his somewhat loosely constituted and indecisive character, and the firm texture which distinguished the calm and moderate, yet high-toned and sagacious mind of Washington.

The causes of the war-that is, the course of events leading to that hostile state of feeling preliminary to a trial of strength between rival powers-may be thought to have been made manifest in this volume in sufficient detail. The grand question before the country now certainly was-How actual war-civil war-the guilt of bloodshed among a kindred people-not improbably the horrible and revolting excesses of a servile insurrection, might be avoided. Whereever a truly patriotic and Christian heart beat, throughout the length and breadth of the land, its fervent supplication was, that a calamity so direful might in mercy be averted— that some way of escape might be provided, from an alternative so needless. There was probably no person so favorably situated as Mr. Everett had been, to learn the exact state of opinion at Washington, and to see clearly what the exigency at hand demanded. His public reputation needs no comment. He had devoted himself conspicuously, for several preceding years, to a great national object, calculated to draw more closely together the ties of the Union.' He had just been a candidate, at the sacrifice of his private feelings, and for the sake of the cause of the distinctively denominated "Union party." He was well known for his moderation in all things. He was in friendly relations with the leading men of all parties throughout the country. Notwithstanding his political position, he was on the best of social terms with those members of the Republican party who were likely to encourage a moderate policy; one of whom at least became the most conspicuous member of the administration, shortly after Mr. Everett's letter to Boston, already cited, was written, and was the acknowledged leader of the Republican party; if any man could be said to lead a party distracted

The purchase of Mount Vernon, by the people of the United States, as a perpetual memorial of "The Father of bis Country."

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by such discordant views, and which he was often compelled to follow through many strange vagaries. Mr. Everett had written, in this letter of February 2d:

"I have yielded, at the sacrifice of personal convenience, to the advice and request that I would prolong my stay at Washington with a view to conference with members of Congress, and other persons from various parts of the Union, who are uniting their counsels and efforts for its preservation.”

This, then, upon such unexceptionable testimony, was the great object, which, with his unsurpassed means of forming his judgment, Mr. Everett thought could be accomplished only by preventing the secession of the important slave States which had not yet determined upon that step. Nor can there be any question that he expressed the opinions of others, able from their position to give the turn to affairs, as well as his own, when he wrote to the Boston committee, that it was preposterous" to expect to hold fifteen States in the Union by force," and that "the idea of a civil war, accompanied as it would be by a servile insurrection, is too monstrous to be entertained for a moment." The eventual result of secession and the non-occurrence of servile insurrection do not change the face of the question. As Mr. Everett states the aspect of the case, it so presented itself at the time. Indeed, great uncertainty hung upon men's minds, in regard to the probable situation in the future. Evidently Congress was not disposed to assume the responsibility of inaugurating war, whatever turn affairs might take, since it purposely omitted to make any provision for such an event. Indeed, towards the close of the session, a series of resolutions was passed by the House of Representatives, which · betokened any thing rather than a disposition for war. They adopted some of the measures recommended by the Peace Conference, but said nothing of the compromise line and slavery in the territories. But the first of the series indicates their spirit. It was as follows:

"That the existing discontents among the Southern people, and the growing hostility to the Federal Government among them, are greatly to be regretted; and that whether such discontents and hostility are without just cause or not, any

reasonable, proper, and constitutional remedies, and additional and more specific guarantees of their peculiar rights and interests, as recognized by the Constitution, necessary to preserve the peace of the country and the perpe tuity of the Union, should be promptly and cheerfully granted."

This was surely the right spirit to entertain and to manifest, in the midst of a domestic quarrel which was on the eve of coming to blows; and it may be considered certain that, if a similar spirit had prevailed at an early period of the session, the foundation, at least, would have been laid for an amicable adjustment of the controversy. The whole series passed the House by a vote of 136 to 53, which was more than a two-thirds majority, although more than half of the Southern members had already relinquished their seats. To be sure it was rather late for mere resolves; but even these, though passed as "joint resolutions," and, therefore, requir ing the concurrence of the Senate, failed of gaining any notice in that body, until during the haste and confusion of the few last hours of the final night of the session, and then were not even put to vote.

So far as any definite idea of the policy proposed by the new administration could be gathered from the inaugural address of the President, it certainly seemed as pacific in spirit as that indicated by the action of the House. A single passage of this address will exhibit its general tone, and is of much importance, in view of transactions shortly af terwards to take place. Mr. Lincoln stated it as—

"Only the declared purpose of the Union, that it will constitutionally maintain and defend itself. In doing this, there need be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none, unless it is forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and collect the duties and imposts; but, beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among people anywhere.

"In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors."

It is difficult to conceive how much less than this could have been said by the Chief Magistrate, under the existing

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circumstances; or how any thing could have been said, unless it were an absolute allowance of the right of secession, less calculated to bring about hostile collision between the United States and the States which had formed the Southern Con:federacy. Language could hardly set forth more explicitly the attitude assumed by the administration. Its profession simply was that it would, as it was bound to do, stitutionally maintain and defend" the Union; and that it would not "assail" those already in open revolt against it. It declared that there should be "no invasion, no using of force" against the latter, except so far as might be necessary in order "to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and collect the duties and imposts;" in a word, that there need be and should be " bloodshed and violence," unless those in secession should be themselves "the aggressors."

no

It might be thought, indeed, that this official declaration was somewhat inconsistent with itself; since, although duties and imposts might certainly be collected outside of the several harbors, yet how to "hold, occupy, and possess " property and places already in the forcible possession of the others, except by "using of force," presented a difficult. problem. Yet the language seemed to be chosen with care, and the expression-"to recover," instead of "to hold, occupy, and possess," as preliminary to the latter phrasesappeared to be purposely omitted. And, in order to appreci ate the full force of this declaration, it is necessary to remember that, at the time it was made, all "property and places belonging to the Government," within the limits of the seceded States, except the fortifications in Charleston harbor, and two or three forts outside of the sea-coast, had been already seized, and were in the possession of the Confederates. So far as the external appearance of things was concerned, there was really no difference between the policy of the new administration, up to the fall of Fort Sumter, and that which had been pursued by its predecessor. In fact, it could not but be thought, that the administration had determined to

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ington, February 2d, 1861, and addressed to a paper in Tennessee, with the purpose of dissuading the people of that State from taking part with secession :

*

*

"You must remember that there are disunionists among the party leaders at the North, as well as at the South; men whose hostility to slavery is stronger than their fidelity to the Constitution, and who believe that the disruption of the Union would draw after it, as an inevitable consequence, civil war, servile insurrection, and finally, the utter extermination of slavery, in all * The Northern disunionists, like the disunionthe Southern States. ists of the South, are violently opposed to all compromises, or constitutional amendments, or efforts at conciliation, whereby peace should be restored and the Union preserved. They are striving to break up the Union, under the pre tence of unbounded devotion to it. They are struggling to overthrow the Costitution, while professing undying attachment to it, and a willingness to make any sacrifice to maintain it.1

"They are trying to plunge the country into civil war, as the surest means of destroying the Union, upon the plea of enforcing the laws and protecting the public property. If they can defeat any adjustment or compromise, by which the points at issue may be satisfactorily settled, and keep up the irritation, so as to induce the Border States to follow the cotton States, they will feel certain of the accomplishment of their ultimate designs. Nothing will gratify them so much, or contribute so effectually to their success, as the secession of Tennessee and the Border States. Every State that withdraws from the Union increases the relative power of the Northern abolitionists to defeat a satisfactory adjustment."

On the same day that this letter was written, Mr. Everett, then at Washington, addressed a letter to a committee of citizens of Boston, who had in preparation the arrangements for a "Union meeting" at Faneuil Hall. The meeting was duly held, and was unsurpassed for the multitude in attendance and the interest exhibited; and the fact that the "Crittenden Proposition" received the unanimous and enthusiastic approval of the vast assemblage gathered in the capital city of New England, may afford some reasonable indication of the support it was likely to obtain, if submitted by Congres to the whole people of the United States. Mr. Everett's let ter contained the following passages:

1 There was another class, however, who boasted of having publicly burnd the Constitution, and that they had been for years engaged in efforts to destroy the Union.