WISCONSIN. The law of this State enjoins on the district attorneys the duty of acting as counsel for alleged fugitive slaves; secures to such persons the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus; provides for appeal to be taken to next stated term of the Circuit Court; secures trial by jury; enjoins a penalty of one thousand dollars and imprisonment of not more than five nor less than one year on all who "falsely and maliciously represent any free person to be a slave"; identity of alleged fugitive slave to be proved by two credible witnesses; no deposition to be received in evidence. It is also provided that "No judgment recovered against any person or persons for any neglect or refusal to obey, or any violations of, the act of Congress commonly termed the Fugitive Slave Act,' approved September eighteenth, one thousand eight hundred and fifty, or any of the provisions thereof, shall be a lien on any real estate within this State, nor shall any such judgment be enforcable by sale or execution of any real or personal property within this State; but all such sales shall be absolutely void; and in case of seizure or sale of any personal property, by virtue of any execution issued on such judgment, the defendant in said execution may maintain an action in replevin, or other action to secure possession thereof, in the manner provided by law for such actions, on affidavit filed as required by law, and a further statement therein that said execution issued in a pro judgment rendered under the provisions of the act of Congress aforesaid; and the visions of this section shall also apply to judgments heretofore rendered." OHIO, INDIANA, ILLINOIS, MINNESOTA, CALIFORNIA AND OREGON. We cannot find that these States have any laws in force on the subject. Notes. In VERMONT Legislature, Nov., 1860, a majority of the Committee of House of Representatives reported in favor of the repeal of the above law, but their proposition was rejected by a vote of two to one. In MAINE, a repealing bill passed the Senate-yeas 17, yeas 10, and failed in the House. In MASSACHUSETTS, a modifying bill was passed. For detail, see under "Massachusetts." IN RHODE ISLAND, a repealing bill passed the Senate-yeas 21, nays 9; the Houseyeas 49, nays 18. In MICHIGAN, a repealing bill was inde finitely postponed in the House-yeas 43, nays 24. In PENNSYLVANIA, a repealing bill was introduced into the House, but was not reached, in the course of business, when the firing on Sumter opened the war. A majority of each House was understood to be in favor of it. This law was first passed in 1847, after the Prigg decision; and one section prohibiting the use of State jails was repealed in 1852. U. S. Senator Simmons of Rhode Island, in one of his speeches, made these remarks: "Complaint had been made of personal liberty bills. Now, the Massachusetts personal liberty bill was passed by a Democratic House, a Democratic Senate, and signed by a Democratic Governor, a man who was afterwards nominated by Mr. Polk for the very best office in New England, and was unanimously confirmed by a Democratic United States Senate. Further than this, the very first time the attention of the Massachusetts Legislature was called to the propriety of a repeal to this law was by a Republican Governor, Governor Banks. Now, on the other hand, South Carolina had repealed a law imprisoning British colored sailors, but retained the one imprisoning those coming from States inhabited by her own brethren." THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO THE SECESSION MOVEMENT. Meeting and Proceedings of Congress. THIRTY-SIXTH CONGRESS-SECOND SESSION. Congress met on the first Monday of December, 1860, and was composed of the following persons : SENATE. MINNESOTA-H. M. Rice, M. S. Wilkinson. OREGON Joseph Lane, Edward D. Baker. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. WILLIAM PENNINGTON of New Jersey, Speaker. MAINE-D. E. Somes, John J. Perry, E. JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE of Kentucky, Vice B. French, F. H. Morse, Israel Washburn, President. RHODE ISLAND-James F. Simmons, H. B. Anthony. CONNECTICUT-L. S. Foster, Jas. Dixon. PENNSYLVANIA S. Cameron, Wm. Bigler. Mason. SOUTH CAROLINA-James Chesnut,† Jas. H. Hammond.† NORTH CAROLINA-Thomas Bragg, T. L. ALABAMA-B. Fitzpatrick, C. C. Clay, Jr. son. ARKANSAS-R. W. Johnson, W. K. Sebas- tian. den. tle. MISSOURI Jas. S. Green, Trusten Polk. Jr., S. C. Foster. NEW HAMPSHIRE-Gilman Marston, M. W. Tappan, T. M. Edwards. VERMONT-E. P. Walton, J. S. Morrill. MASSACHUSETTS-Thos. D. Eliot, James ton. CONNECTICUT NEW YORK-Luther C. Carter, James Ely, Augustus Frank, Edwin R. Reynolds, NEW JERSEY-John T. Nixon, John L. N. PENNSYLVANIA-Thos. B. Florence, E. Joy Morris, John P. Verree, Wm. Millward, John Wood, John Hickman, Henry C. Longnecker, Jacob K. McKenty, Thaddeus Stevens, John W. Killinger, James H. Campbell, George W. Scranton, William H. Dimmick, Galusha A. Grow, James T. Hale, Benjamin F.Junkin, Edward McPherson, Samuel S. Blair, John Covode, William Montgomery, IOWA-J. W. Grimes, Jas. Harlan. James K. Moorhead, Robert McKnight, CALIFORNIA-M. S. Latham, William M. William Stewart, Chapin Hall, Elijah Bab Gwin. • Resigned January 17th, 1861, and succeeded by Hon. Lot M. Morrill. † Did not attend. 48 bitt. Resigned and succeeded January 2d, 1861, by Hon. Stephen Coburn. MARYLAND-Jas. A. Stewart, J. M. Harris. H. W. Davis, J. M. Kunkel, G. W. Hughes. VIRGINIA-John S. Millson, Muscoe R. H. Garnett, Daniel C. De Jarnette, Roger A. Pryor, Thomas S. Bocock, William Smith, Alex. R. Boteler, John T. Harris, Albert G. Jenkins, Shelton F. Leake, Henry A. Edmundson, Elbert S. Martin, Sherrard Clemens. SOUTH CAROLINA-John McQueen, Wm. Porcher Miles, Lawrence M. Keitt, Milledge I.. Bonham, John D. Ashmore, Wm. W. Bovce. NORTH CAROLINA-W. N. H. Smith, Thos. Ruffin, W. Winslow, L. O'B. Branch, John A. Gilmer, Jas. M. Leach, Burton Craige, Z. B. Vance. GEORGIA-Peter E. Love, M. J. Crawford, Thos. Hardeman, Jr., L. J. Gartrell, J. W. H. Underwood, James Jackson, Joshua Hill, John J. Jones. ALABAMA-Jas. L. Pugh, David Clopton, Sydenh. Moore, Geo. S. Houston, W. R. W. Cobb, J. A. Stallworth, J. L. M. Curry. MISSISSIPPI-L. Q. C. Lamar, Reuben Davis, William Barksdale, O. R. Singleton, John J. McRae. LOUISIANA-John E. Bouligny, Miles Taylor, T. G. Davidson, John M. Landrum. Ourо-G. H. Pendleton, John A. Gurley, C. L. Vallandigham, William Allen, James M. Ashley, Wm. Howard, Thomas Corwin, Benj. Stanton, John Carey, C. A. Trimble, Chas. D. Martin, Saml. S. Cox, John Sherman, H. G. Blake, William Helmick, C. B. Tompkins, T. C. Theaker, S. Edgerton, Edward Wade, John Hutchins, John A. Bing ham. KENTUCKY-Henry C. Burnett, Green Adams, S. O. Peyton, F. M. Bristow, W. C. Anderson, Robert Mallory, Wm. E. Simms, L. T. Moore, John Y. Brown, J. W. Steven son. TENNESSEE-T. A. R. Nelson, Horace Maynard, R. B. Brabson, William B. Stokes, Robert Hatton, James H. Thomas, John V. Wright, James M. Quarles, Emerson Etheridge, Wm. T. Avery. INDIANA-Wm. E. Niblack, Wm. H. English, Wm. M'Kee Dunn, Wm. S. Holman, David Kilgore, Albert G. Porter, John G. Davis, James Wilson, Schuyler Colfax, Chas. Case, John U. Pettit. ILLINOIS-E. B. Washburne, J. F. Farnsworth, Owen Lovejoy, Wm. Kellogg, I. N. Morris, John A. McClernand, James C. Robinson, P. B. Fouke, John A. Logan. ARKANSAS-Thomas C. Hindman, Albert Rust. President Buchanan's Last Annual Message. It was delivered on Tuesday, December 4th, 1860. Mr. Buchanan alluded to the distracted condition of the country, and appealed to the American people. He declared that the election of any one of our fellow-citizens to the office of President does not, of itself, afford just cause for dissolving the Union; and that, to justify a revolutionary resistance the Federal Government must be guilty of "a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise" of powers not granted by the Constitution-which, he alleged, and pro ceeded to prove, was not at all the case. He denied that "secession" could be justified as a Constitutional remedy, and asserted that the "principle is wholly inconsistent with the history, as well as the char acter, of the Federal Constitution;" and claimed that such a proposition was not advanced until many years after the origin of the Federal Government, and that then it was met and refuted by the conclusive argu ments of General Jackson. He held that this Government is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty over the special subjects to which its authority extends, and then discussed, in the following language, what he denominated THE POWER TO COERCE A STATE. The question, fairly stated, is: Has the Constitution delegated to Congress the power to coerce a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw or has actually withdrawn from the Confederacy? If answered in the affirmative, it must be on the principle that the power has been conferred upon Congress to declare and to make war against a State. After much serious reflection I have arrived at the conclusion that no such power has been delegated to Congress nor to any other department of the Federal Government. It is manifest, upon an inspection of the Constitution, that this is not among the specific and enumerated powers granted to Congress; and it is equally apparent that its exercise is not necessary and proper for carrying into execution" any one of these powers. So far from this power having been delegated to Congress, it was expressly refused by the Convention which framed the Constitution. It appears, from the proceedings of that body, that on the 31st May, 1787, the clause "authorizing an exertion of the force of MISSOURI J. R. Barrett, T. L. Anderson," John B. Clark, James Craig, S. H. Woodson, John S. Phelps, John W. Noell. MICHIGAN-William A. Howard, Henry Waldron, F. W. Kellogg, De W. C. Leach. FLORIDA-George S. Hawkins. TEXAS-John H. Reagan, A. J. Hamilton. IOWA-S. R. Curtis, Wm. Vandever. the whole against a delinquent State" came Virginia Legislature against the "a'ica and up for consideration. Mr. Madison opposed sedition acts," as "palpable and alarming init in a brief but powerful speech, from which fractions of the Constitution." In pointing I shall extract but a single sentence. He out the peaceful and constitutional remedies, observed: "The use of force against a State and he referred to none other to which the would look more like a declaration of war States were authorized to resort on such than an infliction of punishment, and would occasions, he concludes by saying, "that the probably be considered by the party attacked Legislatures of the States might have made as a dissolution of all previous compacts by a direct representation to Congress with s which it might be bound." Upon his mo- view to obtain a rescinding of the two offend tion the clause was unanimously postponed, ing acts, or they might have represented to and was never, I believe, again presented. their respective Senators in Congress their Soon afterwards, on the 8th June, 1787, wish that two-thirds thereof would propose when incidentally adverting to the subject, an explanatory amendment to the Constitu he said: "Any Government for the United tion, or two-thirds of themselves, if such had States, formed on the supposed practicability been their option, might, by an application of using force against the unconstitutional to Congress, have obtained a Convention proceedings of the States, would prove as for the same object." visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress," evidently meaning the then existing Congress of the old Confederation. Without descending to particulars, it may be safely asserted that the power to make war against a State is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the Constitution. Suppose such a war should result in the conquest of a State, how are we to govern it afterwards? Shall we hold it as a province and govern it by despotic power? In the nature of things we could not, by physical force, control the will of the people, and compel them to elect Senators and Representatives to Congress, and to perform all the other duties depending upon their own volition, and required from the free citizens of a free State as a constituent member of the Confederacy. But, if we possessed this power, would it be wise to exercise it under existing circumstances? The object would doubtless be to preserve the Union. War would not only present the most effectual means of destroying it, but would banish all hope of its peaceable reconstruction. Besides, in the fraternal conflict a vast amount of blood and treasure would be expended, rendering future reconciliation between the States impossible. In the meantime who can foretell what would be the sufferings and privations of the people during its existence? The fact is, that our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never be cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war. If it cannot live in the affections of the people, it must one day perish. Congress possesses many means of preserving it by conciliation; but the sword was not placed in their hand to preserve it by force. In this connexion, I shall merely call attention to a few sentences in Mr. Madison's justly celebrated report, in 1799, to the Legislature of Virginia. In this he ably and conclusively defended the resolutions of the preceding Legislature against the strictures of several other State Legislatures. These were mainly founded upon the protest of the This is the very course which I earnestly recommend in order to obtain an "explanatory amendment" of the Constitution on the subject of slavery. This might originate with Congress or the State Legislatures, as may be deemed most advisable to attain the object. The explanatory amendment might be confined to the final settlement of the true construction of the Constitution on three special points: 1. An express recognition of the right of property in slaves in the States where it now exists or may hereafter exist. 2. The duty of protecting this right in all the common Territories throughout their territorial existence, and until they shall be admitted as States into the Union, with or without slavery, as their constitutions may prescribe. 3. A like recognition of the right of the master to have his slave, who has escaped from one State to another, restored and "delivered up" to him, and of the validity of the fugitive-slave law enacted for this purpose, together with a declaration that all State laws impairing or defeating this right are violations of the Constitution, and are consequently null and void. It may be objected that this construction of the Constitution has already been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States, and what more ought to be required? The answer is, that a very large proportion of the people of the United States still contest the correctness of this decision, and never will cease from agitation and admit its binding force until established by the people of the several States in their sovereign character. Such an explanatory amendment would, it is believed, forever terminate the existing dissensions and restore peace and harmony among the States. It ought not to be doubted that such an appeal to the arbitrament established by the Constitution itself would be received with favor by all the States of the Confederacy. In any event, it ought to be tried in a spirit of conciliation before any of these States shall separate themselves from the Union. Opinion of Attorney-General Black upon the Powers of the President. ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE. November 20, 1860. which merchandize is imported, and from whence it is exported. It is created by law. It is not merely a harbor or haven, for it may be established where there is nothing but an open roadstead, or on the shore of a navigable river, or at any other place where vessels may arrive and discharge Sre: I have had the honor to receive your note of the or take in their cargoes. It comprehends the city or town 17th, and I now reply to the grave questions therein pro- which is occupied by the mariners, merchants, and others poanded as fully as the time allowed me will permit. who are engaged in the business of importing and exportWithin their respective spheres of action the Federaling goods, navigating the ships and furnishing them with Government and the Government of a State are both of provisions. It includes also so much of the water adjacent them independent and supreme, but each is utterly power- to the city as is usually occupied by vessels discharging or less beyond the limits assigned to it by the Constitution. receiving their cargoes, or lying at anchor and waiting for If Congress would attempt to change the law of descents, tha: parpose. to make a new rule of personal succession, or to dissolve the family relations existing in any State, the act would be simply void, but not more void than would be a State law to prevent the recapture of fugitives from labor, to forbid the carrying of the mails, or to stop the collection of duties on imports. The will of a State, whether expressed in its constitution or laws, cannot, while it remains in the Confederacy, absolve her people from the duty of obeying the just and constitutional requirements of the Central Government. Nor can any act of the Central Goverament displace the jurisdiction of a State, because the laws of the United States are supreme and binding only so far as they are passed in pursuance of the Constitution. I do not say what might be effected by mere revolution ary force. I am speaking of legal and constitutional right. This is the view always taken by the Judiciary, and so universally adopted that the statement of it may seem common-place. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared it in many cases. I need only refer you to the United States vs. Booth where the present Chief Justice, expressing the unanimous opinion of himself and all his brethren, enunciated the doctrine in terms so clear and fall that any further demonstration of it can scarcely be required. The duty which these principles devolve not only upon every officer, but every citizen, is that which Mr. Jefferson expressed so compendiously in his first inaugural, namely, to support the State Governments in all their rights, as the most competent administrations for their domestic concerns, and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies," combined with "the preservation of the General Government, in its whole constitutional vigor, as the sheet-anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad." To the Chief Executive Magistrate of the Union is confided the solemn duty of seeing the laws faithfully executed. That he may be able to meet this duty with a power equal to its performance, he nominates his own sabordinates and removes them at his pleasure. For the same reason the land and naval forces are under his orders as their commander-in-chief. But his power is to be used only in the manner prescribed by the legislative depart ment. He cannot accomplish a legal purpose by illegal means, or break the laws himself to prevent them from being violated by others. The acts of Congress sometimes give the President a broad discretion in the use of the means by which they are to be executed, and sometimes limit his power so that he cat exercise it only in a certain prescribed manner. Where the law directs a thing to be done, without saying how, that implies the power to use such means as may be necessary and proper to accomplish the end of the Legislature. But where the mode of performing a duty is pointed out by statute, that is the exclusive mode, and no other can be followed. The United States have no common law to fall back upon when the written law is defective. If, therefore, an act of Congress declares that a certain thing shall be done by a particular officer, it cannot be done by a different officer. The agency which the law furnishes for its own execution must be used, to the exclusion of all others. For instance, the revenues of the United States are to be collected in a certain way, at certain established ports, and by a certain class of officers; the President has no authority, under any circumstances, to collect the same revenues at other places by a different sort of officers, or in ways not provided for. Even if the machinery furnished by Congress for the collection of the duties should by any canse become so deranged or broken up that it could not be used, that would not be a legal reason for abstituting a different kind of machinery in its place. The law requires that all goods imported into the United States within certain collection-districts shall be entered at the proper port, and the duty thereon shall be received by the Collector appointed for and residing at that port. But the functions of the Collector may be exercised any where at or within the port. There is no law which confines him to the custom-house, or to any other particular spot. If the custom-house were burnt down, he might reove to another building; if he were driven from the shore, he might go on board a vessel in the harbor. If he keeps within the port he is within the law. A port is a place to The first section of the act of March 2d, 1823, authorized the President in a certain contingency to direct that the custom-house for any collection district be established and kept in any secure place within some port or harbor of such district, either upon laud or on board any vessel. But this provision was temporary, and expired at the end of the session of Congress next afterwards. It conferred upon the Executive a right to remove the site of the custom-house, not merely to any secure place within the legally-established port of entry for the district-that right he had before-but it widened his authority so as to allow the removal of it to any port or harbor within the whole district. The enactment of that law and the limitation of it to a certain period of time now past, is not therefore, an argument against the opinion above expressed that you cau now if necessary, order the duties to be collected on board a vessel inside of any established port of entry. Whether the first and fifth sections of the act of 1833, both of which were made temporary by the eighth section, should be re-enacted, is a question for the legislative department. Your right to take such measures as may seem to be necessary for the protection of the public property is very clear. It results from the proprietary rights of the Government as owner of the forts, arsenals, magazines, dockyards, navy-yards, custom-houses, public ships, and other property which the United States have bought, built, and paid for. Besides, the Government of the United States is authorized by the Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 8) to "exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever.. over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings." It is believed that no important public building has been bought or erected on ground where the Legislature of the State, in which it is, has not a passed a law consenting to the purchase of it and ceding the exclusive jurisdiction. This Government, then, is not only the owner of those buildings and grounds, but, by virtue of the supreme and paramount law, it regulates the action and punishes the offences of all who are within them. If any one of an owner's rights is plainer than another, it is that of keeping exclusive possession and repelling in. trusion. The right of defending the public property includes also the right of recapture after it has been unlawfully taken by another. President Jefferson held the opinion, and acted upon it, that he could order a military force to take possession of any land to which the United States had title, though they had never occupied it before, though a private party claimed and held it, and though it was not then needed nor proposed to be used for any purpose connected with the operations of the Government. This may have been a stretch of Executive power; but the right of retaking public property in which the Government has been carrying on its lawful business, and from which its officers have been unlawfully thrust out, cannot well be doubted; and when it was exercised at Harper's Ferry in October, 1859, every one acknowledged the legal justice of it. I come now to the point in your letter which is proba bly of the greatest practical importance. By the act of 1807 you may employ such parts of the land and naval forces as you shall judge necessary for the purpose of causing the laws to be duly executed, in all cases where it is lawful to use the militia for the same purpose. By the act of 1795 the militia may be called forth "whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed or the execution thereof obstructed in any State by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the power vested in the marshals." This imposes upon the President the sole responsibility of deciding whether the exigency has arisen which requires the use of military force; and in proportion to the magnitude of that responsibility will be his care not to overstep the limits of his legal and just authority. The laws referred to in the act of 1795 are manifestly those which are administered by the judges and executed by the ministerial officers of the courts for the punishment of crime against the United States, for the protection of rights claimed under the Federal Constitution and laws, and for the enforcement of such obligations as come |