside over its deliberations. It remained in session several days, and adjourned without agreeing upon any satisfactory plan of adjustment.

Most of the delegates from the Border Slave States indicated a willingness to accept the few and feeble guaranties contained in the resolutions offered, a short time before, in the Senate by Mr. Crittenden. These guaranties, paltry and ineffectual as they were, would not be conceded by the representatives of the Northern States. The Peace Conference finally adopted what was called the Franklin Substitute in lieu of the propositions offered by Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky-a settlement less favorable to the South than that proposed by Mr. Crittenden. It is useless to recount the details of these measures. Neither the Crittenden propositions, the Franklin Substitute, nor any plan that pretended to look for the guaranty of Southern rights, received a respectful notice from the Republican majority in Congress.

Shortly after its assemblage in January, the Virginia Legislature had called a Convention of the people to decide upon the course proper to be pursued by the State, with reference to her present relations to the Union and the future exigencies of her situation. The election was held on the 4th of February, and resulted in the choice of a majority of members opposed to unconditional secession. Subsequently, Tennessee and North Carolina decided against calling a Convention—the former by a large, the latter by a very small majority. These events greatly encouraged the enemies of the South, but without cause, as they really indicated nothing more than the purpose of the Border Slave States to await the results of the peace propositions, to which they had committed themselves.

In the mean time, the seceding States were erecting the structure of a government on the foundation of a new Confederation of States. A convention of delegates from the six seceding States assembled in Congress at Montgomery, Alabama, on the 4th of February, 1861, for the purpose of organ

izing a provisional government. This body adopted a Constitution for the Confederate States on the 8th of February. On the 9th of February, Congress proceeded to the election of a President and Vice-President, and unanimously agreed upon Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, for President, and Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, for Vice-President. Mr. Davis was inaugurated Provisional President on the 18th of February, and delivered an address, explaining the revolution as a change of the constituent parts, but not the system, of the government, and referring to the not unreasonable expectation that, with a Constitution differing only from that of their fathers, in so far as it was explanatory of their well-known intent, freed from sectional conflicts, the States from which they had recently parted might seek to unite their fortunes to those of the new Confederacy.

President Buchanan had, in his message to Congress, denounced Secession as revolutionary, but had hesitated at the logical conclusion of the right of "coercion," on the part of the Federal Government, as not warranted by the text of the Constitution. Timid, secretive, cold, and with no other policy than that of selfish expediency, the remnant of his administration was marked by embarrassment, double-dealing, and weak and contemptible querulousness. He had not hesitated, under the pressure of Northern clamor, to refuse to order Major Anderson back to Fort Moultrie, thus violating the pledge that he had given to the South Carolina authorities, that the military status of the United States in Charleston harbor should not be disturbed during his administration. He added to the infamy of this perfidy by a covert attempt to reinforce Fort Sumter, under the specious plea of provisioning a “starving garrison;" and when the Federal steamship, the Star of the West, which was sent on this mission, was, on the 9th of January, driven off Charleston harbor by the South Carolina batteries on Morris Island, he had the hardihood to affect surprise and indignation at the reception given the Federal reinforcements, and to insist that the expedition had been ordered with the concurrence of his Cabinet, including Mr. Thompson, of Mississippi, then Secretary of the Interior, who repelled the slander, denounced the movement as underhanded, and as a breach not only of good faith towards South Carolina,