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no proof that it was not strong when Junot entered it at first; and with you rests the onus probandi. I do not purpose to enter into a detailed account of the circumtances under which Janot entered, and took pos session of Lisbon; nor do I intend to quote the Prince Regent's Manifesto, and a variety of other documents to prove how he could have been resisted; and I am not aware of any reason why it may not be admitted, though contrary to the fact, that there was not, at the time Junot entered Portugal, one parapet in the whole kingdom, from behind which resistance could have been made with greater advantage than in the open field, if resistance had been determined on.

There

can, indeed, be no analogy between the situation of the French and English armies at the times they respectively entered the country. But since when did these places become so very strong? There is no reason to be astonished; Junot has been in Portugal long enough, and his not wanted means, without supernatural aid or the interposition of a necromancer, to erect fortifications, from which to dislodge him by the next arrival would require all the skill of English of ficers, and all the intrepidity of British soldiers. But, Sir, every account since Junot's arrival most fully concurred in representing him as particularly sedulous in repairing the old, and erecting new forti fications, and that he had rendered his position almost impregnable; and I never saw any statement, which tended in the slightest degree to invalidate their claim to general belief; and, certainly, there were not a few individuals who, previous to Sir Arthur's landing, entertained very alarming apprehensions as to the result of the attack, if such had been found unavoidable.

You

then ask, "Was Junot's army to be fed by ravens?" I cannot immediately find the passage, but something to this effect. If you were as successful in proving that Junot was not supplied with, nor had any means of procuring provisions for his army, as you are in exposing the hollow and groundless reasons entertained by our generals as to the impracticability of obtaining a supply for the English army, I should determine not to trouble you with these observations, although the question, as it respects the public, would still remain the same. The newspapers, however, furnished us with various accounts of Junot's having collected a large quantity of provisions; and there was no great reason to believe, that a French army would starve while there were between 2 and 300,000 Portuguese inhabitants in Lisbon, people whom we went to assist, not to distress, to

defend, and not to assail. This was a most perplexing situation for our army, and Junot would take especial care to increase the difficulty to his utmost. Now, had the beforementioned statements of the inmense strength of Junot's position, and his abundant supply of provisions been disproved instead of meeting with a confirmation, in the unqualified assertion, "that Junot could easily have consumed time in a protracted defence," it would avail nothing to your argument. And unless you convince us that every individual of the public, who naturally expected an unconditional surrender was, in forming such opinion, convinced that Junot had no formidable entrenchments to fly to, and no supply of provisions, it will not assist you, if you can even prove that Sir Arthur could have marched into Lisbon with no more obstruction than one of your readers into Mr. Bagshaw's shop, and would have been as cordially and politely welcomed. You proceed-"Well, then," say you, "if "it be true that Sir Arthur Wellesley, with "only 9000 men, beat the whole of the "French force, in spite of all their advantages, have we not a right to expect, nay, "had we not a right to claim and to de"mand, at the hands of the commander in

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Portugal, when he had 30,000 men, the

capture or the total destruction of the "French army in Portugal, and if any na"tion had any right to expect any thing, "this nation had a right to expect a result "such as here described ?"-- It is true policy in a general to whom the defence of a strong place is entrusted, and who has at his disposal a force more than necessary for its defence, to march out and attack the army advancing to the siege, if the circumstances, under which he is to make the attack, are such as to justify him in expecting a favourable result; and in the event of his sustaining a repulse, retreat to his position is se

cure.

On the contrary, it would evince a great want of skill in the general, -who would march out when his force was scarcely sufficient to garrison the place, where suc cess was not certain. Junot, in his plan of attack on the 21st, and in his resistance at Roleia, appears to have been perfectly satisfied that he should succeed. It fortunately was not the case, but his retreat was not prevented. What was the effect? The English army was enabled to blockade him, and prevent his incursions into the country; he could not again meet them in the field; but it did not follow that an English army would be able to expel him from his forts. A crowd of instances might be collected to prove, that men who had been beater in

the field, had successfully defended a fortified place; but those of more recent occurrence, will perhaps be more convincing. We have not yet ceased to deplore the fate and admire the courage of the Spaniards, defeated at Rio Seco, and our tongues still vibrate with the praises of the undisciplined defenders of Valencia, Gerona, and Saragossa; places certainly not more formidable than the forts and entrenchments of Portugal. Now, I do not mean to insinuate that our troops could not reduce Junot; but their amounting to 30.000 would not prevent less bloodshed. Do you believe, that if Lisle, Maestricht, or Brissac, were pro perly garrisoned and commanded, that the besieging army would experience less loss, if they were ten times the number of the blockaded garrison? We also know, that in the battle of the 17th, when our army forced the passes of Roleia, only 6000 men could be brought to bear; and it is proba ble, that if Leison and Laborde bad effected their junction before the attack was made, we should have experienced a very alarm ing loss.. I think no one will deny, that the public had the means of satisfactorily ascer taining that Junot, effected his retreat after the battle of the 21st; that the places to which he retired were strong by nature and art; that he had a plentiful supply of provisions, and that his force after his defeat was still formidable; and the probability of reducing him not much greater than when the forces first sailed, recollecting, that at that time it was generally reported and believed, that Sir Arthur Wellesley would land at Peniche, and immediately invest the place. Impressed with the belief of these facts. I really cannot see how the public could anticipate the result, such as they did anticipate, and as you have reJated, till the public will declare that conditions might not be granted which would be preferable to the eertainty of great loss in, the attack of these places, and the chance" of failure; till it can be proved that it was the public conviction, that our army would have been able to continue the blockade without much difficulty, that their services were not wanted in any other quarter; till, in short, it can be proved, that the public was certain that there were no secret motives, and those very strong ones, to influence the determination of our commanders to agree to a conditional surrender. So far, I think, you will allow unconditional surrender could not reasonably be expected by the public, and that our commanders were, so far, prematurely disgraced; but I most perfectly concur with the now

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general opinion, that except in the most distressing circumstances, nothing can justify our commanders for having acceded to the present Convention; it is, I fear, a Convention which has affixed to the British army and nation a stigma so indelible, that no event, however favourable, can wholly remove it, or prevent its suggesting the most agonizing reflections. We are, however, well aware, that great public calamities and individual misfortunes, have not unfrequently given rise to, or been accompanied by circumstances which, in the progress of time, have very materially contributed to diminish the pernicious effects apprehended at their occurrence; and it is some conso lation, that the people have not suffered their reputation to be sullied without a murmur; that the same page of history which records this infamous and insulting Convention, will also relate the virtuous indignation felt by a people jealous of their honour) will rouse the lethargic, and animate the torpid of succeeding ages, by a glowing de scription of the patriotism which prevailed in every rank; will detail the people's re hement and unceasing cries for vengeance on those who dared to degrade their charac ter, and debase their dignity. And although it is highly probable, that the immediate consequences of this Convention will be highly disastrous, it is not impossible tha it may produce some beneficial effects. I will shew the world the feelings and cha racter of Englishmen; it will powerfully instruct our military commanders, that the honour of a nation is not to be surrendered with impunity. Since the commencement of the French revolution, no treachery however base, no infamy however atrocious (and unfortunately many equally, nay, more iniquitous than the Convention of Lisbon may be enumerated), ever produced in the countries where they happened complaints so general and unqualified as in the present instance. The consideration of these cir cumstances will afford more than a transient gleam amidst the immense gloom; will prove more serviceable than a solitary spar, when threatening waves surround. I feel confident that I have been considerably too prolix and tedious, that many of my remarks are totally unnecessary, and others not sufficiently elucidated; but as I have not time to condense and arrange them, I shall leave them to your candid and unpre judiced consideration. I cannot, however, conclude without expressing my regret, that any circumstances should exist which could prevent our having, what we certainly very much wanted, and which you have energe

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EDINSURGH REVIEWERS.

SIR-The Edinburgh Reviewers, in har bulky pamphlet of April, 1809, under the guise of reviewing two publications, writen by gentlemen, whose names, I beieve, are wholly unknown to the public, Mr. Rylance and a Mr. Lingham, are leased to enlighten the world with their houghts, upon the subject of the late emiration to the Brazils. Upon this topic, I el no interest in controverting their opi ions, as they are of course the echo of the xeches in parliament, of that faction upon hose fortunes their own depend; it being w no secret to any one that the positive erbearing and dogmatical paradoxes, which we so peculiarly distinguished the Edinrgh Review, proceed from a small ot of young friends, who hunt after the al dinners and other good things of those complished statesmen, Lords Holland and enry Petty. The subject, upon which I present address you, Mr. Cobbett, is the guage, which, in the article above-inenned, these gentlemen have made use of on the subject of Libel; language betraying once the base slavish spirit of which they composed, and the determined hostility aich animates them against all the assertors the Liberty of the Press. It seems, that ese authors, whose pamphlets form the prece of the review, Mr. Rylance and Mr. gham, unfortunately agreed in nothing tin each dedicating his work to the Liverol Solomon, Mr. Roscoe. Upon every int, relating to the subject of the Portuese emigration, they differed in their itiments. Mr. Lingham, to use the rds of the review," kept quite clear of the least appearance of faction; while Mr. Rylance, without any material qualification, except perhaps his praise of Mr. Roscoe in the dedication, adopted the precise line of argument, taken by the persons in opposition to the present ministry." This was difference enough regulate the judgment of these candid, and partial critics. Mr. Rylance became, of urse, the favourite, and Mr. Lingham, as man swayed by no party motions, but bold independent enough to write from his vu understanding, was, of course, to be run wn. If, however, on the present occaon, the Edinburgh Reviewers had confined emselves to literary strictures only, hower partial and corrupt those strictures

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might have been, I should not have called your attention to them. But will you be lieve it, Mr. Cobbelt? in consequence of Mr. Lingham, who in his book, according to these critics' own account, "kept quite clear of the least appearance of taction," having characterised the other gentleman by a few expressions not by any means unusual in political controversy, and none of which, from their analysis of his publication, I think it is pretty clear, were misapplied; such as obscure pamphleteer," "unauthorized tool of a party," and the like; I say, will you, Sir, believe it, that these worthy disciples of the Whig school, these pains-taking underlings of the present Opposition, these Scotch preachers of political liberty, are actually for letting loose the dogs of law upon poor Mr. Lingham, and amercing him with fines, penalties, imprisonment, and the pillory, for having failed to acknowledge the eminent consequence of this Mr Rylance and his perfect independence, (which, be it observed, these reviewers themselves impeach) for having dared to publish the truth of him, and to speak of him as he deserves. They introduce their whining complaint, and garbled quotations of Mr. Lingham's "abusive language" with this sentence: "Some passages, we are

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pretty sure, would subject him to punish"mment in a court of justice: " and having finished their extracts, they conclude:"We have little doubt that the above pas

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sages, are themselves libellous." Is not this monstrous? Why, the action lately brought by the Duke of Bedford's Knight, (I forget his name) was nothing to this. Irritated feelings in being shewn to be a dunce, and disappointed expectations in not getting from his task-master his usual hire, to a certain degree palliated the resentment of that wretched book-maker. But what have these reviewers to urge in extenuation of this gratuitous recommendation of legal proceedings? Mr. Lingham did not charge them with a systematic and scandalous perversion of their duty, with a base and profligate bias either for or against every author whom they noticed; Mr. Lingham did not say of them, that their malignity against most authors was to be equalled only by their interested adulation of a few; that their wanton and scurrilous attacks on respectable writers in general, were balanced only in infamy by their gross and unblushing panegyrics upon the members of their own fraternity; that, throughout the whole of their career, their pens have been vilely prostituted to party purposes, in which task their inconsistency has been as notorious as their corruption,

keep up the noble spirit by which it is ani mated. To make known to Spain and the whole world the base means resorted to by the Emperor of the French to seize the pe. son of our king, Ferdinand VII, and to subjugate this great and generous nation, is a duty well worthy of one who, like myself, is in a condition to discharge it; inasmuch as circumstances placed me in a situation to be an eye-witness of the events which preceded the catastrophe of Bayonne, and a which I bore a part It was not in m power to do this before, in consequence personal restraint, and from not having co lected the documents necessary to accred my statement. Some are still wanting which it was necessary to burn, in conse quence of dangerous circumstances, which every thing was to be feared; othe have disappeared through the various inc dents connected with that unhappy period but those which I now present are sufficien to prove the atrocious violence committe against our beloved king, Ferdinand VI and the whole nation.-Though the condu of Spain towards France since the peace Basle, a very interesting portion of its po tical history in these latter times, is int mately connected with the important ever which form the subject of this Expositions it is not necessary to dwell even upon principal periods. It will be sufficient state what the whole nation, and all Enior know, that the political system of Spa has constantly been during this time to pr serve friendship and the best understand with France, and to maintain, at all br zards, the ruinous alliance concluded 1796.-To attain this end, there is no sacr fice which Spain has not made; and as the

the grovelling sycophants of power and place, the admirers of Pitt, when living, and of his opponents, when dead. These, or similar charges, Mr. Lingham never insinuated against the Edinburgh Reviewers. One does not see, therefore why they should feel so sore, why they should so strongly sympathize with Mr. Rylance, cry out the senseless yell of libel, and call for punishment in a court of justice! Really, Mr. Cobbett, the coincidence between the time of this publication (April, 1809) and the commencement of the knight's law-suit, and the identity of their sentiments upon the subject of libel, are so marvellous, that I verily suspect some of these young friends, who perhaps may belong to the profession of the law, were his counsellors upon the occasion, advised the action, as the phrase is, and perhaps assisted in getting up the cause. The knight, I dare say, has since heartily repented of having acted upon the opinion, from whatever quarter it proceeded; and the Edinburgh Reviewers, since the unfortunate failure of his experiment, are probably now ashamed of the detestable persecuting spirit so wholly inimical to the liberty of the press, upon the expression of which I have animadverted. In making these animadversions I have no other object in view than to vindicate that palladium of our rights. without the secure enjoyment of which you, Sir, have so often observed, that our boasted freedom is nothing worth the same time I feel an apology to be due, for the length to which my observations have extended, a length to be justified only by the importance of the subject itself, "which will, I hope, plead my excuse, and hestow a temporary consequence even upon these insignificant individuals, Messrs. Ry-preservation of the Prince of the Peace in Jance and Lingham.-Yours, &c.—P. D.— Sept. 24, 1908.

EXPOSITION OF THE

At

PRACTICES AND MACHINATIONS WHICH LED TO THE USURPATION OF THE CROWN OF SPAIN, AND THE MEANS ADOPTED BY THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH TO CARRY IT INTO EXFCUTION, BY DON PEDRO CEVALLOS, FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE AND DISPATCHES TO HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY FERDINAND VII.

the high degree of favour be enjoyed w Charles IV. depended in a great measure upon the continuance of this system, it wa maintained with the greatest constancy and indefatigable attention. Fleets, armies treasure, every thing was sacrificed France; humiliations, submissions, ever thing was suffered, every thing was dee to satisfy, as far as possible, the insats demands of the French government; but the idea never once occurred of preserv the nation against the machinations of a

At a period when the nation has made ally, who was overrunning Europe.—1b:

and continues to make the most heroic efforts to shake off the yoke of slavery attempted to be imposed upon it, it is the duty of all good citizens to contribute, by every means in their power, to enlighten it with respect to the real causes that have brought it into its present situation, and to

Treaty of Tilsit, in which the destiny of the world seemed to be decided in his tavo, was hardly concluded, when he turned his eyes towards the West, and resolved on the ruin of Portugal and Spain; or what comes to the same purpose, to make himself mas ter of this vast peninsula, with a view el

agent employed to forward the plan which Napoleon had formed.-Fortunately the

aking its inhabitants as happy as those of aly, Holland, Switzerland, and the league the Rhine.-At this very time, the Em-Spanish nation was deeply impressed with

eror was revolving in his mind some designs tal to Spain (for he began to disarm her), y demanding a respectable body of our oops to exert their valour in remote reons, and for foreign interests. This he fected without difficulty, and there was aced at his disposal a gallant and picked rce of 16,000 men of all descriptions.he enterprize of making himself master Spain was not so easy as Napoleon imaned. It was, above all, necessary to find t some pretext for carrying into execution e daring and gigantic plan of subjugating riendly and allied nation, that had made many sacrifices for France, and which s very Emperor had praised for its fidelity i nobleness of character.-Nevertheless, ng accustomed to act with that disregard to icacy in the choice of his means, which characteristic of the man who imagines tthe conquest of the whole world, the truction of the human species, and the oc of war are conducive to true glory, resolved to excite and foment discord in royal family of Spain, through his amsador at this court.-The latter, though haps not initiated in the grand secret of master, succeeded in seducing the prince Asturias, our present king and master,

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suggested to him the idea of interrrying with a princess related to the emor. The affliction which his highness oured under from a conjunction of circumlees, as lamentable as notorious, and his iety to avaid another connection into ch it was attempted to force him, with dy selected for him by his greatest eneand on that account alone the object of aversion, induced him to acquiesce in suggestions of the ambassador, but with stipulation that it was to meet the approon of his august parents, and under the ression that it would strengthen the ndship and alliance then subsisting been the two crowns. His highness, acted by motives so cogent in a political nt of view, and yielding to the solicita1s of the ambassador, wrote accordingly his Imperial majesty.-A few days after beloved prince wrote this letter, occurrthe scandalous imprisonment of his auit person in the royal monastery of St. urence, and the still more scandalous dee which was issued in the name of the 1g, and addressed to the council of Cas

There are very strong reasons to beve, that the unknown hand that frustra

This feigned conspiracy was some French

its situation, entertained a just opinion of ́the good disposition and religious principles of their prince of the Asturias, and sus pected instantaneously that the whole was at calumny fabricated by the Favourite, as absurd as it was audacious, in order to remove the only obstacle which then opposed his views. It is already known, that on the imprisonment of the prince of Asturias, his royal father wrote to the Emperor, nodoubt at the suggestion of the Favourite, complaining of the conduct of the ambas sador Beauharnois, in his clandestine communications with the prince of Asturias, and expressing his surprise that the emperor had not come to a previous understanding with his majesty on a subject of such preeminent importance to sovereigns.-As the imprisonment of the prince of Asturias, and, above all, the most scandalous decree fulminated against his royal person, produced an effect completely contrary to the expectations of the Favourite, he began to be afraid, thought proper to recede, and to mediate a reconciliation between the royal parents and their son. With this view, as is stated in the Abstract of the Escurial Cause, circulated by the Council in consequence of his majesty's orders of the 8th April, he forged certain letters, and made the prince of Asturias sign them while a prisoner, which being delivered into the hands of the royal parents, were supposed to have softened their hearts; and by these singular means did this innocent prince obtain a nominal liberty.-This was the state of affairs when a French courier arrived at the royal palace of St. Laurence, with a treaty concluded and signed at Fontainbleau on the 27th of Oct. by Don Eugenio Isquierdo, as plenipotentiary of his Catholic majesty, and Marshal Duroc, in the name of the emperor of the French. Its contents, as well as those of the separate Convention, constitute Nos. ; 1 and 2 of the documents annexed to this

Exposition-It is worthy of observation, that the department of the ministry, of which I was at the head, was totally unac quainted with the measures taken by Don E. Isquierdo, at Paris, as well as with his appointment, his instructions, his correspondence, and every part of his proceedings.The result of this treaty was to render the Emperor master of Portugal with very little expence; to furnish him with a plausible pretext for introducing his armies into our peninsula, with the intent of subjugating it at a proper opportunity, and to put him in

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