alists had never become reconciled to Republican rule. Their rancor had smoldered but not died after the collapse of the secession plot of 1804. The policy of commercial restriction had revived the waning fortunes of the party, which showed large gains in the election of 1808. The war policy now showed the influence of the West, and Federalist dislike of the West had grown steadily since the purchase of Louisiana. In 1811, when the southern portion of the territory obtained from France asked admission to the Union as the State of Louisiana, Josiah Quincy, of Massachusetts, said in the House: "I am compelled to declare it as my deliberate opinion that, if this bill passes, the bonds of this union are, virtually, dissolved; that the states which compose it are free from their moral obligations, and that as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some to prepare, definitely, for a separation; amicably, if they can, violently, if they must." To the conflict into which the West had plunged the country the Federalists were bitterly antagonistic. Upon the passage of the declaration the thirty-four Federalists in Congress met in caucus and issued an address denouncing the war as "a party and not a national war," entered into by a divided people. It was suicidal, they protested, to subject the bonds of union to the strain of war under such circumstances, and they disclaimed all responsibility for the disasters which they predicted. Taking the address as their keynote, the New England wing of the party continued their factious conduct throughout the period of hostilities. They hung flags at half-mast and tolled church bells upon hearing of the declaration. They made niggardly subscriptions to the government loans, contributing less than one dollar of every thirteen that went into the treasury. They obstructed the efforts of the administration to utilize the militia as a national army, attempted to nullify federal legislation, and finally called a convention supposedly to consider secession. The sectional character of the war, and especially the responsibility of the West for it, are well shown by the presidential election of 1812. Madison's espousal of the belligerent program won him the support of the War Hawks in the congressional caucus in June. Elbridge Gerry received the indorsement for the Vice-Presidency. George Clinton was now dead, but the jealousy of New York towards the Virginia "dynasty" found expression in the candidacy of his nephew, DeWitt Clinton. Nominated by the Republicans of the state legislature, he was later indorsed by a convention of Federalists, as a peace candidate. The returns showed that the original states were almost equally divided; they cast 90 electoral votes for Madison and war and 89 for Clinton and peace, while the five new states cast their 38 votes for Madison, tipping the scales and showing that they held the balance of political power. Madison, "master of ideas but not of men," visited all of the offices of the War and Navy Departments in person on the day after war was declared. The effect is indicated by the words of the observer who described him as "stimulating everything in a manner worthy of a little commander-in-chief, with his little round hat and huge cockade." Incitement of clerks to perform routine tasks was not the duty of the hour for the head of the nation. The competence of department heads, however, was a matter of infinite importance. William Eustis and Paul Hamilton, the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments, were notoriously unfit for their great responsibilities, but in spite of warnings the President lacked the courage to place strong men in their places at the outset. In 1811, after performing the duties of Secretary of State himself for some time, he had dismissed Smith (see footnote, page 303) and appointed Monroe, his late rival, to the post. By this action Monroe became "heir apparent" to the Presidency. He made a fair cabinet officer. Quincy derided the administration as a "despotism," "composed to all efficient purposes of two Virginians and a foreigner.' Gallatin, by far the ablest member of the official family, was so harassed by the continual hounding of small-minded politicians that after a year of war he welcomed the opportunity to exchange his cabinet post for a place on the peace commission. The failures of Eustis and Hamilton at length necessitated the appointment of other officials, but this was not done until great harm had been sustained. The weakness of the executive departments was equaled by the incapacity of Congress to rise to the situation. The developed resources of the country were chiefly agricultural. The general prosperity depended in large measure upon the exportation of cotton, tobacco, corn, wheat, and flour, in exchange for imported manufactures. In spite of non-intercourse with England, foreign commerce in 1811 amounted to more than $100,000,000. Upon duties on imports the government also depended almost wholly for its revenues. Gallatin reported that the duties had fallen from $12,000,000 before commercial restriction began, to $6,000,000 in 1811, and a deficit was in sight for 1812, even with peace. War was certain to reduce commerce still further, curtailing revenues at the same time that expenditures rose. Under such circumstances Congress performed little better than the Continental Congress of the Revolution. Although now possessed of the power of taxation, it was afraid to use it vigorously upon a people unaccustomed to heavy tax burdens. Gallatin, who for a decade had administered the treasury with scrupulous economy, seeking to wipe out the national debt and spare the people all needless taxation, saw all his work menaced by war; but when, facing the inevitable, he advocated internal taxes, the House rebuked the proposal of "unrepublican measures." The tariff was indeed doubled, but the true alternative of direct taxes was loans which would saddle posterity with a burden not of its own choosing. Here too Congress was niggardly; and with most of the loanable capital of the nation in the hands of New England Federalists, Gallatin had great difficulty in securing subscriptions even for the meager sums which Congress authorized him to borrow. The securities sold at much less than par, and bore rates of interest as high as 7 per cent. Gallatin also recommended the renewal of the charter of the United States Bank, which expired in 1811. A strong institution of this type could have been used to excellent advantage by the Treasury. But the Republican Congress had not yet escaped from the Jeffersonian tradition of 1791 and refused the recharter. The declaration of war was made with the army preparations still far from complete. There were at the time less than seven thousand regulars, distributed in widely scattered posts along the coast, near the Canadian border, and in the remote interior. Eustis guessed the number of new enlistments up to June 8 at about five thousand. The Republicans relied upon the state 1 Necessity nevertheless compelled resort to a direct tax and an excise a year later. militia for the early campaigns, while regulars and volunteers were being recruited in adequate numbers. The governors of the New England states refused, however, to honor the call for quotas of militia, and the United States found but a fraction of the desired number at its command.1 Even these refused to fight on foreign soil, and proved useless for the purpose of invading Canada. The response to the call for volunteers was meager also, and for all the government's efforts, the effective forces did not at any time exceed thirty-five thousand men. Most of the fighting had to be done along the northern frontier in a wilderness still untouched by the art of the roadmaker. The movement of large bodies of troops proved to be extremely difficult, and the proper coördination of attacks at widely separated points was almost impossible. The commissariat also was in continual confusion. Worse than any of the physical handicaps was the inefficiency of the officers from the Secretary of War down. At the beginning of the war two major-generals and six brigadier-generals were selected. Their ages ranged from fifty-five to sixty-seven. None had served in the regular army, and only Thomas Pinckney, junior major-general, and William Hull, one of the brigadiers, had records as officers in the Revolution. "The Creator," said Jefferson, "has not thought proper to mark those on the forehead who are of the stuff to make good generals." A period of actual warfare was required to bring to the front men of real military capacity. Meantime the campaigns suffered from the incompetence of the officers chosen, as it were, by a blindfolded administration. THE CAMPAIGNS Hostilities began with a triple movement for the invasion of Canada. Dearborn, the senior major-general, was to move from Lake Champlain and threaten Montreal; Stephen Van Rensselaer, a New York militia officer, and Alexander Smyth, of the regular army, were to strike the Canadian center in the neighbor 1 A decision of the Supreme Court in 1827 (Martin vs. Mott) upheld the President's right to judge of the necessity of calling out the militia. But the use of the militia as a national force, especially for warfare on foreign soil, has been beset with difficulties down to the present. hood of Niagara; while Hull, from Fort Detroit, was to drive the British from upper Canada. The three strokes if properly timed and executed would have brought the forces into united action against Montreal. But Dearborn was conferring with Admiral Warren when his column should have been in motion towards the St. Lawrence, and when at last his army of militia did move, it halted at the Canadian line. In the center there was further trouble with the militia. Moreover, the two generals there would not coöperate, and their separate attacks were easily repulsed. Hull's success depended upon the outcome of the movements farther east, where due activity would have kept the enemy occupied and prevented the sending of additional troops to upper Canada. The sluggishness of the other commanders allowed Hull to move first. Then, alarmed at the failure of the eastern columns, and at the danger to his line of communications because the British controlled Lake Erie, he fell back to Detroit. Isaac Brock, his opponent, receiving reënforcements, took the offensive |