thought, desire, volition; but we are not conscious of the existence of mind itself’.‘“ According to this philosopher, we are only conscious ofthe phenomena of our minds, and hy vir, tue of a fundamental law of belief, we are necessitated to believe that there is something which thinks, and wills, and feels. The same view was taken of the subject by Descartes. His celebrated Cnth("In€7II€, cogizfto, ergo sum, which has been so often misunderstood, was merely intended to express this idea, as we are clearly told by Descartes himself. ‘I do not beg the question ’, says he, ‘ tor I do not suppose any major. I main.tain that the proposition : I think, theretbre I exist, is a particular truth, which is introduced into the mind without recourse to any more general truth, and independently of any logical deduction. It is not a prejudice, but a natural judgment, which at once and irresistibly strikes the intelligence ’.“° The same doctrine is also maintained by the great philosopher of France, M. Cousin, from whose psychology we have copied the above extract from Descartes. In relation to the process by which the existence of the mind is revealed to us, he says, ‘ This process is not, according to Descartes, /'e¢ts`om'/ig, but rea

.son itself, one of those pure, immediate, and absolute concep

tions which, a century after Descartes, were rendered celebrated by Reid and Kant ’. The truth is, that we are only conscious of thinking, and feeling, and willing; and we are so constituted, that we cannot help believing there is something which thinks, and feels, and wills. \\'c know that we exist ; but we are not conscious of existence. In taking this for granted, as an undisputed and indisputable principle, Dr. \Voods certainly labors under a mistake. \\'e are conscious of a vicious act, when it exists; but does this act necessarily imply the existence of an antecedent vicious principle from which it proceeded? \\'e have already seen, that it implies no such thing. It merely implies the existence of a moral agent, that is capable of knowing the law of God, and, under certain circumstances or temptations, of putting forth

an act of the will in opposition to it. There can be no act,

39 Elements ofthe'Philosophy of the Human Mind. Vol. I., p. 36.
fm Cousin`s Psychology. Note C C.

without an actor. There can be no good or evil act, without a
power and a motive to do good or evil. But it does not nc
cessarily follow, that this power must be either good or evil,
before it can put forth good or evil acts. Hence, the analogy
which Dr. Woods has endeavored to establish, is merely fanci-
ful and deceptive.
The origin of this mistake is obvious. \Ve are accustomed
to say, that the moral character of actions are determined by
the principles from which they proceed ; that it depends on the-
nature of the motives or intentions of the agent. This remark
is applied to external actions; and in relation to them, it is
perfectly true. Hence, the great plausibility of the same
inode of expression, the éame tbrm of words, when applied to
our internal acts, or volitions. It is a great misfortune, that in
speaking of things so totally diverse in their nature, we should
be compelled to use precisely the same mode of expression ; for'
it is exceedingly diflicult for the mind to shake off the influence
of those forms of speech to which it has long been accustomed.
The Whole doctrine of the will has been greatly darkened, by
the single circumstance that the term action has been uniformly
applied to the external motion of the body, which is purely pas-
sive, as well as to the internal volition of the will, from which
we derive our very idca of active power and activity.
This is not all. It is one of those natural illusions which
Lord Bacon calls the ‘ idols of the tribe ’, that leads us to con-'
clude that every cause must possess the same nature with its
effect. Hence, we very naturally conceive, that a vicious act
must have a vicious cause, or, in other words, must be ‘ pro-
duced’ by a vicious disposition. This is only a particular
application of a false principle. A cause need not, in every
case, possess the nature of its effect. A volition, for example,
produces motion; but there is nothing in common between an
act of the will and a motion of the body. The one is free, and
the other is necessitated. The one is a mere change Qf place;
the other is simply an act. The one is a mgfer'ing ; the other
is a doing. Again, an act of the will is colzmtary ; but it does
follow, that the implanted principle from which it is supposed'
to proceed is also voluntary. Indeed, the argument of Dr.

Bates, to prove that original sin, or that which we bring into the world with us, is voluntary, is just as good as the argument of Dr. Woods to show, that original sin is truly blameworthy and punishable. Both proceed on the same principle, that the cause must possess the same nature with its effect, or, to speak more correctly, with that which proceeds from it. We need not multiply illustrations of the fallacy of this principle. The world is full of them. As Mr. Mill has truly said, in his work of logic, 'the (1 priori fallacy or natural prejudice', that'the conditions of a phenomenon must, or at least probably will, resemble the phenomenon itself, has spread its errors and delusions through the dominions of ancient and modern philosophy.

We might now quit the subject of consciousness, or the moral reason of man, in relation to the character of native depravity. But we have one more remark to offer, which is indispensable to a complete view of the subject. The objection drawn from our moral judgments against his doctrine, has not been fully met by Dr. Woods. It has not been set forth in bold relief, and then combatted by him. If he had seen the full force of this objection, he would have found it far more difficult to escape from its influence. Let us see, then, what is the true nature and force of the objection in question.

'We never blame ourselves for any thing', he says, for his opponent,' of which we are not conscious, and we are conscious of nothing but the exercises of our own minds.' But this is not all. We never blame ourselves for any thing, unless it be something we have done in violation of a rule of duty, which we knew or might have known. It is a judgment of the moral reason of man, that sin is a transgression of a known moral law, or of a moral law that may be known. This is the judgment and voice of human reason and consciousness in all ages of the world. You see a furious wild beast, for example, as it tears a man to pieces; but you do not, you cannot saj-, that the wild beast has done wrong. But let a man, without provocation, do the same external acts of violence; and your conscience is aroused; it flames with indignation. Now what makes the difference in the two cases? Why do you condemn the man, and not the wild beast ?' Ask a child', says Dr. Wayland 'and he will toll you, because the man knew better, and the beast had no such knowledge.' And he well adds, 'I do not know that a philosopher could have given a better answer.' There is, indeed, many a philosopher, who could not return half so good an answer, unless he would first give bis philosophy to the winds, and then, like a little child, permit the voice of nature to speak in him and for him.

Xow, does the unconscious infant know that it has done any wrong'. Is not God's law, indeed, in so far as the infant is concerned, written higher and in a smaller hand than were the famous laws of Caligula himself? Shall it, then, be punished for the transgression of a law of which it had no knowledge, and of which it could not by any possibility have the least glimmering of knowledge? We answer, Xo! Our moral sense absolutely refuses to see any spectacle so horrid and black in the glorious empire of Jehovah, as the wrath of God revealed from heaven against the world of infants, because they have transgressed the moral law.

But we are told by Dr. Woods, that animals cannot be punished as the doers of wrong, (though they suffer.) because they are not 'intelligent beings'. On the other hand,'both the general representations of Scripture, and the general aspect of things in divine providence' . . . 'indicate that, the offspring of human parents are human beings,—beings of the same nature with their parents,—belonging to the same race, under the same moral administration, and possessing the elements of the same character'.40 True. But suppose it does appear from 'the general representations of Scripture and the general course of divine providence', that' the offspring of human parents ', are really'human beings',—what follows?—-Does it follow, that they may therefore be justly punished by a law of which they can know nothing? This question may, we think, be safely submitted to the unperverted reason of mankind.

In opposition to all the foregoing hypotheses, we assume the position, that new-born infants have no moral character at all. in so far as the transgression of the moral law is concerned, they are perfectly innocent, never having incurred its penalty by

« Essay, p. 171.

any thing they have thought, or done, or desired. In the eye of the moral law, infinitely pure as it is, there is no transgression in them. This is our position.

What shall we say, then, to the logic of an Archbishop, who, in the Ninth Article of the Church of England, has taught that original sin, in everyone that is born into the world, ' deserveth God's wrath and damnation' i Here it is:—' For when such young babes do not lie softly, or be grieved with thirst, hunger, or cold, they cry impatiently. Likewise when we show them any pleasant tiling to their eyes, and suddenly again take it from them, we see them weep. And these be plain and evident tokens, that infants newly born be given to their own wills and appetites, and are -sinners, forasmuch as they transgress the commandment—Thou shalt not desire'." What shall we say( We are absolutely dumb with amazement; and, accordingly, we have not one word to say, at present, in reply to the overwhelming logic of the illustrious Prelate, by whom the ' ThirtyNine Articles' were imposed on the Church of England.

It only remains for us to discuss, (as we shall do in our next issue,) the duty of all Christian men, and especially of all Christian ministers, in relation to the awful dogma of the damnation of infants.

"The Fathers of the English Chun h. Vol. III., p. 200.