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with the public, in favour of the truth of Major Hogan's statement. There cannot have been less, supposing the thing to have been an imposture, than six or eight persons in some measure acquainted with it. Major Hogan must have hired the barouche and horses; for what person would have let them to a woman, who could have been engaged in such a service? The two servants must recollect the expedition. The heroine herself together with her companions, or servants, at home. This affair has made so much noise; it has been so long a matter of public conversation; that, one would think it almost impossible, that all these parties should have kept the secret, until this day, especially as there were such strong temptations to a disclosure, and no temptation at all, in any one, except the Major himself, to prevent such disclosure. This was my reasoning before I started the question about the publication of the numbers of the banknotes; but, as that was pointed out to me as quite effectual to ascertain from whom the notes came into the Major's hands; as I could see no reasonable objection, which the Major could have, to such publication; and, as he neither published the numbers, nor took any notice of my hint, I concluded that he dared not try the experiment. But, if it be true, as I must suppose it is, and as I am now, for the first time, informed, that he was gone abroad before my hint was given, this conclusion of mine was, of course, premature. It is very desirable that the truth of this matter should be ascertained and publicly exposed. If the Major has really trumped up the story about the lady and the notes; if his revenge has carried him so very far, it is proper that it should be known; and, it appears to me, that nothing is more easy than for the police to find out the heroine and the attendants. I cannot refrain from again expressing my surprize, that, upon the supposition of the thing being an imposture, no one of the parties should have yet made a voluntary discovery. They must all have heard of the noise made by their calling at the hotel; the calling there must be fresh in their memory; they must all be aware of the advantage to be derived from turning evidence; the sea is between them and the Major; amongst the vilest of man and woman kind they must necessarily be; and yet, they do not, there is no one of them that does, come forward with a discovery. Supposing, therefore, the thing to be an imposture, ere must be, in the composition of these ns' minds, a most uncommon mixture ess and of honourable feeling.

On the other side, upon the supposition, that the Major's statement be correct, there is little or no chance of a discovery; for, as my correspondent observes, as to the tracing of the notes, you are liable to be stopped by any one of the possessors refusing to tell how he disposed of them, or any of them; besides which, the possessors may not be in the kingdom, or, if in it, not to be found; to say nothing about the circumstance of people's forgetting, or never looking at, the numbers of the bank-notes that fall into their hands. Then, the woman, if the story be true, having her own carriage and servants, there would be no coach-master to trace her to; and, though the servants of such a person are not likely to be remarkable for their fidelity, they would be under no temptation to betray their mistress, or employer, there being no chance of gaining by their treachery, while there would be a pretty good chance of their losing by it.— Such is the light, in which I view this matter. I must confess that I felt great pleasure at hearing a sufficient cause assigned for the not publishing of the numbers of the notes; because, I should have been greatly mortified to find, that a gentleman of such excellent character as Major Hogan appears to be; that so worthy a man and so very meritorious an officer, should, though from a sense of ill-treatment, have been induced to go so far as to state and to promulgate, under his own signature, a deliberate and long-intended falsehood.

* **The "POOR WATCHMAKER OF A ROTTEN BOROUGH," in his enumeration of national calamities and disgraces, has overlooked one, which is greater than any of the rest, but which I need not name, when I add, that it is its existence which prevents me from giving to the world his excellent and admirable letter. This is our curse; this is our political pestilence. Every word he has said ought to be read by every man in the kingdom. Let us hope, that a time may come, when the public may read this very letter; and, in the meanwhile, let us not fret ourselves much as to what so engages the hopes and fears of the coffee-house politicians. Oh! how gladly would I drag forth the "rascals, who gloss over their treasons

to their country by high-sounding decla "rations; raising one hand high with energetic enthusiasm, vowing their eternal

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vengeance on the French tyrant, while "the other is actively rummaging the pub"lic pocket!" But, I will keep his letter treasured up for the use of family and friends; and I beg him to accept of my best thanks for taking the trouble to commu

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is a man after my own heart.

Some peculator, who calls himself " A "Hampshire Man," has written me a letter upon the subject of the last Winchester meeting. For the reasons, stated in the beginning of my letter to Mr. Poulter, I shall not insert this letter; though I should, I must confess, be glad to see it published, particularly in this county, as a specimen of the folly as well as the baseness of those, who stand forward as the champions of corruption and peculation.

Botley, Dec. 15, 1808.

MAJOR HOGAN'S APPEAL. SIR, Respecting as I do the great talents by which you are distinguished, and still more their bold and independent exercise, any suggestion from you naturally commands my attention. I therefore feel myself urged to submit a few remarks upon two paragraphs which have lately appeared in your Register, upon the subject of Major Hogan's Appeal. In the first of these paragraphs, you require, upon the suggestion of a friend, that Major Hogan should publish the numbers of the notes, which your

friend alleges may in that case be traced with facility; and in your second paragraph, you state, that," if the Major does this, the "public will believe the account concerning the notes to be true; if he does not, they "will, with very great reason, believe it to "be a most atrocious falsehood." If this story be really false, Sir, I agree with you, as to its atrocity, nay, I should consider even the term atrocity as too feeble to describe its character. But if it be true, Mr. Cobbett, in what terms of reprobation would you describe all the hireling scribblers, and scurrilous slanderers, ail the newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and reviews, which have, for the last two months, teemed with such vulgar venom against the reputation of Major Hogan This gallant officer's Appeal had not been long before the world, when several persons applied to know the numbers of the notes. But how simple must those who made the application have been, or how simple must they have conceived the person to whom they addressed it, in supposing that it would or could be safely complied with, while the agent of Major Hogan stood pledged to give up the notes to any person who could state their numbers. For, if the application had been acceded to, what se'curity existed that some callous swindler would not avail himself of the information and immediately stand forward to claim the

notes? The motives that would prompt such a claim are obvious;-first, the claimant would obtain the notes, and secondly, he might secure favour, by producing such an evidence of spontaneous zeal. Such a suspicion you would certainly think excusable, were I to name to you four, in particular, of the gentry, by whom the application has been actually made.-But the application of these men, Sir, materially differed from that which you have made: they required a private communication; you call for the publication of the notes, and with your proposition I am entirely disposed to concur.-Indeed so fully impressed have I been for some time, with the propriety of such a proceeding, in order to remove all doubt, and to facilitate the detection of guilt, that long before your paragraph ap peared, I had written to Major Hogan, strongly advising him, first to give the notes to some charitable institution, and then to publish the numbers. But Major Hogan having gone to America, some time after the publication of the pamphlet, in order to make arrangements of property with his brother, who is one of the first merchants in the United States; the Major's agent must wait for his acquiescence, before your proposition can be complied with.-The Major assured me, that he would return to England by February or March; before that period, however, I have reason to hope for his answer to my request.-His compliance will, I assure you, afford me much satisfaction, although I do not feel myself in the slightest degree implicated, in any part of the transaction, having received the whole of the statement from Major Hogan, and taking it entirely upon his faith and credit, which I have no reason whatever to doubt, as I do not find the authenticity of any of the documents referred to in that publication, has ever been questioned.Upon this affair of the bank notes, I must. Mr. Cobbett, take leave to say, that I am by no means disposed to adopt the doubts, which seem to exist, as to the probability of such an event; for I can easily suppose, that a woman of fashion and intrigue might have quite sufficient motives for doing what is, by Major Hogan, stated to have been done by the person in question. -One of the pamphleteers asks with some air of triumph, "what could have "taken any person to a newspaper office,

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to inquire after Major Hogan's address, "which could be so easily known, by ap

plication at the Horse Guards?"-But the Major, having, some weeks before resigned

his con.mission, nothing about his address was ki own at the Horse Guards.-Another pamphleteer asks, why apply at a newspaper ffice, when the name of a bookseller appeared? But the fact is, that no bookseller's name appeared to the first advertisement, which was published in August.

Now, Sir, as to the facility of tracing the notes, I rather think your friend has been too sanguine. To satisfy you of that, I need only refer to the case of Lord Melville, where a committee of the House of Commons, invested with powers, to send for persons, papers, and records, found it extremely difficult to trace any of the notes, and were entirely unable to trace some Then, Sir, if, with the means which that committee possessed, obstacles arose, how can it be sa confidently stated, that it is in the power of any individual, or even of the directors of the Bank of England, to trace the notes, alluded to in Major Hogan's Appeal. It must be obvious, that any individual may refuse to answer the application of the person or persons endeavouring to trace such notes, and the probability of a refusal to answer, where the answer might betray a party, making an improper application of such notes, is so strong, that I always heard with surprise, have the confident language of those, who talked so much about the facility of tracing these notes.-After all, Mr. Cobbett, let us argue this matter as we may, it must resolve itself into a question of faith, and then you are to consider, whether you will attach credit to the words of Major Hogan, recommended as he is, to your respect, by some of the first military characters in the country, or whether you will attend to the mere doubts, surmises, and conjectures, of sycophants in office, and anonymous libellers.--Here let me conclude, Sir, with the repe tinon of your own words, that "the affair "of the Bank notes has no connection with

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Major Hogan's case, which closes before "this affair occurs"-But the motives which urge that meritorious officer's assailauts, to dwell so much upon this affair, are quire obvious. The case of Major Hogan is found impregnable, because the grounds of his complaint are undeniable, and therefore, it is thought expedient, by his foes, to fix the public attention as much as possible, upon the business of the Bank notes, because it affords some opportunity for cavil. fing.

THE PUBLISHER OF MAJOR
HOGAN'S APPEAL.

December 6, 1503.

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MAJOR CARTWRIGHT, ON THE AFFAIRS

OF SPAIN.

Sir, The Proclamation from Aranjuez, bearing date the 26th of October, and published in the "Times" of the 3d of this instant, fully justifies the conclusions drawn in my letter, inserted in your Register of the 29th of October, touching the patriotic views of the supreme junta; but if virtue herself be too slow in her movements, consequences the most fatal may ensue. As the salvation of Spain depended on the people being made politically free, and being armed, these were points on which there ought not to have been a moment's hesitation. The very first resolution of the supreme junta, and while the oath of fidelity was warm upon their lips, ought to have been, that a national cortes, equally representing the people, and annually elected by all who contribute to the taxes, should as soon as possible be assembled; and that all the able-bodied of the whole community should be instantly trained for war, and furnished with arms as expeditiously as they could be procured; and to these objects the whole energies of the junta ought, in the first instance, to have been directed.

These being the principles I have uniformly inculcated, they cannot, now that disasters have been experienced, be called afterthoughts; and I could appeal to a Spanish nobleman, for having, in a letter dated so far back as the 21st of June, expressed an anxiety for sceing " the English force with "the best of the Spanish in the service of

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ive.

No time, however, ought to be lost in attempting to retrieve past errors; and, from the heroism and constancy of the Spanish character, much may be hoped for. If the mind of Spain be not subdued, the farther the enemy leads his columns into the country, the sooner perhaps he may be destroyed. I say perhaps; for, knowing very little of actual circumstances, I cannot judge what is likely to be the event. We have, however, seen the confidence with which Buonaparte Las undertaken the conquest of the Peninsula, at a time when the whole people were apparently hostile, and when every hand that had a weapon would be raised against him. If, under such circumstances, we should see that Peninsula actually subdued, the event must give birth to two reflections, on which we cannot ponder with

too much or too serious attention. First, that all the combinations of political and military powers, applicable to invasion and offensive war, have, in the French government, attained a degree of perfection far exceeding even those of Rome, and consequently whatever was before experienced among mankind; and that, for resisting the attacks of such an invader, nothing is to be depended on, short of the best combinations of political and military power which are applicable to defence. Secondly, that that national disease, of which inveterate despotism and habitual slavery are the indications, so breaks down and destroys the constitution, the energies, and the very means and capacities, of a state, that the mere dissolution of its detestable government is by no means a restoration of health and vigour. According to circumstances, its recovery must be a work of time of greater or less duration; as ge nius and virate have more or less the ascendaut; and as the trae spirit of liberty shall be more or less aroused and cherished.

It was at an early period of the struggle, and in my first public letter on Spanish affairs, written on the 15th, and inserted in your Register of July, the 23d, that I used this language:-" If she fail in the attempt, "it can only be, because she reformed and "armed too late; AND IF SHE FALL, WE KNOW WHOSE HARNESS, FOR THE FINAL CONFLICT, MUST BE NEXT BUCKLED ON.

After just remarking, in confirmation of my second reflection, that eight months have now elapsed since the worn-out government of Spain was annihilated; and four months since the French power in the country was in effect broken by the capture of Dupont's army; which ought to have led to an early contest in the very passes of the Pyrennees, we in England ought not to lose a moment in effecting those reforms in our own govern ment which, by equally restoring to health and vigour both the civil and military branches of our constitution, shall once more give | us those best combinations of political and military power which are applicable to defence.

An attorney-general may think it a right season for proposing a statute, abridging the rights of liberty and adding to the severities of law; a court of King's Bench may think it a right season for acting upon most questionable precedents, in committing, for of fences in Middlesex, the convicted persons to distant gaols, thereby grievously and calamitously adding to the evils of legal imprisonment, and causing to the parties a heavy expence, although fine made no part of the sentence; ministers may think it a season

for mocking the nation with a species of tribunal which has all the qualities of a packed jury, and no one attribute of a court of justice or equity; and the great rival parties in the state may still think it a season, for factiously contending with each other for power; but ought not all parties, and all descriptions of men, rather to consider how long it may be, before we ourselves may have to conter d with that invader, under whose prowess many are of opinion Spain and Portugal must sink?

Should such an event take place, it would need not the spirit of prophecy to foretel, that nought but reforms, civil and military, completely restoring to us those best combinations which are applicable to defence, could save the throne, or government of our country. But when those com- ›* binations are at the same time the very essence of our constitution, which, in the strictest sense, is a constitution of liberty and arms, were it not the first duty of king, ministers, parliament, and people, to restore whatever is in decay, and with one heart and one soul build up again the dilapidated parts of our constitution, and rear again the fallen parts of our liberties, yet, as mere matter of the most vulgar prudence, it should seem advisable, not to neglect these things until the Iberian peninsula may bicome French, until the marine of France may double our own, and until the armies of France may be in Ireland or in England.

"

But Mr. Miles, in his letter to the Prince of Wales, p. 73, tells us of a project of "suspending the constitution," which project he attributes to one of whom he says,

the natural despotism of his temper is "well known, and it has lost nothing of "its stern and inflexible ferocity by a resi"dence in Asia, where it has been most

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wofully felt." The reason which the person alluded to is said to have given for his advice, is this, that the power of Buonaparte can only be effectually resisted by a power as despotic as his own.' But there are some objections to this conclusion. First, in the most effective combinations of political and military power, for offence and for defence, they are radical differences of principle. Secondly, neither of the humbled emperors, nor the king of Prussia, were at all deficient in despotic power. And, thirdly, if despotism is to be our defence against despotism, we may as well submit at once to that of Buonaparte himself, as that of the adviser, or any other. Nay, it would be more creditable as well as more beneficial more creditable, because there is less discredit in submitting to a mighty con

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queror, than to any traitorous usurper of contemptible pretensions; and more beneficial, as we should not only be spared the havoc and bloodshed of a contest, but, when once slaves, should at least be governed with transcendant ability.

As I am not, however, likely ever to become a convert to the preachers of despotism, so I must myself continue a preacher of REFORM.

I have remarked, that in the combina tions for invasion and for defence, there is a radical difference. But this requires explanation and qualification. In the present state of society, standing, regular, and highly disciplined armies, are best for invasion and conquest; but it is only in despotic states that such armies can arrive at the magnitude necessary for subduing extensive and potent states; for so long as any nation retains its liberty, its standing army must necessarily be limited in its numbers for the security of that liberty. A free nation, therefore, in these days of civilization, is, happily, unqualified for the conquest of other powerful nations. In the rude and ferocious ages prior to civilization it was otherwise; for then the nations most free were most warlike; and countries were not conquered by standing armies, discipline, and military science, but by whole nations of free men pouring into a territory more fruitful than their own, and exterminating or subduing nations less free, fierce, and hardy than themselves. My positions therefore remain unshaken, that in our own age despotism, with its unlimited standing armies, are the machinery for invasion; while liberty and the universal arms-bearing of the people, are the means of defence; always recollecting, that the more universal that arms-bearing of the people, the greater may be with safety the regular army of the country in question.

Nor, Sir, is reform, radical reform, only necessary to our political liberty, and to the preservation of our property from taxation at the will and pleasure of a minister, for corrupting parliamentary supporters, and for enlisting an immense army of civil mercenaries for the support of his power, to be paid out of the pockets of the betrayed and injured people; but it is necessary for restoring discipline and vigour to every department of the state; that our affairs abroad as well as at home may not be conducted with imbecility, and our national efforts end in disappointment, and cover us with disgrace. In "A Short English Tale," written in answer to Major Hogan, it is made an apology for the commanders-in

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OFFICIAL PAPERS. ENGLAND AND FRANCE.-King of England's Declaration against France. Dated Westminster, Dec. 15, 1808.

The overtures made to his majesty by the governments of Russia and of France have not led to negociation: and the intercourse to which those overtures gave rise being terminated, his majesty thinks it right thus promptly and publicly to make known its terinination.-The continued appearance of a negotiation, when peace has been found to be utterly unattainable, could be advantageous only to the enemy.-It might enable France to sow distrust and jealousy in the councils of those who are combined to resist her oppressions: and if, among the nations which groan under the tyranny of French alliance, or among those which maintain against France a doubtful and precarious independence, there should be any which even now are balancing between the certain ruin of a prolonged inactivity, and the contingent dangers of an effort to save themselves from that ruin ; to nations so situated the delusive prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France could not fail to be peculiarly injurious. Their preparations might be relaxed by the vain hope of returning tranquillity; or their purpose shaken by the apprehension of being left to contend alone.-That such was, in fact, the main object of France in the proposals transmitted to his majesty from Erfurth, his majesty entertained a strong persuasion. But at a moment when results so awful from their importance, and so tremendous from their uncertainty, might be depending upon the decision of peace or the king felt it due to himself to ascertain, beyond the possibility of doubt, the views and intentions of his enemies.-It was difficult for his majesty to believe, that the emperor of Russia had devoted himself so blindly and fatally to the violence and ambition of the power with which his imperial majesty had unfortunately become allied, as to be prepared openly to abet the usurpation of the Spanish monarchy; and to acknowledge and maintain the right

war,

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