enlisted ranks from December of 1968 until September of 1970. That service included one year in Vietnam, with artillery and information units of the First Air Cavalry Division. During that Vietnam service I was wounded. While YAF has not taken an official position on amnesty for deserters and draft dodgers, I believe that this statement reflects the sentiments of most of our members. We would not favor amnesty. The reasons for our position are several. First and most important, to permit amnesty is to set a precedent that says, "If you think a law is immoral, break it, because you may very well find that society changes its mind, forgives you and does not punish you." More simply it says, "You were completely right to disobey the law." As conservatives, we in YAF believe in individual freedom, yet we are also aware that the concept of government becomes meaningless if individuals are free to pick and choose those laws they will obey and those they will disobey. While those who have decided that the Vietnam war is totally immoral and indefensible may brush this argument aside, I suggest they ask themselves if they would so readily forgive a white racist who follows his concience and blows up a black church, or on a more mundane level, excuse those whose consciences told them a given government program was immoral and therefore refused to pay the taxes to support it (in which case I as a conservative would be paying very few taxes indeed). To permit this is to permit government of whim, not law. What I am suggesting then, is not that amnesty is right or wrong depending on whether the Vietnam war is right or wrong, but that it is wrong because it makes a mockery of the concept of law and government. It is one thing to disobey a law because one feels it immoral-I can conceive of circumstances in which I would do just that-but it is quite another to expect the society that made the law not to punish one for that disobediance. Martin Luther King expected to go to jail when he violated the law; his concept of civil disobedience was not that of those who request amnesty, nor could it be if we are to have a society of order rather than anarchy. Second, one must consider the effect of amnesty on the more than two million men who obeyed the law and served in Vietnam. I believe that all but a very vocal and very small minority of these men felt that in America, with its free speech and democratic system, there were ways to correct bad laws and bad policies without breaking the law, and that both duty and honor compelled them to serve if called. Amnesty would indicate to them-or those who survived, anyway-that they need not have risked their lives, that there was nothing dishonorable about deserting or evading the draft, they they should feel free to ignore the policies of their country. In addition to its effect on them, what kind of precedent would amnesty set for those future generations that might be called upon for similar sacrifices. Third, and I inject this into the discussion only because those advocating amnesty seem to think it a major consideration, there remain many in this country who do not consider the war immoral or indefensible, and I think this includes many who would like to see the U.S. withdraw from Vietnam posthaste. One can reach that conclusion-the conclusion that Vietnam is not worth the sacrifices of blood and treasure-and still believe that our motives there were moral; that the South Vietnamese would be better off if the Communists lost than if they won; that America has not made atrocities a policy, while the other side frequently has; that our position in the world will be weakened, as John Kennedy was aware, by Communist domination of Indochina. In sum, to say that most Americans now believe that Vietnam was a mistake is not to say that they accept the reasons offered by deserters and draft dodgers as to why it was a mistake, or want those deserters and draft evaders to be forgiven. In conclusion, for a variety of reasons, but primarily because for a democratic government to be viable its citizens cannot pick and choose what laws they will obey and what laws they will ignore, most of us in Young Americans for Freedom oppose amnesty. Appendices 1. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SUBCOMMITTEE FOR DR. CURTIS TARR, (1) Section 3 of the Administrative Procedures Act requires publication in the Federal Register of "rules of procedure" and those having "general applicability" to provide proper notice to the public. Your Administrative Bulletin 765.1 describes the Registrants Processing Manual as having "general applicability and legal effect." Therefore, do you intend to publish it in the Federal Register? (2) Those portions of the Registrants Processing Manual which have the effect of regulations are to be pre-published according to the letter of Mr. Erickson. In your testimony, you agreed that those portions which have the effect of regulation but are not labeled as such in the Registrants Processing Manual would be pre-published. Which sections of the Registrants Processing Manual do you intend to pre-publish? (3) In your testimony, you note that certain information pamphlets concerning the Selective Service System are now printed in Spanish. Could you indicate why forms have not been printed in Spanish for distribution in those districts where a substantial portion of the population is Spanish surname? (4) The Inspection Services Bulletins are described in Administrative Bulletin 765.1 as bulletins containing "informative items and messages of general interest." Could you submit those reports which have been so far to the Subcommittee? Do you plan to have them available for public inspection? (5) In the publication of final rules, the criticisms of the Subcommittee Chairman and others of the provisions restricting the time period for personal appearances and appeals to 15 days were not heeded. Could you explain why the objections were not viewed as sufficient justification to retain the previous 30-day period? Also, could you indicate whether the new rule of discretion for extending the time period includes the traditional cause of "lack of understanding the right to appeal"? (6) In your new regulation 1625.2, you provide in subsection (4) for the board to order a reopening "upon the written request of the registrant that is accompanied by written information presenting facts not considered when the registrant was classified or which, in the opinion of the board, justify a change in the registrant's classification." Do you interpret the words "in the opinion of the board" to be the same as the words "if true," an interpretation which seems to be required by the Mulloy decision? (7) Do you intend to provide ultimate appeal to the Director of Selective Service on all placement decisions of conscientious objectors into alternate service positions? Would this not be the minimum requirement under the language of the conference report? Is it not particularly to be provided where there is a question of unsatisfactory work performance and a state director is given the authority to recommend a case for prosecution? (8) In your testimony, you note that Form 150 was prepublished but not because you considered it a regulation. Yet, were not all forms considered as regulations under Selective Service regulations extending back to 1948? In fact, under form Regulation 1606.51, forms were explicitly made part of the regulations. When you revoked that regulation on January 12, 1972, isn't that an example of what Mr. Erickson referred to when he wrote "Obviously, Congress should not be deemed to have contemplated, in amending Section 13(b) (367) so as to provide for the pre-publication of the System's regulations, that material essentially the same as that previously issued as a regulation could henceforth be issued without pre-publication by the simple device of labelling it something other than a regulation"? (9) Mr. Tarr, in your testimony before the House Armed Services Committee July 23, 1970, you stated: "We have stoutly resisted the idea that a young man should be represented by his own lawyer in appearing before the local board. "If we become involved in a local board in adversary proceedings, we will get entwined in a kind of legal framework with which our local board organization cannot cope. "And so stoutly resisting this, we are anxious to offer the services of appeal agents whenever we can, and where-ever they are justified ----" That argument was understood during the debate last year as a reason why the provision adopted by the Senate for legal representation was not adopted by the Conference. Yet, one of your actions since passage of the new law was to abolish government appeal agents. Can you explain the change from your position before the House Armed Services Committee? Since you have been unable to provide a sufficient number of advisors to registrants, do you believe that some discretion might be given local boards to permit them to enable a registrant to bring a legal advisor to the personal appearance? (10) Your letter of February 9, 1972, (which is attached) to all State Directors appears to instruct registrants to give up their rights of appeal in exchange for being placed in a lower priority selection group. Could you indicate the provision in the law which authorizes this practice? Also, since the letter indicates that most registrants are appealing from denial of their conscientious objector clasification, aren't you tempting them to disavow their moral beliefs in exchange for being placed in less liability of being drafted? (11) Has the accompanying "Recommended Letter to Registrants" been sent to all persons with requests for a personal appearance and an appeal? How many requests and appeals were then on file? How many requested being placed in the Second Priority Selection Group? How many were so placed? Were any registrants who wrote local boards and advised them of their desire to withdraw their request for a personal appearance or appeal not placed in the Second Priority Selection Group? (12) The Conference Report on the 1971 extension and revision of the draft law was published on July 30, 1971, with the only remaining matter of debate being the "Mansfield Amendment," which was not related to Selective Service in any way. However, Selective Service did not pre-publish any regulations to implement the new law before November 3, 1971. Consequently, the first changes to be made effective appeared on December 10, 1971, and a large part of the regulations governing classification and appeal procedures of the Selec tive Service System have been frozen for a period of nearly eight months (since July 1, 1971) stalling the processing of thousands of claims, and placing these thousands into Extended Priority. What necessitated this inordinate delay in the implementation of regulations, especially in view of the fact that during this eight-month period a call of only 10.000 men was placed upon the System? (13) Apparently because of the delay in the promulgation of regulations. Selective Service has decided to allow most registrants retained in Extended Priority as a result to escape the draft on March 27 and April 1 of this year by entering the Second Priority Selection Group. However, conscientious objectors in class 1-0, whose processing for alternate service was delayed due to this same circumstance remain eligible for the draft and are being ordered to work at a time when no one in Class 1-A or 1-A-0 is being inducted. I-A-O's and 1-A's who were not inducted in 1971 because they were exercising lawful rights of appeal are now being placed in lower priority, while their 1-0 counterparts who exercised their rights are being drafted into alternate service. Is this policy not punitive to 1-0 conscientious objectors, and does it not violate Section 6(j) of the draft law which provides that CO's be ordered to perform work only "in lieu of induction"? (14) The Selective Service Act as amended in 1971 provides that the Direc tor of Selective Service, rather than the local board, shall determine what is appropriate work for conscientious objectors, and shall be responsible for finding such civilian work. The Conference Report (Joint Explanatory Statement) explains that this change was desirable because the Director was best able to determine national needs, and could utilize conscientious objectors in the best interest of the nation. However, the regulations subsequently implemented, delegate this responsibility to the State directors, and with one exception, do not provide for a review of the decisions made by the State directors. A conscientious objector may request a review of the State director's denial of his job proposal which he makes in the first 60 days of his processing. However, after the man is on the job, he is subject to the supervision of the State director. Any decision made by this State director to transfer the registrant to another job, to refuse to transfer him, to grant him early release on bona fide grounds, or to report him for prosecution for "failing to comply with reasonable requirements of an employer," is not reviewable by the National Director. Even if such a review is allowed (as it must be by the terms of the law), registrants are not given notice of this right by the regulations. Only a well-counseled registrant would know that he could request such a review. Do you intend to change Part 1660 of the regulations to provide for this review of State directors' decisions, or will registrants be informed that they have this right of review by other means? (15) Part 1660.6(a), which outlines criteria for appropriate work for conscientious objectors, allows the State director to waive the requirement that the 1-W registrant receive compensation reasonably parallel to that received had he gone into the armed forces. This provision would allow a man to be assigned to a job at subsistence or lower pay which is far below that received by servicemen in the armed forces under the new pay scale. What guarantee is there that State directors do not assign men to low-paying jobs which do not allow them to meet their financial responsibilities or to support their dependents? (16) Why are conscientious objectors eligible for Class 1-0 not allowed to volunteer for civilian work if they are deferred or in Class 1-H, while registrants who wish to volunteer for induction may do so at any time, regardless of their classification? Is it not discriminatory to deny the CO the privilege of fulfilling the obligation which the law imposes at the time of his choosing, while the non-CO is granted this privilege? (17) The Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Mulloy that a local board must reopen the classification of a registrant when he presents new facts, not before considered by the board, which, if true, would justify a change in classification. However, in the proposed regulation 1625.2 (d), the local board is required to reopen only if "in the opinion of the board" the facts justify a change in classification. Does not this proposed regulation directly violate the requirement of Mulloy that there must be no determination on the merits of the evidence presented unless there has been a reopening of the registrant's classification? (18) The new law and the regulations which have since been effected nullify many of the old procedural directives such as Local Board Memoranda and Letters to All State Directors. However, many of these directives have not yet been rescinded, and continue to be followed by many local boards. For example, LBM's 64, 98, and 111, to mention only a few, are in violation either of the law or the new regulations, yet they continue on the books. What prevents their immediate rescision? (19) What guarantee is there for registrants who, for valid reasons, are unable to appeal their classification within the 15 days allowed by the proposed regulations that they will not receive an order to report for induction after the 15 days and thereby lose their right to appeal? Take for example a registrant who is overseas. If the local board does not receive his request for an appeal within 15 days, they are free to issue him an induction order if his RSN has been reached. If they later receive his request for an appeal, must they cancel the induction order so that he is not denied his appeal rights because of the 15-day limit? (20) The regulations allow local boards and the Presidential Appeal Board to limit personal appearances to 15 minutes. The State Appeal Boards do not have any minimum time limit which they must allow a man for an appearance. The new draft law, however, affords registrants the right to present a reasonable number of witnesses on their behalf before the local board, and the new regulations, as proposed, determine this number to be three. If a regis trant uses his right to present three witnesses on his behalf, is it reasonable to limit the total time for his personal appearance to 15 minutes? If, for ex ample, each witness were to speak for only three minutes, this would leave only 6 minutes for the registrant to present his own case to the local board and respond to questions from board members. Would it not be more reasonable to grant registrants a right to a longer period of time for their appearance before the local board, so that they can effectively exercise their right to present witnesses? Why are registrants afforded no right to a minimum time for appearances with the State Appeal Boards? (21) Dr. Tarr, you testified that Section 613.1, subsection 7, of the Registrants Processing Manual was not intended to prevent a young man from taking Form 100 out of the Local Board Office to discuss with family or counsel prior to signing it. We understand that at least one state (see attached letter) is clearly interpreting it to mean that. Have you changed the RPM provision and have you asked your field inspection service to investigate the matter to confirm that improper procedures have been corrected? [Attachment to Questions for Dr. Tarr] IDENTICAL LETTER SENT TO ALL STATE DIRECTORS Mr. FELIX R. PETREY, Selective Service System, FEBRUARY 9, 1972. DEAR MR. PETREY: Many state directors have expressed concern about the application of paragraph 5(b) in our Letter to All State Directors (00–53) dated January 11, 1972. In that letter, we provided for a uniform method of placing all registrants who are in Extended Priority Subgroup A into the Second Priority Selection Group at the expiration of a 270-day period beginning July 1, 1971. The pertinent sentence in that paragraph reads: "For registrants in Subgroup A. any of that time which is prior to July 1, 1971, and the time from July 1, 1971, until the date the revised Parts 1624 and 1626 of the Selective Service Regulations will become effective, shall count toward the 270 days of consecutive availability." The intent of paragraph 5(b) was that all people who are in Subgroup A. regardless of when they became available for call, should receive credit for the 270-day period beginning July 1, 1971. Those who became available before July first began to accumulate credit on the date of availability. This intent has been misunderstood, and part of the purpose of this letter is to clarify that intention. We now must face another problem. Which relates to those members of Subgroup A in the Extended Priority Selection Group who still are on delays owing to personal appearances and pending appeals. If they were aware of this procedure, and we could make it possible for them to give up their rights for personal appearances or appeals, they could take advantage of the 270-day period and their liability in Extended Priority whould terminate late in March. I know that many state directors feel that these men who have delayed induction in every way possible and have attempted to frustrate both the system and some of use, should be required to serve. I recognize that it disturbs some of our people when it becomes possible for this type of person to avoid service. But on the other hand, the Department of Defense probably will ask for us to induct very few people in the months ahead. The Army would rather work with younger men who have a willingness to serve. Furthermore, Selective Service would be much better off to deal with young men and to permit some of those recalcitrant persons to become eligible for classification into Second Priority. Accordingly, we have decided that we should contact all men in Extended Priority Subgroup A to notify them that they may withdraw their requests for personal appearances and appeals, and thereby enter the Second Priority Selec tion Group at the end of the 270-day period beginning July 1, 1971. Attached is a letter which I recommend that you send to all registrants in Extended Priority Subgroup A who currently have personal appearances and appeals |