cluding peace with Bonaparte. For this mealure of the British Minifters (Lord Sidmouth and his colleagues,) this writer candidly allows them praife, confidering that, under the circumstances then exifling," peace was worth a trial:" but he states the almoft immediate demonftration of the Conful's tyrannical temper, in complaining of the freedom of remark on his conduct in the newspapers and fpeeches in Parliament; and inftead of reforting to the courts of law for redrefs, pouring forth his vengeance against our Government in his official paper, the Moniteur; in which the ebullitions of his anger were expreffed, in the coarseft language, even before the definitive treaty had been figned. The affumption of the office of prefident of the Italian Republic (in fpite of the exifting treaties with Auftria) during the congrefs at Amiens, the annexation of Piedmont, Parma, and the Ifle of Elba to his fovereignties, about the fame period, and the violent, unprincipled feizure of the Valais, one of the ftates of Switzerland, are alfo produced by this writer, to prove (as they do moft fully,) the inordination, ambition, and profligate rapacity of our enemy, even when he most affected and profeffed a defire of peace. The early renewal of the war, Mr. G. obferves, might have been forefeen, from the previous conduct of Bonaparte, and his marked difpofition of hoftility towards this country; and he warmly protefts against the pretence that the retention of Malta by our mi nifters was the cause of that event,

"They retained Malta," he justly obferves, not from an intention or a with to provoke a renewal of the war, but because, from the firft Conful's conduct, it appeared that fuch an event was inevitable, and at no great distance."

The author then proceeds to flate the manifeft fymptoms of hoftility to which he had alluded; the refufal to liquidate the demands of English fubjects on the French Funds, (in direct breach of the 14th Article of the Treaty of Amiens,) the refufal to restore three English fhips, captured in the Indian feas after the peace was known there; the rigid enforcement of every reftriction on British commerce, not only in France, but in every country under French influence; together with the confifcation even of the private property of the respective Captains, as British manufactured goods*; the hoftile expreffions in the Moniteur on the report of a commercial treaty

He might have added the confifcation of veffels (with their cargoes) when driven by ftrefs of weather into French ports.

with Great Britain, and, above all," the tyrant's desperate wifh" (as this writer terms it,)" to have our press fsubject to the controul of his ambaffador here." Thefe circumstances, (and especially the two laft)" will never," in the writer's opinion" permit an enlightened adminiftration of England to enter into any negotiation for peace with Bonaparte." Who indeed can expect that a tyrant fo jealous of our commercial profperity would ever cease to war against it? Who can believe that the murderer of Palm, the extinguisher of every free press on the continent, would endure even a temperate difcuffion of his measures by the political writers of Great Britain ?

In relating the circumftances of Bonaparte's application, through his Minifter, Otto, for filencing Cobbet, and for fending Peltier out of the country; the author ftates, that he was confulted by Mr. Otto, and warned him of the mifunderstanding which fuch an application was likely to create between the governments, and of its probable effect on the - minds of the people. He was defired, it feems, to return to Paris, and remonftrate against the meafure, through Talley. rand and Maret. But this attempt failed, and Talleyrand himself informed him, que le Conful eft furieux, et ne veut pas entendre raifon." The note therefore was delivered; and just praise is given to the dignified reply of the British Go

vernment.

"The English Secretary of State," fays the author, "proved himself to be a greater friend to the liberty of the prefs than fome of the members of the oppofition." From that period he obferves, "the official journal of France was filled with notorious falfhoods, and with the most bitter invectives against the British Cabinet."

The infamous paragraph refpecting Georges, and the infernal machine (as it was called) is cited, and fully proves this affertion, It dares to impute to our Sovereign the inten tion of rewarding a fuppofed affaffin, if fuccefsful, with the Order of the Garter.

The next important topic that calls our attention is the fyftem of diforganization purfued by Bonaparte in this country. Several of his Agents Secrets, and Commercial Agents, are then paffed in review. One of them, we are told, was fent" pour furbeiller les élections," and accordingly the most grossly exaggerated reprefentations of the conduct of the people at the general election, in 1802, appeared in the Moniteur and other French papers. Another agent (the notorious Fievé) was employed to corrupt the public journals, and failing, in a great degree, in that object, published let

ters

ters full of the most raneorous abufe of the British Conftitution and people. Several female fpies are alfo mentioned by name; and we were affured that a Col. Beauvoifin (of whom a most atrocious anecdote is afterwards related,) was fent here" to engage perfons to affaflinate His Majefty, and to organize a plan for the deftruction of our naval arfenals at Portsmouth and Plymouth." Of this charge, it is but fair to fay, no proof, except the author's affertion is produced; but a ftriking anecdote (of which teflimony is offered) is related, in order to fhow the probability, at leaft, that Defpard's confpiracy was infligated by the French Government; which, when it was detected, thought fit to difavow and reprobate that traitor, but accompanied the difavowal with a moft in, decent as well as unmerited farcafın on our excellent Sovereign. The infamous manoeuvres of Mehée de la Touche, in order to engage our minifters to become parties in a plot of affaffination, (which of courfe was to be afterwards betrayed and expofed,) are next detailed by this author, and indeed have been, in a great degree, admitted in a book publifhed by the mifcreant himfelf: and here the author very handfomely juftifies Mr. Drake from the grofs mifre. prefentations of Talleyrand, and gives due praise to the fpirited and truly dignified note of Lord Hawkesbury, addreffed to the foreign minifters in England; a note, he fays, which made a great impreffion, wherever it was known, in' France itself.

The characters of Bonaparte's principal commercial agents, and the inftructions given to them, (a fpecimen of which is referred to in the Appendix) are relied on as a further proof of his hoftility; and we are affured, on authority, that no lefs than five hundred military emiffaries were fent to this country and Ireland. To effect a rebellion in that island was, the author declares, the great measure of Bonaparte. The names of his principal agents for that purpose, and of the officers appointed to his Irifh legion, are given, for the moft part, at full length; and the author contends, on strong grounds, that the expeditions fitting out in the French and Dutch ports could not have been deftined to their colonies; but that,

"The plan was, in the first place, to revolutionize our Weft India islands, with the expeditions which were fitting out at Rochfort, &c. and with the armaments from Holland, attack us in our own country, when we should not be prepared for him."

After fome further arguments and anecdotes to prove the inveterate hoftility of Bonaparte, the author adverts to the

bafe

bafe and perfidious ftratagem by which the English, who hap pened to be in France at the breaking out of hoftilities, were induced to remain there after the departure of Lord Whitworth; and gives at length the article inferted in the Argus for the purpose of entrapping them. After fuch treachery what Britifh administration, or what unprejudiced politician can for a moment rely on any treaty which fuch a government may find it convenient to make?

The conduct of Bonaparte towards the continental powers, form the next fubject in this work; upon which we shall be more brief, as it is lefs directly interefting to our countrymen. The ftriking inftances of imbecility in the conduct of those powers, and of the bafeft treachery in many of the minifters and perfons employed by them, fufficiently account for the fucceffes of their unprincipled enemy, had he not been (as we think he was) greatly their fuperior in his military fyftem, and, generally fpeaking, in the manoeuvres of a

battle.

"The views of Napoleon," fays the author, " from the moment that (when) he procured himself to be declared hereditary Emperor of France, were, to become the dictator to all the other fovereigns and potentates of Europe, to reduce them one by one, first to a state of vaffalage, then to feek occafion for deftroying them; and to establish, on their ruins, a number of small fubordimate monarchies, to be governed by the different branches of his ●wn family, under his controul; in fine, to raise a new dynasty, to rule, not merely over France, but over Europe."

He then proceeds to ftate his violation of the guaranty (by himself and the Emperor of Ruffia) of the integrity of the German Empire, by the feizure of Hanover and the exaction of contributions from the Hanfe Towns; which measure alone (he observes) fhould have roufed the three powers of Auftria, Ruffia, and Pruffia, and united them in measures to "check the progrefs of this violator of treaties, and of the fecurity of foreign fovereigns." Here he very properly reprobates the abfurd mutual jealoufies which prevented these Princes from uniting against a common and powerful enemy, applying very juftly the remark of the Roman hiftorian, that Dum finguli pugnant, omnes vincuntur.

The means of conqueft employed by the tyrant are then more minutely detailed than we have feen in any other publi. cation. The chief of thefe, he infifts, was founded on a maxim which he has found too true (at least on the continent of Europe) namely, that "every man has his price.' knows" (fays the author!" the price of a cabinet minifter;

"He

he

he knows the price of a field-marfhal; and what is more, he knows to whom he may with fafety offer the price."

He proceeds to prove this affertion by forcible deductions of reafoning, and by ftriking facts. He argues (and we think justly) that had there not been traitors in the cabinets of the principal fovereigns of Europe, "it was impoffible they fhould not have discovered that all treaties with the 'Genius who directs the deftinies of France' were fallacious, and that truces were only made on his part for the purpose merely of gaining time, and of maturing his plans of ufurpation."

The author then reviews feparately the conduct of Bonaparte towards the different continental powers, beginning with his treaty with the Emperor Paul of Ruffia, in 1801, (which was immediately violated) and going through his fubfequent negotiations with Alexander, the prefent Emperor, the treachery of fome of whofe minifters is ftigmatized in ftrong terms, and the imbecility of whofe councils is shown by a detail of transactions that can scarcely be attributed to any other source.

In defcribing the tranfactions of Bonaparte with Auftria, the early and flagrant violation of the treaty of Luneville, (by which the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cifalpine, and Ligurian Republics had been guaranteed) is first pointed out; as the Tyrant almoft immediately seized on one of the cantons of Switzerland, and incorporated it with France. The infult to the Auftrian ambaffador to our court, Count, now Prince Stahremberg, is here alfo noticed; and the Auftrian minifter at Paris, Count Philip Cobentzel, is ftigmatized as "a creature of Bonaparte," very juftly, if the anecdote afterwards related be founded in fact.

Other aggreffions and infults on the Emperor of Germany are enumerated, and the fyftem pursued throughout Germany, of bribing the clerks at all the poft-offices, intercepting couriers and meffengers, (of which the outrage on Mr. Wagstaff is a memorable infiance) is particularly detailed. "Thus," fays the author," the whole of Germany might be considered as being completely under the influence of that government as if it had conftituted fo many prefectures of France."

It could not, one would have thought, have been poffible to find a more striking example of imbécility, in the councils or perfidy in the agents of a government, than has been difplayed in the Auftrian and Ruffian ftates, yet is the picture of the Pruflian cabinet (the organization of which is here exhibited) ftill more lamentable and difgufting. The two leading minifters (thofe for the foreign and home department) did not, it feems, fend in their reports directly to the King, but to his two

fecre.