take any more; and suggested that they should take two regiments of cavalry, which I could not arm, and leave me the other regiments. And, upon my representations, the result finally was that the government did not press for the five regiments, and permitted these regiments to remain. And seeing that General Anderson had need at the time of forces in Kentucky, as they had gone that far, I ordered them to join General Anderson.

Question. Did the five regiments leave you at that time?

Answer. Only these two.

Question. Was that at a time when you could spare the troops?

Answer. Not at all.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. From whom did you receive the order to send those five regiments on here!

Answer. From General Scott, and from the Secretary of War, both.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. You constructed railroads and equipped them, purchased cars, &c. Will you state to the committee the reasons which led you to construct those railroads, and whether or not any advantages were derived from that work?

Answer. I ordered our superintendent of roads to examine the rolling stock of all the railroads, and ascertain what amount there was, in order to know what force could be moved at any time upon those roads. His report showed that the quantity of rolling stock was not at all equal to what our requirements demanded. I applied to the president of the Pacific railroad to ascertain if any, and what, arrangements could be made to provide more stock. It was found upon examination that it could not well be done through him, mainly because we had no money to give him to enable him to provide additional stock, even if that would have answered the purpose. I therefore had the matter further inquired into, and after some examination I ordered a contract for cars to be made, which was given to a Mr. Murray, of Cincinnati, who had founderies both at Cincinnati and St. Louis. And growing out of the same investigation, I suppose, it became apparent that great advantages would be derived if all those roads could be connected. At the extremities of the roads were our posts. The roads led through portions of country, or to points, which we supposed to be threatened by the enemy at any time, and a junction of the roads, with a sufficient quantity of rolling stock, would enable us to throw from any one or more points to any other point a force to meet any emergency. I therefore ordered a junction to be made which connected the road running from Ironton to St. Louis, the Pacific road, the road that runs to Rolla, and the road that runs through the northern part of the State, so that all the roads were connected; and the result of the whole arrangement was that with twenty-four hours' notice 20,000 troops could be moved from St. Louis to any point which might be threatened. It had this further advantage, the railroad was brought right along the river bank at St. Louis, so that upon the arrival of troops from Illinois, or any other State east, they could be brought over in the steamer always kept in readiness there and transferred directly to the railroad-they and their equipments and their supplies-and sent off immediately to any one of our posts, or to the interior of the State. Formerly the quartermaster's department had to hire wagons, sometimes hauling equipments and supplies two and two and a half miles through the city to the different depots, and troops arriving there had to move from one point to another with all their supplies. In this case, as we often had occasion to employ it, a regiment embarked at Ironton, for instance, and passed right through St. Louis, with all their equipments, &c., and proceeded directly to Jefferson City, or any other point where they were needed; or a regiment from any one of the posts would come to St. Louis

and pass right through on the cars, without stopping at all in the city, and go to any other place where they were needed. And so with regiments arriving by the river boats.

By Mr. Covode :

Question. Where did you connect these roads?

Answer. In the city of St. Louis. They were all brought to a common landing place on the river. As an instance in point: the rebels tore up about 100 miles of track, more or less, on the North Missouri railroad, which runs to St. Joseph. Probably a part of the rolling stock of that road was on one side of that break and a part on the other. The military authorities went to the Pacific railroad and took 35 of these very cars which I had made as the best cars to be used, and transferred them to the North Missouri road, and no doubt that single operation was worth more to the government than the entire cost of all those

cars.

Question. By this connexion you made the stock on all the roads available for any one road?

Answer. Yes, sir. I first sent across the river, before I ordered any cars to be made, to see if stock could be secured from the Illinois roads. But I found they would not answer, as the gauge was different, and I was obliged to have cars constructed. It gives this advantage to Missouri: that at any time, with 24 hours' notice, you can transport as large a body of troops as 20,000 men from one part of the State to any other part.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. You say the government has availed itself, and is still availing itself, of the advantages of this connexion?

Answer. Unquestionably it is. It is an important advantage to the entire State and to the government in its operations there. It is but recently that the instance occurred to which I have referred, when 35 cars were taken from the Pacific road and used on another road.

Question. Can you tell me how many regiments were stationed in Northern Missouri, under General Pope, at the time you took charge of the western department?

Answer. Not exactly; probably from five to seven regiments. I do not now remember the number. I had just reached the State then. The disposable force, whatever it was-all our Illinois disposable force-was ordered into Northern Missouri at General Pope's request.

Question. Do you know where those troops were stationed-at what points? Answer. Along the line of the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, north of the road-scattered about the interior there.

Question. How many troops did you find at St. Louis at that time?

Answer. Few, if any; a regiment or two, possibly, and some home guard regiments.

Question. On what day did you arrive at St. Louis and take command?
Answer. On the 25th of July.

Question. And the battle of Wilson's Creek was on the 10th of August?
Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. When did you first learn that General Lyon was threatened by a superior force of the enemy?

Answer. While in New York city, I think.

Question. In what manner?

Answer. By a telegraphic despatch to the effect that he needed re-enforcements. That, I think, was about the 18th of July. A large part of the disposable force was then with him.

Question. Was it in your power at that time to have ordered any troops to the assistance of General Lyon?

Answer. No, sir; not under the circumstances.

Question. Did you at any time order any troops to his assistance?

Answer. About the 3d of August, I think, I ordered the regiment under Colonel Stephenson-one of our best regiments-and Colonel Montgomery, with his mounted command, from Kansas, both to march to the relief of General Lyon. And on my arrival at St. Louis I also ordered Colonel Wyman to march with his regiment from Rolla. Colonel Stephenson, who was at Boonville, got as far as Rolla on his way to General Lyon; and there were three regiments under marching orders to join General Lyon when he was defeated.

Question. Did those regiments have sufficient means of transportation to enable them to go to the relief of General Lyon?

Answer. That depends upon what would be considered sufficient. Colonel Stephenson did move from Boonville to Rolla. I received a letter from him informing me that he did not consider the transportation at Rolla sufficient; that he thought it inexpedient, or dangerous, to march from that point to the relief of General Lyon, because of the force of the enemy which he apprehended would be between him and the Mississippi river, and which would expose his force to great danger; and he and Colonel Wyman did not march from Rolla. I ordered Colonel Stephenson from Rolla to St. Louis, upon receiving his letter stating the reasons for his not having marched to the relief of General Lyon, intending to place him under arrest; but I admitted his reasons so far as not to do that. Colonel Wyman was already at Rolla with his regiment; and after Colonel Stephenson's regiment had arrived there, there were two regiments at that point which I had ordered to go to General Lyon.

Question. Was there sufficient transportation at Rolla, or transportation with which it would have been possible for those two regiments to have moved to the relief of General Lyon?

Answer. I should certainly consider it possible for those two regiments to have moved; that is to say, I would have moved those two regiments myself, if I had been there. I consider it would have been possible-not convenient, probably. The men would have been exposed to some suffering, no doubt. But that is a matter for the judgment of the officer there.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. What is the distance from Rolla to Springfield?
Answer. I think it is 118 miles.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. There is no railroad from Rolla to Springfield?
Answer. No, sir.

Question. Had any of the transportation been ordered from Rolla to St. Louis prior to that time?

Answer. No, sir. The difficulty about transportation there was in this, as I remember it: General Lyon had retained the transportation at Springfield—had not sent back the supply train to Rolla. With that supply train there would have been abundant transportation, because the transportation afterwards gathered there amounted probably to between three hundred and four hundred

wagons, large and small. There was abundant transportation if they could have had it there at that time.

Question. The transportation was with General Lyon at Springfield instead of at Rolla?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And no transportation was ordered from Rolla to St. Louis?

Answer. I have no recollection of any such thing, and know no reason why any should have been so ordered.

Question. Either from Rolla or from any other point from which it might have gone to Rolla to have aided those two regiments to have moved to the support of General Lyon?

Answer. I have no recollection of that. Bear in mind the transportation was very deficient at that time. We had very little in the department compared with our requirements.

Question. Were you fully advised in relation to the situation of General Lyon for some days prior to the battle of Wilson's Creek?

Answer. I was advised as to his condition, I think; perhaps fully-I cannot say how fully. I knew generally of his condition; and you will see from his letter of the 9th of August what his condition was. And I had understood his condition to be about as he states it there. I knew he was in need of supplies and in need of re-enforcements, and we were doing everything it was possible to do to send him both. Bear in mind, in going along over this subject, that the first necessity had been to re-enforce Cairo. In the interim between arriving at St. Louis and the defeat of General Lyon I had gathered a force and taken it to Cairo to relieve General Prentiss.

Question. Did you deem it more advisable that Cairo should be strengthened than that General Lyon should be re-enforced?

Answer. Clearly so.

Question. State your reasons for that.

Answer. Cairo, as you are aware, is a permanent post, necessary to be held for the safety of St. Louis. It was occupied by General Prentiss with a force that was being disbanded, and was threatened by a largely superior force of the enemy. The danger to Cairo, therefore, was exceedingly imminent. General Lyon had something near 7,000 men with him, as I then estimated his force; and it was supposed that in case of extreme difficulty he would fall back. The whole point, in my mind, was whether General Lyon would choose to remain at Springfield or to retreat. General Prentiss could not retreat, and therefore I took the first relief to Cairo; went down with it myself. General Prentiss told me I was just in time. He said he had felled trees and barricaded the roads, and was hourly expecting an attack. In fact he said, I remember, that General Pillow was just forty-eight hours too late. Why he used the expression "fortyeight hours I do not know. That was the expression he and his officers used. At all events, he had but 1,200 men under arms there, and informed me then, and has since told me, that the place would have been taken if I had not arrived in time. I considered the first necessity was to re-enforce Cairo. That was done, although with a very inadequate force. Still it was sufficient, as it proved. About 3,000 men was all I could take there.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. At what time did you re-enforce General-Prentiss ?

Answer. I left St. Louis on the 1st day of August, and was back again on the 4th of August, having before I got back sent orders to re-enforce General Lyon with the two regiments of Stephenson and Montgomery. As soon as I reached St. Louis I went to work to get what force I could in order to send it to General Lyon. I think it is very clear that if General Lyon had decided to

fall back upon Rolla, instead of engaging the enemy, there would have been no disaster, except losing that part of the State.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. You considered it in the power of General Lyon to have fallen back to Rolla?

Answer. General Lyon so says in his letter of August 9. It is always supposable that an officer will not allow himself, if he can avoid it, to get in a situation where he cannot fall back.

Question. Did you receive any despatch or communication, or intelligence in any way, that led you to suppose that it was not in General Lyon's power to fall back Rolla?

upon

Answer. No, sir: on the contrary, our information was to the effect that General Lyon had had a successful skirmish with the enemy. General Lyon undoubtedly acted as he judged was best under the circumstances. Question. Did you send any men to Cape Girardeau ?

Answer. Yes, sir; I re-enforced Cape Girardeau at that time.
Question. Do you recollect how many men you sent there?

Answer. A regiment, I think. I am not clear, however, when I re-enforced that place.

Question. You say you regarded the obstacles in the way of Colonel Stephenson were so great as to excuse him in not going to the relief of General Lyon, although you think if you had been in command yourself there you would have pursued a different course?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think I might have done so.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Does that apply to both regiments at Rolla?

Answer. Yes, sir; to the entire force there.

Question. The regiments were not both from the same point?

Answer. No, sir; Stephenson's and Wyman's regiments were at Rolla; that is, after Stephenson had arrived there from Boonville, Wyman had for some time previously been at Rolla, and I ordered him to go to General Lyon after I reached St. Louis. Colonel Montgomery I had previously ordered from Kansas.

Question. You only refer to Colonel Stephenson as disobeying orders? Answer. Colonel Wyman joined with Colonel Stephenson in that matter. Question. How about Colonel Montgomery?

Answer. Colonel Montgomery did not succeed in getting to General Lyon. Question. Was he on his way there?

Question. I suppose so. The order was directed to be communicated to him. But the distance was considerable between St. Louis and Montgomery's position in Kansas; and the 10th of August came very quickly. I think you will find in the documents I have submitted all the circumstances under which Cape Girardeau was re-enforced. It seemed to be especially the object of attack of Jeff. Thompson, who was near there with 5,000 men, and Hardee was between there and Cairo with 7,000 or 8,000 men. You will see by that the exigency under which Prentiss and Marsh, commanding at Girardeau, supposed themselves to be. You will find all these matters fully set forth in the papers I have submitted.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Did you re-enforce Pilot Knob about this time-the 1st of August Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. With what force?

Answer. I think with a regiment.

Part iii-5