advances were repulsed by the deadly fire, with a loss of more than two thousand killed and wounded. Pakenham fell among his men, the attack was abandoned, and the expedition reëmbarked and sailed away. According to Jackson's report his own loss was sixty-three men. The Battle of New Orleans was the chief victory of the war and made Jackson a national hero. Two weeks earlier peace terms had been agreed upon at Ghent. Under other circumstances a British victory at the mouth of the Mississippi might have meant the loss of Louisiana and revived the dangers associated with the occupation of that province by a European power. Such a result was anticipated and even desired by some of the Federalists who had opposed the acquisition of the territory in the first place. The success of the West in defending the approaches to the Borgne BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS. Mississippi Valley gave it greater self-confidence and soon led it to demand more recognition from the nation. The British plan of invasion succeeded only at one minor point. Repulsed at Plattsburg, Baltimore, and New Orleans, they succeeded in taking a few places on the coast of Maine which they held until the peace. From the military standpoint the war must be pronounced a draw. Each belligerent successfully defended its own territory but failed in the attempt to carry the war to the enemy. NAVAL WARFARE The War Hawks had desired to increase the navy but had been defeated by votes of old-line Republicans with the aid of some of the Federalists. The vessels available for service at the beginning of the war were sent out to afford what protection they could to homeward-bound merchantmen and to attack British commerce. During the first season several duels occurred between them and British ships in which the Americans were victorious, to the great elation of the people. The "Constitution" was the victor in two of these combats. In August she disabled the thirty-eight gun "Guerrière" in half an hour, and in December defeated the "Java" of her own size. In other fights the "Wasp" beat the "Frolic," the "United States" took the "Macedonian," and the "Hornet" sank the "Peacock." On the other hand the unfortunate "Chesapeake" was beaten by the "Shannon." It had been the plan of the United States to build its frigates slightly stronger than the standard British vessels of the same class, and in nearly every battle the American boat was of greater tonnage or threw a heavier broadside than its antagonist. Yet the English were so astonished at the series of victories that they imagined the frigates to be disguised ships of the line (see note, page 313). They had felt the same contempt for American ships as for militia. Said Lord Brougham in Parliament, "The assembled navies of America could not lay siege to an English sloop of war!" The truth is the American ships were more skillfully built than the enemy's; they were certainly well handled, and the gunnery was good. The moral effect of their success was all the greater because of the immense prestige of the British navy. Apart from their effect on the morale of the people the sea fights were without influence upon the course of the war. On the contrary the battles on the lakes were well-nigh decisive. The early victories induced Congress to make some additions to the navy. Nevertheless one by one the ships were captured or bottled up in port. It was the privateers after all that made the great showing in the war on commerce. Such enterprises, now discountenanced by international law, attracted many shipowners and interested large numbers of citizens through popular subscriptions for the ventures. About five hundred vessels went out during the war with commissions to prey on the enemy's commerce. These boats gave additional evidence of the superiority of American shipwrights and seamen. By their swiftness they were able to avoid danger, and risked combat only where success was certain. If they fought, they were sure to win; if they fled, they were sure to escape. Although the total captures of all kinds about equaled those made by the foe, English commerce suffered far less than American. Before the end of the war the blockade of the Atlantic coast practically stopped the entry and exit of boats. THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS In the hope of freeing his ally from the embarrassment of war with the United States at the moment when Napoleon was beginning his invasion of Russia, the Czar tendered his good offices as mediator in September, 1812. Madison accepted, and appointed Gallatin and James A. Bayard, Federalist Senator from Delaware, to act with John Quincy Adams, then minister in Russia, as peace commissioners. England rejected mediation but indicated a willingness to treat directly with the representatives of the States. Clay and Russell, formerly chargé in England, were thereupon added to the commission, and negotiations were begun at Ghent in the summer of 1814. Britain's chief statesmen were absorbed in the discussions of the Congress at Vienna, and the conferences at Ghent were intrusted to men of little prominence, who, despite constant directions from their superiors, succeeded in making several blunders of which the American negotiators reaped the full advantage. The instructions of the American commissioners, formulated early in the war when hopes were high, were modified as the tide of hope receded. The demand that impressments be abandoned by express stipulation in the treaty was given up, and a similar recession was made in regard to the British principles of blockade. On these points the British could not be shaken, and in the end the United States had to be content with a treaty which was silent on the matters which had been the main causes of friction before the war. The Americans on their part resisted with equal success the demands of the British. These, framed soon after Napoleon's abdication, were in their turn excessive. The English commissioners asked: (1) for a mutual guarantee of the integrity of the territory of their Indian allies as a sine qua non of peace; (2) for military control of the Great Lakes, with a cession of territory in northern Maine to afford a direct route between Quebec and Halifax; and (3) for a concession in return for the renewal of the fishing rights of the United States within Canadian waters. The severity of these terms was such as to cause our commissioners to reply in effect that they could not be entertained unless America were completely conquered. Back of the British demands was the expectation of success in the operations of Prevost and Ross. The news of the reverses at Plattsburg and Baltimore, and the threat of renewed hostilities in Europe because of disagreements at Vienna, made the British falter. Abandoning the sine qua non as to the Indian territory, they proffered a settlement on the basis of status uti possidetis - that the treaty should leave each belligerent in possession of the territory held when peace was made. The insistence of the Americans upon the status quo ante bellum - which would require the mutual restoration of conquered territory was regarded by the statesmen of Downing Street as the reply of stiff-necked Yankees who could not understand the logic of the war. But the American position was sound, according to the greatest military mind in the British Empire, the Duke of Wellington. In response to the appeal of the ministry that he take command of the Canadian army, the Duke declared that he could not conquer America without first regaining control of the Lakes. Could he do this? He could not promise himself success. Evidently, in his judgment, the victories of Perry and Macdonough were decisive and the prolongation of the war unjustifiable. Nor did he regard the terms proposed by the ministry as warranted. "I confess," he said, "that I think you have no right from the state of the war to demand any concession from America. . You have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory. and have not even cleared your own. . . . Why stipulate for the uti possidetis? You can get no territory." While these consultations, unknown to the American commis -- sioners, were disposing the ministry to acceptance of the status quo ante, Gallatin and his colleagues were drafting a treaty on this basis for submission to the British commissioners. Dissensions now appeared not for the first time within their own commission. Clay, champion of the new West which had arisen since 1783, was unwilling to purchase the renewed recognition of fishing rights by continuing the British liberty to navigate the Mississippi; Adams, true heir of his father as guardian of the fishermen, was ready to contest the point to the uttermost. With the patience which made him in a double sense a great peacemaker, Gallatin persuaded the disputants to agree to offer a renewal of both rights; but the British counterproposal that these questions be left to be dealt with at a later time was finally accepted.1 Already the Americans had consented to make peace with the Indians still at war, on the basis of restoring all their prewar rights, while rejecting everything in the nature of an international guarantee under which Great Britain might claim a right to intervene in their behalf in future. Other portions of the treaty related to matters not connected with the war. They provided for joint commissions to determine the boundary at several disputed points. On December 24, 1814, Clay who had pictured the victorious hosts of his countrymen dictating terms of peace at Quebec, signed a treaty which added not a foot of territory to the United States; Adams, who had called impressment "man stealing," accepted a peace which was silent on the subject which had caused the war. Nevertheless benignant peace smiled again upon foes of kindred blood. In token of restored harmony the British delegates entertained the Americans at dinner on Christmas Day. "The roast beef and plum pudding was from England, and everybody drank everybody else's health." So wrote young James Gallatin, who had been his father's clerk during the long negotiations. "The band played God Save the King, 1 The fisheries question was covered by a convention or agreement made in 1818, by which the rights and privileges of the United States were curtailed somewhat as compared with the provisions of the treaty of 1783. Disputes grew out of the new agreement and the fisheries continued until the twentieth century to be a vexatious problem in Anglo-American relations. The British right to navigate the Mississippi was not renewed, since its sources were found not to be within British territory. |