420

MCDOWELL EXPECTED TO ADVANCE.

once. It was because the enemy expected this movement, that Richmond was in such consternation, and the inhabit ants preparing to leave. In fact, they supposed at first, that the attack on Hanover Court House was made by McDowell..

Apart from the troops left to keep open his communica tion and protect his supplies, McClellan had not a hundred thousand men with whom to advance on the rebel Capital, while it was known that Davis had on his lines of defense or within call, at least a third more. With his inferior force, and his right wing unprotected, to move on strong fortifications, so heavily defended, would have been madness, and sure to end in disaster. Neither he nor his corps commanders ever proposed to do any such thing. Though their united plan had been broken up, yet relying on the promise of the government, that when they arrived before Richmond, McDowell should join them from Fredericksburg, they had carried forward the tedious siege of Yorktown, and fought their way gallantly to the gates of the rebel Capital. Farther than this they never expected to go, without the co-operation of the other portion of the army, unless some blunder of the enemy gave an unexpected advantage. Neither they nor McClellan ever proposed to do, with a little over half the army, what the whole had been gathered, drilled and prepared to accomplish. The army had not been divided for the purpose of leaving half of it idle, while the other half did all the work. It would seem that the public might have seen this, but did not. So possessed had it become with the idea that Richmond must fall, that it would not listen to reason nor take into account the relative strength of the forces in the field. It made no difference whether McClellan had fifty or a hundred and fifty thousand men, and the enemy two hundred thousand, he should take Richmond, or be disgraced. The people expected it and that was enough.

Perhaps there never was another instance on record, in

IMPATIENCE OF THE PEOPLE.

421

which popular impatience exhibited itself in such an unreasonable and unjust manner. To every man who was capable of understanding the situation of things, it was just as plain now that without the co-operation of McDowell's, or a similar corps, Richmond would not be taken, as it was two months after. McClellan and his brave corps commanders had fought their way to this point on a promise, and if that promise was not fulfilled, they knew they had fought in vain. The appeals of their chief to the government for its fulfillment were most moving, but to the public, not a word of complaint, not an explanation was given. A cloud, dark as death, began to settle around that devoted army.

The popular feeling soon after became clamorous and vindictive on the one hand denouncing McClellan and demanding his disgrace-on the other upbraiding the government and accusing it of wantonly perilling the country to effect the ruin of McClellan. Sweeping, unjust, irrational accusations filled the press and the streets-on the one hand making McClellan unfit to command a regiment, on the other the President and Secretary of War little better than traitors.

The truth can be told in a few words, McClellan never proposed, or promised, or expected to take Richmond with the forces given him. The government withheld the requisite force for reasons which at the time unquestionably seemed right and proper, and demanded by the public safety.

It does not follow that because McClellan's plans were broken up, they would have been successful if they had been carried out. In the execution of them, defects may have been discovered which rendered their abandonment necessary, or at least apparently so. Whatever blame is attached to him, must be attributed to the theory of his plan, not to its failure practically, for it never had a trial.

This much, however, may be said: the government tried an experiment in this campaign, which we believe no other

422

A SERIOUS MISTAKE.

government of modern times ever dared to make. Having an army of over two hundred thousand men, designed to act against a common center, Richmond-and thus occupy in fact one great battle field-it divided it up into independent corps, with no Commander-in-Chief to direct the movements of the whole, except the Secretary of War, who knew less of military science than any regular colonel in the field. It is not necessary to condemn this or that commander to get at the cause of failure. It will always come under such an arrangement-if not to day, then to morrow. It was one of the most stupendous blunders ever committed by a great nation.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

MAY-JUNE, 1862.

A FLOOD IN THE CHICKAHOMINY-MC CLELLAN'S FORCES SEPARATED BY ITTHE ENEMY RESOLVES TO ATTACK THE PORTION ACROSS THE RIVER AND DESTROY IT-BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS-ROUT OF CASEY'S DIVISION--HEINTZELMAN COMES TO THE RESCUE-KEARNEY'S DIVISION-BERRY'S BRIGADE -SUMNER SUCCEEDS IN CROSSING THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE-BAYONET CHARGE OF THE SECOND EXCELSIOR-THE VICTORY-APPEARANCE OF THE FIELD-MC CLELLAN'S DISPATCH.

THE

IE brilliant victory at Hanover Court House, proved the prelude to the most desperate battle thus far of the warthat of Pittsburg Landing perhaps alone excepted. Three days after, a terrible storm, accompanied with fearful exhibitions of lightning and explosions of thunder, broke over the Union camps. The water came down in floods all night, completely inundating the valley through which the Chickahominy flowed, turning the narrow stream into a broad and mighty river, converting the adjacent swamps into expansive lakes, and carrying away one bridge and rendering another unsafe.

McClellan, in pushing forward towards Richmond, had crossed the river with part of his forces, when this sudden and unprecedented flood came. Casey's division, numbering, when it left Washington, thirteen thousand men,-now reduced to about half that number-occupied the advance within about six or seven miles of the rebel Capital. The Williamsburg stage road runs west, direct from Bottom's bridge across the Chickahominy to Richmond; nearly parallel to it, and varying in distance from a mile to two and a half or three miles, is the West Point rail road. On and between these, beyond Fair Oaks, lay his division, forming the advance of the left wing, his pickets extending nearly to the

424

POSITION OF OUR FORCES.

Chickahominy north, which, flowing from the north-west, formed a line that made rather an acute triangle with the rail road. Thus, a line running directly north and south would cut the river, rail road and stage road, making a gore of land between the river and either of the roads. Couch's division lay in rear of Casey's, on the stage road. A space of country, about a mile square, enclosed the mass of these two divisions, on the front and left of which was a belt of forest, occupied by our pickets. Between this cleared space and the rail road was a wooded swamp, beyond which spread another wide extent of cultivated fields, in which was stationed Naglee's brigade. Wessel's brigade held the center, joined on the left by General Palmer's. General Palmer's. Heintzelman's divis

ion was directly in rear of the whole, on the same side of the river, though several miles distant. The rest of the forces were on the other side, though Sumner was just ready to cross, farther north, where Casey's line of pickets almost cut the river. Casey had pushed his advance as far as he could, and had commenced intrenching himself.

This was the position of affairs when that terrible storm suspended operations. Whether the resolution of the rebels was suddenly taken or not on account of the unexpected flood, its purpose was to break up, capture and destroy Casey's, Couch's and Heintzelman's divisions, before reinforcements could be thrown across the Chickahominy to their relief. If the movement was decided upon before the storm, its unexpected sudden advent and destructive power must have seemed like a special interposition of Providence, for it made it very doubtful whether reinforcements could be thrown over at all, leaving them to finish those isolated divisions at their leisure.

The storm having done its work, sending a turbulent flood and spreading a wide lake between the two portions of the army, the rebels believed that the overthrow of the divisions