598 BUCHANAN'S MESSAGE. the question of slavery in the Southern States;" declared that the whole machinery of the Federal Government "for the distribution of remedial justice" had been demolished and put upon Congress the whole responsibility of saving the Union. The Southern States stood on the basis of the Constitution; the Northern States were the aggressors. Buchanan's suggestion of a remedy has already been given1 an amendment of the Constitution to make slave property more secure and to make Congress its national guardian and ceaseless protector. Congress responded by devoting the entire session to perfecting and passing such an amendment. When, on the fourth of December, 1860, the reading of the President's message was completed, Clingman, a Senator from North Carolina, in making the usual motion for printing, took opportunity to discuss the state of the country. The abolitionists, he said, having elected a President would soon control all departments of the government. Retaining the forms, this sectional party would revolutionize the country.2 But in sixty days a number of States would secede, and others were only deferring secession in hope of further guarantees. The South had no fear of the future. It was a country extensive enough to support three hundred millions of people. Its exports in 1859 were as many millions of dollars. A tariff of ten per cent would yield more than the Jackson administration had spent in its first year. A duty as small as this "would give life and impetus to mechanical and manufacturing industry throughout the entire South." Why should Northern Republicans wish to continue a connection with the South on any terms? "They declare African slavery to be a crime and that it must be abolished. 1 See p. 593. 2 Congressional Globe, December 4, 1860, pp. 3-4. BUCHANAN'S MESSAGE. 599 If we and they separate, their consciences will be freed from all responsibility for this sin. They want high tariffs, likewise. They may put five hundred per cent, if they choose, upon their own imports, and nobody on our side will complain. They may spend all the money they raise on railroads, or opening harbors without interference from us;-if they are sincere in their views, they ought to welcome a separation." This speech contributes to the great mass of evidence, that secession was attempted for other reasons than the perpetuation of African slavery. A protective tariff and a policy of internal improvements at national expense were almost as odious to the slavocrats as abolition itself.1 In the secession conventions much was said of the iniquity of protective tariffs and the iniquity of internal improvements, but it was discovered, early in the history of the Confederacy of 1861, that speeches of this kind did not fill the Richmond treasury, and that before most of them were printed, the Confederate Congress had passed a highly protective tariff act. Buchanan's message, full of contradictions, blowing hot and cold, lamenting, and breathing abstractions, was defended by no party and, saving its suggestions of an amendment to make the Constitution a more perfect slavocrat code, was the object of general attack by Southern members. Voices for the Union, its preservation and defense were few. Even the Republican Senators kept silent, for they knew the uselessness of speech in a chamber the majority of whose members were already secretly sworn to secession and their leaders foremost in a plot to over 1 Id., 4. See speeches on "The Power of Taxation," by Cochran, Dorgan, Humphries, Jerrison, Morgan, Watts, Whately, in Alabama Convention of 1861. See also Alexander A. Stephens' "Corner Stone" address, Savannah, Ga., March 21, 1861, in Johnston's American Orations III. 600 INTERPRETATION OF LINCOLN'S ELECTION. throw the Union. But the venerable John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky, whose service in the Senate began in 1817, when most of his present colleagues were schoolboys, boldly spoke sentiments that stirred echoes rarely disturbed in the Senate. "I do not agree," he said in direct answer to Clingman, "that there is no power in the President to preserve the Union. I will say that now. If we have a Union at all, and if, as the President thinks, there is no right to secede on the part of any State (and I agree with him in that), I think there is a right to employ our power to preserve the Union." Coming from one of the border States, upon whose action the fate of the Union depended, his words were ominous for disunionists. Lane, of Oregon, the late candidate for Vice-President, on the radical pro-slavery ticket,-declared that Lincoln's election conflicted with the equities of the Constitution and ought to be pronounced void; it stood for ideas inimical to fifteen States of the Union, deprived them of their equal rights to privileges in the territories and was an assurance of an "irrepressible conflict."2 Brown, of Mississippi, scorned the notion of war. Who could suppose that South Carolina and sympathizing States would make war upon the North? "All we ask is that we be allowed to depart in peace." If this was not allowed, then "war would be inevitable." "I should like to know," said Iverson, of Georgia, "where the power exists in the Constitution of the United States to authorize the Federal Government to coerce a sovereign State." The only fault in the President's message was its inconsistency in declaring the Federal Government to be a consolidated government instead of a voluntary asso 1 Congressional Globe, December 4, 1860, p. 5. 2 Id., December 5, p. 8. ■ Id., p. 10. SECESSION OUTLINED. 601 ciation of States. "I am satisfied that South Carolina will resolve herself into a separate, sovereign and independent State before the ides of January; that Florida and Mississippi, whose conventions are soon to meet, will follow the example of South Carolina; and that Alabama, proud daughter of my own State,-actuated by patriotism and pride, will follow this noble example which South Carolina will set to her sisters, and will go out of the Union on the seventh of January. Then the Georgia convention follows on the sixteenth of that month; and if those other surrounding States shall take the step, Georgia will not be behind; and before the fourth of March, before you inaugurate your President, there will be certainly five States, if not eight, that will be out of the Union and have formed a constitution and form of government for themselves. We intend to go out of this Union: I speak what I believe upon this floor that before the fourth of March, five of the Southern States, at least, will have declared their independence; and I am satisfied that three others of the Cotton States will follow as soon as the action of the people can be had. Arkansas, whose legislature is now in session, will, in all probability, call a convention at an early day. Louisiana will follow. Her legislature is to meet; and although there is a clog in the way of the Lone Star State of Texas in the person of her Governor, who will not consent to call her legislature together, and give the people of that State an opportunity to act, yet the public sentiment in that State is so decided in favor of this movement that even the Governor will be overridden; and if he does not yield to public sentiment, some Texas Brutus will arise to rid his country of the hoaryheaded incubus that stands between the people and their sovereign will. We intend to go out peacefully if we can, forcibly if we must.” 602 ASSASSINATION AND SECESSION. But he did not believe that the Federal Government would assume to attempt coercion, as the seceding States would draw all the Southern States after them.1 It must be recorded, in justice to truth, that Southern leaders, in 1860, did not all advocate assassination as a means of securing slavocracy and secession. Wigfall, of Texas, quickly corrected Brown. A State could secede, with or without cause, and the Federal Government could, with or without cause, declare war. "I have no apprehension," said he, replying pointedly to Brown's words, "that the dagger of a Brutus will relieve us from what he regards as an incubus upon that State. I think that the people are not in the habit of committing acts of assassination.” And then, with evident knowledge outlined the Texas program; "it may be that these people will be driven to revolution. It may be that, if their legislature is not called, they will meet in primary assembly, and of their own accord appoint delegates to a convention; and when they have done that, it will be for States which they offer to confederate with to decide whether they have a de facto government. A government de jure cannot be so formed, I know. But that violence will be done to any individual, I do not believe; nor do I believe that the Governor of that State will long persist in refusing to allow the people themselves to be heard and to declare whether they desire to remain longer confederated with abolition States." And he concluded with a simple explanation of secession. "We simply say that a man who is distasteful to us has been elected (President) and we choose to consider that as a sufficient ground for leaving the Union, and we intend to leave the Union.”2 Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, would make no remarks directly to the message. He said he was present as a 1 Id., pp. 10-12. 2 Id., p. 14. |