ated induction to punish past transgressions, it may will authorize acceleration to encourage a registrant to bring himself into compliance with rules essential to the operation of the classification process.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in the judgment.

I do not reach the question whether Congress has authorized the delinquency regulations, because even under the regulations the petitioner's conviction cannot stand. After the petitioner's local board declared him delinquent, he had 30 days as a matter of right to seek a personal appearance before the board and to take an appeal from its ruling. Yet the board gave him no chance to assert either of those rights. Instead, it ordered him to report for induction only five days after it had mailed him a notice of the delinquency declaration.

The local board thus violated the very regulations it purported to enforce. Those provisions seek to induce Selective Service registrants to satisfy their legal obligations by presenting them with the alternative prospect of induction into the armed forces. The personal appearance and appeal are critical stages in the delinquency process. They enable the registrant declared delinquent by his local board to contest the factual premises on which the delinquency declaration rests, to correct his oversight if the breach of duty has arisen merely from neglect, or to purge himself of his delinquency if his violation has been wilful. In any event, the regulatory objective is remedial. The board's authority to reclassify a registrant based on his delinquency and to accelerate his induction is analogous to the age-old power of the courts to pronounce judgments of civil contempt. In each case the subject of the order carries "the keys. . . in [his] own pocket" to the termination of the order's effect.1

The Government has advanced the civil-contempt analogy, not only in this case, but also in others before the Court both this Term and last.2 Such an interpretation of the delinquency regulations comports with the view of the agency charged with their administration-that their purpose is to provide young men for the armed services, not the penitentiaries.3 It comports, as well, with the regulatory scheme itself, under which the local board may reopen its classification of a delinquent registrant without regard to the usual restrictions against such action, and remove the registrant from delinquency status at any time, even after it has ordered him to report for induction,5

1 Cf. Shilitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-372; Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165. 197-198 (BLACK. J., dissenting): Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 330-332 (BLACK and DOUGLAS, J.J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2 The Government has spelled out the analogy in its briefs in Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233; Breen v. Selective Service Board, No. 65, O.T. 1969, awaiting decision; TRroutman v. United States, No. 623, O.T. 1969, cert. pending; and the present case. See also Griffiths, Punitive Reclassification of Registrants Who Turn in Their Draft Cards, 1 Sel. Serv. L. Rep. 4001, 4010-4012.

3 Selective Service System, Legal Aspects of Selective Service 47 (Rev. 1969). 432 CFR § 1642.14 (b); cf. 32 CFR § 1625.2.

532 CFR § 1642.4 (c). Of similar import is the board's authority, before notifying the local United States Attorney that a registrant has failed to report for induction, to wait 30 days if it believes it may be able to locate the registrant and secure his compliance. 32 CFR § 1642.41(a).

The civil-contempt interpretation draws further support from the historical development of the law of Selective Service delinquency. In the First World War War, one who failed to fill out his questionnaire was simply inducted into the military, and his failure to report for duty led to a court-martial for desertion. See United States er rel Bergdoll v. Drum, 107 F.2d 897, 899. By the Second World War, when the precursor of the present delinquency regulations first appeared, 32 CFR §§ 601.106, 603.389-603,393 (Supp. 1940), the law provided compliance procedures for registrants who offered to satisfy their obligations, even after their boards had referred their cases to the United States Attorneys for prosecution. 32 CFR § 642.5 (Cum. Supp. 1938-1943). However, from 1943 on, the regulations required denial of reopenings for knowingly delinquent registrants. 32 CFR § 642.14(b) (Supp. 1943). Under the present regulations even a registrant whose delinquency is wilful may redeem himself before his local board, surely this historical progression demonstrates that whatever may have been the punitive nature of the draft law's initial response to the delinquency problem, its present character is remedial recalcitrant registrants are handled in civilian rather than military proceedings, and receive an opportunity to recant even where their dereliction has been deliberate.

Such an understanding of the delinquency regulations underlies recent decisions in the federal courts, e.g., Wills v. United States, 384 F.2d 943, 945-946, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 908; United States v. Bruinier, 293 F. Supp. 666, including those upholding the constitutionality of the regulations, e.g., Anderson v. Hershey, 410 F.2d 492, 495-496 n. 10, 498 nn. 15-16, 499, No. 449, cert. pending; cf. United States v. Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225, 236-237 but see United States v. Eisdorfer, 299 F. Supp. 975, 984-989, app. docketed, No. 330, O.T. 1960.

Accordingly, even though the regulations seem to say that such reopening and removal lie within the discretion of the local board, the Government agrees that the board would abuse its discretion if it refused such remedial relief to a registrant who breached his duty inadvertently or carelessly, or who sought to correct the breach, even if originally willful, and to return to compliance with his obligations. But the Government argues that in this case the petitioner cannot avail himself of these provisions in the delinquency regulations, because he made no effort to correct his delinquency. The fact is that the petitioner's local board never gave him a chance to purge his delinquency. It declared him a delinquent on December 20, 1967, sent him a notice to that effect the next day, and five days later ordered him to report for induction, more than two weeks before the expiration of the petitioner's time to seek a personal appearance or take an appeal. In these circumstances the petitioner's failure to seek his local board's advice on what he should do, as suggested by the delinquency notice, does not detract from the force of his attack upon the validity of his criminal conviction.9

The Government also argues that the petitioner was not prejudiced by the local board's departure from the prescribed regulatory routine because when he was declared delinquent he was already classified I-A. But the Court of Appeals noted that the petitioner's induction date was advanced as a result of the declaration,10 and the Government concedes that since the petitioner was only 20 years old at the time, it is unlikely that he would have been called at such an early date had he not been declared a delinquent. That the petitioner might eventually have been called-by no means a certainty, given the variations in draft calls and the possibility that he might subsequently have qualified for a deferment or exemption-does not mean he cannot complain that he was ordered to report for induction earlier than he should have been.11

Finally, it is said that the petitioner had no right to a personal appearance before the local board and an appeal from its ruling because its delinquency declaration did not entail his removal into Class I-A from some other category. Since the petitioner was already I-A, the argument runs, his local board never "reclassified" him; it just shifted him from a lower to the highest category within the I-A order of call.12 Neither logic nor policy supports such a narrow reading of the regulations. Section 1642.14 specifically provides for a personal appearance and appeal, not only upon a "reclassification into" I-A, but also upon a "classification in" that category.13 The regulation thus covers precisely those registrants who are already "classified in" Class I-A, and whose declaration of delinquency automatically elevates them to the head of the order of call, as well as those registrants who are not yet in I-A, and who must be "reclassified into" that category before they can be put at the top of the list. The regulation, recognizing that the status of the registrant prior to his being declared delinquent and placed at the head of the order of call is irrelevant to the delinquency process, ensures that all registrants declared delinquent will enjoy the same rights of personal appearance and appeal without regard to their previous status.

Because the challenged regulations afford the petitioner procedural rights that his local board never gave him a chance to exercise, I would reverse the judgment of conviction.

See 32 CFM §§ 1642.4 (c), 1642.14 (b).

The Government qualifies its interpretation by impling that a local board might not abuse its discretion in refusing removal in the case of a registrant who sought in good faith to correct his breach of duty after the board had issued its order to report for induction. But that limitation has no application in the present case, where the local board improperly issued the order to report before the petitioner had a chance to bring himself into compliance. In Troutman v. United States, supra, where the Solicitor General has conceded that the local board erred in refusing to remove the petitioner's delinquency after he sought to bring himself into compliance with his Selective Service duties, nearly six months intervened between the board's declaration of delinquency that the petitioner sought to cure and its oredr to report for induction that gave rise to the prosecution for failure to submit to induction.

32 CFR §§ 1642.14, 1624.1(a), 1624.2(d), 1626.2(c) (1).

Cf. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197.

10 406 F.2d 494, 496.

11 United States v. Baker, 416 F.2d 202, 204-205; Yates v. United States, 404 F. 2d 462, 465-466, rehearing denied, 407 F.2d 50, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 925; United States v. Smith, 291 F. Supp. 63, 67-68; United States v. Lybrand, 279 F. Supp. 74, 77-83.

12 See 32 CFR § 1631.7 (a).

13 CF. 32 CFR §§ 1642.12, 1642.13.

20. WELSH V. UNITED STATES, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)

MR. JUSTICE BLACK announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and M8. JUSTICE MARSHALL join.

The petitioner, Elliott Ashton Welsh II, was convicted by a United States District Judge of refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces in vi olation of 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a), and was on June 1, 1966, sentenced to imprisonment for three years. One of petitioner's defenses to the prosecution was that § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act exempted him from combat and noncombat service because he was "by reason of religious training and belief. . . conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." After finding that there was no religious basis for petitioner's conscientious objector claim, the Court of Appeals, Judge Hamley dissenting, affirmed the conviction. 404 F. 2d 1078 (1968). We granted certiorari chiefly to review the contention that Welsh's conviction should be set aside on the basis of this Court's decision in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 396 U.S. 816 (1969). For the reasons to be stated, and without passing upon the constitutional arguments that have been raised, we reverse the conviction because of its fundamental inconsistency with United States v. Seeger, supra.

The controlling facts in this case are strikingly similar to those in Seeger. Both Seeger and Welsh were brought up in religious homes and attended church in their childhood, but in neither case was this church one which taught its members not to engage in war at any time for any reason. Neither Seeger nor Welsh continued his childhood religious ties into his young manhood, and neither belonged to any religious group or adhered to the teachings of any organized religion during the period of his involvement with the Selective Service System. At the time of registration for the draft, neither had yet come to accept pacifist principles. Their views on war developed only in subsequent years, but when their ideas did fully mature both made application to their local draft boards for conscientious objector exemptions from military service under § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. That section then provided, in part: 2

"Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."

In filling out their exemption applications both Seeger and Welsh were unable to sign the statement that, as printed in the Selective Service form, stated "I am, by reason of my religious training and belief, consicentiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Seeger could sign only after striking the words "training and" and putting quotations marks around the word “religious." Welsh could sign only after striking the words "my religious training and." On those same applications, neither could definitely affirm or deny that he believed in a "Supreme Being," both stating that they preferred to leave the question open. But both Seeger and Welsh affirmed on those applications that they held deep conscientious scruples against taking part in wars where people were killed. Both strongly believed that killing in war was wrong, unethical, and immoral, and their consciences forbade them to take part in such an evil practice. Their objection to participating in war in any form could not be said to come from a "still, small voice of conscience"; rather, for them that voice was so loud and insistent that both men preferred to go to jail rather than serve in the Armed Forces. There was never any question

3

162 Stat. 612. See also 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (3). The pertinent provision as it read during the period relevant to this case is set out infra, at 336.

262 Stat. 612. An amendment to the Act of 1967, subsequent to the Court's decision in the Seeger case, deleted the reference to a "Supreme Being" but continued to provide that "religious training and belief" does not include "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." 81 Stat. 104, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).

3 In his original application in April 1964. Welsh stated that he did not believe in a Supreme Being, but in a letter to his local board in June 1965, he requested that his original answer be stricken and the question left open. App. 29.

about the sincerity and depth of Seeger's convictions as a conscientious objector, and the same is true of Welsh. In this regard the Court of Appeals noted, "[t]he government concedes that [Welsh's] beliefs are held with the strength of more traditional religious convictions." 404 F. 2d at 1081. But in both cases the Selective Service System concluded that the beliefs of these men were in some sense insufficiently "religious" to qualify them for conscientious objector exemptions under the terms of § 6(j). Seeger's conscientious objector claim was denied "solely because it was not based upon a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being' as required by § 6(j) of the Act." United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 167 (1965), while Welsh was denied the exemption because his Appeal Board and the Department of Justice hearing officer "could find no religious basis for the registrant's beliefs, opinions and convictions." App. 52. Both Seeger and Welsh subsequently refused to submit to induction into the military and booth were convicted of that offense.

In Seeger the Court was confronted, first, with the problem that § 6(j) defined "religious training and belief" in terms of a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being . . .," a definition that arguably gave a preference to those who believed in a conventional God as opposed to those who did not. Nothing the "vast panoply of beliefs" prevalent in our country, the Court construed the congressional intent as being in "keeping with its long-established policy of not picking and choosing among religious beliefs," id., at 175, and accordingly interpreted "the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions. . . ." Id., at 165. (Emphasis added.) But, having decided that all religious conscientious objectors were entitled to the exemption, we faced the more serious problem of determining which beliefs were "religious" within the meaning of the statute. This question was particularly difficult in the case of Seeger himself. Seeger stated that his was a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed." 380 U.S., at 166. In a letter to his draft board, he wrote:

"My decision arises from what I believe to be considerations of validity from the standpoint of the welfare of humanity and the preservation of the democratic values which we in the United States are struggling to maintain. I have concluded that war, from the practical standpoint, is futile and self-defeating, and that from the more important moral standpoint, it is unethical." 326 F. 2d 846, 848 (1964).

On the basis of these and similar assertions, the Government argued that Seeger's conscientious objection to war was not "religious" but stemmed from "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."

In resolving the question whether Seeger and the other registrants in that case qualified for the exemption, the Court stated that "[the] task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious." 380 U.S., at 185. (Emphasis added.) The reference to the registrant's "own scheme of things" was intended to indicate that the central consideration in determining whether the registrant's beliefs are religious is whether these beliefs play the role of a religion and function as a religion in the registrant's life. The Court's principal statement of its test for determining whether a conscientious objector's beliefs are religious within the meaning of § 6(j) was as follows:

"The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition." 380 U.S., at 176.

The Court made it clear that these sincere and meaningful beliefs that prompt the registrant's objection to all wars need not be confined in either source or content to traditional or parochial concepts of religion. It held that § 6(j) "does not distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs," id., at 186, and also held that "intensely personal" convictions which some might find "incomprehensible" or "incorrect" come within the meaning of "religious belief" in the Act. Id., at 184-185. What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant's conscientious objection to all war to be "religious" within the meaning of § 6(j) is that this opposition to war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions. Most of the great religions of today and of the past have embodied the idea of

a Supreme Being or a Supreme Reality-a God-who communicates to man in some way a consciousness of what is right and should be done, of what is wrong and therefore should be shunned. If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual "a place parallel to that filled by . . . God" in traditionally religious persons. Because his beliefs function as a religion in his life, such an individual is as much entitled to a "religious" conscientious objector exemption under § 6(j) as is someone who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional religious convictions.

Applying this standard to Seeger himself, the Court noted the "compulsion to 'goodness" that shaped his total opposition to war, the undisputed sincerity with which he held his views, and the fact that Seeger had "decried the tremendous 'spiritual' price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life." 380 U.S., at 186-187. The Court concluded:

"We think it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers." 380 U.S., at 187.

Accordingly, the Court found that Seeger should be granted conscientious objector status..

In the case before us the Government seeks to distinguish our holding in Seeger on basically two grounds, both of which were relied upon by the Court of Appeals in affirming Welsh's conviction. First, it is stressed that Welsh was far more insistent and explicit than Seeger in denying that his views were religions. For example, in filling out their conscientious objector applications, Seeger put quotation marks around the word "religious," but Welsh struck the word "religious" entirely and later characterized his beliefs as having been formed "by reading in the fields of history and sociology." App. 22. The Court of Appeals found that Welsh had "denied that his objection to war was premised on religious belief" and concluded that "[t]he Appeal Board was entitled to take him at his word." 404 F. 2d, at 1082. We think this attempt to distinguish Seeger fails for the reason that it places undue emphasis on the registrant's interpretation of his own beliefs. The Court's statement in Seeger that a registrant's characterization of his own belief as "religious" should carry great weight, 380 U.S., at 184, does not imply that his declaration that his views are nonreligious should be treated similarly. When a registrant states that his objections to war are "religious," that information is highly relevant to the question of the function his beliefs have in his life. But very few registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the word "religious" as used in § 6(j), and accordingly a registrant's statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemp tion. Welsh himself presents a case in point. Although he originally characterized his beliefs as nonreligious, he later upon reflection wrote a long and thoughtful letter to his Appeal Board in which he declared that his beliefs were "certainly religious in the ethical sense of the word." He explained:

"I believe I mentioned taking of life as not being, for me, a religious wrong. Again, I assumed Mr. Bradley [the Department of Justice hearing officer] was using the word 'religious' in the conventional sense, and, in order to be perfectly honest did not characterize my belief as 'religious."" App. 44.

The Government also seeks to distinguish Seeger on the ground that Welsh's views, unlike Seeger's, were "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." As previously noted, the Government made the same argument about Seeger, and not without reason, for Seeger's views had a substantial political dimension. Supra, at 338-339. In this case, Welsh's conscientious objection to war was undeniably based in part on his perception of world politics. In a letter to his local board, he wrote:

"I can only act according to what I am and what I see. And I see that the military complex wastes both human and material resources, that it fosters disregard for (what I consider a paramount concern) human needs and ends; I see that the means we employ to 'defend' our 'way of life' profoundly change that way of life. I see that in our failure to recognize the political, social, and economic realities of the world, we, as a nation, fail our responsibility as a nation." App. 30.

We certainly do not think that § 6(j)'s exclusion of those persons with "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal