duty, in the advanced parallels and approaches, as no warning was possible, and many of our poor fellows lost their lives or were wounded by the fragments of our own prematurely exploding shells. The Whitworth guns, I remember, were, while in use, a terror to our men on this account. This, it seems to have been agreed, was owing to flaws and cracks which admitted the flame of the burning powder into the shell and ignited the charge; and it has resulted in changes in the mode of casting the shells, which it is hoped will remedy the evil.

Not the least surprising thing in the siege was the health of the troops, which was generally excellent. In a great measure this was due to the efforts of the Sanitary Commission. During the assault on Wagner the Sanitary agents were stationed in the very ditch of the fort, and cared for the wounded as they dropped from the parapets and rolled into the water. During the long days of the siege a decided tendency to scurvy showed itself, and fresh vegetables were only procured from the Commission and from them in profusion. The bad water was made endurable by ship-loads of ice, nearly four hundred tons being sent from New York. The efforts of and results accomplished by the Sanitary Commission were so great and so fully appreciated, that the commanding general issued an order testifying to the same, and the flag of the Commission was saluted regularly by the regiments as they passed to the intrenchments.

Finally, it may be interesting to know that during the fifty days of the siege an aggregate length of approaches was constructed of thirty-four hundred and forty yards. Forty-six thousand sand-bags were used in riveting parapets and embrasures, making loopholes for sharpshooters, filling gabions, making foundations for mortar platforms, coverings for splinter-proofs and magazines, etc. Indeed, the siege could hardly have been conducted without the sand-bags.

T

THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.'

BY ARBA N. WATERMAN.

[Read June 4, 1884.]

movement which culmi

At the beginning of chef Chickamauga, the Union

nated in the battle of Chickamauga, the Union Army under command of General Rosecrans was, for practical offensive and defensive operations, at Bridgeport on the Tennessee River, to which point the railroad had been repaired, and where supplies had been accumulated. The Rebel forces under General Bragg were at Chattanooga. Between these two points the railroad had been destroyed.

Rosecrans determined to compel the evacuation of Chattanooga by advancing upon and threatening Bragg's line of supplies. To carry out this plan, the Twentieth Army Corps under General McCook, and the Fourteenth under General Thomas, crossed the river and the mountain ranges south of Chattanooga, thus bringing themselves within striking distance of the railroad on which the Rebel commander depended. It was thought that Bragg would thus be forced either to fight in open field for his communications, or to surrender Chattanooga.

He determined to do neither. He planned to march out of Chattanooga, concentrate his army near Lafayette, annihilate in detail the divisions of Thomas and McCook as they emerged from the mountain passes, and then reoccupy Chattanooga. The scheme was worthy of a greater general and a better cause. There were many chances for it to succeed; and that it did not, was due to the energy with which Rosecrans rescued his army from its perilous position, to the sagacity of McCook and Negley in discerning the peril in which the movements

they were ordered to make would have placed them, to the incapacity and want of courage of Bragg's lieutenants, and last, but not least, to the heroic qualities of General Thomas, and the valor of the officers and men who composed the army of the Cumberland.

On the 8th of September there were indications that the enemy was evacuating Chattanooga; and at half-past three on the morning of the 9th General Rosecrans received information that the city had been abandoned. Orders were at once given for a vigorous pursuit of what was supposed to be the fleeing enemy.

McCook was then at Alpine, more than fifty miles. from Chattanooga; and between him and that place lay on one route the Rebel army, on the other the steep heights and wretched roads of Lookout Mountain. Crittenden with his corps was in the immediate vicinity of Chattanooga; while Thomas was in the mountains, midway between Crittenden and McCook, but within supporting distance of neither.

Unknown to Rosecrans, the Rebel forces were in the vicinity of Lafayette, ready to strike, as might seem best, either of the three Federal corps. McCook was the most isolated; and had he obeyed the instructions given in the despatch announcing the capture of Chattanooga, to move at once on Summerville, it is quite likely that he would have speedily found on his flank and rear a superior force from whose attack there would have been no escape. He, however, soon discovered that the enemy had not retreated, but were concentrated in heavy forces near Lafayette. Instead, therefore, of pressing on and attacking, he sent his wagon-train back to the summit of Lookout Mountain, there to await further developments.

Crittenden, who had been ordered to follow up vigorously the supposed line of retreat, on the 10th moved two divisions to Ringgold, encountering strong parties of the enemy on the way. Marken, of Wood's division, moved toward Gordon's Mills, driving squads of Rebels

before him; the Rebel camp-fires being in plain sight, on the evening of the 11th, from the position of Wood's division at Lee's and Gordon's Mills.

At half-past nine on the evening of the 10th, General Negley reported a heavy force in his front and on his flank. His position was really more perilous than he understood; and had the orders of Bragg been carried out, his division would have been annihilated. On the 11th, assisted by Baird's division, he fell back under a heavy fire, joining the remainder of the corps in front of Stevens' and Cooper's Gap.

General Rosecrans, who on the 10th had impliedly censured General Thomas for not having threatened Lafayette, was on the 11th convinced that the Rebel army was concentrated at that point, and that the concentration of his own force was a matter of the utmost importance. Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions having been recalled from Ringgold on the 12th, Crittenden's corps was in position at Lee's and Gordon's Mills. Two corps of Rebel troops, under command of General Polk, were ordered to attack Crittenden at this point. Ignorant of this fact, on the morning of the 13th, Van Cleve was sent with one brigade on a reconnoissance toward Lafayette. This small force soon encountered the Rebel advance, and drove it some three miles. General Polk was completely disconcerted by this movement. Cleve had no idea how large was the force he had met, and Polk had no idea how small was the body that had driven back his advance. Instead of pressing forward and attacking as ordered, Polk secured a strong position, halted, and sent for reinforcements.

Van

Again disappointed, Bragg gave orders for the concentration of his army on the right bank of the Chickamauga river, intending to deliver battle from his right flank.

General McCook, on the 12th, had been ordered to join General Thomas. The presence of the enemy on the east side of the mountain made it impossible for him