our ‘ volitivity ’,) is neither French nor English, but a misera_ ble hybrid or mongrel. If it were French, it would be Theodicée ,' as every one ought to know, who has ever heard of Leibnitz’s great Essais de Théodicée. If, on the other hand, it were English, then, according to every dictionary of the language, whether good, bad, or indifferent, it would be Theodicy. But what cares our learned author for either French or English? In pure, simple Whedonese, it is Theodice. Blessed be the man who first invented speech! and glory to the man who, in this year of Grace 1871, so boldly contests the blessed privilege and honor with hin1! We have heard of a certain genius, who was always trying to be original in every thing, and yet never succeeded in any thing-except his orthography. Now this is not the case with our author. He is as original in his philosophy, as he is in his dietion; in the style of his thought, as in the style of his language In the preface to his work, he lays claim to originality of thought; and we concede the claim. ‘ The present writer ’, says he, ‘would not offer this treatise to the public did he not believe that even to so ancient a debate he had furnished some new thoughts, and brought the ditliculty nearer to a solution ’. He has, in fact, brought many ‘ new thoughts’ to the very ancient debate about ‘ free-will, foreknowledge, and fate ’, as well as many ‘true thoughts ’. But then, unfortunately, his ‘true thoughts are not new thoughts, and his new thoughts are not true thoughts ’. Hence, instead of bringing the great ‘ difiiculty nearer to a solution ’, he has set it back, at least, a hundred degrees on the dial of human progress. The great difiiculty in question hinges, and turns, on our ideas respecting' the nature of holiness and of sin. Hence, show us a man’s ideas on these subjects, and we will tell you whether he is prepared, or fit, to handle the great diHiculties pertaining to a Theodiey. If such are his views of the nature of holiness and sin, that he believes them to be necessitated in us by causes over which we have no control; then he can never escape the darkness, the confusion, and the profound entanglements of a Leibnitz and an Edwards. If he believes that God, in the exercise of his omnipotence, is the cause of sin ; then he cannot

vindicate the purity of his character, or reconcile his holiness with the existence of moral evil. On the other hand, if his ideas of holiness and sin are suiiiciently clear and correct, to render it impossible for him to conceive of them as resulting from necessitating causes beyond our control; then he may, by patient, close, and consecutive thought, reconcile the holiness of God with the existence of moral evil. But in regard to this great fundamental question Dr. \Vhedon is, as we shall presently see, distinctly and decidedly on both sides of the controversy. It is precisely at this point,-the point on which the whole controversy hinges,-that his originality throws him off the track of truth, and sends him whirling through a chaos of profound originalities. His great discovery,-perhaps the most original of the nineteenth century,-that there is a sin which does not deserve blame, or punishment, is the original blunder which shatters his scheme, (if scheme it may be called,) and plunges him into an abyss of absurdities. It may seem incredible that any man, much less a philosopher, should have discovered, in the year of our Lord 1871, not only a holiness without merit, but also a sin without demerit,-not only a holiness that is not praiseworth y or rewardable, but also a sin that is not blameworthy or punishable. Hence, in order to remove all possibility of doubt on the subject, we shall set forth this great discovery in the words of Dr. Whedon himself ‘There may be ’, says he, (page 385,) ‘ disconformity to law, unrighteousness, evil, moral evil, sin, sinfulness, all without responsibility, guilt, ill-de_sert,just condemmzlity, or punishment ’. Now, surely, this is something new under the sun,-a sin without guilt or ill-desert! a sin that deserves no punishment! But this new thing, is only one of Dr. Whedon’s ‘new thoughts ’. Again, he says, ‘ Should God create an automatic fiend; a being whose perceptions were, indeed, true, but whose emotions were purely and with perfect intensity, yet automatically malignant; and whose volitions were, with all their strength, automatically bad ; we should hate such a being and wish it out of the way. We might still admire its vicious perfection.(?) Yet, when we had indulged our abhorrence of it, and come to remark its

automism, we should see that, though bad, it was unblamably bad. Its volitions, being as necessitated, are as irresponsible as the springs of a gun-lock. . . . The sum of all which is, a necessitated depravity, (the italics are his) is no responsible or justly punishable depravity. ’ It is bad, it is depravity, it is sin; but it is a very innocent sort of sin, and deserves no 6ort of punishment whatever! Though it is as malignant as hell, it is as innocent as a dove! A fiend—a real fiend—raging with the dire malignity of its kind; and yet not at all punishable! It is bad, horribly bad; but there is no demerit in its badness! And why? Because God, and not itself, is, ex hypothesi, the author of its existence, and of all its badness, all its malignity, all its wickedness. If so, then there is no badness in the case, no malignity, no sin, no moral evil, except what is, ex hypothesi, imputed to God. We shall, again, have occasion to notice this very innocent fiend of Dr. "Whedon.

In the meantime, let us see how he arrives at this great discovery of the nineteenth century. He does not reach it per saltern, but by slow and philosophical degrees. As Newton took five steps—each in itself a great discovery—in order to reach the grand climax of all, the most sublime discovery ever made by man; so Dr. Whedon reaches, by a series of approximations, his most wonderful discovery. From the plain, dull level of ordinary men, he travels up the steps of his most curiously constructed metaphysical ladder, till he reaches, at last, the awful abode of his divinely-constituted, and divinely-governed, innocent fiend. Now, we propose to follow Dr. Whedon, Titan though he be, and, marking each step he takes, see whether he really discovers a horribly malignant, innocent fiend, or merely a mare's nest.

His first step is a learned definition of 'an automaton'. The object is, to illustrate the ' distinction between automatic excellence and moral desert'. We have always supposed, that there was a Blight intrinsic difference between automatic excellence,—the excellence of a machine merely,—and moral goodness, or virtue, or holiness. But Dr. Whedon is of a different opinion. He finds moral goodness, virtue, holiness, in a machine; he only insists that this sort of moral goodness, virtue, or holiness, is not praiseworthy or rewardable. In like manner, he finds moral badness, depravity, sin, in a machine; but he protests, in behalf of the machine, that its moral badness, depravity, sin, is not blameworthy or punishable. Now, we agree with him in this last half of his proposition ;, but we cannot swallow the first half. For we shall soon see, that his doctrine is neither Arminianism nor Calvinism, but a miserable hybrid, or mixture, in which the Calvinism spoils the Arminianism, and the Arminianism spoils the Calvinism.

But, meanwhile, we must look at his definition of ' an automaton '. 'An automaton', says he, ' is a machine, constructed sometimes in the human form, whose parts, by force of interior springs, are made to operate apparently like a human system, with self-motion. The movement of the parts is necessitatively caused to take place, in precise proportion and direction of the forces applied. When the whole is artistically framed, we admire the beauty, the ingenuity, and perhaps the imitation, that is, the automatic excellence. But we attribute not to its action or its being the slightest intrinsic quality of moral merit or demerit \l That is to say, and say truly, that we do not regard the machine as at all meritorious and praiseworthy, or as at all rewardable on account of its excellence. By the terms ' moral merit or demerit', the reader might, perhaps, suppose that Dr. Whedon means moral good or evil; but he does riot anywhere use the terms in this sense. By ' moral merit or demerit', he uniformly means rewardable or- punishable. We admit his plea in favor of the machine, that it is not even rewardable, much less punishable, for its ' automatic excellence'; that there is no merit, much less demerit, in its ' necessitatively caused' regularity and beauty. But right here, at this first step, we do, and forever shall, protest that, in the machine, there is no sort of moral goodness, or virtue, or holiness. How great soever its perfection and beauty, or its ' automatic excellence', it has no moral character at all. This is our issue with Dr. Whedon, and with all his holy machines, as well as with all his innocent i automatic fiends' of wickedness.

'The highest order of mechanical or automatic excellence',

1 Part III., Chap. 3, page 375.

says he, ' is found in a watch. So numerous and nice are its adjustments, so exquisitely adjusted are its forces, and so beautiful is its aspect to the eye, that we gaze on it with admiration. And then, in the pointing of its hand to the figure according to the true time, we behold one of the most wonderful adjustments of mechanism to the demands of mind. With but slight fancy, we attribute to it the qualities of truth and reliability, or of falsehood and JicMeness'.' Now, here in playing ' hide and seek' with his great discovery7, the doctor is evidently 'geting hot', and begins ' to burn '. But, however slight the fancy, reason pronounces it nothing but a fancy,—a pure fancy,—and a poor metaphor. "Whoever supposes or fancies that, in such a machine, there is, in the moral sense of the terms, any ' truth and reliability, or falsehood and fickleness', deserves not the name of a philosopher. Dr. Whedon should beware of his fancies.

We proceed to the next step. 'Imagine the automaton says he,' endowed with sensibility in every particle of its substance; and that it is consciously impressed by every contact, and every force applied, and feels every movement it is made to undergo. Yet it is still an automaton, being moved solely in the proportion and in the direction of the forces applied. . . . It moves only as it is moved. ... Its operations are the necessitated effects of necessitative causations. It is guiltless, undeserving, irresponsible, because it can act no otherwise than it does act. Common sense demands not only sensibility but free self-control. We thence deduce the Law, which is (apart from self-superinduction) universal and apodictical, that no act can be morally obligatory, responsible, or guilty—no agent can be morally obligated, rewardable, or punishable—unless tJiere be in the agent adequate power for other act than the act in question. ’

Here, again, we are happy to agree with our author. If, indeed, instead of all his words, (only a small part of which we have quoted,) he had at once set out with the plain, simple proposition, that no state of a machine, and no necessitated state of a sensibility, is rewardable or punishable, we should not have