The Battle Assign

ments.

Corps.* This gave the Union line a crescent shape, only broken by the elbowlike advance of Sickles' Corps (3d) down to the Emmetsburg road, along which it was drawn to a point west of Round Top, where it was refused toward that height. Thus advanced, of course he offered the true point of attack, which Lee was not long in discovering, after Sickles had established his line. The attack was made about 4 P. M. of the 2d, at a moment when Meade was viewing the faulty and somewhat dangerous position.

He said:

"When I arrived on the ground, which I did a few minutes before four P. M., I found that General

Sickles had taken up a position very much in advance of what it had been my intention that he should take--that he had thrown forward his right

flank instead of connecting with the left of General Hancock, something like a half or three-quarters of

a mile in front of General Hancock, thus leaving a large gap between his right and Hancock's left; and that his left, instead of being near the Round Top mountain, was in advance of the Round Top; and that his line, instead of being a prolongation of Hancock's line, as I expected it would be, made an angle of about 45° with it. * I told him that I

*

was very fearful he would be attacked and would

lose the artillery, which he had put so far in front,

before I could support it, or that, if I undertook to support it, I would have to abandon all the rest of the line which I had adopted-that is, that I would

*Meade, having determined to attack from his right, during the forenoon of the 2d, had placed Slocum in command of the 6th and 5th, as well as his own 12th Corps, with orders to fall upon Lee's

left (Ewell's corps), but Sloeum and Warren, after having carefully examined the position, pronounced the attack unadvisable, owing to the nature of the ground; therefore, the attack by the right was abandoned, and Meade turned his attention to his left with the view, he states, of attacking on that section of the field. In pursuance of which purpose the 5th Corps was ordered over to the Union left, and when the 6th Corps arrived (after a forced and exhaustive march of thirty miles, made in seventeen hours) at two г. M., it was assigned to Round Top mountain. [Swinton states that Sedgwick marched thirty-five miles in twenty hours; but as Manchester was thirty-two miles from Gettysburg, by way of Taneytown, and as Sedgwick marched by a shorter route (Meade's statement), and started the previous evening at nine P. M,, we infer that our version is correct.]

* and

have to fight the battle out there where he was, General Sickles expressed regret promptly said that he would withdraw his forces to the line which I had intended him to take. But I told him that I was fearful that the enemy would not permit him to withdraw, and that there was no time for any further change or movement. And before I had finished that remark, or that sentence, the enemy's batteries opened upon him and the action commenced."

Referring to his order Lee's Order of Battle. for attack, Lee said: "In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry the position, while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had been already partially fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the centre of the Federal line, in order to prevent re-enforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself for attack." And he thus succinctly recorded the results:

"General Hill had been instructed to threaten the centre of the Yankee line, in order to prevent re-enforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack.

"On the right of Hill's corps and the left of Longstreet, being joined on to Barksdale's brigade of McLaw's division, was Wilcox's brigade, then Perry's, Wright's, Posey's, Mahone's. At half past five o'clock Longstreet commenced the attack, and Wilcox followed it up by promptly moving forward; Perry's brigade quickly fellowed, and Wright moved simultaneously with him. The two divisions of Longstreet's corps soon encountered the enemy, posted a little in rear of the Emmetsburg turnpike, which winds along the slope of the range upon which the

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49

enemy's main force was concentrated. After a short but spirited engagement, the enemy was driven back upon the main line upon the crest of the hill. McLaw's and Hood's divisions made a

desperate assault upon their main line; but, owing to the precipitate and very rugged character of the slope, were unable to reach the summit.

"After Barksdale's brigade, of McLaw's division, had been engaged for some time, Wilcox, Wright and Perry, were ordered forward, encountering a line of the enemy, and soon putting them to rout. Still pressing forward, these three brigades met

with another and stronger line of the enemy, backed by twelve pieces of artillery. No pause was made. The line moved rapidly forward and captured the artillery.

"Another fresh line of battle was thrown forward by the enemy. Wright had swept over the valley under a terrific fire from the batteries posted upon the heights, had encountered the enemy's advance line, and had driven him across the Emmetsburg pike, to a position behind a stone wall, or fence, which runs parallel with the pike, and about sixty or eighty yards in front of the batteries on the

heights, and immediately under them. Here the

enemy made a desperate attempt to retrieve his

fortunes. The engagement lasted for fifteen or

twenty minutes. Charging up the steep sides of the mountains, the Confederates succeeded in driving the enemy from behind the wall at the point of the bayonet. Rushing forward with a shout, they gained the summit of the heights, driving the enemy's infantry in disorder and confusion into the woods beyond.

"The key of the enemy's position was for a moment in our hands. But the condition of the brave troops who had wrested it by desperate valor, had become critical in the extreme. Wilcox, Perry and Wright, had charged most gallantly over a distance of more than three-quarters of a mile, breaking two or three of the enemy's lines of battle, and capturing two or three batteries of artillery. Of course, our lines were greatly thinned, and our troops much exhausted. No re-enforcements were sent this column by the Lieutenant-General commanding. The extent of their success was not instantly appre ciated. A decisive moment was lost.

tured, and cut their way back to our main lines, through the enemy, who had now almost entirely surrounded them."

The Battle of July 2d.

After twenty minutes rapid and effective artillery fire, Hood's division of Longstreet's command pressed upon Sickles' extreme left. Two brigades of Birney's division-De Trobriand's and Ward's-held the refused line, from the Emmetsburg pike to the base of the Round Top mountain. The 3d brigadeGraham's-faced the road and connected

with the left of Sickles 2d division-Humphrey's. The attack was, indeed, a flanking movement, for, while engaging Birney's two brigades, Hood swung his right around upon. the ridge on whose length Meade's main line rested. This effort to flank Sickles was successful, and only a happy circumstance averted the great calamity of the loss of Round Top mountain. Chief of Engineers, Warren, ascending to the crest of Little Round Top-then used as a signal station—arrived just in time to witness the flanking movement. His ready eye comprehended all in a moment, and he hastened down the rugged declivity for aid to hold the key to the ridge. Happily he encountered the 5th Corps advance division (Barnes'), then marching to Sickles' aid. Assuming the responsibility of detaching Vincent's brigade, with Hazlitt's battery, Warren led the men up the height, while the battery was literally lifted up by human hands.* Not a moment too soon, for the enemy already were mounting the western slope which commanded the crest, when Vincent's men came up from the east and two athletes-Hood's Texans firing and then north. The two bodies rushed together like

himself.

*Warren's own version assumes no credit for Meade's direction, to what is called Bald Top, and He said: "I then went, by General from that point I could see the enemy's lines of battle. I sent word to General Meade that we would at once have to occupy that place very strongly. He sent, as quickly as possible, a division of General Sykes' corps; but, before they arrived, the enemy's line of battle-I should think a mile and a half long-began to advance, and the battle became very heavy at once. The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top hill, and they had a very desperate fight to

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51

The Battle of July 2d.

Hancock threw forward

Han

a brigade (Willard's) from Hays' di ision to Humphreys' left, and two regiments to his right. These were not fully in position when Hill's admirably timed attack was made. Taken on front and right flank by Hill, and on the left by McLaw, the division commander had no choice but to retire toward the Cemetery ridge. Sickles, steadying his lines, was stricken down about six P. M.—having, up to that moment, passed the day's dangers unscathed. The enemy pressed on, under a cutting fire from the ridge crest, but no storm of shot and shell could stay their advancing ranks. Humphreys fell away, contesting every rod of retreat, but leaving gun after gun on the ground with every horse and cannoneer shot away. cock, assuming command at Meade's order, directed the more rapid retirement of what was left of the division, and when it reached the cover of the ridge it was but a wreck of regiments-mere gatheri: gs of battalions. The Confederate leader had played a desperate but skillfully contrived and resolutely executed game. At seven o'clock he found his left and centre thundering at the base of Meade's main line. Could he push his advance further, and gain a lodgement on the ridge, he conceived the field his own and the Federal army defeated. But, he was not to witness any further triumph. He had, after all that day's strife, won only a foot-hold: and though Sykes' [5th] Corps, on the extreme Federal left, and Hancock's [2d] Corps, on the centre, had been somewhat involved in the losses, Meade's advantages of concentration were so great that, when the final attempt was made by Lee, to gain the crest, he found fresh troops there to menace him off. Sedgwick's Corps was sent to the summit of Little Round Top, and to the north of it, to sustain Sykes. Meade, in person, led forward a section of the 12th Corps, to fill the weak spot in the line between Sykes and Hancock. Longstreet's column, attempting an advance, had made its way, under cover of woods, well up the ridge, when Hancock discovered the movement and the First Minnesotians were sent to the charge. The enemy broke easily and fell back in such haste as to lose their regimental colors.

The Battle of July 2d.

Eight o'clock had now come. The enemy's attack had grown desultory and weak, evidently from exhaustion. Hancock, with a portion of his forces, including the gathered remnants of the 3d Corps and the re-enforcements from the right, made a charge to clear out what of the enemy still remained on his front. The Confederates fell back with but slight resistance, and Humphreys' men had the satisfaction of reclaiming all their abandoned guns. A similar charge was made on the left, by Crawford, who, with the Pennsylvania "reserves," threw Longstreet's lines well back from the vicinity of the Round Top; and the struggle ceased at dusk with the original Federal line unimpaired.

On the right a battle was fought, late in the day. Taking advantage of the detachment of re-enforcements to the left, Ewell assaulted Slocum's lines on Cemetery and Culp's hills-hoping to carry them by storm. Early moved upon the former and Johnson upon the latter, after a furious cannonade, at sunset. Marching out from the town, Early encountered a withering fire from the guns on the heights, but, pushing forward his columns by brigades, the Confederates were quickly advanced up the slope. The artillery then fired grape and shrapnell with such effect that Early's left and centre gave way and retired, but, his right brigade, taking advantage of the ground and buildings, made its way up to the advanced batteries, over which a hand-to-hand struggle occurred-the artillery men fighting for their guns with ramrods and handspikes. The infantry, Howard's (11th Corps) troops, holding the field at that point, soon were closely engaged and the fight became severe. Howard dispatched to Hancock for aid, and received Carroll's brigade, which, by its impetuous spirit, aided by the guns a little to the east, drove the enemy back. Their dead thickly strewed the ground. It was a perilous enterprise at best, and was paid for with the lives of many a brave man on both sides. Rodes' division, ordered to sustain Early's movement, as the exigencies should require, failed to reach the field on his right, in season to stay the repulse.*

Pollard wrote: "Major-General Rodes commenced to advance simultaneously with General