120

FEELING AT THE NORTH.

and Colonel Slocum of Rhode Island, whose bodies were left on the battle field. Among the prisoners taken, were Colonel Corcoran of New York city, and Mr. Ely, Member of Congress from Rochester. Beside other trophies which the enemy secured, were twenty-three cannon of various sizes, four thousand muskets, artillery wagons, ammunition, and a large quantity of equipments and stores. Of our whole

army, not twenty thousand had been in the fight, while the number of the rebels actually engaged at first was probably not much greater. We had the largest force in the field previous to Johnston's arrival, when they both together outnum bered and outflanked us.

The north, though at first stunned by the defeat, showed no discouragement. The press, however, was filled with clamors against this and that person, or set of persons, who had been instrumental in bringing it upon us. Less, however, than might have been expected was visited on McDowell. There seemed to be an instinctive consciousness that he had been ruined by either the inefficiency, or cowardice, or treachery of Patterson;-and the latter for some time after would scarcely have been safe in any northern city. Others turned their wrath on the papers and the party whose cry "On to Richmond" had filled the land for weeks. General Scott, it was declared, had been forced to consent to a movement which his judgment disapproved; and fierce denunciations were hurled at the heads of those who had attempted to control the military authorities. The administration came in for its share of abuse, and the want of confidence everywhere felt in its ability to conduct us safely through the war, threatened for a while to produce a greater calamity than the defeat itself. But as the smoke of the conflict cleared away, it became easier to fix the blame. It was evident, notwithstanding the many criticisms to the contrary, that McDowell had planned and conducted the battle

CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT.

121

wisely. The charge of overtasking the men was, perhaps, true, but it is not shown how it could have been prevented. That the troops were not provided with sufficient food, was owing to the negligence of the subordinate officers, and still more to the carelessness of the men who, not believing that the task of whipping the rebels was to be a serious one, did not prepare for their work, as older soldiers would have done. Many regiments were not properly officered, no doubt, but that was an evil that could not have been avoided. McDowell thought if he could have been supplied with the means of transportation, so as to have started earlier, as he designed to do, defeat might have been prevented, notwithstanding the other difficulties he had to contend with. But the enemy were thoroughly acquainted with his movements; and it is more than probable, if it had been necessary for Johnston to be at Manassas earlier, he would have been there. But it is unquestionably true that Patterson's failure to take care of Johnston, made defeat certain, whether Beauregard, as he intended to do, had attacked McDowell, or waited as he did to receive him in position. To the believer in an over-ruling Providence, there will appear reasons for this defeat that are not laid down in military books.

To say nothing of the utter ruin that would assuredly have overtaken an army of that size and composition, had it succeeded then, and attempted to march on Richmond-as it must have done under the pressure of public opinion, and of the consequent greater peril to our cause, or of other results that would have happened-that defeat was necessary to crush out the rash, headlong, and too confident spirit with which we had entered on our task. Scarcely any price was too great to pay to secure such a result. Its permanent establishment over the government would have driven us into such desperate straits that no avenue of escape would have been left us but by the way of military despotism. The

struggle on which we had entered, was too mighty; the war before us of too vast proportions to be disposed of without the most careful and ample preparations. A battle was well 'enough to punish the audacity of the rebels, and secure the Capital, but the blind confidence and arrogant boastfulness that demanded it, would not have been content with such a result. It had become a condition of our success that the public press and politicians should cease to direct the management of the war, and that it should fall into the legitimate and proper hands. This the defeat at Bull Run secured at least for a time. The nation took the attitude of calm reflection, and began to measure somewhat the mighty task before it. It unquestionably hurt us abroad, but that could not be helped.

The huge blunder of taking three month's men now became apparent. It was seen that a grand army, in all its appointments and preparatory drill, must be had before any important movement could be made. We found that there was a great difference between offensive and defensive war. The latter can be carried on in a country difficult of access, without much previous drill; the former never. The New England farmers fought like veterans behind their temporary breast works on Bunker Hill, but had affairs been reversed, and they been called to mount the naked slope, in face of a murderous fire, as were the British regulars, they never would have moved with unbroken ranks for the last and third time as the latter did into the face of death. Here was the cause of our error-we forgot that we were to wage an offensive war-carry intrenchments, and storm strong posi tions held by our own flesh and blood.

On the top of this disaster came the news that on the twenty-fifth of this month Major Lynde surrendered Fort Fillmore in New Mexico, with seven hundred men, to a body of Texans without firing a shot, and under circumstances that left no doubt of premeditated treason.

CHAPTER VIII.

JULY-AUGUST, 1861.

STATE OF THE ARMY AFTER BULL RUN-ITS DISAPPEARANCE from the FIELDA NEW ARMY TO BE RAISED-GREATNESS OF THE TASK-MC CLELLAN SUMMONED TO THE CAPITAL TO TAKE CHIEF COMMAND-BANKS AND FREMONT— THE LATTER SENT TO ST. LOUIS-THE ENEMY'S OUTPOSTS IN SIGHT of the CAPITAL-RISING OF THE NORTH-LYON ADVANCES ON MCCULLOCH-KENTUCKY VOTES TO REMAIN IN THE UNION-FREMONT IN ST. LOUIS-BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK AND DEATH OF LYON-RETREAT OF THE UNION ARMY-PUBLIC FEELING ON THE DEATH OF LYON-DIABOLICAL SPIRIT OF THE SOUTHERN

CLERGY.

THE

HE forces of a great nation were probably never in a more chaotic state than ours, immediately after the battle of Bull Run. The time of many of the soldiers was out just before it occurred; and Patterson explained his tardy action in regard to Johnston on the ground that some of his regiments refused to fight because the term of their enlistment had expired. McDowell, in his official report, said, that in a few days he would have been compelled to discharge ten thousand men, and that on the very eve of the battle, the Fourth Pennsylvania regiment of volunteers and the battery of the New York Eighth militia refused to remain a day longer. All appeals to their patriotism were in vain, -they insisted on their discharge that night; and the "next morning when the army moved forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon." If such disinclination to serve was exhibited on the eve of a battle, in which it was confidently believed we should be victorious, it is easy to imagine what would be the feeling of the troops after an overwhelming defeat. The chaos which a totally demoralized army presents, though

124

MCCLELLAN TAKES COMMAND.

originally composed of the best materials, is a lamentable sight; but that of one made up of such newly-created soldiers as these, was a fearful spectacle. The consciousness that their time of service was nearly expired, took away all sense of responsibility. There were, of course, some noble exceptions, but the mass of these seventy-five thousand men became a disorganized mob. It was to disappear from sight, and a new army to be raised in its place, equipped, drilled, and prepared for the field. The task before the government was herculean; and even Napoleon would have stood aghast at it. To raise and fit, in three months, for the field an army of half a million of men, without, at least, the skeleton of a veteran army on which to build as a base, was a work of frightful magnitude. It was evident that Scott's age and infirmities rendered him unequal to it. A younger man, in the prime of life, with a constitution of iron and a will to match, was needed. It was fortunate for the nation that the young General who had won such renown in Western Virginia was the first full major-general in the regular. army after Scott, and hence must, from seniority of rank, occupy his place. It was still more fortunate that to his natural executive ability and military experience he had added a knowledge obtained in the Crimea, in the war between Russia, France and England.

McClellan was summoned at once to the Capital, where he arrived on the 26th of July. In the mean time, General Banks was transferred to the command of Patterson's division, on the upper Potomac. About this time, also, Fremont, the second major-general, who had returned from Europe in June with arms for the government, being appointed over the western department, including Illinois and all the states west of the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains, departed for St. Louis, to take command. Of these three appointments, the first two were unanimously applauded, while by