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of the troops who formed the camp
of St.
Roch, and of the whole force of Audalu-
sia, Valentia, Carthagena, and Madrid. It is
against this ariny the French troops are now
manoeuvring: the rest having been dispers-

30,000 men, while the dukes of Elchingen and Belluno are already posted on its rear.The remaining 60,000 effective men may amount to 40,000 under arms, 30,000 of whom are in Catalonia, and 10,000 at Mad

ed and destroyed in the battles of Espinos aandrid, at Valencia, and in other garrison towns, Burgos.-The head-quarters were removed on the 22d from Burgos to Lerma, and on the 23d from Lerma to Aranda. -The Duke of Elchingen marched on the 22d to Soria; the town was disarmed, and a committee of well-disposed persons appointed for the administration of the province. The duke is now in Medina Celi, and his light troops scour the road from Saragossa to Madrid.-On the 22d the Dukes of Montebello and Cornegliano formed a junction near the bridge of Lodosa On the 24th the Duke of BelJuno removed his head-quarters to Vente Gorne z. Almost all the roads of communication between Madrid and the northern provinces are intercepted by our troops, whose light parties have picked up a great number of couriers and mails.--The utmost confusion seems to prevail in Madrid, and the whole nation anxiously desires the restoJation of that tranquillity and peace, of which Spain has been deprived by the puerile arrogance and criminal cunning of a few intriguers.-It appears difficult for any army which forms the right of the enemy, and is now on the banks of the Ebro, to fall back on Madrid, and the south of Spain. The events which are now preparing will probably decide the fate of this other moiety of the Spanish army.-For these three days we have bad damp and hazy weather. This season is more hurtful to the natives of the country than to men accustomed to the climate of the north. Gen. Goueson St. Cyr continues vigorously to push on the siege of Rosas. Tenth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain,

dated Aranda de Duero, Nov. 26. It appears that the Spanish forces amount to 180,000 effective men.-80,000 effective men, making 60,000 men under arms, who composed the armies of Gallicia and Estremadura, and were commanded by Blake, La Romana, and Galuzzo, have been dispersed and put hors de combat-The army of Andalusia, Valencia, New Castile, and Arragon, commanded by Casianos, Penas, and Palafox, and which likewise appeared to amount to 80,000 men, that is, to 60,000 under arms, will, in a few days, meet its fate. The marshal duke of Montebelio has received orders to attack it, in front, with

or in motion. Before he proceeded a step beyond the Duero, the emperor resolved to annihilate the armies of the centre and left, and to inflict a similar fate on that of general Castanos on the right.-This plan once exe cuted, the march to Madrid will be but a promenade. This grand design must, before the present moment, have been accomplished. With respect to the corps of Catalonia, which is composed, in a great measure, of the troops of Valencia, Murcia, and Grenada, these provinces being threatened, will with draw their troops, that is, if the state of the communications will permit. At any rate, the 7th corps, after the conclusion of the siege of Rosas, will give a good account of them. At Barcelona, general Dubesine, with 15,000 men, and supplies for six months, answers for that important place. We have said nothing of the English forces, It seems that one division is in Gallicia, and that another made its appearance at Badajoz, about the end of last month. If the English have any cavalry, we must have per ceived it; for our light troops have almost reached the frontiers of Portugal. If they have infantry, they probably have no inten tion to employ it in behalf of their allies; for it is now thirty days since the campaign was opened; three large armies have been destroyed; an immense quantity of artillery is taken; the provinces of Castile, La Montano, Arragon, Soria, &c. are conquered; in a word, the fate of Spain and Portugal is decided, and nothing is heard of any move ment of the English troops -At the same time, one-half of the French army is not yet arrived. Part of the 4th corps of the army, the whole of the 5th and 8th corps, six regiments of light cavalry, many com panies of artillery and sappers, and a great number of men belonging to the regiment which are in Spain, have not yet passed the Bidassoa.-In truth, and without doing injustice to the bravery of our soldiers, it may be asserted that there cannot be worse troopi than the Spanish. Like the Arabs, they can Jurk behind houses, but they have no discipline, no knowledge of manœuvres, and is impossible for them to make any resistance

in a field of battle.

(To be continued)

Printed by Cox and Baylis, Great Queen Street; published by R. Bagshaw, Brydges Street, Covent Garden, where former Numbers may be bad: sold also by J. Budd, Crown and Mitre, Pall-Mañ.

VOL. XIV. No. 26.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1808. [PRICE 10D.

The Honourable C. Stewart is serving as a Brigadier, or a Major, General, in Spain or Portugal, with, of ourse, the pay and allowances of that rank. He is a member of the House of Commons. He also, according to a Report, printed by order of that House, an Under Secretary of State in the office of the war department, which office is kept in Downing Street, and, in which latter capacity, he receives two thousand pends a year. He is a brother of Lord Castlereagh.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS. COURT OF INQUIRY.Since the arria!, and appearance, of Sir Harry Burrard, the objects of Inquiry have taken a new shape. This general is accused of having prevented Sir Arthur Wellesley from pursuing his victory on the 21st of August; that is to say, at the close of those proceedings, which constituted what has been called the Victory of Vimiera. It clearly appears, that Sir Harry Burrard was opposed to the advance of our troops, which advance led to the battle of that day; and, after the battle was put an end to by the retreat of the French, he, having then landed, and being upon the spot, was likewise opposed to a pursuit of the enemy.—It is impossible for the public to be able to determine, whether this decision was right or wrong, unless they could come at an authentic statement of the force of the French. . Sir Arthur Wellesley now says again, that the whole of the effective force of the French was that day engaged. If so, and, if the roads and distances were as they are described in the published evidence; then it cer tainly does appear, that the enemy might, by a pursuit of them, have been completely defeated; and, of course, that Sir Harry Burrard was the sole cause of preventing that defeat. We must take it for granted, that the roads and distances have been accurately described; but, as to the force of the enemy, if that force did really consist of 27 or even of 25 thousand men, as the Conyention-makers would fain have us believe; then the decision of Sir Harry Burrard was certainly wise; for, in that case, is it at all probable, that our army would not have been finally defeated, if not captured in great part or in whole, especially as it is acknowledged, on all hands, that the French were greatly superior to us in cavalry, and that we could not get on our artillery? Besides, it now clearly appears, that, though there was some confusion in the French army, that confusion was by no means general. The retiring corps formed in good order, not anly in sight of our army, but within the reach of our artillery, Now, if the French

the

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army, which we fought with 17 thousand men, consisted of 14 thousand, and if the French had, as they bad according to the Convention-makers' account, 13 thousand more, besides the Russians, in their rear, would it not have been madness to have attempted a pursuit of the 14 thousand, who were retiring upon their reserves and their forts? The enemy was not routed; he was in very little confusion; we took some prisoners, but no standards that I have yet heard of; and, from the account given before the Court of Inquiry, it does not seem that much of a victory was, upon the whole, obtained, though there evidently was a good deal of bravery displayed, on part of our troops.Thus, as to the conduct of Sir Harry Burrard, it appears to me, that the whole of the case turns upon the question, of what was the real strength of the French army, or the strength of which our people had information ? Upon this question will also depend, whether Sir Arthur Wellesley was right, or wrong, in advancing upon the 21st of August; for, if he was aware, that the French had an army of 27 or 25 thousand men, it was evidently faulty, and even criminal in him, not to wait for the arrival of Sir John Moore's division, which division was, at that time, actually landed in Portugal, and which could have been brought to the scene of action in the course of a few days. Nay, upon the su position, that the 14 thousand in

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Kendal Green" were the whole of the French army, and that the 13,000 rognes "in Buckram" have only been brought in for the purpose of justifying the Convention; even, upon this supposition, it does not ap, ear to me, that Sir Harry Burrard was to blame for wishing to bring up the division of Sir John Moore previous to an advance against the Duke of Abrantes in person;" be awe, as the French could, at any time, retreat towards their forts; as there was no compelling them to keep the field against 17 any more than against 25 thousand of our troops, it does not seem to me, that any thing could have been lost by the delay of a few days, while it is quite clear, that much might have

been gained, because no one can fail to per-
ceive, that a retreat before 25 thousand men
must have been more difficult, than a re-
treat before 17 thousand. But, though
such a determination, on the part of
Sir Harry Burrard, might have been
wise previous to the battle of the 21st
of August, it does not follow, that, sup-
posing the French force to have been thus in-
ferior to ours, his decision was wise after
that battle; because then all the advantages
to be hoped for from greatly superior num-
bers were given up. So much for the
reasoning upon supposition. But, I think,
there can be no doubt in the public mind,
that, at the utmost, the French force did
not exceed 14 or 15 thousand men; and
that of this fact our officers were well as-
sured. How does this tell, then, for the
Convention? What becomes of all the pal-
try excuses for suffering the French to go off
with their plunder, and with all the honours
of war, and to be carried home, and set
down (ready to march against the Spaniards)
at our expence ? -The cause of this dis-
graceful event appears to me to be the de-
sign of Wellesley to have to himself all the
honour that was to be achieved, and the de-
sire of Sir Harry Burrard to thwart him
in that design. Wellesley hastened to the
combat before Sir Harry landed, and
against Sir Harry's expressed opinion, who
wanted the former to wait for the arrival of
Sir John Moore. On the 22d. Wellesley
was no longer commander-in-chief.
honour gained by capturing the French must
have been claimed d enjoyed by another;
Wellesley's name would have apppeared
neither at the head nor the tail of the offi-
cial papers relating to the event ; and,
which was of still more importance, in this
view of the matter, his "Victory of Vi-
"mier" would have sunk into compa
rative insignificance. If not to a cause of
this sort; to a jealousy somewhere or
other; to what can we ascribe a Conven-
tion, such as that of Cintra, made with an
enemy, whose whole force, commanded
by the Duke of Abrantes in person,"
had been obliged to retreat, at least, before
one half of the army which we had ready
to act on the day when that Convention was
sigued?"Oh," say they, "but, after
the 21st the opportunity was lost." What
opportunity? What opportunity, my good
Nabobites? Why, the opportunity of
" annihilating the whole of the French
army." This is what you said at first;
but, you had not then thought of the 13
thousand men in Buckram. At the utmost,
it was only the army in Kendal Green that

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could have been annihilated by continuing
the pursuit of the 21st of August. Besides,
does it not appear from the evidence, that,
at most, supposing the pursuit to have been
attended with all the success, which its
most strenuous advocates contend for, there
was only a part of the French army,
amounting to about 4 or 5 thousand men,
that there was the smallest chance of in-
tercepting on their retreat towards their
strong holds. What becomes, then,
of the pretence, that, after the 21st of
August," the opportunity was lost?" The
object of this pretence is evident enough.
Sir Hew, it is clear, is no more than a
participator with Sir Arthur, whom he was
to consult, whom he did consult, and with
whose concurrence he acted. It is, there-
fore, necessary to make it out, that the fault
lay elsewhere; and the only way that can be
found out of doing this, and of combining
all the purposes together, is to throw the
blame upon him who prevented a pursuit
on the 21st; but, unfortunately for this
scheme, it must be shown, by those who
have invented it, that the army in the forts
was the same, or very nearly the same
army, that retreated before our troops the
day before; and this does not suit any of
the persons concerned in making the Con-
vention; of course, it does not suit Sir
Arthur Wellesley, who is in this dilemma:
either the French had 27 or 25 thousand
men, or they had 14 or 15 thousand. It
the former, Sir Harry Burrard was right in
wishing to wait for Sir John Moore, and
also in preventing a continuation of the
pursuit on the 21st of August: if the lat
ter, then the Convention, in making which
Sir Arthur Wellesley had his fuil share, is
deprived of one of the principal facts,
which have been stated in its justification.

-This clutter about the "fatal effects "of preventing the gallant Sir Arthur "from pushing forward on the 21st" is: ruse de guerre, against which the people should be upon their guard. Granted that he would have pushed on; granted that he would have succeeded; granted that he would have cut off and captured the 4 or 5 thousand men, whom he and his friends say he could have captured. What then? What would that have done towards driving out of the forts, the 27 or 25 thousand men, which they are now said to have contained? Evidently nothing. Junot would have been able to march out, the very next day, with a force greatly superior to ours, and consisting chiefly of fresh troops. And, if we take away this force of Buckram men, away goes Sir Arthur's chief argu

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"dictated to thirty thousand Englishmen, "the terms of the Convention of Cintra, which terms caused a firing of cannon, and an illumination in London, under the "direction of those who administered the "government."

SPAIN. If the French bulletins and accounts be true, Buonaparte was at Ma drid on the 4th instant, and, of course, his brother has, before now, been crowned in that city. Madrid is not Spain; and, upon the supposition, that a complete change of the government be intended by those who are at the head of affairs in Spain, the country, I hope, will let the invading despot see, that his conquest is hardly yet begun. He will issue proclamations, as the Duke of Brunswick die; but, with men resolved to live free, or die, hostile proclamations are nothing. A correspondent, whose letter I insert below, complains of my "lukewarm

ness" as to the reverses in Spain, and says he expected from me something mora

ment in favour of the Convention. It is, therefore, the Convention to which our attention is still to be directed. We ought not to suffer our minds to be led astray by any of these pretences of "a lost opportutunity," Let it, for argument sake, be granted, that Sir Harry Burrard acted unwisely; let it be granted, that, if he had acted upon the suggestion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, 5 thousand Frenchmen would have been captured on the 21st; still, according to the latter's own first account, there would have been but a force, one half, at most, as great as ours to subdue. The whole question is, after all, a mere question of numbers, If the French had, as we were first told, only the 14 thousand men, who were engaged in the battle of the 21st, then nothing in the world can justify the Convention of Cintra; and, if they had 27, or even 25 thousand men, previous to that battie, the getting them out of Portugal, except upon the condition of retaining their plunder and securing indemnity to their partisans, was a very meritorious and honourable service, and there is no blame attaches to any of the generals; though one cannot very well excuse Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose greediness for fame would have led him to continue his pursuit of the 21st, while "the Duke d'Abrantes" could have come out upon him with 13 thousand fresh troops. As to the settling of this important question, no proof has been produced, or attempted to be produced, that the French had 27 or 25 thousand soldiers that could possibly have been brought into the field; and, as I have before asked, is it probable; nay, is it possi-clared will of their late masters, and to the ble, that Junot, who knew that our army was daily receiving large reinforcements, would have met our 17 thousand men, with only 14 thousand, if he had had 27 or 25 thousand men capable of being brought into the field? There is not, I think, one man in the whole world, who is impudent enough to say, that he believes the affirmative of this proposition. It cannot be believed. Of course, the public must still see, as the world will always see, that about 12 or 13 thousand Frenchmen, allowing for the losses of the battle of the 21st of August, ob tained from, or rather dictated to, 30 thousand Englishmen the terms of the Convention of Cintra. Whitewash, plaister, disguise the matter howsoever we may; confuse, confound, bewilder, as long as we please; to this plaiu nut-shell statement, the world, who has no interest in becoming our dupes, will still return; and this the enemy does, and will continue to, throw in ou teeth. "Thirteen thousand Frenchmen

patriotic." Now, I have no recollection of what I have said, or thought, upon this subject; if I have, upon any occasion, shown myself wanting in warmth towards the cause of the Spanish people, whom I regarded as engaged in a most perous conflict against a despot, to whom their former despot had transferred them. For then own sakes I heartily wished them success,and also, for the sake of other nations, who, in more than one way, might be induced to follow their example, as far as that example might be found to apply to their several situations. The resistance of the Spaniards to the de

threats and violence of their new ones, excited in my mind more pleasure, as far as I know, than I had ever felt at any political event. But, what had this to do with a war for that very Ferdinand, by whom they had been abandoned, and by whom they had been, in terms the most earnest, exhorted to submit to the sovereign sway of Joseph Napoleon?-My correspondent, in complaining, that I am " continually looking

at the abuses of the old government," asks me, if I am "not assured that those abuses "would be corrected?" I answer, that, so far from being assured of this, I see no reason to believe the fact, in the case of a successful war in behalf of the old government; and, if I had had no doubts upon the subject before, the proclamation of the Central Junta, for restraining what is there called "the licentiousness of the press," would have excited such doubts; because, for reasons which I have, of late, amply stated, I can see no good motive for restrain

mg the press, nor, indeed, any motive at all, other than that of preventing the promulgation of truth; and, of that person, or that government, that desires to prevent such promulgation, I want very little else to enable me to judge of the character.

But," says my correspondent, "if the "abuses were not to be corrected, is this a "time to chill the blool of patriotism ?" What is patriotism, Sir? Is it love of country? If so, let me ask you, whether by restoring the old government of Spain, with all its abuses, good would be done to either Spain or England? I think not; and, really, you must excuse me, if, in my turn, I express my surprise and indignation" to hear an Englishman say that, from which I may fairly infer, that he would gladly see the blood of his countrymen flow, for the preservation, or restoration, of the Inquisition.I am as well aware as my correspondent can be, of the "tremendous power "of Buonaparte; " but I have never seen, and I do not now see, the means of checking the progress of that power, in the old system of Spain, or of any other nation. I wished to see a new system brought to bear against him in Spain. That wish has not yet been gratified; and I am not to blame if I cannot see any good likely to arise from a perseverance in the old system. When the people of Spain first took up arms, they talked of "the "abuses and corruptions of the late infa

"

mous government;" and they uttered unreserved imprecations on the "traitors at "Bayonne." They then drove the French before them. They have now changed their language; and they do not now, that we hear, frequently drive the French before them. I do not say, however, that the one has proceeded solely from the other; for, I always expected the Spaniards to be beaten at first; but, if I had thus far seen the Spaniards successful, I should still have been fully persuaded, that, unless they made a complete revolution, they would have been finally subdued.The Spanish cause was good till it was taken up by those, who never did, and never will, approve of any thing which is not bad at bottom. Who, but such people as those, to whom I allude, would, when the Spaniards discovered such an excellent disposition, have set so systematically at work, to harness them in the cause of royalty? Who, when they saw the Spanish kings go off without any resistance on their own part, or on the part of the people, would, by toasts or otherwise, have given that people to understand, that they would do well to fight for a king, and Davounts. A

for a king, too, who was in the bands, completely in the power, of the despot, whose armies were about to be sent against them? Who, but such people, would not have considered, that there were, and that there must be, a numerous party in Spain opposed to Ferdinand, and that the war, if carried on for him, must be carried on by a party or faction? It is the common trick of partisans, to regard and describe their own party as the whole community; but who, except the people I am now speaking of, would not have known, that it was next to impossible, if not quite impossible, that the whole of the Spanish people should approve of the act by which Ferdinand had supplanted his father, thongh the latter was a half-ideot, and though his favourites were notoriously the most corrupt and rascally men in the nation? What was there in the conduct or character of this Ferdinand, that could be expected to produce such a singular feeling in his favour? We have often spoken of his conduct since the affair of Aranjuez; and, we have, since the war has been carried on for him, made, through Mr. Pedro Cevallos, the discovery, that this famous king had actually given his consent to marry a Princess of France;" that is to say, one of the female relations of Baonaparte, or of his wife. And, this is the king, for whom we are making war. This is the beloved Ferdinand VII." This is the object, for which the whole people of Spain, eleven or twelve millions of people, are to risk their property and their lives. Time was when whole nations suffered themselves to be half butchered in such a cause; but, that time is passed, and who an regret it? Who but the basest of mankind can possibly regret it?A correspondent has lately reminded me, that, at the ontset of the insurrection in Spain, I expressed my hope, that the people would be left to choose a government for themselves; and, that, as they have chosen Ferdinand VII., I should be content. Prove to me that they bave. The Central Junta have, I know and lament; but, without inquiring into their motives, I know that we have no proof, that the people have made any such choice. I always bear in mind the toast at the Turtle Feast. That toast had a great deal of meaning. It was said at the time, and now we see the verification of the saying.

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PORTUGAL is, too, in an unsatisfactory state," if we are to believe that wh ch is given as intelligence coming from that ut fortunate kingdom. Divided into parties and factions, there can be no such thing a

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