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III., Chancy of O., Cheatham of Tenn., Cilley of Me., Clai-❘ was finally relinquished; the states retaining Under the law of Maryland, in force in the exceeding two hundred dollars, with imprison.

borne of Miss., Clark of N. Y., Cleveland of Geo., Clowney of S. C., Connor of N. C., Corwin of O., Craig of Va., Crockett of Tenn., Cushman of Mass., Davee of Me., Deberry of N. C., Degraff of N. Y., Duncan of O., Elmore of S. C., Fairfield of Me., Foster of N. Y., Gallup of N. Y., Rice Garland of La., Gholson of Miss., Glascock of Geo., Grantland of Geo., Grant of N. Y., Gray of N. Y., Griffin of S. C., Hall of Vt., Hammond of Pa., Ilamer of O., Hastings of Mass., Hawkins of N. C., Henry of Pa., Herod of Ind., Holsey of Geo., Howard of Md., Robt. M. T. Hunter of Va., Ingham of Conn., Jabez Jackson of Geo., Jenifer of Md., Henry Johnson of La., James Johnson of Va., Nathaniel Jones of N. Y., Jno. W. Jones of Va., Kilgore of O., Legare of S. C., Leadbetter of O., Lewis of Ala., Logan of Pa., Andrew W. Loomis of N. Y., Lyon of Ala., Martin of Ala., Maury of Tenn., Maxwell of N. J., Robt. McClellan of N. Y., McClure of Pa., McKim of Md., Menefee of Ky., Montgomery of N. C., Morgan of Va., Matthias Morris of Pa., Samuel W. Morris of Pa., Murray, Naylor of Pa., Noble of N. Y., Owens of Geo., Palmer of N, Y., Parker of N. Y.. Parmeter of Mass., Petriken of Pa.. Phelps of Conn., Pickens of S. C., Plumer of Pa., Pope of Ky., Potts of Pa., Potter of Pa., Pratt of N. Y., Prentiss of N. Y., Rariden of Ind., Randolph of N. J., Rhett of S. C., Richardson of S. C., Ridgway of Ohio, Rumsey of Ky., Russell of N. Y., Sawyer of N. C., Sergeant of Pa., Sheffer of Pa., Agustine H. Shepherd of N. C., Chas. Sheppard of N. C. Shipler of O.. Slade of Vt., Smith of Me., Spencer of N. Y., Taylor of N. Y., Thomas of Md., Thompson of S. C., Titus of N. Y., Towns of Geo., Vail of N. Y.. Vanderveer of N. Y.,

Wagner of Pa., Webster of O., Weeks of N. IH.. Albert S. White of Ind., Elisha Whittlesey of O.. Thos. T. Whittlesey of Conn., Sherrod Williams of Ky., Worthington of Md., Yell of Arks.-131.

NAYS. Messrs. Adams of Mass., Aycrigg of N..J., Bieme of Va.. Bell of Tenn., Biddle of Pa., Birdsall of N. Y., Bond of O., Bouldin of Va., Brodhead of N. Y., Chambers of Ky., Chapman of Ala., Childs of N. Y., Coles of Va., Crary of Mich., Cranston of R. I., Curtis of N. Y., Cushing of Mass., Darlington of Pa., Dawson of Ga., Davies of Pa., Dennis of Md., Dromgoole of Va., Dunn of Ind., Edwards of N. Y., Evans of Me., Everett of Vt., Ewing of Ind., Farrington of N. II., Richard Fletcher of Vt., Fillmore of N. Y., Fry of Pa., Goode of O., Jas. Graham of N. C., Wm. Graham of Ind., Graves of Ky., Grennell of Mass., Haley of Conn.. Halstead of N. J., Harlan of Ky., Harrison of Mo., Harper of O., Hawes of Ky., Haynes of Ga., Hoffman of N. Y., Holt of Conn., Hubley of Me., Wm. II. Hunter of O., Thos. B. Jackson of N. Y., Wm. Cost. Johnson of Md., Kemble of N. Y., Klingensmith of Pa., Lincoln of Mass., Arphaxed Loomis of N. Y., Mallory of Va., Marvin of N. Y., Jas. M. Mason of Va., Samson Mason of O., McKay of N. C., Abraham McClellan of Tenn., McKennan of Pa., Mercer of Va., Milligan of Del., Miller of Mo., Moore of N. Y., Calvary Morris of O., Muhlen

berg of Pa., Noyes of Me., Ogle of Pa., Patterson of N.Y.,

Paynter of Pa., Pearce of Md., Peck of N. Y., Pennybacker of Va., Phillips of Mass., Reed of Mass., Reiley of Pa., Rencher of N. C., Rives of Va., Robertson of Va., Shields of Tenn., Southgate of Ky., Stanby of N. C., Stuart, Taliaferro of Va., Tillinghast of R. I., Sibley of N. Y., Snyder of Ill., Toland of Pa., Toucey of Conn., Turney of Tenn., Underwood of Ky., John White of Ky., Lewis Williams of N. C.,

Jared W. Williams of N. II.. Joseph L. Williams of Tenn., Christopher H. Williams of Tenn., Wise of Va., Yorke of N.

J.-90.

Col. Benton says: "The three instalments already delivered were not to be recalled until Congress should so order, and it was quite certain it would never so order. At the same time the nominal discretion of Congress over the deposite of the remainder was denied, and the duty of the Secretary made peremptory to deliver it in the brief space of one year and a quarter from that time. But events frustrated that order. The treasury was in no condition on the 1st day of January, 1839, to deliver that amount of money. It was penniless itself. The compromise act of 1833, making periodical reductions in the tariff, until the whole duty was reduced to an ad valorem of twenty per cent., had nearly run its course, and left the treasury in the condition of a borrower instead of that of a donor or lender of money. The fourth instalment could not be delivered at the time appointed, nor subsequently, and

the amount they had received.

At the third session of the 34th Congress, Mr. Campbell of O., from the Committee of Ways and Means, reported the following bill:A bill to provide for the deposite of the surplus in the Treasury of the United States with the several states.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. Tist the money which shall be in the Treasury of the United States on the first day of July. 1857, reserving the sum of $2,000,000, shall be deposited with such of the several states, in proportion to their respective representation in the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, as shall by law authorize their treasurers or other competent autho rities to receive the same on the terms hereinafter specified; and the Secretary of the Treasury shall deliver the same to such treasurers or other competent authorities on receiving certificates of deposite therefor, signed by such competent authorities, in such form as may be prescribed by the Sec retary aforesaid: which certificates shall express the usual and legal obligations and pledge the faith of the state for the safe-keeping and repayment thereof, and shall pledge the faith of the states receiving the same to pay the said moneys and every part thereof, from time to time, whenever the same shall be required by the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of uefraying any wants of the public Trea sury beyond the amount of the two millions aforesaid: Provided, That if any state deciines to receive its proportion of the surplus aforesaid on the terms before named, the same shall be deposited with the other states agreeing to accept the same on deposite in the proportion aforesaid: And provided further, That when said money, or any part thereof, shall be wanted by the said Secretary to meet appropriations by law, the same shall be called for, in rateable proportions. within one year, as nearly as conveniently may be, from the different states with which the same is deposited, and shall not be called for in sums exceeding $10,000 from any one state, in any one month, without previous notice of thirty days for every additional sum of $20,000 which may at any time be required.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted. That the said deposites shall be made with the said states in the following propor tions and at the following terms, to wit: one half part on the first day of July, 1857, and one-half part on the first day of October, 1857.

Mr. Orr called for the yeas and nays on the passage of the bill.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and it was decided in the affirmative-yeas 119, nays 79; as follows:

YEAS.-Messrs. AKERS, Albright, Allison, Ball, Henry Bennett, Benson, Bingham, Bishop, Bocock, Bowie, Bradshaw, Branch, Brenton, BROOM, Burlingame, James H. Campbell, JOHN P. CAMPBELL, Lewis D. Campbell, Caskie, Ezra Clark, Clawson, Clingman, Colfax, Covode, Cox, Cragin, Craige, CULLEN, Cumback, HENRY WINTER DAVIS, Timothy Davis, Dean, Dick, Dickson, Dodd, DUNN, Durfee, Edie, Faulkner, Flagler, HENRY M. FULLER, Galloway, Harlan, J. MORRISON HARRIS, HARRISON, HAVEN, Hodges, HOFFMAN, Holloway, Thomas R. Horton, Valentine B. Horton, Howard, Hughston, Keliy, Kelsey, KENNETT, King, Knapp, Knight, Knowlton, Knox, Kunkel, ALEXANDER K. MARSHALL, HUMPHREY MARSHALL, McCarty, McMullin, Killian Miller, Millson, Millward, Pennington, Perry, PORTER, Pringle, PURVIANCE, PURYEAR, Moore, Morgan, Morrill, Murray, Norton, Paine, Parker, READY, RICAUD, Ritchie, Robbins, Roberts, Robinson, Ruffin, Sabin, Sage, Sapp. Scott, Sherman, Simmons, William Smith, SNEED, Stanton, Stewart, Stranahan, SWOPE, Tappan, Thor ington, Thurston, Tyson, UNDERWOOD, VALK, Wade, Wakeman, Walbridge, Waldron, Elihu B. Washburne, Israel Washburne, Welch, Williams, Winslow, Wood, Woodruff, ZOLLICOFFER. 119.

NAYS.-Messrs. Aiken. Allen, Barbour, Barclay, Hendley S. Bennett, Billinghurst, Boyce, Buffington, Burnett, Cadwala der, CARLILE, Curuthers, Chaffee, Williamson R. W. Cobb, Comins, Crawford, Damrell, Davidson, Jacob C. Davis, Day, Denver, Dowdell, Elliott, EUSTIS, EVANS, Florence, FOSTER, Thomas J. D. Fuller, Garnett, Goode, Greenwood, Augustus Hall, Sampson W. Harris, Thomas L. Harris, Herbert, Hous ton, Jewett, George W. Jones, J. Glancy Jones, Kidwell, LAKE, * Does not profess to be a Democrat, but supported Mr.

Buchanan.

Leiter, Letcher, Lumpkin, Mace, Samuel S. Marshall, Maxwell, Mc Queen, Smith Miller, Morrison, Mott, Nichols, Andrew Oliver, Orr, Packer, Peck, Pettit, Powell, Quitman, Sandidge, Savage, Seward, Shorter, Samuel A. Smith, WIL LAM R. SMITH, Spinner, Talbott, Taylor, Trafton, Vail, Walker, Warner, Cadwalader C. Washburne, Watson, Wells, Wheder, Woodworth, Daniel B. Wright, John V. Wright.-19. Fillmore Americans in small caps; Republicans in roman; Democrats in italics.

So the bill was passed.

Mr. Campbell of O. moved to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed, and also moved to lay the motion to reconsider on the table; which latter motion was agreed to. Pending the vote,

Mr. Smith of Va. said: Protesting against the policy which creates the necessity of this act, and compels me to vote for it, I vote "ay." Mr. Etheridge stated that if he had been present when his name was called, he would have voted "ay."

The bill was not acted on by the Senate.

Distribution of Proceeds of Public Lands. See PUBLIC LANDS.

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Resolved, That any law enacted by Congress, in pursuance of the Constitution, should be respected as such by all good and law-abiding citizens; and should be faithfully carried into effect by the officers charged with its execution.

Resolved, That so long as the Constitution of the United States provides, that all persons held to service or labor in one state, escaping into another state, "shall be delivered up on the claim of the party to whom the service or labor

may be due," and so long as members of Congress are required to take an oath to support the Constitution, it is their solemn and religious duty to pass all laws necessary to carry that provision of the Constitution into effect.

Resolved, that if we desire to preserve the Union, and render our great republic inseparable and perpetual, we must perform all our obligations under the Constitution, at the same time that we call upon our brethren in other states to yield implicit obedience to it.

Resolved, That as the lives, property, and safety of ourselves and our families depend upon the observance and protection of the laws, every effort to excite any portion of our population to make resistance to the due execution of

the laws of the land, should be promptly and emphatically Resolved, That we will stand or fall by the American Union and its Constitution, with all its compromises; with its glorious memories of the past and precious hopes of the future.

condemned by every good citizen.

[The following was offered in addition by B. S. Morris, and also adopted:]

Resolved, That we, the people of Chicago, repudiate the resolutions, passed by the common council of Chicago, upon the subject of the fugitive slave law passed by Congress at its last session.

The resolutions of the council referred to were as follows:

Whereas, The Constitution of the United States provides

Whereas, The late act of Congress, purporting to be for the recovery of fugitive slaves, virtually suspends the habeas corpus and abolishes the right of trial by jury, and by its provisions, not only fugitive slaves, but white men, "owing service" to another in another state, viz., the apprentice, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer engaged on contract or otherwise, whose terms of service are unexpired, may be captured and carried off summarily, and without legal resource of any kind; and,

Whereas, No law can be legally or morally binding on us which violates the provisions of the Constitution; and, Whereas, Above all, in the responsibilities of human life,

and the practice and propagation of Christianity, the laws of God should be held paramount to all human compacts

and statutes: Therefore,

Resolved, That the Senators and Representatives in Congress from the free states, who aided and assisted in the passage of this infamous law, and those who so basely sneaked away from their seats, and thereby evaded the question, richly merit the reproach of all lovers of freedom, and are fit only to be ranked with the traitors. Benedict

Arnold and Judas Iscariot, who betrayed his Lord and

Master for thirty pieces of silver.

And Resolved, That the citizens, officers, and police of the

city be, and they are hereby, requested to abstain from any

and all interference in the capture delivering up of the fugitive from unrighteous oppression, of whatever nation, name, or color.

Resolved, That the fugitive slave law lately passed by Congress is a cruel and unjust law, and ought not to be respected by any intelligent community, and that this council will not require the city police to render any assistance for the arrest of fugitive slaves.

YEAS.-Ald. Milliken, Loyd, Sherwood, Foss, Throop, Sherman, Richards, Brady, and Dodge. NAYS.-Ald. Page and Williams.

On the succeeding night the common council of the city repealed their nullifying resolution by a vote of 12 to 1.

Drayton and Sayres Pardon.

In the year 1848 the city of Washington was startled by the announcement that a very large number of its slave population had absconded upon the same night. Suspicion was directed against a particular vessel which had left the port of Washington; it was pursued and overtaken, and concealed under hatches were found seventy-three slaves belonging to citizens of the District of Columbia and of the states of Maryland and Virginia. The vessel was in charge of three white men from the North. The slaves and the kidnappers were brought back to the city and placed in prison. prison.

The following record shows the action of the Criminal Court in the case :Criminal Court of the District of Columbia, for the county of Washington. March term, 1849.

United States

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May 8. Convicted of transporting slaves in 73

Daniel Drayton.) cases, and sentenced by the court in each case to pay a fine of $140 and costs, one half of the fine to the owner of the slaves, according to the act of Md. of 1796, ch. 67.

Ordered to be committed to the jail of Washington county till fines and costs are paid.

Same number of cases v. Edward Sayres, and fined $100 and costs in each, and committed as above. Test:

JOHN A. SMITH, Clerk.

that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be District of Columbia, the penalty is a fine not suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it; and,

ment in the county jail as the alternative of | I cannot advise that this power is of greater

non-payment. This act was passed in 1796. The court did not impose the maximum fine in either case, one-half of which, under the terms of the law, enured to the owners of the slaves, and the other to the "commissioners of the county." The costs belonged to the United States, by whom all the expenses of the prosecution had been paid.

They remained in jail four years, when Mr.

Fillmore pardoned them.

Record of pardon. Criminal Court of the District of Columbia for the county of Washington: United States v. Daniel Drayton. August 12, 1852.-Discharged from by the President of the United States, Millard

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Under these statutes, Daniel Drayton and Edward Sayres were severally indicted, in the Criminal Court for the District of Columbia and county of Washington, in many cases, for transporting various slaves, the property of persons residing in the city of Washington, Georgetown, and the county of Washington, to the number of fifty or sixty slaves or more. The slaves were transported in a vessel which was pursued by some of the inhabitants of the District, overtaken in the Chesapeake

scope and extent than that vested in the King of Great Britain, as a branch of the royal prerogative, and as understood and exercised in that country from time immemorial.

I cannot advise that your power of pardon, as President of the United States, extends to any portion of the several fines imposed by the judgments against Drayton and Sayres. The imprisonment is to compel payment of the fines, and not to be released by the power of granting pardons, any more than the fines themselves.

If the power of granting pardons had been,

in practice, applied to the release of the portion of fines, penalties, and forfeitures, which, by the laws of the United States, are directed to be distributed to individuals, the question

of such a power would have been brought

before the judiciary, and into the Supreme Court of the United States, for final adjudication: the individuals, deprived of their interests by such pardons, would not have suffered their losses to go by default, without seeking the opinion of the judiciary. In the long series of sixty years and more, during which which the Fede Federal Constitution has been in operation, that no such question has been brought into the Supreme Court of the United States, leads rationally to the conclusion that no one of your predecessors in office (twelve in number), during the whole operations of the Constitution and laws of the United States, has exercised the power of pardon, by way of remitting or releasing a private right or interest in a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, accrued under laws of the United States, and consummated by judgment or condemnation. The non-user of such a power in any instance, during such a great length of time, and under such multiplied prosecutions, lays the foundation for rational belief that your predecessors

Bay, and the vessel, slaves, and the offenders, in office have construed the Constitution as were brought back to the city of Washington. not conferring such a power; as limiting and

Upon the convictions on the several indictments, the court pronounced judgments for fines in various sums, under two hundred dollars each and costs; amounting in all the several convictions of the two offenders to upwards of $18,000.

The cases of Daniel Drayton and Edward Sayres are convictions under a law, which gave one half of the penalties for its violation to the parties aggrieved, and the other half to the use of the county. The judgments are so given and recorded. According to the uniform and unbroken current of opinions pronounced by the sages of the common law of England, the prerogative power of pardon, vested in the crown of Great Britain, and exercised from time immemorial, does not comprehend such cases as those of Drayton and Sayres.

I have given you a citation of the decisions in the courts of the United States, bearing upon the power of granting pardons, as vested by the Constitution of the United States in the President.

confining the prerogative power of pardon by the principles of the common law; and as not conferring on the President of the United States a more extensive power than the prerogative of granting pardons, vested in the king by the British constitution.

Having given my advice and opinion on the question as propounded to me, with the reasons and authorities on which my opinion has been formed, it remains for you, in your highest trust and better judgment, to decide for yourself this very important question of constitutional law.

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the length to which they have been already extended; and will close by a simple and brief statement of the conclusions to which my mind has been brought, and which seem to me to be sustained by the remarks and authorities I have hereinbefore presented. They are:

First-That the pardoning power of the President extends over the whole case of Drayton and Sayres; and that, by his pardon, he may discharge them from prison, and remit the fines for which they were imprisoned.

Second-That if the President cannot remit the fines in this case, because they have become private property, he can still pardon and release the offending parties from imprisonment, because that is part of the proceedings against them, as criminals, and at the instance of the United States, and is a thing distinct from any individual right of property

in the fines.

Third-That the President may pardon the offence and imprisonment, with an exception or saving as to the fines; in which case, as I suppose, the fines would remain as a debt to the United States, or to those to whom the United States had granted or transferred it; and would be recoverable accordingly by the appropriate legal remedies. And such remedies I suppose, the distributees of the fines, in this case, will have, if they are entitled to any absolute right or property in said fines.

It has been my intention to confine my remarks exclusively to the question of your constitutional power to pardon, a question of much greater or graver consequence than the disposition to be made of this particular case. Whether that power should be exercised, in this instance, is another and very different question, not referred to me, and on which it is not my intention or province to pronounce here any opinion, though I shall be quite ready to express my sentiments on that subject also, whenever it may be proper for me to do so.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully yours,
J. J. CRITTENDEN.

To the President.

Dred Scott Case.

OPINIONS OF THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES THEREON.

Dred Scott, Plaintiff in Error, v. John F. A. Sanford.This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Missouri.

It was an action of trespass vi et armis instituted in the Greuit Court by Scott against Sandford.

Prior to the institution of the present suit, an action was brought by Scott for his freedom in the Circuit Court of St. Louis county (State Court), where there was a verdict and judgment in his favor. On a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State, the judgment below was reversed, and the case remanded to the Circuit Court, where it was continued to await the decision of the case now in question.

The declaration of Scott contained three counts: one, that Sandford had assaulted the plaintiff; one, that he had astaulted Harriet Scott, his wife; and one, that he had Assaulted Eliza Scott and Lizzie Scott, his children. Sandford appeared, and filed the following plea:

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And the said John F. A. Sandford, in his own proper per

son, comes and says, that this court ought not to have or says that said cause of action, and each and every of them (if any such have accrued to the said Dred Scott), accrued to Dred Scott of jurisdiction of this and

take cognisance of the action aforesaid, because he

exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Courture the state of Missouri, for that, to wit: the said plaintiff, Dred Scott, is not a citizen of the state of Missouri, as alleged in his decanation because he stated in his ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves, and this the said Sandford is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays judgment, whether this court can or will take further cognisance of the action aforesaid. JOHN F. A. SANDFORD.

To this plea there was a demurrer in the usual form, which was argued in April, 1854, when the court gave judgment that the demurrer should be sustained.

In May, 1854, the defendant, in pursuance of an agreement between counsel, and with the leave of the court,

pleaded in bar of the action:

1. Not guilty.

2. That the plaintiff was a negro slave, the lawful property of defendant, and, as the defendant gently

paid his hands upon him, and thereby had only restrained

him, as the defendant had a right to do.

3. That with respect to the wife and daughters of the plaintiff, in the second and third counts of the declaration

mentioned, the defendant had, as to them, only acted in the same manner, and in virtue of the same legal right.

In the first of these pleas, the plaintiff joined issue; and to the second and third, filed replications alleging that the defendant, of his own wrong and without the cause in his secon'l and third pleas alleged, committed the trespasses. &c. The counsel then filed the following agreed statement of facts, viz.:

In the year 1834, the plaintiff was a nezro slave belong

ing to Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in the army of the the plaintiff from the state of Missouri to the military post

United States. In that year, 1834, said Dr. Emerson took

at Rock Island, in the state of Illinois, and held him there as a slave until the month of April or May, 1836. At the

time last mentioned, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff from said military post at Rock Island to the military post

at Fort Snelling, situate on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in the territory known as Upper Louisiana, acquired by the United States of France, and situated north of the

latitude of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and north of the state of Missouri, Said Dr. Emerson held the

plaintiff in slavery at Fort Snelling, from said last-mentioned date until the year 1838.

In the year 1835, Harriet, who is named in the second count of the plaintiff's declaration, was the negro slave of Major Taliaferro, who belonged to the army of the United States. In that year, 1835, said Major Taliaferro took said Harriet to said Fort Snelling, a military post, situated as hereinbefore stated, and kept her there as a slave until the year 1836, and then sold and delivered her as a slave at said Fort

Snelling unto the said Dr. Emerson hereinbefore named. Said Dr. Emerson held said Harriet in slavery at said Fort Snelling until the year 1838.

In the year 1836, the plaintiff and said Harriet, at said Fort Snelling, with the consent of said Dr. Emerson, who then claimed to be their master and owner, intermarried, and took each other for husband and wife. Eliza and Lizzie, named in the third count of the plaintiff's declaration, are the fruit of that marriage. Eliza is about fourteen years old, and was born on board the steamboat Gipsey, north of the north line of the state of Missouri, and upon the river Mississippi. Lizzie is about seven years old, and was born in the state of Missouri, at the military post called Jefferson Barracks.

In the year 1838, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff and said Harriet, and their said daughter Eliza, from said Fort Snelling to the state of Missouri, where they have ever since resided.

Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff, said Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the defendant, as slaves, and the defendant has ever since claimed to hold them, and each of them, as slaves.

At the times mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration, the defendant, claiming to be owner as aforesaid, laid his hands upon said plaintiff, Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, and imprisoned them, doing in this respect, however, no more than what he might lawfully do, if they were of right his slaves at such times.

Further proof may be given on the trial for either party. It is agreed that Dred Scott brought suit for his freedom in the Circuit Court of St. Louis county; that there was &

verdict and judgment in his favor; that on a writ of error the Supreme Court the judgment below reversed, the same remanded to the Circuit Court, where it has been

continued to await the decision of this case.

In May, 1854, the cause went before a jury, who found the following verdict, viz.: "As to the first issue joined in this case, we of the jury find the defendant not guilty; and as to the issue secondly above joined, we of the jury find that, before and at the time when, &c., in the first count mentioned, the said Dred Scott was a negro slave, the lawful property of the defendant; and as to the issue thirdly above joined, we, the jury, find that, before and at the time when, &c., in the second and third counts mentioned, the

said Harriet, wife of said Dred Scott, and Eliza and Lizzie,
the daughters of the said Dred Scott, were negro slaves, the
lawful property of the defendant."

Whereupon, the court gave judgment for the defendant.
After an ineffectual motion for a new trial, the plaintiff

filed the following bill of exceptions.

On the trial of this cause by the jury, the plaintiff, to maintain the issues on his part, read to the jury the following agreed statement of facts (see agreement above). No further testimony was given to the jury by either party. Thereupon the plaintiff moved the court to give to the jury the following instruction, viz.:

"That, upon the facts agreed to by the parties, they ought to find for the plaintiff. The court refused to give such instruction to the jury, and the plaintiff, to such refusal, then and there duly excepted."

on motion of the defendant:

The court then gave the following instruction to the jury, "The jury are instructed, that upon the facts in this case, the law is with the defendant." The plaintiff excepted to

this instruction.

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not a citizen of the state of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, being a negro of African descent, whose ancestors were of pure African blood, and who were brought into this country and sold as slaves.

To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the defendant joined in demurrer. The court overruled the plea, and gave judgment that the defendant should answer over. And he thereupon put in sundry pleas in bar, upon which issues were joined; and at the trial the verdict and judgment were in his favor. Whereupon the plaintiff brought this writ of error.

Before we speak of the pleas in bar, it will be proper to dispose of the questions which have arisen on the plea in abatement.

That plea denies the right of the plaintiff to sue in a court of the United States for the reasons therein stated.

If the question raised by it is legally before us, and the court should be of opinion that the facts stated in it disqualify the plaintiff from becoming a citizen, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, then the judgment of the Circuit Court is erroneous, and must be reversed.

It is suggested, however, that this plea is not before us; and that as the judgment in the court below on this plea was in favor of the plaintiff, he does not seek to reverse it, or bring it before the court for revision by his writ of error; and also that the defendant waived this defence by pleading over, and thereby admitted the jurisdiction of the court.

But, in making this objection, we think the peculiar and limited jurisdiction of courts of

This case has been twice argued. After the argument at the last term, differences of opinion were found to exist among the members of the court; and as the questions in controversy are of the highest importance, and the court was at that time much pressed by the ordinary the United States has not been adverted to. business of the term, it was deemed advisable This peculiar and limited jurisdiction has to continue the case, and direct a re-argument made it necessary, in these courts, to adopt

on some of the points, in order that we might have an opportunity of giving to the whole subject a more deliberate consideration. It has accordingly been again argued by counsel, and considered by the court; and I now proceed to deliver its opinion.

There are two leading questions presented by the record:

1. Had the Circuit Court of the United States jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between these parties? And

2. If it had jurisdiction, is the judgment it has given erroneous or not?

The plaintiff in error, who was also the plaintiff in the court below, was, with his wife and children, held as slaves by the defendant, in the state of Missouri; and he brought this action in the Circuit Court of the United States for that district, to assert the title of himself and his family to freedom.

The declaration is in the form usually adopt ed in that state to try questions of this description, and contains the averment necessary to give the court jurisdiction; that he and the defendant are citizens of different states; that is, he is a citizen of Missouri, and the defend

ant a citizen of New York.

The defendant pleaded in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court, that the plaintiff was

different rules and principles of pleading, so far as jurisdiction is concerned, from those which regulate courts of common law in England, and in the different states of the Union which have adopted the common law rules. In these last-mentioned courts, where their character and rank are analogous to that of a Circuit Court of the United States; in other words, where they are what the law terms courts of general jurisdiction; they are presumed to have jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears. No averment in the pleadings of the plaintiff is necessary, in order to give jurisdiction. If the defendant objects to it, he must plead it specially, and unless the fact on which he relies is found to be true by a jury, or admitted to be true by the plaintiff, the jurisdiction cannot be disputed in an appellate court.

Now, it is not necessary to inquire whether in courts of that description a party who pleads over in bar, when a plea to the jurisdiction has been ruled against him, does or does not waive his plea; nor whether upon a judgment in his favor on the pleas in bar, and a writ of error brought by the plaintiff, the question upon the plea in abatement would be open for revision in the appellate court. Cases that may have been decided in

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