Gross fear the subject could hardly be approached, or any advice be tendered No. 85. without offence. Any proposal to mediate, whether from France, or from britannien, any other Power, would be received, I a convinced, with high indignation, 21. Januar and lead to no beneficial result. I have, &c. To Viscount Palmerston, London Heytesbury. 1831. No. 86. GROSSBRITANNIEN. -- Der königl. Gesandte in St. Petersburg an den. Min. d. - britannien, St. Petersburgh, February 25, (Received March 16.) 1831. My Lord, I understand that an Ukase has been made out, ap- No. 86. pointing Field Marshal Diebitsch to be Military Governor of Poland, and Gross M. Engel to be the head of the Provisional Civil Government which is to25. Februar be established at Warsaw after the entry of the Russian army. These appointments announce a material change of system with respect to the future government of Poland. ¶ I have, &c. To Viscount Palmerston, London. GROSSBRITANNIEN. burg. No. 87. Heytesbury. Min. d. Ausw. an den königl. Gesandten in St. PetersDie völkerrechtlichen Gesichtspunkte bei der Verfassungsangelegenheit des Königreichs Polen betr. Foreign Office, March 22, 1831. 1831. britannien. 1831. My Lord, Your Lordship's despatch of the 25th ultimo seems to No. 87. imply that if the Russian arms should be finally triumphant in Poland, it Grossis the intention of the Emperor to make some material change in the system 22. März of government in that country. In an ordinary case of civil war between a Sovereign and his subjects, foreign States can have no grounds for interference, even by advice or remonstrance; but there are circumstances peculiar to the Kingdom of Poland which make it in this respect an exception to the general rule. ¶ The Kingdom of Poland was created and attached to Russia by the Treaty of Vienna, to which most of the States of Europe were parties. That Treaty defines the relation in which Poland was to stand towards Russia, by providing that it should be attached to the Russian Empire by its constitution and should enjoy a distinct administration. ¶ His Majesty's Government are of opinion that any change which would have the effect of incorporating Poland with the Russian Empire, and of destroying its separate administration and constitution, would be a breach of the Treaty of Vienna, to which England and all the other Powers who were parties to that Treaty would have an unquestionable right to object. His Majesty's Government, however, are disposed to believe that the ap wurden. Wir schliessen daran einen beiden Häusern des Parlaments "by Command of Her Majesty" zugefertigten Briefwechsel über den nämlichen Gegenstand zwischen dem englischen und französischen Cabinet aus dem Juli 1831. Staatsarchiv. 1861. 15 No. 87. pointments announced in the Ukase mentioned in your Lordship's despatch Gross- are intended to provide for the emergency of the moment, and are appli22. März cable only to the interval which must elapse between the occupation of britannien, 1831. Warsaw by the Russian troops, and the complete restoration of the Emperor's authority as King of Poland. But if your Lordship should find that there exists any intention on the part of the Russian Government to make any material changes in the political condition of Poland, you are instructed to watch those changes with the closest attention, and to remonstrate in strong terms against any measure of this kind which might not be in strict accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna. ¶ His Majesty's Government could not admit that the revolt of the Poles, and their casting off the authority of the Emperor and King, could afford to the Russian Government any grounds for departing from the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna. ¶ That revolt cannot release Russia from engagements contracted with other Powers; engagements which had for their object, not merely the welfare of the Poles, but the security of neighbouring States. In order to put your Lordship more completely in possession of the views of the British Government in 1814 and 1815 upon the subject of the arrangements for Poland, of the part which was taken with regard to those arrangements by the British Plenipontentiary at the Congress of Vienna, and of the bearing of those arrangements upon the security of other States, I send your Lordship copies of various despatches received at this office in the years 1814 and 1815. ¶ Your Lordship will see explained in these papers the importance of the advanced military position which the Kingdom of Poland presents to Russia, interposed as it is between Austria and Prussia, and at no great distance from the capitals of each. It is obvious that this position would become more commanding, if Poland, instead of being a separate kingdom, and occupied, as by its constitution is stipulated, only by native troops, were to become a Russian province, and the Russian army were to change its permanent stations from the Niemen and the Memel to the Vistula and the Warta; such an alteration in the military attitude of Russia must of necessity tend to give her an inconvenient ascendancy over Austria and Prussia, and might, under many conceivable circumstances, impress upon the policy of those two Powers a character very different from that which it might assume if free from external influence. ¶ These considerations were felt in the year 1815, but they have acquired additional weight since that time, in consequence of the increased security which Russia has acquired on her Southern and on her Asiatic frontiers, by the successes of her arms over the Turks and the Persians; because in proportion as she is free from danger of all molestation in those quarters, she may concentrate her forces for any given purpose in Poland. ¶ His Majesty's Government are fully sensible that it is a matter of great delicacy for one Government to make any communication to another as to the manner in which it may think fit to deal with subjects who have been subdued after an unsuccessful revolt; and they have too high an opinion of the generous and high-minded sentiments of the Emperor of Russia to doubt that his victory will be used with as much moderation and mercy as may be No. 87. consistent with the future security of his authority; but as far as you may Grossfind it useful and proper to touch upon this subject, you will conform your 22. März language to the sentiments entertained upon it by His Majesty's Government. There is one other point to which I wish to direct your attention. ¶ By Article I. of the Treaty of Vienna it is stipulated that the Poles, subjects respectively of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, shall obtain a national representation and institutions regulated according to the kind of political existence which each of the Governments to which they belong shall think it useful and fitting to grant them. It is understood that although this stipulation has been executed by Austria and Prussia, it has hitherto been entirely unfulfilled by the Russian Government. His Majesty's Government have been informed by the French Ambassador at this Court that instructions have been sent to the Duke de Mortemart to draw the attention of the Russian Government to this matter, and the French Government have expressed a wish that your Lordship might be instructed to support the Duke in his representations on this subject. ¶Your Lordship will of course be careful not to take any step on this business which could lead to any unfriendly discussions with the Russian Government, with whom His Majesty's Government are, under present circumstances, more than ever desirous of keeping up the closest relations of friendship. But if the question should be agitated, your Lordship is instructed to state that as far as His Majesty's Government are informed of the facts of the case, it does not appear to them that the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna applicable to the Polish provinces of Russia have been hitherto carried into execution. To Lord Heytesbury, St. Petersburgh. GROSSBRITANNIEN. No. 88. I am, &c. Der königl. Gesandte in St. Petersburg an den Min. d. Bericht über die Absichten des Russischen Cabinets in Betreff der künftigen Regierungsform des Königreichs Polen. St. Petersburgh, April 13, (Received April 26.) 1831. britannien, 1831. Gross 1831. (Extract.) Upon the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 22nd No. 88. March, I thought it advisable not to lose any time in informing Count Nes- britannien, selrode of the nature of the instructions I had received, and in touching 13. April upon the several points to which my attention was directed. This I did in the order in which they stood in your Lordship's despatch, beginning with the obligations imposed upon us by the Treaty of Vienna, and the necessity in which England, as well as France, was placed to watch over the progress of the war in Poland, and to remonstrate in the event of any measures being adopted on its conclusion at variance with existing engagements. I also particularly alluded to the Special Commission lately named for the provisional government of Poland. ¶ Count Nesselrode observed that we could not but do the Russian Government the justice to admit that the violation of the Treaty of Vienna was entirely on the side of the insurgents, who, in proclaiming the déchéance of the Emperor and independence of britannien, No. 88. Poland, had virtually destroyed the act to which they owed their existence Gross- as a nation. But notwithstanding the just indignation to which such con13. April duct naturally gave rise, the Emperor would adhere to the strict letter of 1831. the engagements he had contracted with foreign Powers by the Treaty of Vienna; and, in proof of this, his Excellency read to me a despatch addressed to Prince Lieven in the course of last month (which that Ambassador was authorized to communicate to your Lordship in case any conversation upon the subject took place), explaining the provisional nature of the Special Commission which had been appointed, and declaring that His Imperial Majesty, although by no means disposed to admit any right of interference with the internal affairs of his dominions, would hold to the strict letter of the engagements which Russia had really contracted with foreign Powers. In answer to my allusion to the difference that would be given to the attitude of Russia by the permanent establishment of the Russian armies on the Vistula and the Warta, his Excellency observed that he could not understand why England and France should object to this, if the two Powers who might be supposed to be most immediately interested, approved of the measure. An attempt had been made by France to alarm the Court of Vienna upon this subject, and to engage it to join in its remonstrances to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, but entirely without success. Count Nesselrode here read to me a despatch from M. de Tatischeff, giving an account of Marshal Maison's conversation with Prince Metternich upon the subject, and the Prince's firm and decisive answer in approbation of the Emperor of Russia's proceedings. He further told me that a similar attempt had been made at Berlin, and though he was not yet officially acquainted with the answer, be had not the slightest doubt of its being essentially the same as that of Austria. "Indeed," observed his Excellency, "what possible difference can it make to these Powers or to Europe (if the army stationed in Poland be really faithful and devoted to its Sovereign) whether it wear a Polish or a Russian uniform? If it be not faithful, and be not attached to the Emperor (as there is but too much reason to fear so long as a Polish army shall exist there), the case may, indeed, be different; but then the inference to be drawn from the demand for its continued existence must be, that the object in view is not the tranquillity of Europe, but the weakening and embarrassing of Russia, by engaging her to maintain a force upon her frontier, ready to break into open rebellion upon every favourable opportunity. If," said the Count, "we are only to retain possession of Poland upon this condition, it would be better for us to make a present of it to any Power willing to accept the offer." I strenuously denied the justice of this inference, in as far at least as England was concerned. With respect to the want of institutions in the ancient Polish provinces of Russia, a question upon which I was instructed to support any observations that might be made by the Duc de Mortemart, Count Nesselrode informed me that the Duc de Mortemart had held vague language to the Emperor, but had not given any official character to his conversation. Having made known to Count Nesselrode the feelings of the British Government upon these several points, I thought it unnecessary to push the britannien, 1831. conversation further, the more particularly as the line traced out for me by No. 88. my instructions was rather to watch over what was done on the submis- Grosssion of the Poles than to take any official steps in their favour for the mo- 13. April ment. Upon my opening myself to the Duc de Mortemart upon the subject, and expressing my readiness to co-operate with him to a certain extent, his Excellency confirmed what had already been stated to me by Count Nesselrode, namely, that he had not as yet considered himself bound to do more than to recall to the recollection of the Emperor, as well as to that of Count Nesselrode, the engagements taken at Vienna, and to express the hope of his Government that they would not be violated. His instructions, he said, were not very precise, and were applicable rather to the moment of victory (which he did not think by any means arrived), when it might be attempted to give a good direction to the well-known magnanimity of the Emperor,, than to the present state of things, when all was uncertainty and doubt. ¶ The Duke then informed me that the assurances which had been given to him were perfectly satisfactory as far as they went. He had been told that the letter of the Treaty of Vienna would not be departed from; that no incorporation of the Kingdom of Poland with the Empire of Russia would take place; that the separate administration of the two countries would be maintained, though all the places in that administration might no longer be exclusively occupied by Poles; and lastly, that after the dissolution of the Polish army, arrangements would be made for, supplying its place in a manner that would have no just ground for complaint to any foreign Power. My conversation with Count Nesselrode enabled me to arrive pretty nearly at the same conclusions, with this addition, however, that the present constitution of Poland will be virtually, if not openly, done away with. There will be some difficulty in dealing with this question, should foreign Powers be inclined to remonstrate upon it, as it does not appear that any particular form of constitution was guaranteed to Poland by the Treaty of Vienna. ¶ Before I close this despatch, it may be proper for me to draw your Lordship's attention to the peculiar situation in which the Emperor will be placed with respect to his own people, when called upon to pronounce upon the future fate of Poland. Vast and unlimited as the Imperial Power is upon ordinary occasions, history teaches us that there is a force of public opinion in this country, when strongly excited, which cannot be braved, even by the Sovereign, with impunity. If, after all the blood that has been spilt, and the treasure that has been expended, in the recovery of Poland, everything is placed again upon the ancient footing; and if no punishment is inflicted on the authors of the cold-blooded assassinations. which took place in Warsaw on the first breaking out of the insurrection, I do not believe that, irritated and exasperated as this nation is, the exercise of such magnanimity will be unattended with danger. The cry of the nation may become too powerful for even the Sovereign to resist, and, in despite of himself, he may perhaps be forced into measures which his own nobler feelings, his own unbiassed judgment, would probably induce him, under other circumstances, to reject. |