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than they would have been expelled by the English army, had no victory been obtained." I stated my reasons for so thinking, and the fallacy of them has not been established. The question then was, considering the relative situation of the armies, according to the information of which the public was possessed at the time of the pub. lication of the Gazette, announcing the victory at Vimiera, whether terms might not be granted, which would be preferable either to consuming time, and encountering the difficulties that must necessarily be experienced in blockading them, or to sustaining a great loss in forcibly expelling them from their forts and entrenchments. Indeed, so clear and obvious was my meaning, that I concluded no Englishman could be found so perversely stupid, as not to comprehend it; and under the influence of this conviction, added to the expectation I entertained, that, on the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple, some additional particulars would be communicated to the public, I determined neither to reply to your explanation, nor to the other observations which you made upon what I advanced. In both instances I have been disappointed; and shall therefore now shortly reply to those observations, and assure you, that, as you are well acquainted with mankind, I now begin to incline to the opinion, that you thought here might be some for whose benefit it was necessary to elucidate what was not ambiguous, and expound what was not mysterious.

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And now this fustian stuff is done, Let's fairly to th' argument come. You ask was it a reasonable expectation? First: If you mean by it, was the victory at Vimiera such as to render reasonable the expectation generally entertained that an unconditional surrender would be the immediate result?" I answer, no; and from the general tendency of your observations in the Register, I should conclude that you are a convert to this negation, were it not impossible to deduce this inference from your statement, that the whole of Junot's force (14,000) was repulsed by part (9,000) of Sir Arthar Wellesley's army, amounting to 18,000. Now, Sir, this is a phenomenon (if you please) in military affairs, for the existence of which a skilful tactician, even supposing the bravery of the contending armies to be equal, would experience no difficulty to account. But neither does necessity urge, nor inclination prompt me, to detail the demonstrations of theory, or crowd your pages with mili

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tary axioms. It is with peculiar satisfaction I admit, that the superior bravery and firmness of our troops repulsed the attacks of superior numbers of the French. But was their ability to do so first discovered at Vimiera? No. Fortunately many instances have occurred, in which the intrepidry and resolution of English troops have re dered abortive the impetuous and vigoro attacks of the French. They have resisted, where cautious prudence would dictate retreat, or advise surrender; they bare assailed, where cold calculation would predict defeat, or foretel destruction. people of England well knew the character of their soldiers; the retrospective view d their exploits was cheering and delightfu but what reason was there to suppose the they had degenerated? Was the spirit si courage, displayed by our soldiers at Ma plaquet, at the commencement of the Eighteenth century, less apparent at attack at Lincelles and other places, at close? Was the glory acquired at Minden obliterated at Maida? We were cuteria with glory at Vimiera-but obtained t else.

The battle of Alexandria was gamed by our troops, in nearly the same proportiva to the French, as the battle of Vimiere The retreat of the French in both cases wa not prevented. Was the unconditional sur render of Abdallah Menou's troops immediate and necessary consequence? Wa it the eventual consequence after Sir Dava Baird had joined with the Indian ama and General Belliard had surrendered b Cairo, to the particulars of which surrende and the circumstances under which it was negociated, I beg leave to refer you To return, however; was it the immedia and necessary consequence? No, and the only possible reply is, that after the bats of Alexandria the English army received no reinforcements; after the battle of Vmiera it did. This reply concedes the point, that, with the troops Sir Arthur Wellesley had at the battle of the 21st, it was not reas sonable to expect an unconditional surrendere We have now to examine, with the augme tation of force on the part of the Englis the relative situation of the two armies, which naturally includes the consideration of what you may, secondly, mean by the term it, viz. was the position of Junot so strong, his supply of provisions so ample, and his force so formidable, as to prevent its English army compelling him, withet great delay or considerable loss, uncondi tionally to surrender? I refer to my fornict letter to you to shew, that, with the infor mation the public then had, it was not rea

able to expect it, and shall now offer -b observations as your remarks on that er seem to require. It is necessary to mise, that it was generally known that 000 men had sailed for Portugal, yet till news of the victory at Vimiera arrived, sanguine expectations of unconditional render were entertained by the public; that, at the time I wrote my former letno accounts had reached this country of numbers for which transports had been anded. I purposely admitted as correct number which you acknowledged Janot re-conducted into Lisbon; I stated the ner in which I accounted for the numof men Junot could collect; it was what one could misunderstand or deny; and I continue to believe that Junot had 20,000 on whose active services he could rely. do not prove that there is even a strong Dability of the contrary. I cannot avoid ressing my surprise that you should so far e misunderstood as to misrepresent what ated with respect to the advantage to be red from a superiority of numbers in a kade. I started no difficulties, but even ted, that immediately after the battle of iera, the English army was

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to blockade him, and prevent his incorSinto the country; Junot could not n meet them in the field." Further ment is unnecessary. I shall now conwhat you advance respecting the advanto be derived from a superiority of abers in a storm, reminding you that I said: "I do not mean to insinuate our troops could not reduce Junot, but - amounting to 30,000 men would not ent a great effusion of blood." Esting, then, the actual military force of ot at only 20,000 men, and increasing 30,000 English troops in the proportion

to 9, the ratio established at Vimiera, which is conceding to you every advanyou can possibly expect from your arent, we shall gain an additional force of O imaginary men, phantasmagoria sol.. Philipstal hussars, phantoms who Ed have been a long time in clearing rets, ramparts, counterscarps, &c. and done little to enable our 30,000 subcial English soldiers to possess themselves not's intrenchments. ["Risum teneatis, "It is important however to be seria considering a serious subject. Let us form and substance to airy nothing. as suppose that 30,000 English soldiers ain materials sufficient for the manure of 50,000 Frenchmen: here, then, Do Frenchmen in intrenchments have sist the attack of 50,000 Frenchmen.

I admit that this superiority for insuring success in storming is advantageous; but I repeat, that it would not prevent, on the part of the assailants a great effusion of blood. I suppose success, and shall therefore not allude to instances in which the assailants were defeated. When the Austrians, under Daun and Nadast, attacked the Duke of Beverr, commanding an army of 25 000 men in enentrenchments before Breslaw, their loss nearly equalled the whole of Bevern's army, although they attacked him with a force. nearly four times as numerous. The Aus- trians were astonished at their success, and. the duke of Bevern was censured for returning with a comparatively trifling loss. Did the superior numbers of the French at Lodi prevent on their port a great effusion of blood? Dul Mollendorf-but you must already be exclaiming :

Utituria re non dubiâ testibus non necessariis. Further, it is notorious that many instances may be cited to prove, that, after great loss has been sustained in storming the intrenchments and outworks, the assailants have granted to the besieged in the citadel terms of capitulation which secured to them very considerable advantages to small bodies of men shut up in forts not more formidable than those of Portugal, the greater part of which you say, if your information is correct, were things to be taken by storm with perhaps the loss of a thousand men for each attack.-Bravo! Mr Cobbett ! Excellent well! Let the public read this, and every cool reflecting man will be vexed that he has suffered his feelings to get the better of his judgment, that he anticipated what was either impossible or what policy could not justify. I have a strong suspicion, that, with all your pretended contempt for the learned languages, you are well acquainted with the classics, and that, in writing the preceding sentence, you had in view the followin passage of Cicero de Oratore: "Si quæ premat res vehementiùs, ità cedere solere, ut non modo non abjecto, sed ne rejecto quidem sento fugere videar; sed adhibere quandam in dicendo speciem atque pompam et pugnæ similem fugam." The application is not diff cult: and I proceed to reply to what you ad vance respecting the successful defence of Saragossa and Valencia. You say it has not been owing to the strength of the place, but to the strength and courage of the defenders. I thought I had provided against an answer of this sort by instancing the defeat of the defeat of the Spaniards at Rio Seco by a third of their number; and it so happened, that the uudisciplined defenders of these places were vanquished in the field, com

pelled to retreat to their towns, and there became victors. And we now learn that these brave Spaniards hesitate perhaps prudently, to attack Marshal Ney's corps on the Ebro. Although according to the acCounts given in the newspapers, their army is three times as numerous as the French, and possesses besides a large proportion of regulars. As an answer to your representation of what I said with respect to distressing the inhabitants of Lisbon, I shall state what I did say: "there was no great reason to believe that a French army would starve, while there were between 2 and 300.000 Portuguese inhabitants in Lisbon; people whom we went to assist not to distress, to defend and not to assail;" and if Junot was to be reduced by blockade, the inhabitants of Lisbon would first suffer by want of provisions, whatever number of gibbets Dalrymple might erect round Junot's camp. Is it even a very great infraction of the laws of war for a general to subsist his army at the expence of the inhabitants who are his enemies? I beg leave to remind you of the manner in which you have treated this subject in some of your former Registers. In order, however, to remove every pretext for cavil, I will suppose myself to have said, that in the event of assault, every ball the English fired would kill more Portuguese than French; and that Junot would not have been restrained by the feelings of humanity from practising any species of torture and cruelty on the inhabitants, friends or foes, in order more successfully to resist the attack of the English.You say that for our general to refrain from attacking them on that account is the determination of a coward. "What! did not Junot well know, that at last he must become really responsible for all the cruelties he committed upon the people of Lisbon?" Is Duhesme restrained through fear of the consequences from distressing the inhabitants of Barcelona? And did not the celebrated Earl of Peterborough and sir Cloudesley Shovel hesitate to attack this Barcelona, the inhabitants being in the interest of Charles, and not daring to lift a hostile finger, because, as they affirmed, they were overawed by the duke de Popoli's garrison of 5000 men? Was general Schmettau to be intimidated by threats from burning the fine suburbs of Dresden, and otherwise distressing its inhabitants, when Marshal Daun appeared be. fore it with the whole of his army after his victory at Hoehkirchen ? And was Daun considered a coward, for not attacking, with very superior numbers, the Prussian army in and before Dresden? No; and it was

the threat to destroy the place, and partial

execution of that threat, that induced Daun not to ruin his friends equally with his foes, and save the Prussian army. Did the terror of Russian sabres and halters induce the French to desist from firing from the ci tadel of Turin, on its inhabitants in the interest of the allies, who had driven them from their outworks, and got possession of the town? Was hanging mentioned in any article of the convention concluded there! It is indeed superfluous to relate any of the atrocities of which the French have been guilty for no man will believe that they are to be deterred by a gibbet from committing any cruelty, if thereby they can secure to themselves any advantage. And the mur dering of a few thousand Frenchmen in coll blood, would not much alleviate the fuffer ings of the inhabitants. It is however in controvertible, that whatever portion of dis tress it is possible for an army to avert from friendly inhabitants, is a circumstance, that degree at least, exculpatory of the com mander, in not resorting to those measura which would have produced that distress It is not alone, perhaps, sufficient to justif the total abandonment of an object, in itself highly important to be gained, (to she which I have before, stated the conduct the great Earl of Peterborough at Barcelona), but it is a very considerable item in the cata logue of these obstacles, that collectively would wisely determine a commander to re linquish that object. I wish it to have a due weight and no more. I have now answered all your observations, and w again ask you candidly to declare, whether was reasonable to expect an unconditiona surrender of the French in Portugal, as the com sequence of the battle of Vimiera; knowing that Junot wasenabled to retreat to his posi tion? If we had gained novictory, we must have occupied the same ground, and possessed near ly the same advantages. We gained glory, and little more; and this glory so dazzled out countrymen, that they considered as inev table, what before they had deemed scarcely possible. It was this victory at Vimiera that made them exclaim:

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are convincing, let it be candidly avowed. If their fallacy shall be established, I shall not be ashamed to acknowledge my error; and I can assure you, I never hold the candid in contempt. Truth and impartiality are my objects; they were, I suppose, yours, when you nobly advocated the cause of Lutz, and firmly supported the effects of popular indignation at the peace of Amiens. Do not suffer yourself now to be biassed by popular clamour; whatever part of it arises from erroneous opinions, resist and correct as far as you can; whatever part of it is just and reasonable, sanction and support; but, Jet your determination be the result of inquiry; aud do not let it be asked,

-Cur non Ponderibus modulisque suis ratio utitur; ac res Ut quæque est, ità suppliciis delicta coercet? The case seems to be this: the total expulsion of the French from Portugal is the grand object for which an English army s sent there; the difficulties in accomplishng this object are great, if the enemy deermines to risk his own ruin in opposing hem; but, so important is the object, they

nust be encountered. If however it can be btained by granting terms to this enemy, which terms, on balancing the advantage ferived, and the injury sustained, both in preentffect and probable consequence, will se

only the same benefit that would have utted from adopting the severe alternative f force, it is not culpable to grant them; nd in whatever degree the disadvantages esulting from such a Convention can be roved to exceed the benefits derived, in hat degree the commander who signs it culpable; and, I am sorry to say, there are me articles in it so mortifying and degrading, at I cannot conceive it will be possible to roduce satisfactory reasons for having acceed to them. There is a portion of infamy tached to this Convention of Lisbon which fear can never be wholly effaced. Grief ad disgrace have invaded us, and I cannot et discover how they are to be altogether spelled.I have the honour to remain, ith great respect, &c.-C.-25th October,

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your Register pending the Distillery Bill. It appeared to you, because much had been said both in the house and out of it, that the subject had been completely exhausted; but, in the different views which were exhibited, the peculiar and distinguishing characteristic of our present situation appears to have been overlooked. This, in fact, consists in that very extraordinary extension of the consumption of wheat in this country which of late years has so greatly outstripped the growth of the other countries of production. It is not that our own growth has not increased in a ratio proportioned to this extended consumption that we have cause of alarm, for the reverse is notoriously the case. In a work recently published, entitled "An Inquiry into the State. of National Subsistence as connected with the Progress of Wealth and Population, by W. T. Combe," an historical view is exhibited of the progress of this increase, and it is there shown that the growth of wheat has doubled itself within the present reign, and, from evidence equally unquestionable, he has shown, that the increased production of other countries has borne no proportion to this amount. However adequate, therefore, our usual and ordinary growth may be to the support of our population, yet, in case of a failure, we can nowhere look for a stock adequate to supply our wants; for the redundant produce of other countries, which might supply a deficiency in a growth of four million quarters of wheat annually, would be utterly inadequate to cover a proportionate failure where the usual growth exceeded eight millions. We must confere admit the justness of the remark of the author above alluded to (p. 18, 8vo. edition), that when the consumption of a country greatly exceeds the general produce of the neighbouring countries of exportation, it is from her own produce alone that a stock can be formed at all adequate to her probable wants on a failure of her own growth. The surplus produce of the whole world," it is added,

would afford small relief to such a population as that of China."-Without following this writer, who seems to speak from a practical acquaintance with the subject, through all the causes connected as they are with the existing corn laws, and the peculiar situation of the country which have prevented the formation of such stores, it must be acknowledged, that the removal of these difficulties becomes, under the present circumstances of the country, a matter of very urgent necessity. The practicability of encouraging such stores, without checking the operation of the dealers and farmers, is

demonstrated, and it certainly becomes the imperious duty of the legislature, from the peculiar fickleness of our climate, which.

But

owing either to our insular situation, or northern latitude, or both, combined with the comparatively limited extent of territory, has been a source of scarcity and famine in every period of our history." to turn their attention to this subject.-Nothing but that natural propensity in man, to forget past evils in the possession of present good, could prevent the effect which these repeated lessons ought to produce on our conduct. we seem to be governed by a blind fatality or a desperate confidence. The harvest is now over, and the universality of the complaint of mildew puts it beyond a doubt that the injury is extensive. In some places the produce is estimated at a third less than the average crop, in others a fourth, and in some a fifth. If we could suppose the deficiency on the whole to be an eighth, this would an ount to at least a million quarters of wheat, more than double our average importation, and which has never been exceeded but once in the annals of our biory, and that after two successive failures.-The price of wheat has already risen at least 25 per cent, or a full fourth higher than they were before the harvest, and had it not been for the uncertainty of the American embargo, there can be little doubt that this rise would have been more considerable. "It is not the magnitude of our foreign supplies, so much as the manner of their coming into our markets, which affects our price." A hundred thousand quarters of wheat are not more than an eightieth part of our annual consumption; but such a supply arriving suddenly from America either in London or Liverpool, or both places, would depress the price very considerably, and affect those of the whole kingdom. This circumstance renders the holding of stocks extremely dangerous, without some sort of encouragement from government, and consequently lays us open to every casualty. This rise is already felt by many of the manufacturers both in Yorkshire and Lancashire, where a partial stagnation of trade exists, notwithstanding the new channels that have been opened tous. We must hope, however, that the words of the writer before alluded to may not prove prophetic: "The least consequence that would attend even an inconsiderable deficiency, in the total absence of all measures of precaution and prevention, and the almost inevitable exhaustion of the stocks, which would be a consequence of such neglect, would be a considerable distress to almost every rank and a most serious

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alarm to the whole nation. If the failure was at all general or considerable, the consequence might be an abandonment of national interests, and a sacrifice of national honour, to obtain a participation in stocks, the amount of which, at least, probably, would afford us a very inconsiderable relief." I remain, Sir, &c.-COLUMELLA.

BREWERIES.

STR,-Persuading myself that a communication, which may contribute to remove error of any sort, will be favourably received by you, I am induced to offer the following observations on a subject of ges neral concern, inasmuch as it relates to the purity, and other good qualities, of the national beverage, Beer.-What I am desirons to impress on the minds of the com munity is, that the production of uniform. ly good beer is not an arbitrary matter, as is commonly supposed, and which may be accomplished by any and every person who choses to take on himself the othce of a brewer. For, a man may be willing sacrifice a large allowance of the choices materials, without having the power, alt all, to make a palatable, early, and spen taneously fine, and consequently a wholes some malt liquor, unless he is provid with, and fully understands all the uses cl. some far more secure guides than th

discriminations of his own senses alone wi

prove. A studious observation of ti powerfully different effects of the differe degrees of heat in the water used in the several extractions, and of the heat in fer meating the worts so extracted from 11 malt, is of the very first importance necessity. The list is an operation of s influence in the case, that, in conjuncti with the precautions required to be observe in the mashings, fermentation determice the early or the later period of natural ins ness, as well as a distinction of flavour cording to the several stages of its progress and, withal, fixes the principles of prot vation in beers. Hops afford the hast d this last mentioned and desirable property but all the benefits of the hops are destinys by a few hours only of too long pretra ed, or otherwise erroneous, fermentation The several degrees of heat, critica suitable to these two leading parts of the process, rest on the brewer's experie and judgment; and, when discovered 2 determined on by him, are applied, no precisely, by the use of properly constric ed thermometers. But these beats can be judged of, to any tolerably sufficient de gree of correctness, by the perceptions

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