ple saw nothing worth fighting for. At least, having had a trial of Buonaparte's government, they were not, perhaps, so very tired of it as to determine, all at once, to sacrifice their lives for the new king, of whose government they had had no trial, and which had nothing more favourable in its aspect than the former to recommend it. This train of reasoning was naturally to be expected of a people so proverbially phlegmatic as the Dutch. The page of history no doubt represents that nation, at one period, engaged in a gallant and successful opposition to foreign domination. But in that case the consequence of submission was the entire loss of independence, while the advantages of resistance were manifest and incalculably great. In the present instance, and supposing them to have been stript of their political rights by Buonaparté, it no where appears that the Prince of Orange intended to restore them. On the contrary, his Royal Highness took upon himself the title of a king, and, it is to be presumed, he has since exercised all the powers of sovereignty. It is true, the noise and clamour which the first news of this counter-revolution occasioned, and the importance which government attached to it, operated, for a while, to make some believe that the people of Holland had in truth thrown off the French yoke. In the House of Commons it was said, by Lord Castle reagh, that this revolution was "the result "of the spontaneous and unanimous wish of the people of Holland of all parties;" and the event was every where hailed as a triumph of freedom over oppression. But the less credulous were not long in discovering that the people had nothing to say in the business; that they interested themselves as little, perhaps less, in the fate of William the first, the "Sovereign Prince of the "Netherlands," as what they did in the fate of the Emperor Napoleon. In no shape did they justify Lord Castlereagh's statement; for if the impulse had been spontaneous and unanimous in favour of William, this would have been seen in its corresponding effects. All Holland would have been in arms to make good the claims of the house of Orange. Like France, the voice of the sovereign would have aroused the people; like France they would have united their fortunes to his; and, like France, they would have discomfited the armies, and baffled the projects of all the combined Powers of Europe. But nothe Dutch were actuated by no such feeling. Whether they were attached to Buonaparté, or had experienced the beneficial effects of the excellent code of laws which he has established; whatever were their motives for acting the part they did, it is certain they never gave that support to the new government which it was asserted they had given. On the contrary, though Napoleon was compelled, by reverse of fortune, almost to abandon Holland to its fate, the Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands" has not been able to clear his kingdom of French troops, even with the assistance of at least 10,000 of our best troops, an incalculable quantity of military stores, and a sum of money from this country fully adequate to his views. But men and money can accomplish nothing in the cause of a sovereign, when that cause, as is evidently the case here, is not also the cause of the people. This is a fact of which we ought to, (and I am certain might) have informed our selves better than we did, when we espoused the interests of the house of Orange. Had we acted in this cautious and prudent manner, we might have avoided the disgrace which must attend the withdrawing our troops from Holland, without accom plishing the object for which they were sent thither; and we might have saved the Prince of Orange the mortification which he must feel if, as is likely to happen, he should be forced to relinquish a crown, which was assumed without any calculation of chances as to the probability of his being able to retain it. But instead of acting in this way, the proceedings were gone into with the greatest rashness by the managers in this political drama, and the lookers on, without any regard to the consequences, displayed the most consummate folly in the applause which they gave to the first act of a piece which so very soon disappointed their hopes, and which may now, in all probability, terminate fatally to the individuals who were urged on, by the most flattering promises, to become the chief actors. But this is not all. Our news-paper press, with its usual regard for truth and justice, has commenced an indiscriminate and abusive attack upon the people of Holland and the house of Orange, because the result of the event which they were so active in promoting (and on the failure of which every judicious person might easily have calculated) has not been what they expected, and what they were so forward in tell, ing the public it would assuredly be. The Times paper, which takes the lead when any dirty work is to be performed, has opened its budget of abuse with the follow ing article: "The Dutch proceed very leisurely in their efforts to distinguish themselves among the allied nations. Gor- | cum was taken possession of on the 20th instant; but Naarden, even yet, shows no indication of an intention to surrender. It is difficult to say whether this supineness reflects more discredit ou the people or on the government; but we cannot help thinking, that one or the other must be much to blame to suffer the existence of any foreign garrison in the heart of their country so long after all external danger has been removed from the frontiers. Do they still allow the traitor Verhuel to insult them with impunity? Do they not look on the fortresses Occupied by a foreign force, as the very badges of their recent slavery, most into lerable to the eyes of freemen?—The other allied powers have a right to expect that Holland shall not set an example of apathy in the sacred cause. Unless they see in her a spirit to maintain her independence, they will hardly venture to guarantee, much less to secure it by stronger barriers, or new accessions of territory; and if the House of Orange does not act up to its hereditary greatness, it will be ill suited to an union with that of Brunswick.". -So, if the Dutch people, according to this writer, do not make common cause with the Allies against France, they are to be punished with the loss of independence, and of new accessions of territory; and if the Prince of Orange does not do what his subjects will not let him do; if he does not accomplish an impossibility, he is to be punished also, by denying to his son his affianced bride, the Princess Charlotte of Wales, who, we have long known, was destined to be the wife of the hereditary Prince of Orange. I dare say the Dutch people feel themselves very little interested in the business. To them it must appear a matter of indifference whether the man who is to be their ruler marries a greasy Hottentot or a refined European. Their views chiefly centre in commerce, and from the experience which they have acquired during the last 20 years, I am inclined to think, if the question were asked them, that they would prefer an alliance with Buonaparté's family to that of every other, because they would find it more conducive to their interest. But to punish the house of Orange for the fault of another; for misplaced confidence in the patriotism of a nation, after being assured by Lord Castlereagh that that nation had spontaneously and unanimously declared in their favour, would be a species of cruelty and injustice unexampled in history. The most absurd and curious part of the Times' statement is, that which respects the Allies. It appears, that it was at one time in contemplation to enlarge the ancient boundaries of Holland by "new accessions of territory," and this idea is fully warranted by the new title which William the First assumed when he landed in Holland. But it is not so clear that the allied powers were parties to this arrangement, or that it had even been communicated to them prior to that Prince's declaration. It seems to have originated entirely with this country; and as a proof that neither the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, nor Prussia were consulted in the business, we find them, at the breaking out of the counter-revolution, offering to Napoleon to recognise the title of his brother Louis to the crown of Holland. It was our interest undoubtedly, in the event of a family compact, that that kingdom should be enlarged. Though this might not give us direct possession, it would extend our influence on the Continent; and, what is of far greater consequence, enable us to cripple the maritime power of Buonaparte. Here is the true secret of our anxious wishes for the restoration of the Orange family. Not the emancipation of the Dutch people from the tyrant of France, but the establishment of an order of things in Holland, which would enlarge our po litical influence, and increase our means of annoying our greatest enemy. Hence our wish to get possession of Antwerp; hence our anxiety to burn or get into our power the Scheldt Heet, and hence the virulence of the Times, the Courier, and the whole tribe of hireling writers, against Admiral Verhuel, whom they impudently denominate a traitor, because he is acting in strict conformity to his oath of allegiance, and in a way which does credit to his valour and to his integrity. Instead of landing the army under General Graham at a point where, from the well-known skill and courage of that gallant officer, something might have been effected, in conjunction with the Allies, of importance to the common cause, these troops were ordered to take the nearest route to Antwerp, in the expectation, no doubt, that that place, amidst the consternation and confusion which prevailed, would be taken by surprise, or present a feeble resistance to a besieging army. Could the Allies be ignorant of all this? Are they so stupid as not to have discovered in this proceeding the particular object we had in view? Is it to be supposed that they are not aware of the policy which influences Great Britain in her hostility against France? that it is the annihilation of her maritime power which we aim at ; | which have been used to bring Murat round and that, this once effected, they may perhaps to the cause of the Allies, I could not for a find it necessary at no very distant period, to moment have hesitated as to the fact. It arm against us in defence of their own naval no where appears that Britain is to allow rights. In these circumstances, it is ridi- the King of Naples, a subsidy in money, as culous to talk of the Allies having a right we do Bernadotte for his magnanimous conto expect any thing from the people of duct. But Murat has received, and actualHolland. It must, in the first instance, ly taken possession of territory, as a bonus be shown that the Sovereigns of Europe are for joining in the "sacred cause," equal in disposed to forward our views as to that point of real value to the whole kingdom of country; that they are willing the succes- Naples. -The Courier at first told us sion to the crown should be fixed in the that Murat was "to have an accession of Orange family; that the proposed matrimo-"territory from the Papal States.' It apnial alliance with this country should be carried into effect; and that they are inclined to submit to the vast accession of maritime" power which this would eventually give us. It is proper, I say, to clear up these necessary points, before we presume to threaten the Dutch people or the house of Orange; because we might, perhaps, find, as we have often done, when it was too late, that it is one thing to manage a government and a people when they look upon us as friends, and another when we have made them our enemies by our arrogant and unjust pretensions. Whatever the aggregate of the English nation may think, it is very clear to me, that the allied powers will not stand by and suffer Great Britain to maintain the sovereignty of the seas, while their own rights, as naval powers possessing a large extent of sea coast, are compromised; nor do i believe they will permit France, Holland, or the other maritime states, to become a prey to the inordinate ambition of any sovereign, be his power and pretensions what they may. pears, however, he has not only got a part, but the whole of these States; he has taken possession of the south of Italy as far as the right bank of the Po."Why the Allies should have given up so much; why they should have sacrificed so large a portion of this fine country, for the mere cooperation of a Power like Naples, has excited a good deal of surprise. Our newspapers, such as the Times and the Courier, have attempted to create doubts as to the arrangement, on account of the very advantageous terms obtained by Murat.-Others again, while they give implicit credit to the fact, have thought they discovered some symptoms in the transaction of a scheme, a stratagem, on the part of Napoleon, to save Naples from falling into the hands of the Allies, at a moment when, from the dangers which threatened him on all sides, he could not afford her any succours in case she should be attacked by a superior force.- -As to the apparent defection of Murat, I see no reason to doubt this because he has obtained better terms than the Times and Courier would have allowed him. But I have not discovered any thing which enables me to form a positive opinion as to the other point-namely, that the whole is the result of a deep policy on the part of Napoleon to preserve Naples. This may be the case; it is likely enough; but, as far as is yet seen, nothing positive can be advanced on the subject. Still, sufficient has transpired to satisfy me, that Murat has not been a willing instrument in the business, but has yielded only to circumstances, which he could not control. In short, that it was necessity, as in the case of the Danes, which led him to join the Allies. In proof of this, we have his own procla mation, published at Milan, on the 17th of January, which runs as follows :—" Mi MURAT, KING OF NAPLES.- -I dare say the Emperor Napoleon begins to think that the kings he was lately so active in making, have turned out rather scurvy fellows. First, Bernadotte deserts his cause, leagues with the Allies, and then invades France, regardless of what fools may say about patriotism, and rebellion against one's country. Then comes the alleged defection of Murat, a personage whom, we had every reason to believe, was the particular favourite of Buonaparte, and who always evinced a decided attachment to his cause. It was some time, I confess, before I could persuade myself that this last sovereign of Napoleon's creation had followed the example of the "great "Prince of Sweden," and, like him, taken up arms against his native country. But this reluctance on my part, I now find, was owing to inattention; for if I had considered aright the nature of those stimulants" lan, Jan. 30th. The King of Naples, on the 17th inst. issued the following proclamation:Having, for sundry "weighty causes, found ourselves OBLIGED to adopt measures for being admitted into "the Alliance of the States united against "France, we have in this instance been "successful. We have given up the three "islands situated opposite to Naples, and ❝ our whole fleet: but for this we are to "have a sufficient compensation. We are "going to take possession of the South of “Italy, as far as to the right bank of the "Po. We shall always remember our "duty; and those persons in office who "have always performed their's, and who "have made no opposition to our measures, 66 may assuredly reckon on our protection, "and on keeping their respective posts. From this document it is sufficiently clear, that Murat was obliged, from "sun"dry weighty causes" not explained, to solicit an alliance with the powers "united "against France." It requires very little penetration to discover what these causes were. He could not be ignorant of the recent disasters of France, on which alone Naples can depend for assistance in the hour of danger. Surrounded on all sides by the enemies of that sovereign to whom he owed every thing, it was, indeed, a wise and profound policy on the part of the Neapolitan king to avert the threatening storm by conciliation. Whether this was the result of Buonaparte's schemes or not, it seems to me that terms have been obtained by Naples, much more favourable than she had any reason to expect. These, indeed, have excited the indignation of the Courier, which exclaims, "A sufficient compensation with a vengeance! for as "the Po, having its source in the Alps in "Savoy, flows into the sea, north of Co"machio, Murat would, besides Naples, "have all the Papal States, Tuscany, "Modena, Parma, Bologna, &c.!!". It is no way surprising to find our hireling press venting its spleen in this way; but it is somewhat singular, if we can believe Buonaparté serious, to see him censuring the conduct of Murat, recalling, as he has done, all Frenchmen from Naples, and denouncing them defaulters, who would be "pursued by the agents of the public go"vernment," if they did not return into "the territory of the empire within the of three months." Napoleon is space either acting a double part in the business, or he is become quite unreasonable if, as Murat says, he was actually obliged to adopt measures for being admitted into the alliance. By that step he has not only preserved Naples from being invaded by the Allies, but all Italy to the south of the Po; and young Beauharnois has shewn by his late successes, that the rest of Italy 66 66 Should may safely be left to his care. But oh! fetched From glittering semblances of piety; A soul so easily as I won his. King Henry the Vth, Act the 2nd. PEACE OR WAR ?-If we are to judge from the altered tone of that vile press, which has, for twenty years, sacrificed every principle of justice, of honour, and of humanity, to its interested clamour for interminable war, the great question is now about to be settled, and Europe once more restored to a state of peace. Not many days have elapsed since we were told in the amicable termination of the negociation. Gourier, that the Allies had determined not With such shallow-minded people, Great to make peace with the Emperor of France Britain is every thing; she is the fulcrum until they were in possession of his capital. which moves and directs all the proceedings This insolent language was doubtless suited at Chatillon; she is the pivot upon which to the narrow views of those who had been the whole must turn. To say nothing of all along endeavouring to persuade the France, with a population of 30 millions country, that France was sunk in a state of of people, who are now in a condition to apathy, and unwilling to continue the con- dictate terms to their invaders, Russia, test any longer in support of its present Austria, Prussia, and the whole of the government. It was language quite con- confederates must, according to these sage sistent with the assurances they gave their politicians, submit to be controlled by the readers, that the Allies were actually in pos- whim and caprice of this country; must session of Paris, and were about to "de- prosecute the war if England resolves on throne the tyrant," and restore to France war; must make peace if it suits her pleathe "mild and virtuous sway of the house sure. Highly absurd and ridiculous as of Bourbon." In fine, it was language this must make us appear in the eyes of every way becoming men who talked and other nations, it is a sort of language not boasted thus in the absence of the intelli- only to be found in the mouths of thousands gence of Napoleon's victories, which, like who can neither read nor write, but, to a powerful talisman, has in one instant their eternal disgrace, of thousands more overthrown their vain and towering hopes, who have received a liberal education, and, and converted their imperious exultation of course, ought to know better. In fact, into doleful lamentations. Those, in par- the same false ideas with regard to nationaĺ ticular, who were the most active in sound-importance and national superiority, pering the everlasting war-whoop, and who vades all ranks, and disgustingly obtrudes piously told us that "to make peace with itself upon our notice in every news-paper Buonaparte would be to make war against and political pamphlet which issues from virtue and against God," are now the most the press. The period is fast approaching forward in proclaiming their expectations when the eyes of mankind will be open to of an immediate peace. It has been this this horrible delusion, and when they will expectation, they say, which has led to be made sensible of the folly of treating another prorogation of parliament to the every other nation with contempt that does 21st instant, before which day, they con- not bow to the mandates of an unjust and fidently assure us, the preliminaries will imperious domination. But let peace come have been signed; not merely by the minis- when it may, it will be found, to our sad ters of Russia, Prussia, and the other con- experience, that it would have been more tinental powers, but also by Lord Castle- to the advantage of Great Britain if, instead reagh in behalf of this country. This is of assuming a dictatorial tone, and being what the newspapers, who pretend to be in the prime mover in the greater part, if not the secret, and who, only the other day, in all the coalitions that have been formed told us a very different story, would now against France, she had confined her views have us to believe is the state of the nego- to the improvement of her manufactures, to ciation for peace. It is possible that what her agricultural pursuits, and to the enthey say may at last be true; these lying couragement of the other useful arts. Then, oracles may for once have spoken the truth, indeed, she might have been great; then and many of their former dupes, notwith- she might have had reason to be proud of standing the repeated proofs they have had her superiority. But she preferred a state of their total disregard of all honest prin- of ruinous warfare, which has had the ciple, may credit every iota of it. For my effect of giving to the people against whom part, however, I confess that peace, a ge- she fought, the pre-eminence she might neral peace such as these newspapers have have enjoyed ; and caused herself to tremble described, is an event which does not appear at the prospect of peace, which she dreads to me so very near. The recent dis because it must be fatal to millions, and asters of the Allies, may have disposed the place the country in a situation in which minds of those who manage our affairs at it will poignantly feel all the pernicious home, to pursue more peaceable measures effects consequent on the destructive system with the French Emperor than we were which has so long desolated Europe. No lately taught to expect; and this may have one can suppose me an enemy to peace, superinduced a persuasion in some minds, without supposing me destitute of the comthat nothing now stands in the way of an mon feelings of humanity. But I cannot |