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executed, and to excite resident country gentlemen to the same laudable exertion. Allow me, Sir, to introduce another case to the notice of your readers as a further stimulus. The parish of Mitcham in the county of Surrey, had for many years been suffering the dictatorship of Methodists and members of the Suppression of Vice Society under whose government the poor were fed on cheap provisions, rice and dried herrings; a walk was raised two-fifths of a mile over the common, for the saints to visit and pray with the idle and profligate at the work. house; eternal complaints were made by the paupers to the bench of magistrates, the rates were from 12 to 14 shillings in the

debt.-About 5 or 6 years ago a Mr. Moore, the lord of the manor, having some hundred acres of freehold, and occupying some hundreds more, felt the increase of pour rates oppressively himself, and listening to the complaints of the neighbourhood, although he had an exemption from parish. offices, yet offered himself to be one of the overseers; having held the office for 3 years he paid off the old standing debt, re

than from the united zeal for proselytism of all the sects; and those who pretend to be so staunchly her friends would better evince the sincerity of their professions by endeavouring to bring about a reform, than by joining in the factious and vulgar bawl of " no popery." When the offices of the church are thus considered as so much property which, without regard to the duties annexed to them, may be bought and sold, how can we be surprised that offices in the state, and seats in the House of Commons should also be taken in to the estimate of individual wealth? They are all abuses belonging to the same system, they have a common origin, and are employed for a common purpose. Do you imagine, that when a rectory is sold, the wel-pound, and the parish were nearly £700 in fare of the parish is consulted? Far from it: you might as well suppose that attention is paid to the interest of the public, when places and boroughs are transferred from one possessor to another. No, Sir; it is well if the parish do not suffer by the change. Thereare, I am aware, some cases which form honourable exceptions to his character; but so few are they, as to be scarcely worthy of mention, unless it be as examples of private excellence exerted for the public good.-Weduced the rate from 5s. to 5s. 6d, and left are taught to regard our ecclesiastical and civil establishments as monuments of the wisdom and virtue of our forefathers-with more propriety may we look upon them as the remains. But when we hear that the friends of this young nobleman, or that young commoner, who has wasted his substance in riot and extravagance, are about to provide" bread of idleness," and though he at a forhim by procuring him a living, a place, or a borough, how can we avoid being reminded of two stupendous almshouses, where highban mendicants are charitably received!, I request your attention, Sir, to the foregoing letter, and am, with every sentiment of respect-A FRIEND TO RADICAL REFORM.Liverpool, Aug. 20, 1808.

POOR. MITCHAM. SIR; As the reduction of the poor's rate is become an object of such national concern, not merely on pecuniary conside rations, but because it tends to debase and enervate the minds of the lower orders of the people, who were once considered, and ought now to be the strength of the country, I was pleased to see you relate in your valuable work, an account of some gentlemen who had been successful in lessening the burthen, and reforming the abuses of their respective parishes. You gave this relation in honourable testimony of their zeal, to shew the thing is practicable if ably

£160 in hand though the rate was burthened with the half bounties for militia men, and the maintenance of their wives and families,] which had not been the case in his predeces sors' time; though he apprenticed cut with parish fees between 30 and 40 of the children who before had been "fed with the

5 per

very considerable expence repaired the work-
house.-His first step was to compel 2-5ths
of the able but idle paupers to maintain
themselves, who had been supported with.
out work at public expense, merely be
cause they affected saintship; the rest, who
were not incapacitated by age or infirmity,
were employed in labour according to thei
abilites. No house holder was excused pay
ing rates for religions or political party's
sake; every man renting above
annum was compelled to pay his share
of the burthen; the lower orders thereby
feeling the obligation they were under to the
larger renters for their larger share of the
compulsive subscription, which they were
least likely ever to be benefited by them-
selves thus the poorer part became con-
cerned in keeping the rate low; while the
actual paupers were rendered more comfort.
able, are better fed and clothed, are kept
in habits of industry and led to sober habi
of religion.
(To be continued)

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Printed by Cox and Baylis, Great Queen Street; published by R. Bagshaw, Brydges Street, Covent Garden, where former Numbers may be had sold also by J. Budd, Crown and Mitre, Pall-Mall.

VOL. XIV. No. 11.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1808. [PRICE 10D.

"Curls are not cannons; hair-powder is not gun-powder, tails are not bayonets. Are these the arms and ammunition, by which the enemies of Russia are to be defeated!"- SUWAROFF.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS. PORTUGAL. Of the victories, obtained over the French, in Portugal, by the Eng. lish army, under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and which victories are detailed in the official papers contained in this sheet, it is unnecessary to attempt to speak in praise; but, as far as we can judge from the accounts yet received, they certainly reflect the greatest honour on the army as well as on the commanders of every rank. It was, in my opinion, fully proved before, that our troops, when well commanded, were far superior to the French troops. I never regarded the assertion of that superiority as an empty boast. There were always reasons why our troops should be intrinsically better, and there was abundant experience to verify the theory. But, now, I should imagine, it will be very difficult for the French, though masters of the press of Europe, to prevent that fact from being acknowledged all over the world. In this point of view alone, then, our success is of vast importance. The victory, though not more glorious to the nation, is, in this as well as in other parts of its consequences, near and remote, of far greater importance to us than the victory of Trafalgar, which gave no new turn to the war, excited no great degree of feeling in the nations of Europe, and did not, in the least, arrest the progress of the French arms or diminish their fame or that dread of those arms which universally prevailed The consequences of this victory will be, first, a thorough conviction in the mind of every man in this kingdom, that the French, when met by us upon any thing like equal terms, are pretty sure to be beaten, which conviction will produce a confidence in our means of defence which did not unequivocally exist before, it will dissipate all the unmanly apprehensions about the threatened invasion, and, of course, it will, in a short time, relieve the country, in great part at least, from the inconvenience and distress, which, in so many ways, arise from the present harrassing system of internal defence. Secondly, this victory, gained under such circumstances, will take off from that dread, in which the French arms have

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been so long held in other nations, and particularly in the southern parts of Europe. Thirdly, it will confirm the confidence of the Spaniards, will make them even bolder than they were, will make them despise as well as hate the French. Fourthly, it will not only diminish the military and pecuniary means of Napoleon, but will render him timid ; it will make him hesitate; it will fill him with apprehensions; it will enervate his councils; the consequence of which may be his total overthrow; particularly as his rigorous maritime and commercial regulations are so severely felt in all the countries under his control. Amongst the minor consequences of this victory (taking for granted that it will lead to the total evacuation of Portugal by the French) will be a speedy and bloodless settlement of our dispute with America, which is costing us something in precautionary measures. The American trade to Spain and Portugal was very great; and to trade thither now, as well as with the colonies of those countries, we can, if they behave well, give them leave. The merit of the ministers in sending out this expedition, in their plan of operations, in their choice of a commander, and in every part of the enterprize, no man of a just mind will, whatever be his sentiments in other respects, attempt to deny. They would, if the thing had failed, have been loaded with no small share of the blame; it would, therefore, be the height of injustice to withhold from them their share of the praise. Indeed, it cannot be denied, that almost the whole of their measures, with respect to foreign countries, have been strongly marked with foresight, prompti tude, and vigour. Their Orders in Council, against which Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Roscoe, and the Barings, so bitterly inveighed, have been one cause, and not a trifling one, of the events in Spain and Portugal, into which countries we could not have entered had not the people been with us, and that the people were with us, arose, in great part, from those despair-creating effects, which were produced by the Orders in Council, which orders they could not fail to ascribe to Napoleon, nor could they fail to perceive, that,

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while he possessed their country, there was not the smallest chance of their being relieved from those effects. How false, then, have events proved to be the reasoning of Lord Grenville and Mr. Roscoe and Mr. Baring, that the Orders in Council would make us detested by all the suffering nations, - and would tend to strengthen the power of Napoleon over them! I could easily refer to the passage, wherein I contended, that the Orders in Council would naturally have the effect of shaking the authority of Napoleon in the couquered, or dependant, states, by producing unbearable distress. 1, indeed, wished for a still greater stretch of maritime power. I wished an interdict to be issued against all those not in alliance with US. I wished the whole world to be told: "As long as you sufferFrance to command all

the land, England will command all the sea, "and from that sea, she will permit none "of you to derive any, even the smallest

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advantage, or comfort." But, without this, the ministers really have done what they said they would do; they have brought things to a crisis; they have got rid of that benumbing, death-like lingering, which had been the characteristic of our warfare for so many years; and, if they follow up their blows, it is not impossible, that, after all the senseless admiration which has been bestowed upon speech-making ministers, we may see the conqueror of Europe, the king and queen maker, toppled from his gtool by the Duke of Portland.

Now is

the time to recall the public attention to the doctrines of Mr. Whitbread and Mr. Roscoe. I should now like to see, from the pen of the latter in particular, an essay on the wisdom of making peace in 1806, and another upon the moderation of Napoleon, both of which were the subjects of his dull pamphlet. I should like now to see him attempting to convince the manufacturers, that they would have gained by a peace made in 1806, and that they would have enjoyed their gains in peace and safety. His doctrines, luckily for the nation, did not prevail. The common sense of the people taught them that his doctrines were false. He could not make them see any prospect of real peace; and, though the conqueror was still borne upon the wings of victory; though a refusal to submit to his terms was followed by a still greater extension of his power and of our danger, yet the nation said, "go on he must if he will, for, until the state of Europe be changed, England cannot enjoy a moment's real peace." By the measures of the present ministers, the great question, which every od, was at once clearly

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put can England exist independent, and in defiance, of all the civilized world, or can she not? This question, the most interesting that ever was started, has now been decided, and for this decision, so glorious to us and to our country for ever, we have to thank the men who are at present in power. But, if these victories, and if a continuation of success, is not to have the effect of diminishing the sacrifices that the people make; if they are not to put an end in time, to the system of red-coat arming and forts and barracks, in England, I shall regard them as being of little use. I do not expect or wish, that these precautions, little as I may think of their efficacy, should all at once be thrown aside; but, I do hope, that,' as soon as al reasonable men are perfectly satisfied, that? there is no longer the smallest danger of invasion, the ministers will begin to shew a disposition to restore the country to its for mer state of confidence in itself, to abridge the enormous expences of an establishment which now costs about twenty millions and nually, and to render the ruling influence less of a military nature. The army, or at least, the part of the nation under military rule and influence, is too large to be consis tent with the principles or the practice of freedom. Regarded as the means of an emergency it is not so odious; but, if i were to be attempted to keep such a ford on foot as a permanent establishment, w might, at once, bid adieu to the hope d ever being a free people, and, in fact, we should have made all these sacrifices, and our countrymen would have bled, only f the purpose of forging and rivetting our own chains. By degrees, which succeed each other very rapidly, a military nation gets ins to a military government. It is quite ime possible to separate the things in idea, and as impossible to separate them long in fact, They are interwoven in their nature.The expence too is enormous. Every parent who leaves a hundred pounds in legacies to his children, has to reflect, that six or seven of those pounds are now deducted for purposes of a military nature. To maintain such an army, with all its numerous retainers, and all its pretences for expenditure, must alone, in time, leave: the individua proprietor little to call his own. In short, it must eat him out of house and home.Therefore, in rejoicing at the success of the army, in applauding the wisdom and braver of all concerned in the enterprize, I must say, that no small part of my satisfaction arises from the hope, that, in the end, this success, with the others, by which I trust it will be followed, will produce a diminution

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of the army and its expences.That we should continue a military nation, as long as the necessity exists, there can be no doubt; and, that we should afterwards have a general and permanent plan of military defence is what I wish for; but, that we should have a large permanent army, commanded by officers appointed and cashiered at pleasure; that we should have such an army an hour longer than is absolutely necessary to our security from the attacks of a foreign foe, I hope no man will be found to assert; especially after the glorious example given us by the patriots of Spain, who have proved to the whole world, that a people rising in de.. fence of their country, though without discipline and without appointed leaders, are more than a match for the bravest and most skilful enemy.

SPAIN. In speaking of the probability of Buonaparte being overthrown, and in expressing satisfaction at that probability, I must always be understood as including the condition, that his sway is succeeded by a free government; because, if people are to be slaves, it is a circumstance of no consequence at all whom they are slaves to, except that it is less dishonourable to bend the knee to a famous conqueror than to a silly Creature, who has never done any thing but eat and drink. If the nations, who, to all appearance, are breaking his chains, have the wisdom and the virtue to drive out despotisni of every sort along with him, then they will and ought to succeed; but, if the wars against him be carried on by a cabal, by a faction whose object is to exalt themselves, they not only will fait but they ought to fail. The work of opposing him is but just begun. What is done is nothing, if not well followed up. To be sure, a defeat of him who has so long been accustomed to Beet with uninterrupted success is an excelJent beginning. He has, however, been defested before now; and his army, under other commanders, has been defeated: yet, be recovered that; it produced little injury to him in any way. What line of conduct he may adopt with regard to Spain and Portugal, whether he may send large armies thither, or may leave them for a while to see the result of those internal differences which be may naturally expect to see arise, and which he will not fail to endeavour to foment, is quite uncertain. It will, however, be a great error in us to act as if we supposed, that he had given up the idea of placing kings of his own family upon the thrones of Spain and Portugal. He is not easily turned from any of his projects; and it would be a dreadful mistake to suppose,

that, because our newspapers laugh at him, he is really, all at once, in consequence of the loss of thirty or forty thousand ga, become an object of con empt. The internal

affairs of Spain cannot be easily arrange and settled The patriots have ; ronounced their old government an infamous one; they have stipulated with the people for a reform of abuses; they have demanded an assembling of the Cortes. If there are no interested motives to come athwart the intended, reformation, the little confusion that will arise will be of no consequence; but, if there are; if private interest and not pubic good be the object of the leaders, Joseph Napoleon will yet be king of Spain and the In dies, in spite of all that we can do to the ce trary. I am, I must confess, sorry that .. poleon does not seem disposed to send amies into Spain I wish the war there to be long and arduous; for, if it cease now, the people will have gained very little indeed, especially if any of the rags of the old government are brought back again. Nay, it is very probable, that they may be worse treated than they were before. The despois will conclude, and with reason, that the people are fashioned to despotism., They will have got a new lease of their enjoy ments and their abuses; and the people will be more wretched than ever. All the old corrupt crew will be in power. There will be no example given to the enslaved nations of the world, except that of a people having shed their blood for the apparent purpose of perpetuating their own slavery; of cailing back despotism amongst them, after they had got rid of it. A struggle of some length would have made the people of Spain think no more of FERDINAND than they would think of a fly. Such a struggle must have called up hidden talents and virtues. Now there appears to be a sickliness in the councils of the Juntas; and of this, it is very probable, Buonaparte may take advantage. What we ought to wish. for is a new and vigorous government in Spain; a government upon principles precisely the opposite of those whercon Napoleon's government is built and maintained; a government that would be a living example to all the nations whom he has enslaved. He has in his clutches the chief of that government which we seem to desire tor Spain. Who is to make him give that chief up; and, if he does it, upon what conditions will be do it? It is easy to see what a turmoil must arise out of this single circumstance. While Ferdinand is in France, unless all idea of making him king be abandoned, there never can be any peaceable

of legitimate right to reign, or they mus openly avow the doctrine, that the people have, at all times, a right to cashier thei kings. As to saying, that the Spaniard chose the son of the old "unworthy" king as the English chose the son-in-law of thei unworthy king; the very existence of suc persons was a matter of accident. Suppos these kings had had neither sons nor ons in-law, were the people to have gone to th more distant relations? Suppose they ha been able to find no distant relations; wha was then to have been done? Does th right of cashiering kings, or, to use th more gentle phrase of the Morning Chr nicle, this right of "forcing kings to abd cate," exist only in cases where the sa kings happen to have relations? Will d people at Whitehall admit the right of cas

settlement of affairs in Spain. If, in the midst of those divisions of opinion that will inevitably arise, as to what ought to be done, Napoleon send an army of a hundred thousand men, his brother will be seated upon the throne with very little difficulty. It appears to me, therefore, that the thing to be desired, is a new government, established as soon as possible, unless Buonaparte immediately send his armies; for, in that case, there will want very little of government until the war be over, and then it will be found, that the talents and virtues of the nation have, of their own accord, formed the sort of government required by the state of the country. There are some who talk of FERDINAND as if he had been fairly chosen by the down his put people of Spain, who had first father. The Morning Chronicle, of the 2d instant, has, upon the subject, a long-windediering kings? If they do not, where w article, which concludes thus: "The Spa"niards are fighting for their national inde"pendence, and for their legitimate sove

reign-but what constitutes the legitimacy "of FERDINAND VII.? That which made " WILLIAM III. the legitimate sovereign of "this country, "the choice of the people." "They have set aside his father by forcing "him to abdicate his throne, because he

was incapable and unworthy to reign. "Instead of embarrassing themselves, like "the French, with speculative theories of

government, they have chosen his son as "his successor, as the English chose the "son-in-law of JAMES II.; and we have not

a doubt, that their privileges will be assured, as ours were, by a Bill of Rights. "Their conduct ought to operate, both as "a warning to kings, and an encourage

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ment to every people; and if princes do "not profit from the lesson, their subjects "will, we trust, follow the example of the Spaniards."Now, I should like to know what evidence there is of the people of Spain having given their voice for the young king. Never has there appeared the slightest foundation for the assertion. The people had nothing at all to do with the matter. The old king was turned out by a band of armed men; he was, indeed, forced to abdicate his throne; but it was by a cabal at court, and with which cabal the people of Spain had nothing to do. The son, having assumed the kingly office, afterwards abdicates it in behalf of Napoleon; so that, if be really was chosen by the people, he gave up what the people had given him, and Joseph went to Spain in virtue of the people's choice. With those who stick to Ferdinand there must always this embarrassment exist: Abey must either acknowledge in him a want

they find a justification for any attempt th may be made by us to place Ferdinand up the throne, during the life of that fathe who protested against the violence whi compelled him to abdicate? But, coupl the cause of Spain with that of this mar we get ourselves into difficulties, from whi it will not be easy for us to get clear. N should I be at all surprized, if, bye-and-by we should see all our present hopes blast in consequence of some act of pertinaci relating to the sort of government which w or our rulers, desire to have established Spain.

DUKE OF YORK.- -I had, I though entirely done with this subject in my sheet; and I now revive it merely to poi out to the public a striking proof of falsehood of the pamphlet there noticed. charges the daily papers with malice again the Royal Chieftain. It represents them encouraged by both the parties, the ins a the outs, to assault him; to misrepresen ridicule, and degrade him. Now, let us how this charge is justified by the condu of the official paper of the Opposition. Th paper, upon the first appearance of t pamphlet, said: "It has evidently be "written under the eye, and published u "the sanction, of the Duke of York. Na we conceive, that it must have had t concurrence of the highest authority in t "kingdom." Here, then, it unequivocal imputes the pamphlet to the dictation, not the pen, of the duke, and to the appr bation of the king. On the 2d instan this same paper says: "We have alrea "noticed the public and authentic disavow "of the "Statement" lately publishe "under the assumed character of a defend “of his royal highness the Duke of Yon

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