the public, calculated to keep up that interest in removing the veil from the secret history of that ill-starred enterprise. It will not be out of place at this time to correct a popular error which ascribes to the late King Leopold I the part of a promoter or instigator of the so-called Mexican empire. I have good reason to believe that the contrary is the fact; and I may say further, and upon high authority, that from the moment of the offer of the imperial crown to the Archduke Maximilian the King determined to exercise no influence upon him or his daughter in that connection. When the first overtures were made even, his Majesty said in familiar conversation that he did not believe they would favorably entertain them; and later, when Maximilian and the archduchess had the proposition under consideration, the King repeated again and again that his firm resolution was to leave them to act entirely in accordance with their own inclinations, and to abstain from counsel in either sense. any I deem it due to the memory of a great and good man, to whose enlightened and friendly interest in the United States the archives of this legation bear frequent testimony, to make this statement of record here, although the facts, communicated long since in a more informal manner, are not new to you. That the King in his paternal solicitude, after the determination of his children to undertake this perilous_adventure, favored the recognition of the "empire" and the formation of a Belgian legion of volunteers, who should serve as a protection for his daughter, is not to be gainsaid; but that he was directly or indirectly responsible for the scheme of a Mexican empire cannot with truth be ascribed to him in history. I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. No. 465.] Mr. Sanford to Mr. Seward. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: In my despatch No. 398 I had the honor to inform you that the Belgian government had appointed a commission, consisting of members of the senate and of the house of representatives and of generals and superior officers, for the purpose of inquiring into the most eligible means of reorganizing the army. The debates of the commission have just been collected and printed in a report of considerable extent. Before mentioning the suggestions and conclusions of the commission, it may be well to observe that the Belgian army, by the law of June 8th, 1853, is to consist, in case of war, of 100,000 men. But in reality the establishment had remained on the previous footing of 80,000 formed by yearly levies of 10,000, liable to eight years' service. With the exception of the artillery, which, for technical purpose, are kept longer under arms, the actual time of service does not exceed two years and a half, the discharged soldiers falling into the reserve, but liable to be recalled to active duty till the expiration of their eight years. The peace establishment, therefore, amounts to 25,000 men, from which deductions must of course be made for casualties, &c. The commission propose maintaining 100,000 men as the war establishment, that figure being considered indispensable for the security of the country. For this purpose, the yearly levy, consisting at present of 10,000 men, must be in creased to 13,000; so that on an emergency the war effective of 100,000, allowance being made for casualties, may be obtained by calling out all the eight years' levies. At present the army is raised by conscription, as in France. The commission propose maintaining the system, with the power of obtaining exemption from military service on condition of paying the government before drawing a sum of not less that 1,000 francs. This would in the opinion of the commission put an end to jobbing and other inconveniences attending the present system of substitutes, and from the relative high sum would bring a better class of men into the army as privates. The government, however, does not appear disposed to adopt this suggestion. With respect to the time of actual service, the commission propose, as at present, two years and a half, with seven months' additional service spread over the remaining five years and a half. In addition to the regular force of 100,000 men, the commission propose a reserve of 30,000 at most, supplied by the unmarried men and widowers of the first ban of the civic guard, (under 30 years of age.) But the commission do not seem to have come to a practical solution as to the best mode of putting this reserve on a war footing, and combining its operations with those of the army. The Belgian infantry consist of 16 regiments, viz: one regiment of grenadiers, two of chasseurs, one of carabiniers, and 12 of the line; in all 84 battalions, 68 active and 16 reserve, of 876 men, making in round numbers from 70,000 to 74,000 men, including officers, commissariat, punishment companies, &c. No essential change is proposed by the commission, except that the number of officers will have to be increased in order to meet the augmentation of the yearly levy raised, as has been above mentioned, from 10,000 to 13,000 men. The cavalry consists of seven regiments, viz: one of guides, four of lancers, and two of chasseurs; forming 38 squadrons, besides nine companies of gendarmes, in all 6,530 men. No alteration is proposed in this branch of the service. The only serious changes proposed refer to the artillery, which, in the opinion of the commission, requires to be considerably increased. It is well known that Belgium, at one time, was covered with fortified places, filling a conspicuous place in military and diplomatic history. For political and strategical reasons, it was decided in 1851, by a military commission whose labors were published two years afterwards, that the fortresses on the southern frontier and several in the centre of the kingdom should be demolished as useless and untenable, and that the national defence should be concentrated at Antwerp, that city to be covered by an entrenched camp of considerable extent, strengthened by a system of detached forts. Behind this bulwark the government, the houses, &c., might, in case of invasion, find a refuge under the protection of the army falling back on Antwerp, which place was to be rendered capable of sustaining a siege of six months at least. It was not, however, until 1859 that the legislature voted the sums required for carrying out this system of defence. Since that time the works have been carried on at Antwerp, and I have had frequent occasion to refer to discussions in Parliament respecting them. They are, in so far as relates to the original plan, about terminated; although for a complete system of defence, other works will be necessary in all probability. It is estimated on high authority that 15,000 artillerymen would be necessary to man these works. The Belgian artillery consists at present of four regiments, comprising 24 siege batteries and 19 field batteries, (4 horse and 15 mounted,) of eight guns each. The force on foot is stated in last year's estimates at 4,772 men, besides a regiment of engineers, (839 men,) field train, &c. The commission propose raising the artillery force to 15,394 men, of which 10,563 for Antwerp, and 1,650 for the fortresses of Diest and Termonde, serving as outworks to Antwerp, making for the three fortresses 12,213 men; the remain ing 3,181 men for the field artillery. The number of guns required for Antwerp is stated at 3,201. The commission propose forming 31 new siege batteries, which, added to the 24 existing ones, will make in all 55 batteries. The inspector general of artillery insisted on 64, but his opinion was not adopted by the majority of the commission. The field artillery, consisting at present of 152 pieces, distributed into 19 batteries of eight guns each, should consist, according to the commission, of 27 batteries, (5 horse and 22 mounted,) of six guns each, the latter number being adopted by the principal European powers, and even by Holland and Switzerland, since the introduction of rifled cannon. These changes would raise the number of artillery regiments from four to six. The annual budget for the war department amounts to about 35,000,000 francs, ($7,000,000.) Should the proposed changes be made, the additional annual cost to the treasury will be about $700,000; to the people 3,000 more conscripts annually, and the government will have its patronage increased by 1,000 more officers. This report is attracting a good deal of public attention, and opposition as well, but its suggestions in all probability will be in the main adopted. I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant, H. S. SANFORD. Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. Mr. Seward to Mr. Sanford. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, No. 234.] Washington, October 31, 1867. SIR: An absence of several days has delayed this acknowledgment of your despatch of the 30th of September, No. 457. It reopens in the records of the department a question which, although once a subject of profound concern, has now ceased to have a practical interest. Until the occurrence of the late illconceived European intervention in Mexico, the administration of the late King Leopold the First was not more highly distinguished for its wisdom in all other respects than it was for a just and enlightened consideration of the character and rights of the United States. It was with much pain, therefore, that this government saw the Belgian King lend recognition and a legion to establish in a neighboring country, on this continent, a system antagonistic to and incompatible with the permanent security and welfare of the United States. To Mexico, the United States, and the other republics of this continent, this proceeding of the King of the Belgians was not merely his own personal act; it was the effective act of the Belgian State. The only apology which has, or which can be offered for it, is one which least of all republics can be expected to accept. I mean the apology of parental affection on the part of the King, for the unsuccessful aspirant Maximilian. The part assumed by Belgium was a subordinate one. Enlightened statesmanship suggested to us that for this reason Belgium might be overlooked in the representations which were required to be made by the United States to France, the leading power of the intervention, nor is it my purpose now to dwell upon the great error of the first King Leopold's reign. Let it go before the tribune of impartial history. I am, sir, your obedient servant, HENRY S. SANFORD, Esq., &c., Brussels. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. DENMARK. No. 43.J Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: I do not make this paper a despatch, because it does not concern the internal or external affairs of Denmark, nor the relations between this government and the United States, and I leave it entirely to your better judgment whether the subject-matter or any of my observations in regard to it shall be laid before others having such matters particularly in their charge. The subject is the organization and management-the whole efficiency-of the foreign diplomatic service of the United States; and I propose, with your permission, to submit to your consideration some reflections which I deem pertinent to the public service, not impertinent for me to make, and which, in any event, I will be partially excused for making, by their having been constantly forced upon my attention during my short stay in Europe. It need hardly be remarked that the only rational object of the service is public utility; and it cannot be amiss for any citizen, more especially for one in that branch of the service, to point out what seems to him the means of increasing its efficiency and usefulness. 1 feel the more entirely at liberty to do this, as I did not expect, in accepting my present position, that I would hold it, or be expected to hold it, for more than a few years at most, and am, therefore, in no way obnoxious to the imputation that any of my reflections would have a tendency to benefit myself personally. I have no fear of any such unfounded criticism, and its possibility will not deter me from making such observations as I think just in themselves, and adapted at least to inciting an increased and impartial consideration of the subject. Prominent among my reasons for accepting a position so kindly tendered without solicitation were the probability of restored health and the facilities for pursuing a long-desired course of study, while constantly having in my mind the desire and the expectation of a future return to my profession. It is only too apparent that the American diplomatic service is regarded abroad as the least carefully organized and, as a necessary result, the least efficiently executed among all the great or highly civilized powers; and this opinion may be entertained and expressed by others without implying any reflection upon the gentlemen engaged in that service, at home or abroad, but as a fact arising entirely out of defective organization. Mr. Randolph has been censured for saying rather splenetically, and with more energy than grace, that Americans were "at the tail end" of the corps diplomatique in Europe. There was some petulance in the remark, and, as far as there is or was any truth in it, it may be safely affirmed that it is not the fault of the gentlemen sent abroad, but of the inherent and patent defect in the organization and conduct of our diplomatic service. The matter has frequently been the subject of conversation between myself and my very intelligent and friendly colleagues accredited to this court, and I have thus, as well as in many other ways, been led to observe wherein our service differs from that of other nations, and in what points of difference it would appear to be susceptible of improvement. One difference, perhaps the leading one, between our service and that of other powers, is the care they observe to secure the services, while young, of men supposed to be adapted to it, and to prepare and qualify them by a long course of experience and training for the intelligent and skilful discharge of its duties, and which contrasts, in a marked manner, with the casual and transient service of American diplomatic agents. European diplomats call it a profession, or, more commonly, a career, and of course to run the career well, it is necessary to know well its landmarks, its objects, its duties, and the most apt means of accomplishing these. A majority with whom I have conversed began, while quite young, as attachés, and were promoted gradually to second secretary, first secretary, chargé, minister, and envoy, a course of service embracing successive residences in various different capitals. Aside from the official experience thus acquired, which is certainly its greatest advantage, the familiarity with different languages, and with the manners of diplomatic society and of social intercourse among European officials, and the reach and accuracy of political views, acquired by a studious residence in different countries, are very great advantages. In speaking of qualifications for the diplomatic service, I wish especially to reject the idea that diplomacy is a lie; the art of polite and successful hypocrisy, of using language so as to conceal ideas; in short, of reaching any important end by finesse and strategy. In this the best and most successful practice would seem to corroborate the most approved advice, by demonstrating that entire sincerity and a properly guarded candor are, in the end, the best policy. To say that one ought to observe a due caution, a discreet reticence, use all proper and worthy means of acquiring information, and say and write no more than is necessary, is only to prescribe such rules as would serve one equally well in any other sphere of life as in the discharge of diplomatic functions. But diplomacy, no more than the profession of arms or of law, is not all learned on paper, and it is a service apart and distinct from an ordinary political experience, only a little less than the military service, and clearly not to be learned in a day or a year. I avow myself unable to conceive a greater or more apparent error in administration than the theory of rotation in office merely for the sake of rotation. It is extremely well for the public service that incumbents should be impressed that rotation will surely occur unless duties are well discharged. And in political offices irregular and frequent rotation must necessarily and often occur to give expression to the changed or dominant opinion of the constituency. This is a result of our institutions, and I profoundly believe in those institutions. But the idea of rapid rotation in ministerial offices is only a little less injurious, and scarcely any better founded, than rapid rotation on the bench; and the idea of frequent changes, in any department of the service, only with the view of gratifying a greater number of applicants with a taste of the supposed and unreal sweets of public official service, if good in its application to a short term of a few years, must be followed to its logical results, of a few months or even a few weeks; and it would thus become as ridiculous as disastrous, by always having a set of officers who are only learning their duties; who, as soon as they have learned them, or a little before, will give place to others who run the same short, and, to the government, unprofitable career. I have long been satisfied that upon this and the kindred subject of salaries the great body of the people are in advance of most of their public men, and that many errors upon the subject of short terms, rapid changes, and low salaries, done mainly because it is supposed such measures are demanded by the people, give the intelligent part of them real concern and displeasure. They want their affairs well managed, and are not ignorant of the advantages and necessity of experience. As to the minor advantages of experience, it is quite true that a man who is a gentleman in America is a gentleman everywhere; but, for all that, he will |