The Constitution of the State of Illinois, adopted in 1819, contained a provision authorizing every free white male "inhabitant" above the age of twenty-one years to vote at all elections. Under this provision, from the earliest settlement of the state, all persons who had become actual inhabitants of the state, whether naturalized or not, were permitted to vote. The election for President in 1836 had shown that Mr.Van Buren's majority barely exceeded three thousand; and it was supposed that if the "alien vote," as it was called, could be thrown out at future elections, the state would fall into the hands of the Opposition. From that time forth the rejection of the alien vote became a part of the policy of the Opposition. It was important that the question whether these men were legal voters or not should be decided by some judicial authority. The Opposition, therefore, selected the Jo Daviess circuit in which to strike down a large body of the Democratic voters. At the congressional election in 1838, one of these "inhabitants" of the State of Illinois, being unnaturalized, voted for Mr. Douglas. His vote had been received by the judges of election with a full knowledge on their part that he had never been naturalized. The Opposition, through a Mr. Houghton, instituted a qui tam prosecution against Mr. Spraggins, one of the judges. The case was tried; and the Circuit Court (Judge Stone) before whom the case was tried denied the authority of the state to confer the privilege of voting upon an unnaturalized alien, and rendered judgment against the defendant. This decision, in its practical effect, cut off at least one half the Democratic vote in the great northern district of the state. It was fatal to the Democratic party, which, bereft of that vote, would be in a minority in the popular vote of the state, and would be in a minority in a large number of senatorial and representative districts then represented by Democrats. If allowed to stand as law, that decision would have the effect of delivering the state and all the branches of the government to the Whig party. Mr. Douglas saw the importance of the decision not only to the thousands who were disfranchised by it, but also the importance in a political or party view. Though a stranger to the party convicted as well as to the voter, as soon as he heard of the decision he voluntarily interfered, and had the cause taken to the Supreme Court for review. At this time he stood almost alone at the bar in the opinion he expressed, that the

regulation of the matter of suffrage, within their respective limits, was one of those rights which the states had never surrendered to the federal government; that each state had, within its own limits, the full and exclusive right and authority to admit to the privilege of voting any and every class of persons she might think proper. The right to vote was not necessarily or exclusively pertaining to citizenship. Five sixths of the free white citizens of the United States were denied by law the privilege of voting. The Constitution of the United States expressly conceded, in the second section of the first article, to the states the exclusive control of the privilege of voting. At that time, as has been stated, Mr. Douglas almost stood alone at the bar in maintaining this view of the case. Men were led off from the true view of the case by the very plausible theory that, if aliens were allowed to vote, the election of a President might possibly be decided by their vote; and that the Constitution, in providing for a naturalization law, intended that aliens who desired to participate in the political privileges of the country should first become citizens. Those who took this view of the case forgot that, however strong their argument might be against the policy of a state admitting aliens to the privilege of voting, yet that was not the question at issue. The point depending was not whether the state ought to admit aliens to vote, but whether the state, having already conferred the privilege, had the power and authority to do so or not. The case was the first involving the point ever tried in the United States. Notwithstanding that it was generally understood that a majority of the Supreme Court were against him, Mr. Douglas fearlessly undertook the case, which has since become so well known. Its title was, Thomas Spraggins, appellant, vs. Horace H. Houghton, appellee. The argument was long and elaborate, and took place at the winter term of 1839-40. Upon its decision hung the future success or defeat of the Democratic party. The counsel were, Douglas and Murray M'Connell for the appellant; and Cyrus Walker, Schuyler Strong, and Justin Butterfield for the appellee.

The court took the case under advisement until the next term. In June, 1840, the court reassembled, and commenced its business by reading opinions and entering judgments upon those cases heard but not decided at the previous term. state, at the time, was all excitement; cider barrels, log cabins,

The

and coon-skin emblems were in the height of popular estimation. The Democracy of Illinois were alarmed; they required every vote that could be procured to save the state. The "alien vote," numbering several thousands in the state, was indispensable. In a conversation with Judge Smith, Mr. Douglas learned that Judges Lockwood, Brown, and Wilson had agreed upon a decision in the case of Spraggins vs. Houghton, and that, at the opening of the term, they would announce it, and that the decision would sustain the judgment of the court below. This intelligence was important. The moment such a decision as that should be rendered by the Supreme Court, the Democracy would be shorn of their strength, and the state would be hopelessly Whig. It would be useless to carry on the campaign, for the loss of the "alien" vote would place the Democracy in a hopeless minority. How to prevent the calamity was a serious question. Every possible mode was considered, and rejected as vain. At last he read the record sent up by the clerk of the Circuit Court. It was defective; it contained errors; it lacked some things which had been carelessly omitted. When the court opened, and the judges had unrolled their opinions, preparatory to pronouncing judgment in the case of Spraggins vs. Houghton-a judgment so fatal, if rendered -Mr. Douglas rose and stated that the case was one of the highest importance. It was important to the persons who were involved in it, but it was of still greater importance to thousands of others in their state. It was a case involving the political status of a very large portion of the people of Illinois. It was therefore necessary that the judgment of the court should be final, whichever way it might be. Upon an examination of the record in the case since the argument, he had discovered that it was fatally defective, so much so that no judgment could be rendered on it. He was unwilling to accept a judgment in a matter of such vast importance to his clients and to the public, when that judgment, in consequence of defects in the record, would be of no force or effect. He therefore moved that the cause be dismissed. This motion was resisted, and was set down for argument. It was subsequently argued, and, without any decision on the motion, the whole case was continued over until the next winter term.

very

Thus was prevented a decision which at this day would have but few defenders, and thus was saved, in a day of extremity,

a vote which, at the election in November following, enabled the Democratic party to retain their ascendency in the State of Illinois.

The legal principle asserted by Mr. Douglas for the first time in this celebrated case, and then supposed to be so unsound, was afterward elaborately discussed by him in Congress, and is now the well-established doctrine of all parties in all the states.

In the debates in the lobby, in which Hon. J. A. M'Clernand, now of the House of Representatives, Hon. Murray M'Connell, and Hon. J. A. M'Dougall, now of California, took prominent parts, upon the Judiciary question, at that session of 1840-41, the action of the Supreme Court in this case was freely commented upon. It is true that early that winter the court delivered its opinion reversing the decision of the court below, yet its intended decision otherwise when it was required as a party measure was employed with great effect. It gave strength to the advocates of a reorganization of the judiciary. The political character of the court, and the partisan nature of their official acts as judges and as members of the Council of Revision, were held up in the strongest light, not only in the Legislature, but in the more animated debates in the lobby. The proposed plan of reorganizing the courts was as follows:

To abolish the existing circuit courts, and to increase the number of judges of the Supreme Court to nine, and requiring those judges to do circuit duty, the whole court sitting in banc at stated periods to hear appeals, etc.

This plan was perfectly in accordance with the Constitution of the state. The circuit courts had been created by the Legislature, and were wholly within its control. The plan proposed in no way interfered with the constitutional rights of the judges of the Supreme Court; they continued undisturbed in the possession of their offices and their salaries. Accordingly, Mr. Snyder, in January, introduced a bill into the Senate to reorganize the judiciary of the state upon the plan stated above. The debate in the Legislature and in the lobby was renewed with great warmth, and finally the bill passed both houses. On the 7th of February the bill was returned by the Council of Revision (consisting of the judges of the Supreme Court and the governor) with their objections. The objections

were on the ground of expediency. The governor dissented from his associates in council, but was overruled by the majority. The bill was, however, considered, and passed both houses by the requisite majority.

Under this act the state was divided into nine circuits, that being the number of judges of the Supreme Court; and on the 15th of February, 1841, the Legislature met in joint convention to elect the five additional judges provided for by the act. In that convention, Sidney Breese, Stephen A. Douglas, Thomas Ford, S. H. Treat, and Walter B. Scates were chosen. In the allotment of circuits, the fifth, being the Quincy District, was assigned to Judge Douglas. On the 4th of March, 1834, a poor stranger, without friends, books, or money, he obtained, what was supposed to be a favor, from the four judges of the Supreme Court, a license to practice law; and in less than seven years from the date of that license, by the force of his own unaided abilities, he had so won the confidence and respect of the people that he was chosen a member of that same court.

It was at this session of the Legislature that the Hon. LYMAN TRUMBULL, now of the United States Senate, introduced his resolution advising the practical repudiation of a portion of the state debt by refusing to pay interest on certain bonds of the state for which the state had received no equivalent. This measure was advocated by Trumbull in the House, and was discussed in the lobby, and in a powerful speech in the latter Mr. Douglas administered a crushing rebuke to the arrant demagoguism evinced by the mover of the resolution. The proposition was made so odious that it was soon abandoned as an unsafe hobby even for a demagogue. The state, through inability, for a number of years afterward omitted the payment of interest, but never at any time repudiated the debt; and subsequently, when the state was in a condition to pay, the accrued interest was funded, and stock for its amount was issued bearing interest. All honor to the gallant men who met the insidious and perfidious proposition to repudiate at the threshold, and strangled it even in the hands of its author.

The circuit to which Judge Douglas was assigned was the most perplexing and annoying. It included the Mormon settlements, and there was a constant conflict between the "Saints" and the "Gentiles." Some of the most exciting scenes of his life were spent in the judicial and other proceedings growing