military circles, and every feasible effort was made to destroy the entire expedition. The time lost in marching to Wyliesville and back, was a misfortune, but, it seemed impossible that the column could have made good its escape. The mistake in supposing the National forces to be in possession of Ream's, must have been fatal, even had Wilson's force been fresh and stronger.* Accepting Butler's suggestion to occupy the north bank of the James, as a base for feigned or real operations against Richmond, Grant returned two divisions of the 18th Corps to Bermuda Hundred, on the 21st. That night Foster's brigade crossed and entrenched at Deep bottom, and a pontoon thrown over on the 22d, connected the commands. This serious menace bore immediate fruit in compelling Lee to detach a powerful force to try and drive Foster from his works, or, failing in this, to entrench on his front and thus bar the way to further advance. Three several assaults failed to dislodge the brigade, and the position, thereafter, became *Not the least novel and affecting incident of this raid was the conduct of the negro slaves along the line of march. One with the expedition said: "We had scarcely marched ten miles on the late expedition when the negroes began to rally round our flig, and the number with us rapidly increased, till I feel perfectly safe in saying, two thousand contrabands of all ages followed the expe ition. How the women and children managed to keep up with us, I cannot conceive. From the 22d of June till the present they have followed us, notwithstanding the fact that at times we scarcely rested for an hour in forty-eight; and in twenty-four hours we have marched more than sixty miles. Yet the poor creatures follow, panting and perspiring, still keeping up. "Many of them joined us mounted on either horses or mules, and as these were wanted in the batteries and wagons they were taken from them. A large number of carts, carringes, wagons, coaches, barouches and vehicles of every description were brought into our lines, but have since fallen into the hands of the enemy. The rebel cavalry sabred many of the negroes who fell into their hands, when they made their charge near the Rowanty. It was really appall ing to hear the heartrending shrieks of the women and children as the rebels dashed into them, firing their carbines among them and cutting them down with their sabres. Probably a thousand men, women and children followed us to our lines" The anger of slave proprietors at this stampede of their human property was not calculated to inspire them with mercy to those recaptured; yet, despite the suffering which the slaves knew must follow any failure to escape, the poor creatures never hesitated when a Federal columu approached to try to reach their dimly conceived "promised land." to Grant, as we shall see, one of some strategic importance. Sheridan's Opera tions. The prolonged absence of Sheridan was owing, as stated, to his necessary presence over the Chickahominy. After having failed in the attempt to reach Hunter, the two divisions were marched to the North Anna, from whence, by Grant's orders, they moved to White House, reaching it June 19th, just in time to again strike Hampton's cavalry, which had been repulsed in an attempt to seize the trains and stores still at that point. The cavalry corps' trains had been left at White House, awaiting the return of the command, under the charge of Captains Tallman, Corson and Luddington, division quartermasters, protected by the infantry command of General Abercrombie and some dismounted cavalry, under Lieut.-Colonel Gould, Major Crom, Captain Armstrong and others. The day prior to Sheridan's return he having been delayed by sending his prisoners and wounded, nearly one thousand in number, to West Point by another route -Wade Hampton, who had marched upon his right flank at a respectful distance all the way from Gordonsville, crossed the Mattapeny and Pamunkey to the westward, and made a descent on the depot. He was frustrated in this by the combined efforts of General Abercrombie, Major Robinson, of the horse artillery, and the gunboats. Hampton's forces were shelled out; but his rear guard had not passed from the vicinity before it was overhauled, near Tunstall's station, by Colonel Gregg's and Colonel Devin's brigades of General Sheridan's advance, who charged upon and greatly hastened its movements. After a couple of days spent in necessary recuperation, Sheridan abandoned White House; the depot was broken up and the trains started for the James, by way of Jones' bridge over the Chickahominy-Devins' and Merritt's brigades on the advance. the bridge, on the 23d, the rebel cavalry were found on the front, but a charge sent them flying, and the crossing was not interrupted. Nearing To Gregg's division was assigned the duty of protecting the flank and rear. Advancing toward Charles City Courthouse, on the 24th, he encountered Wade Hampton, in force, RELATIVE STRENGTH AND LOSSES OF BOTH PARTIES. 305 Sheridan's Operations. The relative Strength and losses of the Contestants. through the thigh. The day was excessively hot and the roads deep in dust, rendering the battle doubly onerous. On the 29th, General Sheridan, having crossed the James, advanced with Torbert's and Gregg's divisions to the left of the army, near the Petersburg and Roanoke railroad. With this junction Grant may be said to have had, immediately before the Petersburg fortifications, every available man near St. Mary's Church. sylvania, was among the The combat which ensued missing. Colonel Smith of was exceedingly severe-the First Maine, was shot the enemy pressing Gregg with a stubborn pertinacity which at once rendered it apparent that the train was the prize at stake. The two Federal brigades, dismounted, fought at first for time, but, being overmatched, slowly retired, making stands at frequent points where the artillery could be used to advantage. From two P. M. until dark this running battle was waged. At Hopewell Church the last stand was made, when the enemy furiously charged Captain Randol's at the Government's disposal. Hunter's and Lieutenant Dennison's batteries. The guns were served until the last round was fired; seeing which the Confederate charge was renewed, but Davies' brigade covered the guns, and the entire command rejoined Sheridan, at the James, in safety, that night. The losses indicated the close nature of this contest. Hampton, having all his own command and a full brigade of infantry, considerably outnumbered the two brigades holding him at bay, but he failed in every effort to break or flank them, so admirable was their pluck and field management. Randol's battery lost 18 men and 25 horses; Dennison's, 3 men and 6 horses. Among the killed was Colonel Covode of the Fourth Pennsylvania cavalry-an officer of brilliant qualities. Colonel Huey of the Eighth Penn 22,000 horse and infantry were beyond call, for any purpose of co-operation, besides being required as an army of occupation for the line of the Potomac, whither Early's divisions, with Breckenridge's brigades, were then heading, after having run Hunter over the Blue Ridge, through Bicford's Gap. By the dispatch of Early, with the divisions of Gordon, Rodes and Ramsur, and Ransom's division of cavalry, Lee had reduced his strength to about the equivalent of Beauregard's re-enforcement; but, considering his fortifications, he may be said to have been in better resistant condition, on the morning of July 1st, than at any time during the previous eight weeks' struggle, for Grant's reenforcements had scarcely repaired his losses. These losses were thus tabulated: vice in Virginia-temporarily, as was at first sup、 posed. The fortunes of the field, and the impropriety of a divided command, impelled Grant, on the 24th, to order its consolidation with the Potomac This table does not embrace the first casu- | may be fixed at 4,500. This will give an agalties of the 9th Corps, which, up to May gregate of nearly 70,000—equal to more than 24th, was not regarded as a part of the Army of the Potomac.* Its losses, up to May 24th, Having been re-organized by Burnside's individual efforts, the 9th Corps was at first destined for North Carolina, whence Burnside was to proceed-Army- whereby the once chief of that army became Major-General Foster having been transferred to Burnside's late command in East Tennessee; but the unification of the armies of the Union, by virtue of the new rank of Lieutenant-General, and the campaign's necessities, compelled its detail to ser subordinate to one who had served with him as division General. The patriotic Rhode Islander did not, for that reason, "ask to be relieved," but, with his well-ordered troops, fought to the end, under his old division commander. the entire number of the Confederate army at the commencement of the overland campaign. But, even these figures do not include Butler's casualties. His Army of the James, during all this period, was independent of Meade, save as portions of its forces (18th Corps) was detailed to the Army of the Potomac. In the series of contests for the possession of Petersburg, prior to June 10th, and in the advance upon Richmond from Bermuda Hundred, these casualties, in all arms, were fully 6,000. We may, therefore, assume that the depletion of the national armies operating directly against Richmond were, up to July, not less than seventy-five thousand men. To restore this drain, every resource was made available. The President's last two calls were enforced by the recruiting process and by the draft, but, owing to "credits" on State quotas, and to various delays, not more than 100,000 new men were put into the ranks by July 1st, of which number Grant had the larger share. The failure of the second Red River expedition against Texas released the 19th Army Corps, and it was ordered North, but, instead of going forward to Grant, was hastily thrown into the field against Early, then threatening Washington. The 6th Corps also was detailed, early in July, and sent North to cover the capital. This detachment, and the losses, left Grant, for the first weeks of July, in a comparatively non-combative condition, his safety lying in Lee's weakness. Having detached the equivalent of a corps February 1st, 500,000 were called for, and the draft invoked to hasten the process of filling up the rauks. March 15th, a call for 200,000 more was made, and draft ordered. for the third "invasion of the north," and another division to watch Butler's operations on the north side of the James, Lee was in strength, in Petersburg, just sufficient to hold his constantly augmenting system of field works. Every conceivable means had been used to recruit his force. Boys of sixteen and men of sixty stood side by side in the Confederate ranks. Able-bodied gov ernment employees, in civil positions, were made to give place to old men, or those unfitted for field duty; and thus released, were sent to the entrenchments. Not a single idle man was to be found in or around Richmond. Throughout all sections of the Confederacy still in rebellious hands the conscription law, or the stern law of public sentiment had operated almost literally to drive or draw into the ranks "the last man;" and the consciousness that the "last ditch" was before Petersburg, impelled to that point every possible recruit. In this way Lee's own enormous losses (equal to about 35,000 men, from May 4th to July 1st*) had been made good, and the well-ensconced Army of Northern Virginia, at the date under notice (July 1st), presented a fair counterpoise to the numerical superiority of the national arms. The struggle from that time forward was to be one of strategy as well as of blows; and we shall behold, in the second stage of the 'siege," a system of plot and counterplot commensurate with the vast issues in the balance. * As stated, the aggregate of losses in the Wilder ness was two to Grant's three; but, as the Confederates adopted the defensive and fought only be hind works, the proportion lessened greatly. In the battles of the Chickahominy, and the assaults on Petersburg, the Confederate loss was about as one to Grant's six. CHAPTER II. SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST ATLANTA.-OPERATIONS UP то JOHNSTON'S RETREAT FROM THE KENESAW MOUNTAINS. The Great Campaign The Initial Steps. Army of the Ohio, 15,000 men, left wing; Army of the Cumberland, 50,000 men, centre; Army of the Tennessee, 35,000 men, right wing: thus to give Sherman a grand army of 100,000 men for the campaign. The Generals also were instructed as to the garrisons to be left at the important points, and the arrangements to be made for protecting the railroads, etc. GENERAL SHERMAN hav- | Chattanooga; while Mcing just returned from his Pherson, on the right, was expedition to Meridian, at Huntsville, Ala. These three officers, were Miss., was at Memphis, on his way to the head-instructed so to organise their commands as to quarters of the Department of the Tennessee, be able to put troops in the field on May 1st, when, on the 14th of March, he received an as follows: order from the new Lieutenant-General, directing him to assume command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. This was accompanied by a note from General Grant, asking Sherman to meet him at Nashville, Tenn. Here the two Generals met on the 17th, and together proceeded to Cincinnati. In the Burnet House in that city the great campaign was talked over. With maps spread before them, they discussed the moves which each should make, arranged that both should strike simultaneously and persistently, and at that interview the fate of the na-viding for his army, he directed the issue of tion was decided. From that moment, it may be said, the doom of the Confederacy was sealed. The time had passed when each corps commander might operate on his own responsibility. The armies of the East and the West were to advance at the same time, from the Atlantic to the Arkansas, and with the fixed purpose to carry all before them. At once leaving Cincinnati, Sherman made a tour of inspection through his new command. The Military Division of the Mississippi consisted of the four Departments of the Ohio, Major-General J. M. Schofield; the Cumberland, Major-General George H. Thomas; the Tennessee, Major-General James B. McPherson; and the Arkansas, Major-General Frederick Steele. General Sherman now passed through his posts in North Georgia and Tennessee, visiting Generals Schofield, Thomas and McPherson, at their headquarters-General Schofield's army then lying at Knoxville; General Thomas' army at and about On returning to Nashville, the question of supplies for so large an army, occupied Sherman's attention. As a first step for pro rations to citizens to cease, and ordered the military railroads to be used only for army transportation, increasing their capacity for work at once, by stopping the immense amount of sutlers' stock and other rubbish which for months had cumbered every train. That the feeding of his army was no small part of his successful campaign, may be seen from General Sherman's letter to General Grant about this time, on receipt of his final instructions from Grant. He says, after speaking of his plans: "If Banks can, at the same time, carry Mobile, and open up the Alabama river, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my problem-provisions. But, in that I must venture. Georgia has a million inhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve. If the enemy interrupts my communications, I shall be absolved from all obligations to subsist by my own resources, but feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever I can find. I will inspire my command, if successful, with my feelings, and that beef and salt are all that are absolutely necessary to life." The success of an invading army largely depends on its receiving food enough for subsistence. The advancing host was to depend, during this campaign, on the single track that carried the means both of sustaining and destroying This line, then, was to be proteeted by block-houses, at all the bridges, and a large construction party was organized to repair breaks. Trains were run to the utmost capacity of the road, and by May 1st, thirty days' rations for the army were accumulated at Chattanooga. life. During the latter part of April, the wings were brought toward Ringgold to join the centre in a general advance. On the 6th of May, McPherson had reached Gordon's Mills, on his eastward move; Thomas was at Ringgold, with his advanced lines against Tunnel Hill; while Schofield, bearing down upon Dalton from the north, had reached Red Clay. Thus the three armies were united, the line extending northeasterly from Gordon's Mills, and the movement was begun which was to test Sherman's powers for handling a vast army, and his capacity for strategy of the most exalted nature.* Sherman's antagonist was General Josephi E Johnston, who had relieved Bragg soon after the disasters to that officer in his first contest with Grant. Said the author of the "Lost Cause:" "On the 27th December, 1863, General Johnston had assumed command of the army at Dalton, Georgia. In January he had fallen back from Dalton, and his advanced posts; on the 7th February he was encamped at Rome, Georgia; but he again advanced to Dalton shortly afterwards, and proposed then an offensive movement against the enemy, whose strength he knew would be greatly increased in the spring, and who, therefore, could be attacked with better advantage before such increase of the disproportion of numbers. General Johnston knew very well that he could not expect re-enforcements at pace with the enemy, and was, therefore, wisely determined to make at once a forward movement and try issues with him as soon as possible. But a most untimely controversy in Richmond defeated Johnston's just and promising moved from command of the army he had so disasplan of operations. General Bragg had been retrously led to take the post, by the persistent partiality of President Davis, of consulting or advis. ing officer' to the Executive. The favorite in Richmond had his own plan of offensive operations differing from that of Johnston; President Davis agreed with him. General Johnston, in vain, telegraphed to Richmond: I expressly accept taking the offensive-I only differ with you as to details;' *The detail of his strength, May 1st, was reported but the discussion of 'details' lingered in Richby Sherman as follows: ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, MAJ.-GEN. THOMAS, COMMANDING. Infantry. Artillery Cavalry Total.. Guns....................... mond, until, when in the month of April the Presi dent sent a messager to Georgia to explain his plans, .54,568 2,377 the opportunity of the offensive was past, the enemy 3,823 was being re-enforced to more than twice John60,778 ston's number, and was only waiting for the signal 130 from over the Alleghanies to commence the 'On-toAtlanta' movement. ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, MAJ -GEN, M'PHERSON COMMANDING Infantry. Artillery. Cavalry Total........ Guns..... 22,437 .24.465 ARMY OF THE OHIO, MAJ.-GEN. SCHOFIELD, COMMANDING. Infantry 96 .11,183 "On the 1st May, the effective artillery and infantry of the Army of Tennessee amounted to 40,900; the effective cavalry to about four thousand. General Johnston was thus greatly overmatched in numbers; and he had no prospect of compensation, but in superior skill and strategy. But the condition of his army was excellent in every respect, and had been made so by the admirable skill and inspiration he had brought to the work of its regeneration. It was well-fed, well-clad, in high and hopeful spirits; Grand aggregate number of troops, 98,897; guns, 254. and for the first time in its history there was no bareJohnston's army, composed of the corps of Har-foot soldier in its ranks. Ninety days before, the dec, Polk and Hood, was estimated at about 45,000. Some 15,000 "State Militia" were also contributed by the State authorities to enhance Johnston's strength, and fought out the campaign. .13,559 28 army left by Bragg was disheartened, despairing, and on the verge of dissolution. By judicious mer. sures General Johnston had restored confidence, reestablished discipline, and exalted the hearts of Lis |