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people of the states in the place of that of the state legislatures, for a threefold purpose. First, it was deemed desirable to resort to the supreme authority of the people, in order to give the new system a higher sanction than could be given to it by the state governments. Secondly, it was thought expedient to get rid of the doctrine, often asserted under the Confederation, that the Union was a mere compact or treaty between independent states, and that therefore a breach of its articles by any one state absolved the rest from its obligations. In the third place, it was intended, by this mode of ratification, to enable the people of a less number of the states than the whole to form a new Union, if all should not be willing to adopt the new system. The votes of the states in committee, upon this new mode of ratification, show that on one side were ranged the states that were aiming to change the principle of the government, and on the other the states that sought to preserve the principle of the Confederation."

These, together with a provision that the authority of the old Congress should be continued to a given day after the changes should have been adopted, and that their engagements should be completed by the new government, were the great features of the system prepared by the committee of the whole, and reported to the Convention on the thirteenth of June.'

'See Madison, Elliot, V. 157, 158, 183.

* Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, no, 3; Delaware, Maryland, divided. See further on the subject of "Ratification," post, Index.

The report was in the following words:

"1. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee that a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary.

"2. Resolved, That the national legislature ought to consist of two branches. "3. Resolved, That the members of the first branch of the national legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several states for the term of three years; to receive fixed stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service, to be paid out of the national treasury; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular state, or under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch), during the term of service, and under the national government, for the space of one year after its expiration.

"4. Resolved, That the members of the second branch of the national legis

lature ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures; to be of the age of thirty years, at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to insure their independence, namely, seven years; to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service, to be paid out of the national treasury; to be incligible to any office established by a particular state, or under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch), during the term of service, and under the national government, for the space of one year after its expiration.

"5. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts. “6. Resolved, That the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and, moreover, to legislate in all cases to which the separate states are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several states contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the Articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union.

"7. Resolved, That the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national legislature ought not to be according to the rule established in the Articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of representation; namely, in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes in each state.

"8. Resolved, That the right of suffrage in the second branch of the national legislature ought to be according to the rule established for the first.

"9. Resolved, That a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the national legislature, for the term of seven years, with power to carry into execution the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, to be ineligible a second time, and to be removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed stipend, by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the national treasury.

“10. Resolved, That the national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards passed unless by two thirds of each branch of the national legislature.

"11. Resolved, That a national judiciary be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which shall be appointed by the second branch of the national legislature, to hold their offices during good behavior, and to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.

"12. Resolved, That the national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.

"13. Resolved, That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend

to all cases which respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony.

"14. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission of states lawfully arising without the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national legislature less than the whole.

"15. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress, and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after the reform of the Articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their engagements.

"16. Resolved, That a republican constitution, and its existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each state by the United States.

"17. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.

"18. Resolved, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers within the several states ought to be bound by oath to support the Articles of Union. "19. Resolved, That the amendments which shall be offered to the Confederation by the Convention ought, at a proper time or times after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon."

CHAPTER XXI.

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ISSUE BETWEEN THE VIRGINIA AND THE NEW JERSEY PLANS. HAMILTON'S PROPOSITIONS.-MADISON'S VIEW OF THE NEW JerSEY PLAN.

THE nature of the plan of government thus proposed-called generally in the proceedings of the Convention the Virginia plan— may be perceived from the descriptions that have now been given of the design and scope of its principal features, and of the circumstances out of which they arose. It purported to be a supreme and a national government; and we are now to inquire in what sense and to what extent it was so.

Its powers, as we have seen, were to be distributed among the three departments of a legislative, an executive, and a judiciary. Its legislative body was to consist of two branches, one of which was to be chosen directly by the people of the states, the other by the state legislatures; but in both the people of the states were to be represented in proportion to their numbers.

Its legislative powers were to embrace certain objects to which the legislative powers of the separate states might be incompetent, or where their exercise might be injurious to the national interests; and it was moreover to have a certain restraining authority over the legislation of the states. This plan necessarily supposed that the residue of the sovereignty and legislative power of the states would remain in them after these objects had been provided for; and it therefore contemplated a system of government in which the individual citizen might be acted upon by two separate and distinct legislative authorities. But by providing that the legislative power of the national government should be derived from the people inhabiting the several states, and by creating an

The regulation of commerce was not, any more than other specific powers, otherwise provided for than by these general descriptions.

executive and a judiciary with an authority commensurate with that of the legislature, it sought to make, and did theoretically make, the national government, in its proper sphere, supreme over the governments of the states.

With respect to the element of stability, as depending on the length of the tenure of office, this system was far in advance of any of the republican governments then existing in America; for it contemplated that the members of one branch of the legislature should be elected for three, and those of the other branch, and the executive, for seven years.

If we compare it with the Confederation, which it was designed to supersede, we find greatly enlarged powers, somewhat vaguely defined; the addition of distinct and regular departments, accurately traced; and a totally different basis for the authority and origin of the government itself.

Such was the nature of the plan of government proposed by a majority of the states in convention, for the consideration of all. It had to encounter, in the first place, the want of an express authority in the convention to propose any change in the fundamental principle of the government. The long existence of the distinctions between the different states, the settled habit of the people of the states to act only in their separate capacities, their adherence to state interests, and their strong prejudices against all external power, had prevented them from contemplating a government founded on the principle of a national unity among the populations of their different communities. Hence it is not surprising that men, who came to the Convention without express powers which they could consider as authority for the introduction of so novel a principle, should have been unwilling to agree to the formation of a government that was to involve the surrender of a large portion of the sovereignty of each state. They felt a real apprehension lest their separate states should be lost in the comprehensive national power which seemed to be foreshadowed by the plans at which others were aiming. It seemed to them that the consequence, the power, and even the existence, of their separate political corporations, were about to be absorbed into the nation.

In the second place, the mode of reconciling the co-ordinate existence of a national and a state sovereignty had undergone no

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