of which they are the organ, but we must take the leave to say, that while we concede to them the entirest freedom in judging for themselves on the merits of the work, and also in reversing any judgments which they may have pronounced; and while too we believe that they must be far better able to judge of the fitness of a work for Boston and Massachusetts than we can be; still we can not concede to them the right to deal in this way with any man's good name. In the name of all fair dealing and good manners and Christian courtesy, we protest against it.

As patriotic New Englanders, we have a natural pride in our metropolis. As provincial to Boston, we may be expected to defer to the judgments which issue from our lawful capital. But we can not so far defer to these decisions as to be content that they shall dispose of our reputation for orthodoxy in this summary manner, and that our brethren shall capitally condemn us, without trial and without an appeal.

We profess also a strong interest in the faith and principles which we hold in common with our orthodox brethren at Boston. Feeling thus, our concern and interest is not a little sensitive that this faith may be defended by honorable methods, and that a concern for the truth, may never betray into a neglect of the plain maxims of common justice. We confess our mortification that this zeal for the truth has been exposed to the Unitarian body, in actions so undignified;—that a book so inter esting and useful as this, has been laid aside, and not a reason has been rendered, nor a fault has been specified ;- -so that when the uninitiated ask, If this book be heretical, what is orthodoxy, and what is it to be sound in the faith?' the only answer that they can receive, is, 'A man is orthodox when he is orthodox! and sound in the faith when he is sound!'

We are still more mortified that it should have been suggested or confessed as a sufficient reason to condemn the book, that the Unitari ans are pleased with it, and it can not therefore be either sound or honest. The Unitarians may all be very artful and dishonest men for aught we know. Our Boston brethren ought to know better than we. But it is hardly expedient to tell them so, nor is it either wise or pol. itic to talk of them in this way as a class of men who can not be trusted.

This talking of them as a class, in terms expressive of suspicion and horror, or the dividing them into subordinate divisions according to their relative claims to soundness in the faith or true piety, has always seemed to us a liberty utterly unwarrantable and offensive. Are they not men, and as such are they not to be supposed to have reasons for their opinions, and to hold them on some distinct grounds? As men too may they not be reasoned with, and is there any way of approach. ing them with hope, except as you concede to them, in form at least, the power of judging, and the capacity of feeling the force of an ar gument. If they have a wrong and deficient system, as we believe they have, it is a very plain and simple business to tell them what we be lieve and why we believe it, and to show them why their system is defi. cient and wherein. If they are our friends and neighbors, it is a Chris tian duty which we owe to them, to meet them in the religious as we do in the social world, with some show of friendly concern, that we may have a common faith. We ought to believe them capable of changing their opinions.

Besides, we hope the time may come when they will change. We do not expect that they will do this all at once, but that they may look at the Christian faith with less and less prejudice, and with a full and still fuller consent to all its princi.

ples. If that time should have already come with any, and we not be aware of it, it is quite ungracious to take the very sign of their conversion, as a ground of reproach against the book or the man who has been the means of it, and to repel every token of a common way of thinking, or every sign which in dicates an approach to it, by repulsive and suspicious attitudes. These seem to us very plain and simple principles, and we regret that they have been sinned against in the present controversy.

In taking leave of this book, we

say distinctly to our readers, that it has not been our object to criticise the whole volume, or to sift every expression, illustration or opinion even, advanced by its author. There are expressions which we think might have been altered for the bet ter, illustrations which might have been improved, and opinions which are hastily ventured and not well defended. The doctrine of the book as we understand it, we think to be true and important. The leading arguments we have noticed, as far as they seemed to call for our criticism, and the reception of the work has seemed worthy of comment.

THE bankruptcy of several hundred of the most eminent commercial firms of Great Britain, the almost entire prostration of private credit, the depreciation of public stocks to the extent of one-fifth their nominal value, and a much greater decline in the market value of rail. way and other securities, and the extreme embarrassment of the Bank of England, are events which can not fail to arrest the attention of every intelligent man in the community. Eighteen months since, the nation was apparently in the most prosperous condition, every operative being employed, and every branch of industry fully developed; while at the present time, the pros tration of the commercial and manufacturing interests is more complete and universal than at any previous period within a quarter of a century, unless possibly in the year 1825.

We propose to examine in a brief and rather desultory manner, the causes and probable results of this state of things. We enter upon this work with diffidence, as we are aware that our distance from the

theater of these events, may prevent us from estimating correctly the subject in some of its relations. Still we believe that this distance, and the consequent exemption from personal interest in the matter, may enable us to take a more calm and accurate view of the course of events, than can easily be formed by an actor and sufferer.

Two causes have been almost uniformly assigned by the English and American press for the state of things to which we have referred ;the exportation of the precious met als in payment for food, and the immense investments in railways. To both these causes a part of the calamity is without doubt to be ascribed; but in our remarks we shall give the precedence to two or three others.

We suspect that the cause to which, more than any other, the mischief is to be attributed is, that a large part of the middling and higher classes have for a long series of years lived beyond their means.' It has excited universal surprise that so large a proportion of the bankrupt houses have proved to be utterly

rotten. Several, whose indebtedness amounted to from three to eight millions of dollars, had not sufficient property in their hands to pay twenty-five cents on the dollar, and, as is now ascertained, had been in this situation for many years. The individuals composing these houses lived in the most expensive manner. In many cases these parties having abundant credit, and being utterly insolvent, made from time to time extravagant speculations in branches foreign to their regular business, and thus became more and more irretrievably involved. How far such habits of extravagance have pervaded these classes of the British community, it is of course impossible to say; but beyond question they have existed to an extent far greater than would be believed by a careless observer. It is well known that many of the nobility are involved in debt to an enormous and embarrassing degree; so that, their landed estates being entailed, their incomes are sequestered for the benefit of their creditors. The late Duke of York at the time of his death was in debt several millions of dollars, and if we recollect right, his estate paid a very small dividend. It is not a very uncommon thing to find the name of a nobleman in the list of bankrupts in "the Gazette."

As these habits of reckless extravagance have been prevalent to a great extent and for many years, it is evident that their results must be almost equally disastrous to the debtor and the creditor, and must exert a ruinous influence upon the community. When the custom of pay ing debts promptly and equitably is universal in a community, goods will be sold at fair prices, and purchased with prudence. If on the other hand it is considered doubtful whether debts will be paid, the purchaser will readily buy any amount of goods, from any one who will trust him, whether he requires them or not, and the seller will charge a

sufficient advance to cover the risk. Of course the national industry will, so far as it is influenced by the state of things alluded to, be directed in a useless and perhaps injurious channel. It is unnecessary to refer in addition to the ruinous effect upon the integrity of the community, which is thus produced.

We regard, as another cause of this wide-spread calamity, the immense extension of commercial credit and indebtedness. After the convulsion of 1837 in our own country, when we had sufficiently recovered from it to begin to examine its causes, we were unanimous in assigning as the most prominent and efficient, the extensive operations upon fictitious capital; which capital was to a great extent furnished by banking institutions in different parts of the country. In England, unless we are much mistaken, precisely the same effect has been produced, though in a different manner. Individual houses have taken the posi tion, and accomplished the results, produced in this country by banks in the period alluded to; their notes and acceptances, from time to time paid and replaced by others, being always in the market to a very large amount, have accomplished the purpose of bank notes in every particu lar, except one, that of a circulating medium. Every one knows that whether business is conducted in the most healthy and prudent manner, or with extreme recklessness, the paper of individual houses, and bank notes and credits, must constitute the available assets of the mercantile community. In the former state of things, however, these assets have real convertible value; in the latter they pass currently until the crisis, the day of reckoning, comes, and they are then found to equal in value "the baseless fabric of a vision."

We do not subscribe to the celebrated denunciation of General Jackson against all "men who trade on borrowed capital," but we fully

believe that in most cases, when the result is not averted by unusual industry and prudence, they will 'break.' In the memorable year referred to in our own history, when matters were settled up, it was found that the whole property of many banking institutions consisted in the promissory notes of insolvent mer chants, while the property of a large proportion of the mercantile community was represented by the notes of these banks and of other merchants equally insolvent. Of course a common ruin involved both classes, leaving here and there one who with extreme difficulty kept his head above water. In London, the settling day has now arrived. Multitudes whose credit had been for many years, in some cases for half a century, unquestioned, are found to be irretrievably insolvent; and their bills constitute the whole assets of an almost innumerable company of smaller houses. We are aware that the commercial business of London is enormously extended, and that a large part of the commerce of the globe is consummated in that city; still when we learn the vast indebt edness of many of the insolvent kouses, and estimate from them the liabilities of the much greater number who still continue to meet their engagements, we can not doubt but that a very large proportion of the bills floating in the great commercial metropolis, are what are styled in vulgar mercantile parlance, kites -let fly to raise money and not in settlement of real transactions.

We would suggest as another cause of these embarrassments, the investment of large sums of money in securities and other kinds of property in foreign countries. It was stated that the bankruptcy of one house was caused by their having more than half a million sterling locked up in sugar estates in the Mauritius, and that a large part of this vast sum would be a total loss. Other houses held immense amounts

of Mexican bonds, Spanish bonds, the stocks issued by some of our insolvent states, and other unavailable securities of a similar nature. Investments of this nature have not recently been made with such extravagant folly as in 1825; still the amount thus held by houses in London, could it be ascertained, would occasion universal astonishment.

An inadequate currency has, we think, assisted in producing this result. While the commerce of the country has been steadily increasing for many years past, the currency, by which we mean specie and notes of the Bank of England, has either remained stationary or been contracted in amount. When the Bank of England was rechartered in 1844, a radical change was made in the principles on which its circulation should be regulated. Our limits will not permit us to state the changes thus made by Sir Robert Peel's celebrated bill; their result is, that as the specie held by the Bank diminishes, that institution is compelled to contract its circulation, and of course to diminish its discounts. It is almost universally conceded by the leading journals and reviews, that the system works badly, and that its practical operation has contributed a large share towards producing the present state of things.

The large importations of food from foreign countries have unquestionably exerted a powerful influence in effecting the present distress. If they have not been the ultimate cause; if the extravagance, the overtrading, and the other particulars which we have mentioned, have produced unsoundness and dis ease in the commercial body politic, the large exportations of specie consequent on these importations have without doubt brought the disease to a head, and accelerated a result which otherwise might have possibly been delayed for many years. Still it appears to us unquestionably true, that had the financial interests of

Great Britain been in a healthy state, the evil resulting from the purchases of bread stuff's would have been so small in comparison with the present terrible prostration, that they would hardly have been worth regarding. These bread stuffs have actually been paid for to a large extent by sending on our state stocks and other securities to be sold in this country; and the balance might have been liquidated by the sale of manufactured goods and other property, and by loans upon the continent, had not the evil influences which we have mentioned, prevented that healthy action which was necessary to the relief of the country.

It has been stated that the calls for money for the construction of railways, have amounted during the present year to more than one hundred and fifty million dollars. To withdraw this vast sum from the ordinary channels of trade and investment, must at any time interrupt the usual course of business and produce embarrassment, especially as these investments are for the time wholly unproductive; and it is perfectly evident that the extent of this embarrassment must have been greatly increased from the coöperation of the other evil influences which we have been considering. It must be remembered however, that this large amount of money has been expended in payment for British iron and British labor; that the amount of money in the kingdom is not diminished by these payments; and that the inconvenience thus resulting would be partial and temporary, if the mercantile community were in other respects in a healthy condition. Did our limits permit, we should be disposed to examine the general systems of British railways, and their effect upon the shareholders and the community; but this is a field into which we can not at this time enter.

We had proposed to consider the probable results of the events which have thus passed under our review.

Some of the most obvious we will suggest briefly; but with regard to other particulars about which we might be inclined to speculate, we are restrained by the consciousness that before these pages meet the eye of our readers, events may have transpired which would render our speculations futile.

Like every other storm which devastates the natural or the political and social world, this tornado will in time exhaust its strength and blow over. Although to a reader of daily journals private credit seems entirely prostrated, we have reason to believe that hardly one mercantile firm in a hundred, has actually become bankrupt. The amount of solid wealth in Great Britain, consisting of land, buildings, shipping and merchandize, is enormously great; and this fact properly appreciated, will soon inspire confidence, and reviving confidence will in time make money sufficiently abundant. Still the thousands who have become bankrupt, and the vastly greater number whose property is seriously impaired, will long have occasion to remember the crisis of 1847. We regret to say, that we fear that the sufferings of the poorer classes during the present winter, both in Great Britain and Ireland, will be extreme. The high price of food, the great number in the manufacturing districts partially or wholly unable to obtain work, the multitudes of laborers on railways thrown suddenly out of employment, the impaired means of multitudes whose charities have heretofore mitigated the pressure of poverty, the disorganization and lawlessness of Ireland, and the general want of heart and hope in the com munity, present a picture which we are unwilling to look upon.

How far the events of this year will lessen the confidence of the world in British stability and integrity, we can not at present fully determine. We will barely suggest to the thoughtful reader whether there are not causes in operation,