Much that is valuable in the history of the country, and much that would be useful in forming a true and just estimate of Mr. Douglas's great abilities as a jurist, a statesman, and an orator, is reluctantly yet necessarily omitted in this volume. In preparing the sketch of his services in Congress, it has been found more convenient, and possibly more advantageous to the reader, to arrange them under subjects, without any strict reference to chronological order; and the reader must remember that the subjects treated of in the following pages are not all, but only a few of the leading measures in which he has taken an active part.

CHAPTER IV.

MR. DOUGLAS AND GENERAL JACKSON.

It has already been stated that Mr. Douglas's first speech of a political character in Illinois, and his first public political triumph, was at a public meeting at Jacksonville, in the spring of 1834, where he encountered the ablest of General Jackson's opponents, and in a county where the influence of the bank had paralyzed the Democracy, had silenced the old hero's champions, and was carrying unopposed all political power to the side of the monopoly. Young, inexperienced, unknown to the people, he vindicated the policy of the old veteran, and turned the tide of popular opinion in his favor. That was not the only speech, nor the only time that he encountered the gallant and eloquent orators of the Whig party in the defense of General Jackson. On the circuit while prosecuting attorney, on the stump as candidate for the Legislature, in the Legislature as a member, before the people as a candidate for Congress, on the stump as a Democratic orator, every where, on all occasions, from 1834 until the expiration of General Jackson's term of office in 1837, Mr. Douglas was selected by his political friends, and recognized by his opponents, as the especial champion of the administration, and of the personal and political character of General Andrew Jackson. It has also been stated that in boyhood, when serving as an apprentice in Vermont, he was found in the workshop, and in all congregations of youths of his own age, and even of a larger growth, the de

fender of Jackson. His exploits in tearing down the infamous coffin hand-bills are still remembered. Afterward, while at Canandaigua, he was noted for the fervor with which he espoused the cause of Jackson, and during the canvass of 1832 for the zeal displayed in behalf of Jackson and Marcy.

Nor was his advocacy of the principles of General Jackson terminated by the retirement of the old hero from the presidency. In Mr. Van Buren's administration, and in the trials and vicissitudes that attended its earlier days in financial matters, the old hero's cause was tried over and over again. During 1837, 8, and 9, Mr. Douglas was indefatigable on the stump and in convention in the defense of the financial policy adopted by the party. In these matters he occupied the very first position as an orator before the people of his state.

In December, 1843, he took his seat in Congress. For several years preceding there had been a struggle over a bill proposing to refund to General Jackson the fine of $1000 imposed upon him by Judge Hall, at New Orleans, during the defense of that city. Some of the best minds in Congress had considered the question, and it had been, as was thought, thoroughly discussed. The bill had never become a law. Early in the session of 1843-4 a bill was introduced, and the subject was again debated. General Jackson was extolled on all sides; most of the friends of the bill supported it as a measure of gratitude-a -a boon due by a grateful country to her patriotic and successful defender. On this ground it was mainly supported by its friends. On the 7th of January, 1844, Mr. Douglas obtained the floor. He was then unknown to Congress. His was a new face, and his was a strange voice in those halls. He did not follow the beaten path in his advocacy of the bill. He at once took high and strong ground in defense of General Jackson's conduct. He denied the legality of Judge Hall's judgment. This position was a bold one; the speaker attracted attention; and, as he warmed with his subject, he soon obtained the ear of the House. His speech was a success. It established his character as a lawyer and as a debater. From that time to the present day he has never been compelled to address empty benches, or an impatient, inattentive audience. As a monument to indicate his starting-point in the parlia mentary history of the country, the speech is here inserted in full.

Mr. Douglas said:

When this bill was introduced by the learned gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. C. J. Ingersoll), I entertained the hope that it would be permitted to pass without discussion and without opposition. But the character of the amendment submitted by the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Stephens), and the debate which has taken place upon it and the original bill, have been of such a nature as to justify and require the friends of the bill to go into a discussion of the whole subject. For one, I am not disposed to shrink from the investigation of any question connected with this subject, nor am I prepared to acquiesce silently in the correctness of the imputations cast upon the friends of this measure by gentlemen in the Opposition. They have been pleased to stigmatize this act of justice to the distinguished patriot and hero as a humbug—a party trick-a political movement, intended to operate upon the next Presidential election. These imputations are as unfounded as they are uncourteous, and I hurl them back, in the spirit which they deserve, upon any man who is capable of harboring, much less expressing, such a sentiment. It ill becomes gentlemen to profess to be the real friends of General Jackson, and the exclusive guardians of his fame, and to characterize our effort as sinister and insincere, while in the same breath they charge him with violating the Constitution and laws, and trampling with ruthless violence upon the judiciary of the country. They seem to act upon the principle that the most successful mode of blackening the character of a great and good man is to profess to be his friends while making unfounded admissions against him, which, if true, would blast his reputution forever. If these are to be taken

as the kind offering of friendship, well may the old hero pray God to deliver him from the hands of his friends, and leave him to take care of his enemies. I insist that this bill has been brought forward and supported in good faith as an act of justice—strict, rigid, impartial justice to the American people, as well as their bravest defender. The country has an interest in the character of her public men-their unsullied fame gives brilliancy to her glory. The history of General Jackson is so inseparably connected with the history of this country, that the slightest blot upon the one would fix an indelible stain upon the other. Hence the duty, the high and patriotic duty, of the representatives of the people to efface every unjust stigma from the spotless character of that truly great man, and transmit his name to posterity adorned with all the charms which the light of truth will impart to it. The charge of exerting arbitrary power and lawless violence over courts, and Legislatures, and civil institutions, in derogation of the Constitution and laws, and without the sanction of rightful authority, have been so often made and reiterated for political effect, that doubtless many candid men have been disposed to repose faith in their correctness, without taking the pains to examine carefully the grounds upon which they rest.

A question involving the right of the country to use the means necessary to its defense from foreign invasion in times of imminent and impending danger is too vitally important to be yielded without an inquiry into the nature and source of the fatal restriction which is to deprive a nation of the power of self-preservation. The proposition contended for by the Opposition is, that the general in command, to whose protection are committed the country, and the lives, property, and liberties of the citizens within his district, may not declare martial law when it is ascertained that its exercise, and it alone, can save all from total destruction. It is gravely contended that in such an awful conjuncture of circumstances, the general must abandon all to the mercy of the enemy, because he is not authorized to elevate the military above the civil authorities, and that, too, when it is certain that nothing but the power of the military law can save the civil laws and the Constitution of the country from complete annihilation. If these are not the positions assumed by

gentlemen in so many words, they are unquestionably the conclusion to which their positions necessarily and inevitably conduct us; for no man pretends to venture the assertion that the city of New Orleans could, by any human agency or effort, have been saved in any other manner than the declaration and enforcement of martial law. For one, I maintain that, in the exercise of this power, General Jackson did not violate the Constitution, nor assume to himself any authority which was not fully authorized and legalized by his position, his duty, and the unavoidable necessity of the case. Sir, I admit that the declaration of martial law is the exercise of a summary, arbitrary, and despotic power, like that of a judge punishing for contempt, without evidence, or trial, or jury, and without any other law than his own will, or any limit to the punishment but his own discretion. The power in the two cases is analogous; it rests upon the same principle, and is derivable from the same source-extreme necessity. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Barnard), in his legal argument to establish the right of Judge Hall to fine General Jackson one thousand dollars for contempt of court, without the forms of trial, has informed us that this power is not conferred by the common law, nor by statute, nor by any express provision, but is inherent in every judicial tribunal and every legislative body. He has cited the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in support of this doctrine, and I do not deem it necessary, for the purposes of this argument, to question its soundness. The ground upon which it is held that this extraordinary power is original, and inherent in all courts and deliberative bodies, is, that it is necessary to enable them to perform the duties imposed upon them by the Constitution and laws. It is said that the divine and inalienable right of self-defense applies to courts and Legislatures, to communities, and states, and nations, as well as individuals. The power, it is said, is coextensive with the duty, and, by virtue of this principle, each of these bodies is authorized not only to use the means essential to the performance of the duty, but also to exercise the powers necessary to remove all obstructions to the discharge of that duty. Let us apply these principles to the proceedings at New Orleans, and see to what results they will bring us.

General Jackson was the legally and constitutionally authorized agent of the government and the country to defend that city and its adjacent territory. His duty, as prescribed by the Constitution and laws, as well as the instructions of the War Department, was to defend the city and country at every hazard. It was then conceded, and is now conceded on all sides, that nothing but martial law would enable him to perform that duty. If, then, his power was commensurate with his duty, and (to follow the language of the courts) he was authorized to use the means essential to its performance, and to exercise the powers necessary to remove all obstructions necessary to its accomplishment-he had a right to declare martial law, when it was ascertained and acknowledged that nothing but martial law would enable him to defend the city and the country. This principle has been recognized and acted upon by all civilized nations, and is familiar to those who are conversant with military history. It does not imply the right to suspend the laws and civil tribunals at pleasure. The right grows out of the necessity; and when the necessity fails, the right ceases. It may be absolute or qualified, general or partial, according to the exigencies of the case. The principle is, that the general may go so far, and no farther, than is absolutely necessary to the defense of the city or district committed to his protection. To this extent General Jackson was justifiable; if he went beyond it the law was against him. But, in point of fact, he did not supersede the laws, nor molest the proceedings of the civil tribunals, any farther than they were calculated to obstruct the execution of his plans for the defense of the city. In all other respects the laws prevailed, and were administered as in times of peace, until

the Legislature of the State of Louisiana passed an act suspending them till the month of May, in consequence of the impending danger that threatened the city. There are exigencies in the history of nations as well as individuals when necessity becomes the paramount law to which all other considerations must yield. It is that great first law of nature, which authorizes a man to defend his life, his person, his wife and children, at all hazards, and by every means in his power. It is that law which authorizes this body to repel aggression and insult, and to protect itself in the exercise of its legislative functions; it is that law which enables courts to defend themselves and punish for contempt. It was this same law which authorized General Jackson to defend New Orleans by resorting to the only means in his power which could accomplish the end. In such a crisis, necessity confers the authority and defines its limits. If it becomes necessary to blow up a fort, it is right to do it; if it is necessary to sink a vessel, it is right to sink it; and if it is necessary to burn a city, it is right to burn it. I will not fatigue the committee with a detailed account of the occurrences of that period, and the circumstances surrounding the general, which rendered the danger immediate and impending, the necessity unavoidable, the duty imperative, and temporizing ruinous. That task has been performed with such felicity and fidelity by the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Slidell) as to make a recital of the facts entirely unnecessary. The enemy-composed of disciplined troops, exceeding our force four-fold in numbers-were in the immediate vicinity of the city, ready for the attack at any moment. Our own little flotilla already destroyed; the city filled with traitors, anxious to surrender; spies transmitting information daily and nightly between these traitors and the enemy's camp; the population mostly emigrants from the different European countries, speaking various languages, unknown to the general in command, which prevented any accurate information of the extent of the disaffection; the dread of a servile insurrection, stimulated by the proclamation and the promises of the enemy, of which the firing of the first gun was to be the signal-these were some of the reasons which produced the conviction in the minds of all who were faithful to the country and desirous to see it defended, that their only salvation depended upon the existence of martial law. The governor, the judges, the public authorities generally, and all the citizens who espoused the American cause, came forward, and earnestly entreated General Jackson, for their sakes, to declare martial law, as the only means of maintaining the supremacy of the American laws and institutions over British authority within the limits of our own territory. General Jackson, concurring with them in opinion, promptly issued the order, and enforced it by the weight of his authority. The city was saved. The country was defended by a succession of the most brilliant military achievements that ever adorned the annals of this or any other country, in this or any other age. Martial law was continued no longer than the danger (and, consequently, the necessity) existed. At the time when Louallier was imprisoned and Judge Hall was sent out of the city, official news of the signing of the treaty at Ghent had not been received; hostilities had not ceased; nor had the enemy retired. On the very day the writ of habeas corpus for Louallier was returnable, General Jackson received official instructions from the War Department to raise additional troops, and prepare for a vigorous prosecution of the war. Hearing a rumor, on the same day, that a treaty of peace had been signed, he sent a proposition to the British general for a cessation of hostilities until official intelligence should be received, which proposition was rejected by the English commander. It can not be said, therefore, that the war had closed, or the necessity for martial law had ceased. All the considerations which induced its declaration required its continuance. If it was right to declare it, it was

right to enforce and continue it. At all events, Judge Hall and his eulogists