FARRAGUT AT MOBILE.

289

of Forts Morgan and Gaines, and, as a result of his observations, wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that he was satisfied that if he had had but a single iron-clad, he could have "destroyed the whole force in the Bay, and reduced the forts at his leisure." In the latter part of February, he shelled Fort Powell. Two or three months later, he wrote: "I deeply regret that the Department has not been able to give us one of the many iron-clads that are off Charleston and on the Mississippi. I have always looked for the latter, but it appears that it takes us twice as long to build an ironclad as any one else. It looks as if the contractors and the fates were against us. While the rebels are bending their whole energies to the war, our people are expecting the war to close by default, and if they do not awake to a sense of their danger soon, it will be so." This was very plain talk, by one who stood at the head of the navy, to the Secretary, and shows how differently things would have been managed if he had been allowed to control matters.

Between the victory of Chattanooga and the next May, when Grant would be ready to begin his great simultaneous movement of the two grand armies of the republic, there was considerable activity in military affairs in various parts of the country. In January, quite a fight occurred at Strawberry Plains, Tennessee, and the rebels obtained some successes in Western Virginia. The President's proclamation, on the 1st of February, ordering a draft for five hundred thousand men to be made on the 10th day of March, showed what mighty preparations were in prospect.

Butler, having heard that Richmond was weakly garrisoned, started an expedition to liberate the prisoners there, but it turned out a miserable failure.

One of the most important expeditions-or, at least, most talked about—was one under General Seymour, that left Port Royal, the fore part of the month, for Jacksonville,

290

FLORIDA EXPEDITION.

Florida. It was composed of twenty steamers, eight schooners, and about five thousand troops. It left Hilton Head on the morning of the 6th, and occupied Jacksonville the next day. Gillmore, the Commander of the Department, said the object of the expedition was: First, to procure an outlet for cotton, lumber, timber, &c. Second, to cut off one of the enemy's sources of supplies. Third, to obtain recruits for any colored regiments. And last, "to inaugu rate measures for the speedy restoration of Florida to her allegiance, in accordance with instructions received from the President, by the hands of Major John Hay, Assistant AdjutantGeneral." The three first reasons might as well have been omitted, as the last was the true one. Seymour, in accordance with his instructions, pushed a force on to Baldwin, twenty miles from Jacksonville, while another portion was sent forward to Sanderson. These preliminary steps being taken, Gillmore returned to Jacksonville, leaving Seymour in command in the field. The latter, on his own responsibility, now determined to advance inland a hundred miles, without supplies, in order to destroy the railroad, near the Savannah River. On the 18th, the army left its camp at Jacksonville, in light marching order, with ten days' rations, and made sixteen miles, over bad roads, that day. The next day, it marched seventeen miles, and encamped at a place called Barber's. In the morning, the march was resumed, the objective point being Lake City, nearly forty miles distant; but the columns had proceeded only sixteen or eighteen miles, when the enemy's skirmishers were met. Pushing these back four miles, the army came upon the rebels in force. The columns were at once deployed, and Hamilton's battery ordered forward to within a hundred and fifty yards of the hostile line. This close proximity, of course, brought the gunners completely under the fire of the sharpshooters. It went in with four pieces, fifty horses,

BATTLE OF OLUSTEE.

291

eighty-two men and four officers. In twenty minutes, half of the guns, half of the officers, more than half of the men, and all but ten of the horses, were lost. The different regiments, as they came into position, were met by a murderous fire. One broke, another got out of place, and yet the conflict raged with terrible ferocity. Seymour was everywhere present, apparently reckless of death, striving to win the battle thus suddenly, unexpectedly thrown upon him; but his efforts were all in vain. He succeeded only in holding the men to a useless slaughter. From two o'clock till dark, the contest was close and deadly, when, as if by mutual consent, it ceased, and Seymour, leaving most of his wounded in the hands of the enemy, withdrew, and the troops, foot-sore and weary, marched all night to Barber'shaving marched over thirty miles, and fought for four hours, since the previous morning. The next morning (Sunday), the shattered, dispirited army continued its retreat, and did not rest till it reached its old camps at Jacksonville. Over one-fifth of the army of five thousand men, and five pieces of artillery, were lost in this disastrous fight-called the battle of Olustee, because it occurred a few miles from this railroad station. The whole affair caused a great deal of indignation, and, as in the case of all foolish, unsuccessful expeditions, every one engaged in it was blamed by turns. Now the President and Hay-whom he had made Major on purpose to accompany the expedition-were blamed; now Seymour, for being ambuscaded, and now Gillmore, for allowing it to be so miserably conducted. So, too, the Seventh New Hampshire, and a colored regiment, were accused of losing the battle by their poltroonry. Of course, an investigation was called for, while the newspapers discussed it freely, without waiting for its developments. Gillmore asserted that Seymour moved inland in direct violation of his orders, and, after he started, required him, his superior,

292

KILPATRICK'S RAID.

to make a naval demonstration in his behalf. Seymour has not seen fit to tell how much the presence of Major Hay had to do with this departure from the course marked out for him by Gillmore. We suspect it would be hard to fix the blame on any one man. It was one of those shrewd little plans got up between those at Washington and some civilians and officers-the success of which was intended to astonish the country, and show that all the wisdom did not rest in military quarters. All that need be said of it is, it was a foolish expedition from the start-badly carried out, and a total, disgraceful failure.

The rebel General, Patton Anderson, soon after the battle, did an act which should be mentioned to his honor. He made out and sent in a complete list of all our prisoners in his hands, both white and colored, together with a description of the character of the injuries of each of the wounded. This conduct was the more noticeable, being in such striking contrast with the brutality shown to the blacks at Fort Wagner and other places.

In the latter part of the month, Kilpatrick started on his great raid for the relief of our prisoners in Richmond, which were reported to be in a most suffering condition. Knowing that the rebel Capital was weakly garrisoned, he thought that he might, by a sudden dash, enter it and release them before a sufficient force could be brought up to arrest his progress. His plan was submitted to the President and Secretary of War, and after due deliberation accepted, and, on the last day of February, this daring leader, with four thousand chosen men, left his camp at Stevensburg, and marched for Ely's Ford, on the Rapidan. By the aid of a daring scout named Hogan, he succeeded in capturing the entire picket stationed there, without giving the alarm. He then pushed rapidly forward, and at daylight reached Spottsylvania Court House. Elated with his successful start,

RICHMOND ALARMED.

293

he now moved rapidly towards the Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central railroad, which he reached at four o'clock, and where he went into camp for a few hours. Colonels Dahlgren and Cook, with five hundred men, had been sent across the James River, to move down its south bank and release the prisoners at Belle Isle, and then with them join Kilpatrick in the city, who was to enter it by the Brook turnpike. The latter carried the first line of rebel works, within two miles of the Capital, and opened on it with his artillery, the sound of which was to be the signal for Dahlgren to advance. The latter, however, misled by a negro guide, did not appear, and Kilpatrick, disappointed in not having his co-operation, and finding the rebel defenses stronger than he had anticipated, now spent some hours in reconnoitering to see if he could not find a weak place where he could dash in. In the meantime, the city was thrown into the wildest consternation. The bells were rung, and couriers sent off to hurry up the troops on the Chickahominy. Finding the obstacles in front of him too great to be surmounted, and the hostile forces concentrating fast, he was compelled reluctantly to abandon his bold design, and see to the safety of his command. Falling back, he swept around Richmond to the Chickahominy, which he crossed, at Meadow Bridge, and went into camp in the midst of a driving storm of sleet, and hail, and snow. Here he was attacked by a heavy force, but succeeded, after a sharp fight, in repulsing it, and moving off to Old Church, again went into camp, to wait the arrival of his scattered detachments. During the day, they all came in except Dahlgren's command. At length, hearing that the latter was over the Pamunkey, and making his way towards Gloucester Point, he moved leisurely down the Peninsula, and arrived safely at Yorktown. Dahlgren, becoming separated in the darkness from his main body, fought his way, with a hundred men, to within three miles