41 is the power to so regulate the relative rights and duties of all within its jurisdiction so as to guard the public morals, the public safety, and the public health, as well as to promote the public convenience and the common good; House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 282, 55 L. Ed. 213. "As a police regulation, relating exclusively to the internal trade of the States, it can only have effect where the legislative authority of Congress excludes, territorially, all State legislation, as, for example, in the District of Columbia. Within State limits, it can have no constitutional operation. This has been so frequently declared by this court, results so obviously from the terms of the Constitution, and has been so fully explained and supported on former occasions, that we think it unnecessary to enter again upon the discussion." United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. 41; 19 L. Ed. 593. If a source of food supply is not within the exclusive control of a state under its power of police, is there anything. which is within the exclusive control of the police power of a state? If Congress by means of a treaty can tell the people of a state when and under what conditions they may eat wild game which they own in their collective sovereign capacity, and in and over which, while within the borders of the state, neither Congress nor any foreign nation can have, either under national or international law (see Behring Sea Arbitration, 32 Amer. Law Reg. 901), any property rights nor any power of control, then the Xth Amendment with its powers "reserved" to the states respectively or to the people, is a delusion, and they are states in name only, and our government a very different government from that presupposed and intended by the people who ratified the Constitution. "If this extraordinary proposition can be taken as universally or as generally tru?, . . . the Constitution of the United States, with all its limitations on Federal power, and as it has been heretofore generally understood to be a special delegation of power, is a falsehood or an absurdity. It must be viewed as the creation of a power transcending that which called it into existence; a power single, universal, engrossing, 42 absolute. Everything in the nature of civil or political rights is thus engulfed in federal legislation, and in the power of negotiating treaties.” Passenger Cases, 7 Howard, p. 474; 12 L. Ed. 702. VII. Upon the authority and principles of the cases hereinbefore cited it has been held that a prior act of Congress, approved March 4, 1913-which act is similar to the one now in question, save that it was not made in aid of any treaty—was unconstitutional and void. United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154; United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288. "The act challenged is believed to be the single instance in the entire legislative or judicial history of this nation, or the composing states, in which a contrary view has been expressed. Unless a departure, as radical in theory as it is important in its effects, is to be made from fundamental principles long established by our laws, and long acquiesced in by our people, the act in question must be held incapable of support by any provision of the organic law of our country. If the act in question shall, on any ground, or for any reason, be upheld and enforced, it must surely follow that many laws of the separate states of this Union must hereafter be held inoperative, for there can be no divided authority of the nation and the several states over the single subject-matter in issue, with either safety to the nation or security to the citizen." 66 United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288, 1. c. 294295. If Congress has not the power, the duty of the court is to deolare the act void. The court is unable to find any provision in the Constitution authorizing Congress, either expressly or by necessary implication, to protect or regulate the shooting of migratory wild game when in a state, and is therefore forced to the conclusion that the act is unconstitutional." United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154, 160. 43 VIII. The fact that the present Act of Congress purports to give effect to a treaty between the United States and Great Britain cannot validate such Act of Congress when its effect is not only to accomplish that which under the Constitution Congress has no power to do, but also to do that which is forbidden to the entire Federal Government in all or any of its departments under the terms of the Constitution. Any and every treaty must be presumed to be made subject to the rightful powers of the governments concerned, and neither the treaty-making power alone, nor the treaty-making power in conjunction with any or all other departments of the Government, can bind the Government to do that which the Constitution forbids. The Federalist, pp. 144-145, 215-216; Works of Calhoun, Vol. I, 203-204, pp. 249-250, 252-253; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267; People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381, 382 et seq.; Tucker on the Constitution, Vol. II, pp. 725, 726; Cantini v. Tillman, 54 Fed. 969; Butler, Treaty Making Power, Vol. I, p. 64; Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 662663; Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, Sec. Duer, Lectures on the Constitutional Jurispru- Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law, Vol. I, 59th Congress, 41 Congressional Record, Part I, p. 299; 44 William Archer Cocke's "Constitutional History of the United States," p. 235; Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice, p. 110, note 3; Elliot's Debates, Vol. III, pp. 504, 507; Cherokee Tobacco Case, 11 Wall. 616, 20 L. Siemessen v. Bofer, 6 Cal. Rep., p. 250; The People v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 246, 247; 8 Opinions of Attorney-Generals, 411-415; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U. S. 698; Butler on Treaties, Vol. II, pp. 350, 352; Cooley, Constitutional p. 11; Limitations (7 Ed.), Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326; Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1;. "A treaty cannot be made which alters the Constitution of the country, or which infringes any express exceptions to the power of the Constitution of the United States." Hamilton's Works, Vol. IV, p. 342. "If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers entrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a government; which is only another word for political power ans supremacy. But it will not follow from this doctrine, that acts of the larger 45 society, which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such." Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, p. 145. "It is sufficient, in reply, to state, that the clause is declaratory; that it vests no new power whatever in the government, or in any of its departments. Without it, the constitution and the laws made in pursuance of it, and the treaties made under its authority, would have been the supreme law of the land, as fully and perfectly as they now are; and the judges in every State would have been bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of a state to the contrary notwithstanding. Their supremacy results from the nature of the relation between the federal government, and those of the several States, and their respective constitutions and laws. Where two or more States form a common constitution and government, the authority of these, within the limits of the delegated powers, must, of necessity, be supreme, in reference to their respective separate constitutions and governments. Without this, there would be neither a common constitution and government, nor even a confederacy. The whole would be, in fact, a mere nullity. But this supremacy is not an absolute supremacy. It is limited in extent and degree. It does not extend beyond the delegated powers;-all others being reserved to the states and the people of the States. Beyond these the Constitution is as destitute of authority, and as powerless as a blank piece of paper; and the measures of the government mere acts of assumption. And, hence, the supremacy of laws and treaties is expressly restricted to such as are made in pursuance of the Constitution, or under the authority of the United States; which, can, in no case, extend beyond the delegated powers. There is, indeed, no power of the government without restriction; not even that which is called the discretionary power of Congress. I refer to the grant which authorizes it to pass laws to carry into effect the powers expressly vested in it, or in the government of the United States, or in any of its departments, or officers. This power, |