Burnside's Operations. BURNSIDE'S OPERATIONS. 163 Burnside's Operations. Burnside's campaign in | moved with his main body East Tennessee, originally upon Knoxville, reaching designed by the war office that place Sept. 3d. The as co-operative with Rosecrans' movements, march from Kingston was a kind of triumphnever amounted to such in effect. Assigned to al entry-so rejoiced were the long oppressed the Department of the Ohio, March 29th, 1863, people. Alas, how many a citizen was gone Burnside proceeded west with his old 9th from his fireside—the inmate of a rebel dunCorps, designing to recruit it to four full di- geon, a fugitive in the mountains, a conscript visions strength. But, the corps being de- in the rebel ranks or a murdered martyr to tached to Grant, the movement into Tennes- his steadfast Union principles ! sce was delayed until a new army equal to the work could be gathered. With headquarters at Camp Nelson, near Richmond, Ky., the "Army of Liberation" gathered slowly; and it was not until the second week of August that it was ready for the forward march. August 16th, in harmony with Rosecrans' movement upon Bragg's lines, Burnside started for Kingston, in East Tennessee - -an important strategic point, which would bring him upon Rosecrans' left. The march was in light order and made with rapidity, by way of Crab Orchard, Mount Vernon, Loudon and Williamsburg-which latter place was reached August 24th. Thence moving by way of Chitwood, Tenn., he was there met by General Hartsuff's command. Leaving Chitwood on the 28th, the army reached Montgomery Aug. 30th. The brigade of Colonel Julius White, marching from Centra! Kentucky by way of Albany, Monticello and Jamestown, also reached Montgomery on the 30th. The movement upon Kingston was not contested, much to Burnside's surprise. The cavalry advance, under Colonel Burt, reported Pegram in the pass at the Emery river Iron works-a position of great strength; but the rebel decamped during the night of August 30th, leaving the route clear to Kingston, where the column arrived Sept. 1st. From Emery river a detachment under Colonel Foster moved upon Knoxville, which was occupied on the 1st, amid the wildest expressions of delight from the people. Had the hour of their deliverance finally come? From Kingston General Shackleford's command was dispatched to secure the large bridge over the Holston river, at Loudon, but reached the work to find it in flames. At Kingston Colonel Minty's cavalry pickets, of Rosecrans' army, were encountered. Finding the rebels in no force at that point, Burnside The enemy had hurriedly retired upon Burnside's approach-Buckner toward Chattanooga and Sam Jones toward the North Carolina line. General Frazer, with a small brigade, held Cumberland Gap-the only Confederate force within reach. Against the gap Shackleford was dispatched, September 5th, followed on the 7th by Burnside in person, with a considerable force of cavalry and artillery. A column under General De Courcey, having been left at London, Kentucky, to watch the gap from the north, moved upon it at the appointed time. Frazer thus found himself shut in-both avenues of escape closed. To the demands for surrender, made both by De Courcey and Shackleford, the Mississippian answered somewhat defiantly. When Burnside arrived, on the 9th, with his artillery, a second summons followed, giving an hour for answer. Frazer asked for a parole on the spot, but Burnside denied the right of the party to ask it, and the Confederate was forced to unconditional terms of capitulation. His force consisted of two North Carolina, one Virginia and one Georgia regiments, with two batteries (fourteen guns)—in all about two thousand men. Frazer never recovered from the obloquy brought upon himself by this peaceful obedience to Federal demands. The Confederate government seemed to think it was his business to fight; but, the officer acted with a Davis, in his December message to Congress, adverted to the surrender in terms of condemnation. "I am unable," he said, "to suggest any explanation of this disaster, which laid open Eastern Tennessee and South Western Virginia to hostile operations, and broke the line of communication between the seat of Government and Middle Tennessee." He further added, that re-enforcements were within supporting distance and had been ordered to his aid. All of which was the merest nonsense. Frazer was Burnside's Opera tions. Burnside's Opera tions. wise discretion—a surren- | telegraphed to Halleck, der spared needless blood- Sept. 21st: "Nothing but shed; and the maledictions provost guards are left at hurled at his head were expressions of spite at Knoxville, London and this place (Morrisdefeat, rather than justly conceived censures. town). All the force from Cumberland Gap This left but the half guerrilla forces of will be brought down. I have not left a single Sam Jones and Pegram at large, in the vici- guard at my lines. When you remember the nity of Burnside's command. It only remain- size of our force, the amount of work which it ed to close up with Rosecrans and fight Bragg, has to do, and the length of line occupied, you as it unquestionably was Halleck's original will rot be surprised that I have not helped design should be done, or, to scatter the Rosecrans; more particularly as I was fully command in detachments to keep East impressed with the truth of the statement that Tennessee free from the curse of rebel visita- Bragg was in full retreat. It has not seemed tion. This latter policy was adopted. Said possible for me successfully to withdraw my force from the presence of Jones until he shoul be beaten back or captured." And Sept. 29th, Rosecrans telegraphed his own views to the war office, from Chattanooga: Halleck: "As the country between Dalton and the Little Tennessee was still open to the enemy, General Burnside was cautioned to move down by the north bank of the river, so as to secure its fords and cover his own and Rosecrans' communications from rebel raids. With our forces concentrated near Chattanooga, the enemy would be compelled to either attack us in position or to retreat further into Georgia. If he should attempt a flank movement on Cleveland, his own communication would be cut off and his army destroyed. But, although repeatedly urged to effect this junction with the Army of the Cumberland, General Burnside retained most of his forces in the upper valley, which was still threatened near the Virginia line by a small rebel force under Sam Jones." Thus matters remained at the date of Rosecrans' removal. Burnside, confronted by Forrest at Cleveland, and Sam Jones (reported to be six thousand strong) at Zollicoffer, hopelessly surrounded. The mistake was Buckner's, who left so small a garrison to maintain so impor tant a post, if its retention was seriously contemplated. The "re-enforcements" alluded to must have been Sam Jones' "irregulars"-not then formidable enough to encounter Shackleford's brigade. "I would not advise the withdrawal of our forces from East Tennessee. Kingston should be strongly garrisoned, the bulk of the troops concentrated for movement in any direction, and cavalry thrown out this way to co-operate with us. ** It is now too late for Burnside to do more than protect our flank, but his forces should be held in readiness to help us in case of emergency." Upon this showing must rest the case of Burnside's conduct of the movement into East Tennessee. Conceiving his force inadequate to re-enforce Rosecrans and yet retain his important posts, he awaited re-enforcements, it would appear, before advancing to the Federal left. The expression in the dispatch just quoted, from him-" particularly as I was fully impressed with the truth of the statement that Bragg was in full retreat"— gives evidence that he (Burnside)*like Rosecrans when at Murfreesboro', conceived himself to be the best judge of the situation and acted accordingly, in the disposition of his army. The Rival Commands. COMING North, at the | those made by General Grant in his report of summons of the war office, Dec. 23d, 1863, i. e.: first, that the Secretary General Grant reached Louisville, Kentucky, of War had fears that Rosecrans designed to October 18th. The succeeding day he an- abandon Chattanooga; second, that, on arnounced his assumption of command of the riving at that point October 23d, he (Grant) combined departments of the Cumberland, found that Thomas had ordered Hooker's the Tennessee and the Ohio. This order was concentration at Bridgeport, preparatory to followed by the assignment of Major-General the movement into Lookout Valley; third, Geo. H. Thomas to the immediate command after his (Grant's) arrival he made a reconof the first named; Major-General W. T. Sher-noissance of Brown's Ferry and the hills on man to the second; and Major-General A. E. the south side of the river, and then adopted Burnside to the last named. Repairing to the front, steps were taken to relieve Chattanooga of its peril, from want of supplies. Reaching the field on the 23d, Grant found Hooker on the eve of a movement into Lookout Valley, then held by the enemy, who, by thus controlling the routes to Bridgeport, compelled all supplies to come by the almost impassable roads from the west and north. This movement of Hooker was in furtherance of Rosecrans' prearranged plan. The deposed commander said: “To effect this (the occupation of Lookout Valley) General Hooker was directed to concentrate his troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport, and advised that, as soon as his train had arrived, or enough of it to subsist his army ten or twelve miles from his depot, he would be directed to move into Lookout Valley, to take possession of that, and every effort was made to complete the pontoons, etc., to connect with our troops at Chattanooga. On the 19th of October I examined the river, and selected a point for the crossing of the bridge at Ferry to connect Hooker's with the forces at Chattanooga. I moreover directed General W. F. Smith [Chief Engineer of the Army] to reconnoitre the shore above Chattanooga with a view to that very movement on the enemy's right flank which was afterwards made by General Sherman." the plan afterwards carried out. Justice to an able commander demands that Rosecrans shall be utterly exonerated from the first count, and given credit upon the others as his own positive declarations, above quoted, shall warrant. The passage into Lookout Valley must be attended with hazard; the enemy, being masters of the field, could concentrate rapidly enough to overwhelm Hooker if forewarned of his design. It was, consequently, necessary not only to make the movement with rapidity but also to seize the ferry (Brown's) covering the debouch of Lookout Valley, thus to connect with Hooker and afford means of concentration equal to that of the enemy. The plan adopted embraced two separate enterprises-one, by Hooker, who was to cross at and march from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides to Wauhatchie, in the Lookout Valley; another, a night expedition to seize and hold the hills covering Brown's Ferry, on the southern side, and the laying of a pontoon bridge at that point, for the use of the Federal army in passing into the valley. Hooker, concentrating at Bridgeport, marched on the 26th of Oct. The enemy was found in small observing force along the route, These statements are of interest in view of but no serious opposition was offered to the The Movement into Lookout Valley. advance. Touching the tortuous river again at Whitesides, Hooker passed on to Waubatchie, in the valley, while Palmer's division, having marched from Chattanooga along the north bank of the Tennessee, crossed the river at Whitesides and remained there for reserve and support. Howard's corps (11th) entered Wauhatchie on the 28th, but, though much worried by the shot and shell of a rebel brigade holding Lookout Mountain, did not pause to dislodge the enemy, as it was first necessary to press on to Brown's Ferry and open communications with the second expeditionary force, of whose success Hooker was then fully informed. Geary's division of Slocum's corps (12th) was left in the village vicinity, with his line well thrown out along the road toward Kelley's Ford, three miles distant. That afternoon Howard's advance-after a sharp skirmish near the railway bridge on Lookout creek, in which a few men were lost-conjoined with the party at the ferry and then the way to and from Chattanooga was clear. The river expedition, under charge of Chief Engineer General W. F. Smith, was managed with celerity and skill. On the night of the 27th, Hazen's brigade dropped noiselessly down stream to Brown's Ferry. Keeping well under the northern shore the rebel pickets were not alarmed, and the expedition landed with a sudden rush at the ferry, seized the guard and soon held the high ground commanding the crossing. Not a man was lost in this adventure, and only a half dozen were wounded. The rest of Smith's force, crossing Moccasin point, opposite Chattanooga, advanced to the ferry, prepared to perfect the pontoon crossing in event of Hazen's suc The Night Attack on Geary. a night sally and surprise, hoping not only to disperse his men but to break through the lines and stampede the trains, Just after midnight, with a wild, prolonged yell-the rebel battle-cry-the enemy having stolen down and over the adjacent hills, swept away the guards, and were before the encampments ere the men could be called to arms. But, Geary was too cautious a soldier to be caught by a surprise. His camp was well guarded, as the enemy found to their cost. A rattling of musketry was quickly followed by the roar of artillery, and shot and shell went tearing through the air, completely sweeping the three points of attack. The assailants pressed heavily on the now compacted regiments, resolved to break the ranks and force the retreat, and the night battle, for a while, assumed threatening proportions. Geary conceived it to be an attack by the enemy in force, to cut off Hooker's line of retreat and to force a combat in the valley where the rebels held the vantage of the higher hills. The division commander acted with resolution; determined not to retire nor to yield a point until driven from it, he fought his men accordingly. The rebels worked,under cover of the darkness, around the Federal right flank, and succeeded in creating some commotion among the teamsters, but, this soon placed the assailants in peril, for Schurz' division, of Howard's command, bivouacking three miles further down the valley, came forward on the double quick, at sound of the guns; and Tyndall's brigade moved to the assault to sweep the enemy's position from the Federal left around to the right. Sustained by one of Steinwehr's brigades, led by Colonel Smith (Seventy-third Ohio), the assaulting column advanced in the darkness, over the unknown ground, to confront an enemy of untested strength; but, its spirit was perfect, and soon the rebel regiments were flying for security. By three o'clock the main struggle was over, and the gallant The enemy's infantry retiring over Lookout creek burned the railway bridge, and moved thence around the nose of Lookout Mountain | brigades held ground dotted with wounded to their encampment along Mission Ridge in the Chattanooga creek Valley. Stevenson's division of Longstreet's command, comprising the extreme Confederate left, perceiving Geary's comparative isolation, resolved upon and dead. One hundred and fifty of the enemy's killed, and over one hundred wounded were gathered when daylight permitted. The Confederates confessed to 361 casualties. Geary's loss, from the nature of the fight, it BRAGG AND GRANT'S PLOT AND COUNTER PLOT. 167 was to be supposed would have been larger | relief should come, and depended upon the than that of the assailants. Drawn up in well defined lines, and compelled to sustain the fire of a concealed foe, it was a matter of surprise that so few were lost. The Federal | general commanding reported his casualties, from the crossing of the Tennessee up to the occupancy of the valley as 76 killed; 339 wounded; 22 missing. Bragg's Plot and Grant's Counter-plot. further contingency of the arrival of Sherman's corps, without which the Federal army in and around Chattanooga was not strong enough for the flank movement and the conflict which must result. A careful survey of the ground and a due consideration of the hazards involved, determined the general plan, of which Burnside was informed by telegram, dated Nov. 7th. Sherman's corps, then slowly working its way along the rail track as he progressed, was ordered to cease repairs and to hasten his march to the scene of action; and such other measures were arranged as would further the adopted programme. The corps of Howard now fully occupied the west line of Lookout creek, and Grant was enabled to recuperate the almost exhaust-way from Memphis to Decatur, repairing the ed commissariat at Chattanooga. Oven ten thousand horses and mules, it is estimated, had been sacrificed to the exigencies of the situation, after the defeat of Sept. 20th-some killed in Chattanooga to avoid starvation, but most of them used up in dragging supplies over the dreadful roads over the Waldron hills and down the Sequatchie valley. Thus cleverly thwarted in his plans for starving the Union host out of the stronghold, Bragg had no alternative but to add to his defensive position along Missionary Ridge, and to hold his lines on the east as a means of offense against Burnside. The President of the Confederacy visited the Chickamauga battle-ground after the great battle of the 20th, to inquire into the condition of his army, to hear the complaints and defense of aggrieved parties, and to arrange with reference to the further prosecution of hostilities looking to the reoccupation of Tennessee. Among other schemes it is understood that he advised the detachment of Longstreet's command for a descent upon Knoxville, depending upon the general strength of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain to hold in check any Federal movement, and also counting upon an easy conquest and Longstreet's return before Grant could obtain strength enough to strike, if he was inclined to be aggressive. Learning of this prospective detachment, early in November, Grant immediately conceived the military counter-stroke of a descent on Bragg's right, to interpose between the detached and main army and insure Longstreet's destruction or his retreat into Virginia. This plan presupposed Burnside's ability to hold out against the enemy until But, the days sped too slowly for Sherman's coming, and too swiftly for Burnside's condition. Longstreet, sweeping in upon the Federal outposts, drove all before him, and was knocking at the gates of Knoxville, greatly to the alarm of the war office and the country, which conceived Grant virtually flanked by Longstreet's advance, while Nashville itself, it was not deemed improbable, might fall into rebel hands. Dispatches flew over the wires from Halleck to Grant, expressive of his nervous haste for Burnside's relief. Grant replied by telegraphing to Burnside (Nov. 14th) to hold on to East Tennessee, developing the more matured arrangements for Bragg's discomfiture and Longstreet's final defeat. "Every arrangement is now made," he said, "o throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of the Chickamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left, at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there rush a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will, at the same timo attack, and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favois us. The further to confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whitesides to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whitesides to Kelley's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up |