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than they would have been expelled by the tary axioms. It is with peculiar satisfaction English army, had no victory been obtaio- I admit, that the superior br very as ed." --I stated my reasons for so thinking, firmness of our troops repulsed the anacs and the fallacy of them has not been esta- of superior nunbers of the French. bit blished. The question then was, consider- was their ability to do so first discovered a ing the relative situation of the armies, ac- Vimiera? No. Fortunately many...3 cording to the information of which the have occurred, in which the ii iepima. I public was possessed at the time of the pub. and resolution of Engli h troops have rego lication of the Gazette, announcing the dered abortive the impetuous and vigula victory at Vimiera, whether terms might attacks of the French. They bare ressies, n t be granted, which would be preferable where cautious prudence would dicere eittier to consuming time, and encounter- retreat, or advise surrender ; ther bare ing the difficulties that must necessarily be assailed, where cold calculation wouk po experienced in blockrding them, or to dict deteat, or foreiel destruction. '] sustaining a great loss in forcibly expelling people of England well knew the characa them from their forts and entrenchiments, In- of their soldiers ; the retrospective view & deed, so clear and obvious was my meaning, their exploits was cheering and d light that I concluded no Englishman could be but what reason was there to suppuse it found so perversely stupid, as not to coni- they bad degenerated ? Was the spirit side prehend it; and onder ile influence of this
courage, displayed by our soldiers at 1 conviction, added to the expectation I enter- plaquet, at the cominencernent of the tained, that, on the arrival of Sir Hew Dals eighteenth century, less apparent at iba rymple, some additional particulars would attack at Lincelles and other places, at 14 bi communicated to the public, I deter- close ? Was the glory acquired at dina mined neither to reply to your explanation, obliterated at Maida? We were curier por to the other observations wliich you with glory at Vimiera—but obiained li* made upon what I advanced. In both in else. The battle of Alexandria was ga.. stances I have been disappointed ; and shall by our troops, in nearly the same prop 0134 therefore now shortly reply to those obser- 10 ile French, as the battle of Vime. vations, and assure you, that, as you are The retreat of the French in both cases wat well acquainted with wankind, I now begin not prevented. Was the unconditional sur to incline to the opinion, that you thought render of Abdallah Menou's troops it here might be some for whose benetii it immediaie and necessary consequence? 1188 was necessary to elucidate what was not it the eventual consequence aller Sir Danat ambiguons, and expound what was not Baird had joined with the Indian a1105, mysterious.
and General Bclliard had surrendered sa And now this fustian stuff is done,
Cairo, to the particulars of which surrende", Let's fairly to th' argument come.
and the circumstances under which it wast
negociated, I beg leave to refer you? You ask was it a reasonable espectuion? To return, however; was it the immediate a First: If you mean by it,
and necessary consequence ? No, and the victory at Vin:iera such as to render reason- only possible reply is, that after the basis able the expectation generally entertained of Alexandria the English army received that an unconditional surrender would be no reinforcenients; after the battle of Vio the immediate result ?" I answer, no; and miera it did. This reply concedes the poini, from the general tendency of your observa- that, with the troops Sir Arthur Wellesler tions in. ihe Register, I should conclude had at the battle of the 21st, it was not res that you are a convert to this negation, sonable to expect an unconditional surrender : were it not impossible to deduce this in- We have now to examine, with the augmenference from yo'ır statement, that the tation of force on the part of the English, whole of Junot's force (14 000) was repulsed the relative situation of the two armies, by part (9,000) of Sir Arthur Wellesley's wbich naturally includes the consideration army, amounting to 15,000. Now, Sir, of what you may, secondly, mean by the this is a phenomenon (if you please) in term it, viz. was the position of Junot so o militu aita rs, for the existence of which strong, his supply of provisions so ample, a skiiful tactician, even supposing the bra- and bis force so formidable, as to prevent ite very of the contending armies to be equal, | English army compelling him, willitis? would experience no dificulty to account, great delay or considerable loss, uncondBut neither does necessity urge, nor inclina- tionally to surrender? I refer io ny formir tion prompt me, to detail the demonstrations letter to you to show, that, with the injure of theory, or crowd your pages with mili- mation the public then had, it was not ré.2
unable to expect it, and shall now offer 1 l admit that this superiority for insuring ch observations as your remarks on this success in stormilig is advantageous ; but I tter seem to require. It is necessary to repsat, that it would not prevent, on the part emise, that it was generally known that of tlie gesailants a great effision of blood. I 1,000 men bad sailed for Poringal, yet till suppose succe•g, and shallilerefore not allude e news of the victory at Vimiera arrived, to instances in which the assailants were
sanguine expectations of unconditional defeated. When the Austrians, under Daun rrender were entertained by the public; and Nadist, attacked the Duke of Beverr, d that, at the time I wrote my former let- commanding an army of 25 000 men in en*; no accounts had reached this country of entrenchments before Breslaw, their loss e numbers for which transports had been nearly equalled the whole of Bevern's army, minded. I purposely admitted as correct aithough they attacked bin with a force. 2 number which you acknowledged Junnot nearly four times as numerous. The Aus. dre-conducted into Lisbon ; I siated the trians were astonisbed at their success, and inder in which I accounted for the num- the dike of Beveru was censured for return. r of men Junot could collect; it was what ing with a comparatively triling loss. Did one could misunderstand or deny; and ! the superior pabers of the French at Lodi Il continue to believe that Junoi had 20.01) prevent on their part a great effusion of blood? :0 on whose active services he could rely. Du Mollendorf-but you must already be nu do not prove that there is eren a strong exclaiming : obability of the contrary. I cannot avoid
Urturia re non dubia restibus non necessariis. pressing my surprise that you should so far
Further, it is notorious that many instancce pe misunderstood as 10 misrepresent what
may be cited to prove, that, afier grea: loss bas tated with respect to the advantage to be
buen suciained in sorming the intrenchiments rived from a superiority of numbers in a
and ouiworks, the assailants have granted to ckade. I started no difficulties, but even
the besieged in the ciialel terms of capitulaated, that immediately after the battle of
tion which secured to them very considerable miera, " the English army was
advantages to small bodies of men shut up in d to blockade him, and prevent his incor.
forts not more formidable than those of Para ns into the country ; Junot could not in meet them in the field.” Further
tugal, the greater part of which you say, if your
information is correct, were things to beiaken rment is un necessary. I shall now coner what you advance respecting the advan
by storm with perhaps the loss of a thousand
men for each attack. --Bravo! Mr Cabbett! e to be derived from a superiority of mbers in a storm, reminding you that I
Excellent weli! Let the public read this, and in said : " I do not mean to insinuaie
crery cool reflecting man will be vexed that
he has suffered his feelings to get the betier tour troops could not reduce Junot, but
of his judgment, that he anucipaled what ir amounting 10 30 000 men would not
was eitner impossible or what policy could "ent a great effusion of blood." Esti. ting, then, the actual military force of
not justify. I have a strong suspicion, that, aot at only 20,000 nien, and increasiog
with all your pretended contempt for the 30,000 English troops in the proportion
learned languages, you are well acquainted
with the classics, and chat, in writing the pre1410 9, the ratio established at Vimiera, d which is conceding to you every advan
ceding sentence, you had in view the follow
in passage of Cicero de Oratore : “ Si que se you can possibly expect from your arment, we shall gain an additional force of
premat res vehementiùs, itàl cedere solere, it
non modo non abjecto, sed ne rejecto quide:n ,000 imaginary men, phantasmagoria solers, Philipstal hussars, phantoms who
sento fugere videar; sed adhibere quauidiam mld have been a long time in clearing re
in dicendo speciem aique pompim et pug! abts, ramparts, counter-caris, &c. and
similem fugam." The application is not difti. ve done little to enable our · 30,000 sub.
cult; and I proceed to reply to what you all. intini English soldiers to possess themselves
vince respecting the successful defence of Junot's intrenchments. [" Risum teneatis,
Saragoss3 and Valencia. You say it has rot aici ?"] It is iinportant however to be seri
been owing to the strength of the pluce, but 13 in considering a serious subject. Let us
to the strength and courage of the defenders. ve form and substance to airy nothing.
I thought I had provided against an answer et us suppo e that 30.000 English soldiers
of this sort by insiancing the defeat of the atain materials sufficient for the inanu
defeat of the Spaniards at Rio Seco by a cture of 50 000 Frenchmen : here, then,
third of their number; and it so happen. 000 Frencinen in intrenchments have
ed, that the idisciplined defenders of these resist the attack of 50,000 Frenchmen.
places were vanquished in the field, con
pelled to retreat to their towns, and there execution of that threat, that induced Daun became victors. And we now learn that not to ruin his friends equally with his foes, these brave Spiniards hesitate perhaps pru- and save the Prussian army. Did the terror dently, to attack Marshal Ney's corps on
of Russian sabres and halters induce the the Ebro. Although according to the ac- French to desist from firing from the ci. counts given in the newspapers, their army is tadel of Turin, on its inhabitants in the inthree times as numerous as the French, and terest of the allies, who had drieen them possesses besides a large proportion of regulars. from their outworks, and got possession of As an answer to your representation of what the town? Was hanging mentioned in any I said with respect to distressing the inhabi- article of the convention concluded there! tants of Lisbon, I shall state what I did say: It is indeed super fuous to relate any of the " there was no great reason to believe that a atrocities of which the French have beer French army would starve, wbile there were guilty: for no man will believe that they are between 2 and 300.000 Portuguese inbabi- to be deterred by a gibbet from committing tants in Lisbon ; people whom we went to any cruelty, if thereby they can secure to assist not to distress, to defend and not to themselves any advantage. And the mu. assail ;" and if Junot was to be reduced by dering of a few thousand Frenchmen in con blockade, the inhabitants of Lisbon would blood, would not much alleviate the fuffer. first suffer by want of provisions, whatever ings of the inhabitants. It is however innumber of gibbets Dalrymple might erect controvertible, that whatever portion of dis. round Junot's camp. Is it even a very great tress it is possible for an army to avert from infraction of the laws of war for a general | friendly inhabitants, is a circumstance, to subsist his army at the expence of ihe in- that degree at least, exculpatory of the con. habitants who are his enemies ? I beg leave mander, in not resorting to those measura to remind you of the manner in which you which would have produced that distress
, have treated this subject in some of your It is not alone, perhaps, sufficient to jastile former Registers. In order, however, to the total abandonmeni of an object, in itse remove every pretext for cavil, I will sup- highly important to be gained, (to sber pose myself to have said, that in the event which I have before stated the conduct of of assault, every ball the English fired would the great Earl of Peterborough at Barcelona), kill more Portuguese than French ; and that but it is a very considerable item in the cata. Junot would not have been restrained by the logue of those obstacles, that collectively feelings of humanity from practising any would wisely determine a commander to the species of torture and cruelty on the inlabi. linquish that object. I wish it to have it tants, friends or foes, in order more success. due weight and no more.
I have bor fully to resist the attack of the English. answered all your observations, aed w: You say that for our general to refrain from again ask you candidly to declare, whether attacking them on that account is the deter- was reasonable to expect an unconditional mination of a coward. " What! did not surrender of tbe French in Portugal, as the copy Junot well know, that at last he must become sequence of the battle of Vimiera; knowing really responsible for all the crneries he that Junot waienabled to retreat to his posicommitted upon the people of Lisbon?" Is tion? If we had gained povictory, we musthave Dubesme restrained through fear of the con occupied the same ground, and possessed near sequences from distressing the inhabitants of ly the same advantages. We gained glory, and Barcelona ? And did not the celebrated Ear] little more ; and this glory so dazzled our of Peterborough and sir Cloudesley Shovel countıymen, that they cousidered as inerhesitate to attack this Barcelona, the inhabi- table, what before they had deemed scarcely tants being in the interest of Charles, and possible. It was this victory at Vimiera not daring to lift a hostile finger, because, that made them exclaim : as they affirmed, they were overawed by
-Occidit, occidit, the duke de Populi's garrison of 5000 men? Spes omnis et fortuna nostri nominis. Was general Schmettau to be intimidated by
The public knew the amount of the force threats from burning the fine suburbs of
sent against Lisbon; and I ask, whether, Dresden, and otherwise distressing its in- (without recapitulating all the particulars) habitants, when Marshal Daun appeared be. the relative situation of the armies, agree tore it with the whole of his army after his
ably to the information the public then had victory at Hoehkirchen ? Aud was Daun
and since confirmed, was such as to render considered a coward, for not attacking, with
unpardonable the granting of terms to the very superior numbers, the Prussian army
French ? I think I have advanced reasons in and before Dresden ? No; and it was
sufficient to prove the contrary. If they are the threat to destroy the place, and partial futile, let their futility be proved; if they are convincing, let it be candidly avowed. your Register pending the Distillery Bill. It If their fallacy shall be established, I shall appeared to you, because much bad been said not be ashamed to acknowledge my error ; both in the house and out of it, it at the and I can assure you, I never hold the candid subject had been completely exhausted ; but, in contempt. Truth and impartiality are in the different views which were exhibited, my objects; they were, I suppose', yours, the peculiar and distinguishing characteristic when you nobly advocated the cause of of our present situation appears to have been Lutz, and firmly supported the eflects of; overlooked. This, in fact, consists in that popular indignation at the peace of Amiens. very extraordinary extension of the conDo not suffer yourself now to be biassed by sumption of wheat in this country wbich of popalar clamour ; whatever part of it arises Jale years has so greatly outstripped the from erroneous opinions, resist and correct growth of the other countries of production. as far as you can ; whatever part of it is just It is not that our own growth has not and reasonable, sanction md support; but, increased in a ratio proportioned to this let your determination be the result of in- extended consumption that we have cause of quiry; and do not let it be asked,
alarm, for the reverse is notoriously the case. Cur non
lo a work recently published, entitled " An Ponderibus modulisque siis ratio utitur ; ac res Inquiry into the State, of National SubUt quæque est, ità supplicis delicta coercer? sistence as connected with the Progress of
The case seems to be this : the total Wealth and Population, by W.T. Combe," expulsion of the French from Portugal is an historical view is exbibited of ibe prohe grand object for which an English army gress of this increase, and it is there shown s sent there; the difficulties in accomplish- that the growth of wheat has doubled itself og this object are great, if the enemy de- within the present reign, and, from evidence ermines to risk his own ruin in opposing equally unquestionable, he kes shown, that hem; but, so important is the object, they the increased production of other countrie: must be encountered. If however it can be has borne no proportion to this amourt, btained by granting terms to this enemy, However adequate, therefore, our usra' and which terms, on balancing the advantage ordinary growih may be to the suppori vi Griend, and the injury sustained, both in pre- our population, yet, in case of a failur?, we **15tct and probable consequence, will se
can now bere look for a stock adequate to only the same benefit that would have supply our wants; for the redundant produce
!ted from adopting the severe alternative of other countries, which might supply a f furce, it is not culpable to grant them; · deficiency in a growth of four million quare nd in whatever degree the disadva.stages ters of wheat annually, would be utterly esulting from such a Convention can be inadequate to cover a proportionate failure roved to exceed the benetits derived, in where th: usual growth exceeded eight miliat degree the commander wło signs it lions. Wemuihinkre admitibe justness culpable; and, I am sorry to say, there are of the remark of the autia ! above alluded ome articles in it so mortifying and degrading, to (p. 18, 8vo. edition), that when the sat I cannot conceive it will be possible to consumption of a country great exceeds roduce satisfactory reasons for baving acce
the general produce of the neighbouring ed to them. There is a portion of infamy countries of exportation, it is from her own tached to this Convention of Lisbon which produce alone that a stock can be formed at fear can never be wholly effaced. Grief all adequate to her probable wants on a ad disgrace have invaded us, and I cannot failure of her own growth. The sorplus et discover how they are to be altogether produce of the whole world,” it is added, (pelled.--I have the honour to remain,
is would afford sm:!! relief to such a popuith great respect, &c.-C.--25th October, lation as that of China."--Without follow808.
ing this writer, who seems to speak from a
practical acquaintance with the subject, The Late HARVEST.
through all the causes connected as they are SIR;— As you are always watchful to with the existing corn laws, and the peculiar rect the public attention to important to- situation of the country which have prevented cs, the intrinsic interest of a sabject will the formation of such stores, it must be = a sufhcient claim to your notice though it acknowledged, that the removal of these jould not obtrude itself by the popular difficulties becomes, under the present cira amnour of the moment. The state of our cumstances of the country, a matter of very tocks of Grain, the prospects of ourgrowing urgent necessity. The practicability of enop, and the probability of foreign supplies, couraging such stores, without checking the ere matters of inquiry and examination in operation of the dealers and farmers, iş
demonstrated, and it certainly becomes the alarm to the whole nation. If the failure imperious duty of the legislature, from the was at all general or considerable, the conpeculiar firkleness of our climate, which. sequence might be an abandonment of na“ owing either to our insular situztion, or tional interests, and a sacrifice of national northern latitude, or both, combined with honour, to obtain a participation in stocks, the comparatively limitedextent of territory, the amount of which, at lea-t, probibly, has been a source of scarcity and famine in would afford us a very inconsiderable relief." every period of our history," to turn their I remain, Sir, &c.- COLUMELLA. attention to this subject. Nothing but that natural propensity in man, to forget past
BREWERIES. evils in the possession of present good, could Sir,- Persuarling myself that a comunprevent the effect which these repeated les- nication, which may contribute to resons ought to produce on our conduct. But
nove error of any sort, will be favouriy we seem to be governod by a blind fatality received by you, I am induced to offer the or a desperate confidence. The harvest is following observations on a subject of a now over, and the universality of the con- neral concern, inasınuch as it relates to this paint of mildew puts it beyond a doubt :bat purity, and other good qualities of the the injury is extensive. In some places the national beverage, Beer.-What I am des produce is estimated at a third less than the sirous to impressost the minds of the com. average crop, iv others a fourth, and in muniry is, ibat ih; production of unifort: • some a fifth. If we conid suppose the defi. 1 ly good beer is not an arbitrary matter, as is ciency on the whole to be an eighth, this commonly supposed, and which may be would amount to at least a million quarters of accomplished by any and every pers! wheat, more than double our arerage impor- wbuchoses to take on hiabielf the office of tation, and which has never been exceeded a brewer. For, a man may be willing ! but once in the anuals of our history, and sacrifice a large allowance of the choice that after two successive failures.--The price materials, without having the power, aller of wheat has al:cady risen at least 25 per all, to make a palatable, early, and sporo cent, or a full fourth higher than they were taneousl: fina, and consequently a uhak.. before the harvest, and had it not been for some mait liquor, unless he is provik! the uncertainty of the American embargo, with, and fully understands all the uses 17" there can be little doubt that this rise would soinc far more Secure guides thaa have been more considerable. “ It is not discriminations of his own senses alone s the magnitude of our foreign supplies, so prove.
A studious observation of 1 much as the manner of their coming into powerfully dificrent efficts of the difere our markets, which aifects our price.” A degrees of heat in the water nsed in hundred thousand quarters of wheat are not several extractions, and of the heat in to more than an eightieth part of our anal meating the worts so extracted from 1.5 consumption ; but such a supply arriving malt, is of the very first importance i suddenly from Anerica either in London or necessity.---The list is an operation of sich Liverpool, or both places, would lopress the influence in the case, that, in conjuncti. price very considerably, and atient those of with the precautions required to be observe: the whole kingdom. This circumstance in the mashings, fermentation determin renders the holding of stocks extremely dan- the early or the laier period of natural 06gerous, without some sort of encruragement ness, as well as a distinction of fis out from government, and consequently lays us cording to the several stages of its progres? open to every casualty. This rise is already and, withal, tixes the principles of presne felt by many of the manuiacturers both in vation in beers. Hops afford the basis Yorkshire and Lancashire, where a partial this last nentioned and desirable prope: *** stagnation of trade exists, potwithsiunding but alihe bevefits of the hops are desting tire new channels that have been opened to by a few hours only of too long preten.
We must hope, however, that the ed, or otherwise erroneous, fermediationwords of the writer before alluded to may The sercral degrees of beat, critic not prove prophetic :
" The least con- suitable to these two leading parts of i'. sequence that would attend even
process, rest on the brewer's experier considerable deficiency, in the total absence and judgment; and, when discovered a" of all measures of precaution and prevention, determined on by him, are applel, m. and the almost inevitable exhaustion of the precisely, by the use of properly coratrici storks, which would be a consequence of ed thermometers. But ihese hests can soch nèglect, would be a considerable distress be judged of, to any tolerably sufficient u to almost every rank and a most serious gree of correctaess, by the perceptions