66 fecretaries, Mr. Lombard for the foreign department, and Mr. Beyne for the interior. Of thefe, the latter is flated to have been one of the illuminati, and a staunch friend to the French revolution; the former, we are told, was the fon of a French hairdreffer to the late, Pruffian monarch; who educated him and his two brothers, and placed them all in high officiat fituations; in return for which" (fays the author)." they betrayed their adopted country," At all events the fyftem tfelf, by which the fovereign repofed his chief confidence in fubordinate agents, (for he not only received all re. ports from them, but communicated his anfwers to them, a cabinet council being only held on extraordinary occafions) is a monument of weakness and abfurdity for which it would not be ea, to find a parallel. The ruffian fovereign, it is stated, was not more fortunate in the conftitution of his cabinet than the Emperor Alexander, nor, in his ambassador to Paris than the Emperor Francis, for the wily Italian Lucchesini is not confidered by the author as more faithful in the difcharge of his duties, than Count Philip Cobentzel. But to the cupidity of the late King of Pruffia, in receiving an annual fubfidy (amounting to 200,0001. fterling) in confequence of the treaty of Bafle, the author attributes, as its primary caufe, the prefent degraded ftate of Europe. A view is then taken of the conduct of Pruffia from that period, through which, as most of the facts were already notorious, we will not follow the author. One inftance, however of perfidy in the Pruffian minifter Haugwitz, or the fe cretary Lombard, we cannot omit. A remonftrance by the English minifter, Mr. Jackfon, (on the renewal of the war in 1803) against the feizure of Hanover, in contempt of the treaty with Pruffia, and to the manifeft danger of that state, ap pears to have been fuppreffed by one or both of these werthies, through whom it had been tranfmitted, and never reached their betrayed fovereign. Yet that infatuated monarch only decided that Haugwitz had been negligent, and though he took from him the porte-feuille for a short time, soon reinstated him in his office, Many particulars of the ufurper's conduct towards the leffer continental powers are then detailed; for which we must refer to the work itfelf, and alfo for a curious statement of what paffed in Bonaparte's camp at Boulogne, in the fummer of 1805, when he meditated, or at least menaced, an invafion of this country. From this flatement, it would appear that his plan, though depending on too many circumftances, to afford much probability of fuccefs, was yet more rational than is generally supposed. He reckoned, it seems, 4 on L. Goldsmith on the Cabinet of Bonaparte Goldsmith on the Cabinet of Bonaparte. 591 ombard for the foreign department, and Mr. are told, was the fon of a French monarch who educated him the author) they he knows the price of a field-marfhal; and wh ne army at Boulogne, ar guard; and the corps de environs of Metz, was already at e camp at Boulogne broke up." Theauat Bonaparte meant to "attack the allies unpre yet to make it appear that they were the aggreffors." furtherance of this view, Count Philip Cobentzel (whom poi the author accufes of being " more the minifter of Bona than of the Emperor Francis,") is faid to have informed court, that "before they could receive his difpatches, Bonaparte would be embarked, and that now was the time to march." By this falfehood (which certainly was a very grofs one,) the author confiders him as "the faviour of Bonaparte," who difappointed of the co-operation of his navy, and detained at Boulogne, with an impatient and almoft mutinous army, was much embaraffed how to act. The difpatch of Cobentzel to his own court, above referred to, was, the author declares, dictated by Bonaparte himself!!! moriw quot The author purfues this imperial free-booter through Germany, Poland, and Hungary, not detailing all his military operations, but pointing out various inftances of his "treachery, cunning, art, perjury, robbery, and affaffination, practifed" (as he terms it)" in the cabinet, and followed into the field."To expatiate on thefe (as fet forth by this writer) and to accompany them with all the comments which they fuggeft, would require" the hundred tongues and iron voice" of Homer and Virgil, rather than the abbreviated ftyle and limited space of a review. Many of the anecdotes here related, though probably new in this country, and not fupported by direct proof, tally with other circumftances already known; and, fome are fo truly the ftyle of French gafconade, treachery and coldruelty (particularly the murder of a Pruffian an emiffary of the affaffin Savary, of the name of hat atrocious as they are, they do not furpafs bafe perfidy of Murat, by which he obtained ridge, which facilitated the conquest of ve, a fact notorious on the continent of on of the events which preceded and battle of Austerlitz, the misconduct, e Pruffian minister, Haugwitz, is and juft reprobation. h on the Cabinet of Bonapart the foreign department, and Mr. hi friend to the French the lader is flated to save 't with a high, but well merited ninifter, Mr. Pitt; which, as e of our country, we most ays the author) "that juftly celebrated man, paid the debt of nature, nothing that I can fay, o the general eftimation in which he was held by all ope; and I have heard many Frenchmen who were in power in 1793, declare that WILLIAM PITT SAVED HIS COUNTRY. This is the opinion of Talleyrand, Hauterive, Sieyes, Barrere, Cevenot, Tallier, and a great many other leading men, who knew what was then paffing between them and perfons in this country. I have often heard it said, and it is ftill infifted on by many perfons in England, that it would have been better if the British cabinet had not gone to war with France, and that we ought to have left the French to manage their own affairs, &c. To this I reply, that thofe Frenchmen whofe names I have just mentioned, were of a very different opinion; and they are perfuaded that the exiftence of England, as an independent nation, is owing to the measures adopted by the English cabinet at the commencement of the war in 1793. I allude particularly to the alien bill, and the other measures for preventing all intercourse with France." This Author, however, is of opinion that Mr. Pitt conducted the war upon an erroneous principle, and thinks (with Mr. Burke) that the allies fhould have marched into France with a Bourbon at their head." It was however a very doubtful queftion, in point of prudence, whether, or not, Great Britain fhould have pledged herself irrevocably to the restoration of the Bourbons? and (what we think in this country a decifive objection) fuch a measure would, we are convinced, have been unpopular with a very confider-able, if not the larger part, of the nation. The measures of the Fox and Grenville adminiftration, and in particular their negotiation for peace, are next difcuffed; ૨૧ BRIT. CRIT. VOL. XXXVI. DEC. 1810. on the return of the French and Spanish fleets from the Woft Indies in much greater force than they actually affembled there; on their junction with the Breft fleet of twenty-fix fail of the line, and on the co-operation of the Dutch fleet in the Texel; not to mention the Danish fleet; forthe furrender of which the ftatement (from a perfon then in Bonaparte's employment} affures us, a negociation had even then commenced. From the whole of the relation, however, the author infers, thạt, after our enemy "began to be convinced of the impracticability of an immediate invasion of England his object was to induce the continental powers to commence offenfive operations, that he might have an oftenfible excuse for abandoning his so much boafted enterprize." 66 66 The apparent celerity of his fubfequent malbh to the Rhine is accounted for, in this statement, by a circumstance, not, as we believe, generally known. The army at Boulogne, we are told, was only the rear guard; and the corps de referve, which was in the environs of Metz, was already at Strafburgh before the camp at Boulogne broke up." Theauthor affures us that Bonaparte meant to "attack the allies unpre pared, and yet to make it appear that they were the aggreffors." In furtherance of this view, Count Philip Cobentzel (whom the author accules of being more the minifter of Bonaparte than of the Emperor Francis,") is faid to have informed. his court, that "before they could receive his difpatches, Bonaparte would be embarked, and that now was the time to march." By this falfehood (which certainly was a very grofs one,) the author confiders him as " the faviour of Bonaparte," who difappointed of the co-operation of his navy, and detained at Boulogne, with an impatient and almoft mutinous army, was much embaraffed how to act. The dispatch of Cobentzel to his own court, above referred to, was, the author declares, dictated by Bonaparte himself!!! 66 The author pursues this imperial free-booter through Germany, Poland, and Hungary, not detailing all his military operations, but pointing out various inftances of his treachery, cunning, art, perjury, robbery, and affaffination, practifed" (as he terms it)" in the cabinet, and followed into the field." To expatiate on thefe (as fet forth by this writer) and to accompany them with all the comments which they fuggeft, would require" the hundred tongues and iron voice" of Homer and Virgil, rather than the abbreviated ftyle and limited space of a review. Many of the anecdotes here related, though probably new in this country, and not fupported by direct proof, tally with other circumftances already known; and, fome are fo truly truly in the ftyle of French gafconade, treachery and coldblooded cruelty (particularly the murder of a Pruffian Colonel, by an emiffary of the affaffin Savary, of the name of Beauvoifin,) that atrocious as they are, they do not furpafs our belief. The base perfidy of Murat, by which he obtained poffeffion of a bridge, which facilitated the conquest of Vienna, is, we believe, a fact notorious on the continent of Europe. In the relation of the events which preceded and immediately followed the battle of Austerlitz, the misconduct, and even treachery of the Pruffian minifter, Haugwitz, is again marked with indignant and juft reprobation. In part of the work we meet with a high, but well merited eulogium on our late excellent minifter, Mr. Pitt; which, as coming from his enemies and those of our country, we most willingly tranfcribe. 1 "At this period" (fays the author) "that juftly celebrated man, William Pitt, paid the debt of nature, nothing that I can fay, can add to the general eftimation in which he was held by all Europe; and I have heard many Frenchmen who were in power in 1793, declare that WILLIAM PITT SAVED HIS COUNTRY. This is the opinion of Talleyrand, Hauterive, Sieyes, Barrere, Cevenot, Tallier, and a great many other leading men, who knew what was then paffing between them and perfons in this country. I have often heard it faid, and it is ftill infifted on by many perfons in England, that it would have been better if the British cabinet had not gone to war with France, and that we ought to have left the French to manage their own affairs, &c. To this I reply, that thofe Frenchmen whose names I have just mentioned, were of a very different opinion; and they are perfuaded that the exiftence of England, as an independent nation, is owing to the measures adopted by the English cabinet at the commencement of the war in 1793. I allude particularly to the alien bill, and the other measures for preventing all intercourse with France." This Author, however, is of opinion that Mr. Pitt conducted the war upon an erroneous principle, and thinks (with Mr. Burke) that "the allies fhould have marched into France with a Bourbon at their head." It was however a very doubtful queftion, in point of prudence, whether, or not, Great Britain fhould have pledged herself irrevocably to the restoration of the Bourbons? and (what we think in this country a decifive objection) fuch a measure would, we are convinced, have been unpopular with a very confiderable, if not the larger part, of the nation. The measures of the Fox and Grenville administration, and in particular their negotiation for peace, are next difcuffed; ૨૧ BRIT. CRIT. VOL. XXXVI. DEC. 1810. |