to the toast of the King, and Yankee Doodle. Congratulations on all sides and a general atmosphere of serenity; it was a scene to be remembered. God grant there may be always peace between the two nations."

THE HARTFORD CONVENTION

While the peace negotiations were nearing their close New England discontent came to its climax. Again as in the revolutionary days the town meetings became centers for the discussion of grievances, and the state legislatures, like those of Virginia and Kentucky in 1798, passed resolutions denouncing the acts of the federal government. The Federalists now talked of the Constitution as a compact and spoke of the states as sovereign. In 1814 the Massachusetts General Court used the very words in which the President had once maintained the right of a state to interpose its authority in cases of violation of the "federal compact"; and a few months later Connecticut passed an act intended to thwart the execution of a law of Congress for the enlistment of minors.

In consequence of the refusal by the New England states of the call for militia, the federal government had stationed no troops in that quarter, and when the British invaded the coast of Maine in 1814, New England was left to defend herself. Massachusetts thereupon asked the neighboring states to join with her in sending delegates to a convention to be held at Hartford, in December.

The Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island legislatures, and counties in New Hampshire and Vermont, appointed delegates to the convention. Although the purpose stated in the call was to devise means of security and defense "not repugnant to their obligations as members of the Union," and to "procure such amendments to . . . the national constitution as may secure them equal advantages," it was generally believed that the leaders contemplated secession unless their demands were met.

Color was given to this conjecture by the utterances of some of the more radical Federalists. For example, one of them, writing in the Boston Advertiser, urged the convention to recommend that the states declare the Constitution "suspended," and the

Centinel, another Boston newspaper, announced Connecticut's decision to send delegates to Hartford as the rearing of the "second pillar of a new federal edifice." "Refederator," who was quoted with approval by many papers, wanted, not the secession of New England, but the expulsion of the western states from the Union. "Let the Western States go off," he argued; "then let us, who belonged to the old family [of original states], try, by the agency of such men as are to meet at Hartford ... [to] revise our family compact." Gouverneur Morris, writing of the doings of Congress while the convention was sitting, declared that they were "indifferent to one whose eyes are fixed on a Star in the East, which he believes to be the day spring of freedom and glory. The traitors and madmen assembled at Hartford will, I believe, if not too tame and mild, be hailed hereafter as the patriots and sages of their day and generation."

Additional suspicion was aroused by the secrecy of the sessions, and to this day little is known of what was said.1 When after nearly three weeks the convention adjourned to meet again at the call of the presiding officer, the parallel with the course of the First Continental Congress was too striking to be overlooked, for the Hartford Convention had formulated certain demands to be presented at Washington, and the presumption was strong that some revolutionary action would follow rejection.

The demands took the form of amendments to the Constitution: apportionment of taxes and representatives in the House on the basis of free population; a two-thirds vote of both houses for the admission of new states, the interdiction of foreign commerce, or the declaring of war; the limitation of embargoes to sixty days; the disqualification of naturalized citizens for federal office; and the limitation of the President's tenure to a single term, no two Presidents to come in succession from the same state. The first of these proposals sprang from an ancient dissatisfaction with the three-fifths compromise; the rest from sectional jealousy due to the Virginia dynasty and the growth of the West.

Sober

1 The Journal of the Convention was published in 1823 to show the mild temper of the meeting. Members declared that it recorded every motion and vote, and that no proposal was made to divide the Union, organize a separate government, or form any foreign alliance. The man chosen as president of the gathering was George Cabot, one of the original founders of the Federalist party, but a moderate man, now sixty-two years of In 1813 he had said to Pickering, "Why can't you and I let the world ruin itself in its own way?

age.

afterthought questions whether any of the changes except perhaps the first would have been wise.

Massachusetts and Connecticut appointed commissioners to present the proposals to the government at Washington. Yet in spite of appearances, most of the Federalists probably wished for nothing more than a redress of their supposed grievances. It is more than doubtful whether the majority of the people of any New England state would have supported secession. As an indication of their loyalty it is worthy of note that as many volunteers entered the army from Massachusetts as from Virginia.

In the columns of the National Advocate, a New York paper, appeared in January, 1815, the following mock advertisement: "Missing: three well-looking, responsible men, who appeared to be travelling towards Washington, disappeared suddenly from Gadsby's Hotel, in Baltimore, on Monday morning last, and have not since been heard of." The jibe was aimed at the New England commissioners. On their way to Washington they had learned of Jackson's victory at New Orleans, and news of the peace had arrived before them. Realizing that amid the universal rejoicing their errand would appear ridiculous, they had quietly turned their faces homeward.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CHAPTER XVI

Mahan, Sea Power, is excellent on the whole war period and the peace negotiations. This writer, himself an officer in the United States navy, was the first historian to point out the importance of sea power in the history of international relations. Adams' treatment is able and full on all the topics of the chapter. Babcock, Rise of American Nationality, gives a good brief account of the war but pays slight attention to diplomacy. Paine, The Fight for a Free Sea, is another brief account.

Rise of the War Party.

A good life of one of the leaders of the "War Hawks" is Schurz, Henry Clay.

War Plans and Resources. Bogart, Economic History of the United States; Dewey, Financial History.

The Campaigns.

more easily read.

McMaster and Schouler are briefer than Adams and

Naval Warfare. Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812, is an older work than Mahan's, but has fuller details on naval operations.

The Hartford Convention. Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot, is best on the convention. The recent work of Powell, Nullification and Secession in the United States, contains a brief account (chap. 5).

CHAPTER XVII

THE NEW NATIONALISM

The War of 1812 was one of the most futile of conflicts, judged by the contrast between its objects and the terms of peace. The easy confidence with which the leaders had predicted a peace dictated at the Canadian capital contrasted sadly with the meager successes along the border. Neither force nor diplomacy wrested from England the recognition of neutral rights. Yet the war profoundly affected the American people. In spite of the inconclusive duel they had a sense of vindicated honor. The victories at the Thames and Lundy's Lane, the repulse of the enemy at Plattsburg and New Orleans, and most of all, the gallant performance of the seamen, appealed powerfully to the national pride; while the darker experiences the lack of preparedness, the failure of the militia, the recalcitrancy of New England, the financial mistakes were warnings to plan more wisely for the future.

The Republicans had been undergoing a process of nationalization since 1801. Jefferson had come to the Presidency as the apostle of localism and the foe of centralized authority, but from the moment of his inauguration the logic of circumstances had proved stronger than his theories. After the purchase of Louisiana Gouverneur Morris wrote: "By downright demonstration it is shown that the republican party were not dissatisfied because the power of the Government was too great, but because it was not in their hands." In proportion, moreover, as the Republicans had gravitated towards the standard of strong government set up by the Federalists, the latter, as the party of the "Outs," had swung around to states' rights and localism. Thus there had been an actual exchange of positions. But the opposition of New England to the war, culminating in the

Hartford Convention, brought home to the whole country the dangers in the weakening of political authority towards which states' rights sentiments tended, and peace was accompanied by an access of patriotism and nationalistic feeling. Gallatin wrote in 1816: "Under our former system we were becoming too selfish . . . too much confined in our feelings to local and state objects. The war has renewed the national feelings and character which the Revolution had given."

AFTER-WAR READJUSTMENT

The spirit of nationalism had never before attained the vigor shown at the close of the second war with England. It pervaded all of the measures of reconstruction which followed the peace. One of its first manifestations is found in the plans for placing the army and navy on a peace basis. Madison's message of 1815 recommended adequate provision for the national defense. Clay, now returned from Ghent and reëlected Speaker, pointed to the unsatisfactory state of the relations with several European powers, and urged the retention of the direct tax as a measure of financial preparedness. New wars were not unlikely to come, and the former trust in pacific methods of preserving national rights was gone. There was no more talk of reducing the navy to the vanishing point, as in Jefferson's early plans. On the contrary, it was maintained at its full, though meager, war strength, with provision for some additions. The peace footing of the army was put at ten thousand men. Although this was but half the number recommended by Monroe, as Secretary of War, the action of Congress indicated that faith had been lost in the militia as a trustworthy first arm of defense.

Having provided for the military and naval establishments, the Republicans, still following Madison's lead, set about restoring the currency. The evils of unregulated issues of paper, which Hamilton avoided by the creation of the United States Bank, had fallen upon the country when the Republicans refused to grant a renewal of the charter in 1811. Banks chartered by the states had multiplied, and while nominally specie paying, their issues were so little regulated that a total of possibly $170,000,000 was put into circulation upon the basis of specie