heirs, it has, in that respect, an analogy to an estate of inheritance; but as in this case the right does not inhere in, or issue out of, anything corporeal, any natural subject of property, the analogy is imperfect. It is true, these offices and employments produce something that is property, the wages paid or recieved. Such is the case with all offices and employments, whether of a public or a private nature.

Under the inducements of these analogies, the laws have generally classed these rights with the rights of property, and have provided remedies, accordingly, in cases of ouster and violation. These analogies have been extended much farther. Monarchs and independent princes are held to have a sacred right of property in their authority, and that inheritable; not only so, but to inherit the states and kingdoms over which they preside, and the allegiance and services of their subjects, who are left to inherit the duty of submission. The same observations will apply to the members of a sovereign. aristocracy.

With respect to a hereditary nobility under a monarchy, forming a branch of the government, they inherit certain subordinate powers, which they exercise conjointly with the monarch, or in a mixed government, with the prince, and the popular branch, and their rights are supported by the same principles, and the same analogies. There are also, in most, if not all monarchies, enjoyed hereditary titles, of mere rank, connected with no authority, no power, no office, either of trust or profit. The analogy here consists merely in the hereditary quality of a factitious rank, which has been aptly compared to a mouthful of moon-shine ;-yet they are considered as having a property in this rank.

All these rights of property in offices, in power, ranks, titles, and dignities, will with one consent, be pronounced, by all those who have been born and educated under a free and well regulated popular government, to be flagrant abuses; while the subjects of a mild, or a mixed monarchy, although they may acknowledge them to be factitious, yet from the force of education and habit, will consider them inventions of wisdom super-human, for the peace and happiness of mankind. Still they will admit the abuse under a despotic government;

almost

but will attribute the abuse, not so much to the nature of the institution as to the character of the reigning prince, or the absence of certain preventives of the evil, certain checks and balances, consisting of the like institutions.

We cannot here omit an enquiry concerning the other species of property mentioned at the beginning of this chapter; which claims a right of prescription beyond all authentic history, beyond the most remote tradition; the right of property, which one human being claims in another being of the same species; the right which the master claims in his slave. This is also deemed an hereditary right, but of a corporeal nature. The master has an inheritance in his slave extending through him to his children, and children's children, to the remotest generation.

The practice of slavery is indeed, very ancient, has prevailed generally if not universally, and has been confirmed by the civil institutions of most countries. The antiquity and general reception of the custom of holding slaves, has been, and still is urged as a proof, that it is just, and founded in the laws of nature. It is acknowledged, that the antiquity and generality of a custom is a strong, but by no means, a conclusive proof that it is so founded. It has been observed that circumstances very general may happen, that will produce a general perversion of sentiments, and the consequence will be, the adoption of customs equally perverse. Such circumstances were found in the early ages of society, which introduced the ferocious custom that subjected to the mercy-mercy did I say?-to the brutal fury of the conqueror, the lives of the vanquished, from the soldier taken in arms, to the child in the womb of the mother, of which the practice of slavery is the legitimate offspring. But a more particular discussion of this subject will be deferred, until we come to treat of the laws of nature and the laws of nations.

Notwithstanding the antiquity of the practice of slavery, and confirmed as it is, and has been, by the civil institutions of so many countries, we cannot hesitate to say, it is supported by no right, no principle, acknowledged by the laws of nature; that it is inconsistent with all natural right;-the right of personal liberty, of personal security, and of private property,-all are violated

or rather annihilated in the person of the slave.-Not only does it violate rights and principles allowed natural, but it fails in that safe and sure test of every law of nature, and of all civil institutions as founded in those laws, its tendency to promote the general interest and happiness of the society where it prevails, as well as of mankind in general.-Its general tendency is, in every just view, directly the reverse, so generally is this now understood, that to attempt the proof, would be as tedious as it is unnecessary.

An

Is it necessary then, to support the institution of slavery in any country, to discard the general tendency of a law or action as a moral test? or shall we say that those rights, which have so generally been considered as appertaining to every individual, whether in society or out of it, and which are still claimed even by slave holders themselves, in their own case as founded in the irreversible laws of nature are but a vain illusion, and adopt the opinion of a modern writer," That all right is founded upon power, and all obligation upon self interest ?”* opinion that explodes the benevolent and divine precept,"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy self," which has so generally, and it seems so weakly been considered as inculcating one of the first principles of morality and religion, and substitutes in its place, as a universal precept—“ Thou shalt love thyself alone"-a precept, which the most ferocious tribe of savages would, in their intercourse among themselves, reject with contempt.

What then shall we say of this species of private property? is it wholly condemned by morality? is there no moral obligation to respect it ?-certainly there is. In a country where slavery is introduced and permitted by law or general custom, the right of the master to his slave is as complete, while remaining within the limits of the law or custom, as to any, the most common subject of property, considering the right, as before explained, a title, an allowed claim, the jus suum of the civil law. The private right in a moral view, is distinct from the moral of the law or custom, and its tendency to

Cooper's Justinian.-Note 412. vide. Note at the end of this chapter.

promote the interest of the society, where it exists, or the general interest and happiness of the human race. From these sources, arguments may be drawn to persuade the people to reform their general sentiments and to change their laws; but until that be done the private right of property, ought, as far as the law or custom extends, to be considered inviolable. Still there is an important distinction between this and other kinds of property. The right of the master in the slave is truly a mere civil and not a natural right.-The right of the owner in the common, or as we may say, natural subjects of property is a natural right and is every where respected and supported by the laws of nature as well as of society. The right of the master ceases the moment he passes with his slave into a country or state, where there is no law or custom to support it; or unless, as in the United States, there is some provision to protect his property in the slave accompanying him. So a slave escaping into such a state becomes free, unless a provision have been made, enabling the master to reclaim him. But if a slave owner remove with his slave into a state to reside where there is no law to protect his right, it ceases at once, and the slave becomes ipso facto free; because the laws of that state protect all men alike in their natural rights.

NOTE.

The passage, a part of which is quoted in the text, ought to be recited at large, that it may meet that execration which it deserves from every lover of mankind, every friend of morality and religion.

"As to the right of slavery, I look upon it as a point completely settled, that all right is founded upon power, and all obligation upon self interest. What right have we to sieze and castrate a horse or an ox, and condemn the one to perpetual slavery and the other to slaughter? The question about the abstract right of making slaves is a futile discussion.-If one being has the power of subjecting another to his dominion, service and control, and can do it with perfect impunity, why should he not? Let the answer to this question be given, and pursued to its ultimate term, and the dispute is at an end. In fact, throughout all nature, this is the law. I have greatly changed my opinion on this, and many other subjects in consequence of thirty years' observation, and reflection. I do not treat it now as an abstract but a practical question."

And can this be so? Is all right resolved into power, and all moral obligation, into self interest? Let us examine this question.-If one being has the power of subjecting another to his dominion, service, and control, and can do it with perfect impunity, why should he not? And he might have added, on his own principle,-If self interest requires, he is under an obligation to do it. We will answer the question, why should he not? and pursue it to its ultimate term.

But first let it be premised, that the being having the power, and the being to be subjected, are both human beings.-For I have too much respect for the human race, of which I happen to be one, to place them in the same grade of being and of rights, with oxen and horses. I answer then,-Power merely, gives no right, because every man, as a moral being, is by the laws of social nature, under a moral obligation, not only to abstain from such acts as are immediately or in their general tendency, injurious to others, but to do that which tends to promote the interest and happiness of his fellow men, including himself, according to the relations in which he stands connected with them.

But says the author--All obligation is founded upon self interest—a man is under no obligation to abstain from any act by which his own present interest will, in his view, be promoted, however injurious to others, provided only that he can do it with perfect impunity. If he cannot do it with perfect impunity, it may injure instead of promoting his interest, and so be a violation of his obligation.

To this I answer-If by self interest the author means the isolated interest of the individual, it is not true, when asserted as the foundation of moral obligation. To say that a man is, in any strict sense, under an obligation to himself, is absurd. If one person owes a duty or is under an obligation, on the one hand it must, necessarily, be to some person, on the other, who has a corresponding right—a right to demand the performance of that duty. I am here speaking of duties of perfect obligation, as sufficient for the present purpose.-If the duty and the right, as sometimes happens, unite in the same person the duty merges and becomes extinct. In a word, to say that all obligation is founded upon self interest, in this isolated sense, is to assert, that one man can be under no obligation to another.—But if by self interest the author means an expanded interest, which is co-extensive and identifies itself with all the social relation of which the individual makes a constituent part, it does indeed put an end to the dispute but by giving a full and decided negative to his conclusion.

"The dispute about the abstract right of making slaves is a futile discussion." But the dispute is not about a mere abstract, but, a practical right—the right of one man to reduce another to slavery. Let it always remain an abstract right never to be carried into practice, and the discussion will be as futile as the right.

"In fact," concludes the author, "throughout the whole system of nature this is the law."—that is,-" that all right is founded upon power"—that the stronger shall subject the weaker,-and is man then like the brutes, subject only to the law of instinct? are the laws of morality and the benevolent