otherwise there would be imperfection without its proper remedy, which is impossible; for God and Nature, in things necessary, do not fail in their provisions. But it is manifest that there may be controversy between any two princes, where the one is not subject to the other, either from the fault of themselves, or even of their subjects. Therefore between them there should be means of judgment. And since, when one is not subject to the other, he cannot be judged by the other (for there is no rule of equals over equals), there must be a third prince of wider jurisdiction, within the circle of whose laws both may come.

The strongest opponent of Justice is Appetite, as Aristotle intimates in the fifth book to Nicomachus. Remove Appetite altogether, and there remains nothing adverse to Justice; and therefore it is the opinion of the Philosopher that nothing should be left to the judge, if it can be decided by law; and this ought to be done for fear of Appetite, which easily perverts men's minds. Where, then, there is nothing to be wished for, there can be no Appetite, for the passions cannot exist if their objects are destroyed. But the Monarch has nothing to desire, for his jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean; and this is not the case with other princes, whose kingdoms are bounded by those of their neighbors; as, for instance, the kingdom of Castile is bounded by the kingdom of Aragon. From which it follows that the Monarch is able to be the purest embodiment of Justice among men.

Again, the human race is ordered best when it is most free. . . . This liberty, or this principle of all our liberty, is the greatest gift bestowed by God on mankind; by it alone we gain happiness as men; by it alone we gain happiness elsewhere as gods. But if this is so, who will say that human kind is not in its best state when it can most use this principle? But he who lives under a Monarchy is most free. Therefore let it be understood that he is free who exists not for another's sake but for his own, as the Philosopher, in his Treatise of simple Being, thought. For everything which exists for the sake of some other thing is necessitated by that other thing, as a road has to run to its ordained end. Men exist for themselves, and not at the pleasure of others, only if a Monarch rules; for then only are the perverted forms of government set right, while democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies, drive mankind into slavery, as is obvious to any who goes about among them all; and public power is in

the hands of kings and aristocracies, which they call the rule of the best, and champions of popular liberty. And because the Monarch loves his subjects much, as we have seen, he wishes all men to be good, which cannot be the case in perverted forms of government; therefore the Philosopher says, in his Politics: "In the bad state the good man is a bad citizen, but in a good state the two coincide." Good states in this way aim at liberty, that in them men may live for themselves. The citizens exist not for the good of consuls, nor the nation for the good of its king; but the consuls for the good of the citizens, and the king for the good of his nation. For as the laws are made to suit the state, and not the state to suit the laws, so those who live under the laws are not ordered for the legislator, but he for them also the Philosopher holds, in what he has left us on the present subject. Hence, too, it is clear that although the king or the consul rule over the other citizens in respect of the means of government, yet in respect of the end of government they are the servants of the citizens, and especially the Monarch, who, without doubt, must be held the servant of all. Thus it becomes clear that the Monarch is bound by the end appointed to himself in making his laws.

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But it must be carefully observed that when we say that mankind may be ruled by one supreme prince, we do not mean that the most trifling judgments for each particular town are to proceed immediately from him. For municipal laws sometimes fail, and need guidance, as the Philosopher shows in his fifth book to Nicomachus, when he praises equity. For nations and kingdoms and states have, each of them, certain peculiarities which must be regulated by different laws. For law is the rule which directs life. Thus the Scythians need one rule, for they live beyond the seventh climate, and suffer cold which is almost unbearable, from the great inequality of their days and nights. But the Garamantes need a different law, for their country is equinoctial, and they cannot wear many clothes, from the excessive heat of the air, because the day is as long as the darkness of the night. But our meaning is that it is in those matters which are common to all men, that men should be ruled by one Monarch, and be governed by a rule common to them all, with a view to their peace. And the individual princes must receive this rule of life or law from him, just as the practical intellect receives its major premiss from the speculative intellect, under which it places its own particular premiss, and then draws its

particular conclusion, with a view to action. And it is not only possible for one man to act as we have described; it is necessary that it should proceed from one man only to avoid confusion in our first principles. Moses himself wrote in his law that he had acted thus. For he took the elders of the tribes of the children of Israel, and left to them the lesser judgments, reserving to himself such as were more important and wider in their scope; and the elders carried these wider ones to their tribes, according as they were appiicable to each separate tribe.

Hence it is plain that whatever is good, is good for this reason, that it consists in unity. And because concord is a good thing in so far as it is concord, it is manifest that it consists in a certain unity, as its proper root, the nature of which will appear if we find the real nature of concord. Concord then is the uniform motion of many wills; and hence it appears that a unity of wills, by which is meant their uniform motion, is the root of concord, nay, concord itself. For as we should say that many clods of earth are concordant, because that they all gravitate together towards the centre; and that many flames are concordant because that they all ascend together towards the circumference, if they did this of their own free will, so we say that many men are in concord because that they are all moved together, as regards their willing, to one thing, which one thing is formally in their wills just as there is one quality formally in the clods of earth, that is gravity, and one in the flame of fire, that is lightness. For the force of willing is a certain power; but the quality of good which it apprehends is its form; which form, like as others, being one is multiplied in itself, according to the multiplication of the matters which receive it, as the soul, and numbers, and other forms which belong to what is compound.

To explain our assumption as we proposed, let us argue thus: All concord depends on unity which is in wills; the human race, when it is at its best, is a kind of concord; for as one man at his best is a kind of concord, and as the like is true of the family, the city, and the kingdom; so is it of the whole human race. Therefore the human race at its best depends on the unity which is in will. But this cannot be unless there be one will to be the single mistress and regulating influence of all the rest. For the wills of men, on account of the blandishments of youth, require one to direct them, as Aristotle shows in the tenth book of his Ethics. And this cannot be unless there is one prince over all, whose will shall be the mistress and regulating

influence of all the others.

But if all these conclusions be true, as they are, it is necessary for the highest welfare of the human race that there should be a Monarch in the world; and therefore Monarchy is necessary for the good of the world.

"It has often happened that the thought and life of an historical period have been impersonated in some one man of genius, who has been its type and embodiment for later times. Thus to take the best known cases the speculative genius of Greece is summed up in Plato, and the scientific in Aristotle; the romance and passion of the Renaissance are mirrored in Shakespeare, the ideal side of Puritanism in Milton, and the eighteenth century in Goethe. There are only two examples where a single life has in this way taken in and reproduced an entire period or phase of civilization, so as to stand alone as its sufficient monument. As Homer represents to us the pre-historic age of Greece, and as his verse bears down to us the melody and splendor of a time which we are only beginning to see by glimpses from other directions—so in Dante we have a transcript or reflex, curiously complete, of the many phases of mediæval life, in a form at once ideal and intenṣe. All the glow of its romance is behind the transparent veil he has woven about his own 'New Life.' All the ardor of its faith is seen in the visions of unutterable glory that crowd his 'Paradise.' All its subtilties of speculation are found in the arguments and comments of his 'Banquet.' The terrible or revolting realisms of its creed fill the thronged circles of his 'Hell.' Its whole scheme of redemption is displayed in the steep ascents of his 'Purgatory.' Its partisan passion, its capacities of pride, wrath and hate, come to a hot focus in some of his 'Epistles,' or are reflected in the incidents of his career. Its fond dream of universal sovereignty, its allied ideal Empire and Church, has its completest expression and defence in his treatise on the Divine right of 'Monarchy.' There is no other name in literary history which is, in anything like so large a sense, a representative name. - Allen.

"The voice of six silent centuries " Dante has been called by one, "the soul of the middle ages" by another. As the first great writer to use the language of the people, as in so much besides, he was the first great modern man. He stands at the parting of the ways, is the bond of union rather, between the old time and the new. Ruskin has said, "The central man of all the world, as representing in perfect balance the imaginative, moral and intellectual faculties all at their highest, is Dante." "In all literary history there is no such figure as Dante," says our own Lowell. Tributes equally high from many thinkers equally great might be quoted to show the young people how important it will be for them to study Dante. It is especially as the representative of his own century that attention is here directed to him.

His mind took in all the interests of his time, and the historical references and relations of his works are so constant and varied that it has been well remarked that the whole history of the time becomes a commentary upon Dante and Dante a commentary upon the time.

The Dante Handbook by Scartazzini, translated, with additions, by Thomas Davidson, is the best general manual for the student; it contains a good life of Dante, accounts of his various works, and references to all the important illustrative books. The volume on Dante by Mrs. Oliphant, in the series of "Classics for English Readers," is simply written and quite within the comprehension of any of the young people who will be interested in the subject. Symonds's Introduction to the Study of Dante is an excellent work, and special attention is directed to the first chapter, on Early Italian History. Miss Rossetti's The Shadow of Dante, Miss Blow's work on Dante, and Botta's Dante as Philosopher, Patriot and Poet, are all valuable books; in the latter read especially the chapters on Dante's Patriotism and his Political System. Dean Church's little book on Dante, which is one of the best, contains a translation of the De Monarchia in the appendix. The notes to Longfellow's translation of the Divine Comedy and Norton's trans-. lation of the New Life are of much value. The various translations of the Divine Comedy and the New Life are well known. A translation of the Convito, by Sayer, has recently been published in England. Lowell's essay on Dante in Among My Books, 2d series, should be read by everybody; there is no better essay upon Dante. Lowell also wrote the article on Dante, embodying much from his essay, in the American Encyclopædia. The careful article on Dante in the Encyclopædia Britannica is by Oscar Browning. The interesting essay on Dante by Joseph H. Allen, from which the passage quoted above is taken, is in his Fragments of Christian History, vol. ii. Carlyle's lecture on Dante, in Heroes and Hero- Worship, is very eloquent and striking, notable as the first strong word upon Dante spoken by a modern Englishman. Macaulay's essay upon Dante should be noticed, and the words of Gladstone, who is a devoted student of Dante. All the great modern Italians have been ardent lovers of Dante, in whom they find the prophet of "New Italy." Read Rossetti's Early Italian Poets and other works touching Dante, Mazzini's interesting essay, and Hermann Grimm's essay on Dante and the Recent Italian Struggle, in the volume of his essays translated by Miss Adams. Read in connection Michael Angelo's two sonnets upon Dante. Milman's pages upon Dante, in his Latin Christianity, and Bryce's, in his Holy Roman Empire, are specially important as treating Dante's relations to the life and thought of the middle ages; the latter takes up particularly the De Monarchia.

Dante's De Monarchia, from which selections are printed in the present Leaflet, is one of the noblest and most noteworthy of the many works in which, from the time of Plato's Republic and Augustine's City of God to the