in obedience to previous orders from General Rodes, I immediately went after the brigade ordnance wagons, and ordered up one from each brigade with Lieutenant Partridge. On reaching the field. again I was informed by Major Peyton, Adjutant-General of Rodes' Division, that General Rodes had been killed soon after the division became engaged. He was struck on the head by a piece of shell, it is thought, and lived but a short while, totally unconscious. This is an irreparable loss to our division, and, indeed, to our army, for he was General Early's right arm. We succeeded in handsomely repulsing this attack, and several succeeding ones, our artillery being very effective, doing good execution. Ramseur was pressed back on the right, but succeeded finally in re-establishing his line, which was very long and thin. Fearing the enemy might attack there again and, if the line gave way, get into Winchester, in our rear, General Early ordered up Wharton's (Breckinridge's) Division, which was engaged with the Yankee cavalry (Merritt's Division) near Brucetown. To the withdrawal of this division, though necessary, perhaps, may be attributed the loss of the day, for now our disasters commenced. Wharton's Division had barely reached Ramseur's line [if, indeed, it reached there] when a heavy force of Yankee cavalry (Averill's and Merritt's Divisions, the former coming up from Martinsburg and the latter from Brucetown, had joined near Stephenson's) dashed up the Martinsburg pike, driving back our cavalry, two very small brigades, and penetrating to our rear. Wharton's Division was immediately withdrawn and sent to the left and rear to check them, which it succeeded in doing; but the enemy, seeing the success of their cavalry, sent a body of infantry, Crook's Corps to connect with it, which turned our left flank, forcing Gordon's and Rodes' Divisions to fall back and form perpendicular to their original line; and in this position the fight raged for an hour or When Wharton's Division became engaged with the cavalry, * ** ammunition being inquired for, I started after my brigade ordnance wagons, which had gotten out of the way when the Yankee cavalry advanced. I missed their track and rode around the east side of the town to the Staunton pike without finding them, but succeeded in finding others, which I sent forward. Riding through town on my way back I found everything coming through town in the greatest confusion, Market street being filled with medical and ordnance wagons and ambulances three deep. I met the ambulance with General Rodes' body, in charge of Captain M. Lewis Randolph [signal officer of General Rodes' Division], and

more.

* * *

afterward my brigade ordnance wagons in charge of Lieutenants Cabaniss and Partridge. * * * * * On Main street I met the troops coming through in much confusion. The Yankee cavalry had charged again and captured most of Wharton's Division, and the overwhelming numbers of their infantry, after our left was thus broken, had forced the remainder of the line to retire. The troops, however, were formed beyond the town, and the retreat continued in good order. After bidding some friends good-bye, I rode over to Market street again, when Major Henry Kyd Douglas and others just before me were shot at near the corner beyond. I then retired up Market street, stopping near the Methodist Church and witnessing the Yankees coming in near the Union Hotel, flags flying, drums beating and men shouting. I have retired through Winchester many a time before, but never did I witness the Yankees come in in that manner, though I have often seen them in the same predicament that we were in. Douglas was a square nearer the Yankees and I called to him to come on, but he amused himself bowing to them while they were shooting at us. After viewing them long enough on Market street, I rode over to Main street and looked at them a while there. A dozen or so of our men were on Main street, and the enemy fired several shots at us. I rode out of town and stopped at our skirmish line until after the Yankee skirmishers appeared on this side (south) of the town, and then came on to the division, which stopped a while in the woods beyond Kernstown, then moved about a mile this side of Newtown and camped for the night in line of battle. *** If we had only had some good cavalry to resist that of the enemy our infantry could have maintained its position, but our cavalry did not behave well, even if there were superior numbers against them. If Wharton's Division had been up early in the morning when we repulsed the first attack, we might have followed it up, but its withdrawal from below let in the whole Yankee cavalry upon us, for McCausland's and Imboden's Brigades could not resist them, even when reinforced by Wickham's and Payne's Brigades. I have just issued this morning the last of the arms, accoutrements and ammunition that I had, and the division still lacks arms and accoutrements, though it is pretty well supplied with ammunition, for it has lost, I suppose, about 1,000 men all together. General Ramseur has been assigned to the command of the division. * **We sent a large ordnance train to Staunton this morning for stores. May we have more success with them than with those expended day before yesterday, though up to 3 o'clock

we had whipped the enemy well, and but for that cavalry we might have held our own against succeeding attacks. It is the first time that I have ever seen cavalry very effective in a general engagement. Would that Rosser's Brigade had been with us, and on the left! The day might have been different. It was 5.07 o'clock when I looked at my watch as the Yankees came into Winchester, and we had been fighting from 10 or 11 until 2, when there was a cessation until the cavalry attack, about 3, which resulted so disastrously."

It will be seen from this account, written two days after the battle, that there has been much exaggeration in Federal accounts of this battle. The actual facts were bad enough, and there was no need to make them worse. Ramseur retreated on the east side of Winchester, and so preserved his organization better than the troops that passed through the town, but these were re-formed on the south side. It was some time after the posting of our skirmish line, with artillery, on the south side of Winchester, before the enemy showed themselves, and our artillery fired until it was too dark to see anything but the flashes of the guns. I remained near this piece of artillery for some time and watched Ramseur's Division passing, and Lomax's Cavalry beyond, which had kept in check Wilson's Cavalry Division all day on our right, and was only forced to retire after the general retreat. Wilson should have burst through this handful of men and seized the Staunton pike long before. Even so intelligent a writer as General Merritt says (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume IV, page 510): "At the time of this last charge the Union infantry advanced along the entire line, and the enemy fled in disorder from the field, and night alone (for it was now dark) saved Early's army from capture." It was not dark, not even 5 o'clock, as I have shown above from my exact record of the time (5.07) when the Federal troops entered Winchester. Again he says (same page): "Early had not stopped on the night of the battle until he reached the shelter of Fisher's Hill." Now, I myself, with troops all around me in line of battle, spent the night at the headquarters of Rodes' Division, one mile south of Newtown, which is eight miles south of Winchester and twelve miles north of Fisher's Hill, to which place we did not retire until next morning. General Merritt did not come far enough to see for himself. No wonder General Early says in his "Memoir: " "When I look back to this battle, I can but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the incapacity of my opponent."

Moreover, General Sheridan, in his telegram to General Grant on the evening of the battle, "September 19, 1864, 7.30 P. M." (War

Records, Volume XLVII, Part I, page 25), says: "The enemies were strong in number and very obstinate in their fighting," and (page 26) he gives Early's strength as "28,000 infantry!"

The obstinacy of their fighting was all right, but the strength of their numbers was all wrong. He attributes to Early in infantry alone at least double the number that he had of all arms-infantry, cavalry and artillery.

Let us see about this for a moment. In Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (Volume IV, page 524) there is given from a field return of General Early's army, August 31, 1864, excluding Kershaw's Division, as "present for duty, 1,076 officers, 9,570 men," an aggregate of 10,646. Early's Memoir gives Fitz Lee's Cavalry as "about 1,200," and Lomax's Cavalry as "about 1,700," or 2,900 all together, and the artillery as 39 officers, 818 men, 857 together. This would give an aggregate of a little more than 14,000; but in a note to the editors General Early states that at the time of the battle his force was reduced to 8,500 muskets, which would reduce this aggregate to 13,000. Rodes' Division was the largest in the corps, and a short time before the battle I reported between 2,600 and 2,700 muskets in the division. I remember distinctly that Colonel Allan, the chief of ordnance of the army, told me that there were then abont 9,500 muskets in the army. Perhaps this was the return of August 31, noted above, for I do not remember that we made any return of September 10, it being customary to make returns every ten days, when we were in camp.

Now, let us look at Sheridan's force. His field return for September 10, 1864, gives as "present for duty 43,284 men, 2,225 officers, a total of 45,509. To this we must add Averill's Cavalry Division, 2,500, not included in the above, and we have a grand total of 48,000 troops of all arms. This gives to Sheridan three and two-thirds times as many men as Early had.

The Confederate losses were in round numbers about 4,000 men, of whom one-half were prisoners and missing; the Federal losses were about 5,000 men, of whom 600 were prisoners and missing. It is not surprising that General Early was defeated, but it is surprising that he should have risked a battle against such odds, and that he should have maintained his position as long as he did.

General Early has never received the credit that he deserves for his Valley campaign. With Kershaw's Division, which should never have been recalled in view of Sheridan's immense force, it is highly

probable that he would have gained the battle of Winchester even against such odds.

Wright and Emory had been fought out, and it was only with Crook's fresh corps and the two cavalry divisions of Merritt and Averill, which, with Wilson's, were equal in numbers to Early's Infantry, that Sheridan was enabled to gain the victory.

We may now see some ground for Early's opinion that, "instead of being promoted, Sheridan ought to have been cashiered for this battle."

It was my intention to add some account of the battle of Fisher's Hill, which has been called "the aftermath" of Winchester, but this article has already extended to too great length, and that battle, if noticed at all, must be reserved for some future occasion. Besides the references given above, the reader should add Pond's The Shenandoah Valley of 1864, an interesting book, but one containing the usual exaggerations of Confederate numbers, and Senator Daniel's address in Richmond, December 13, 1894, on General Early's Valley campaign.

THE CONFEDERATE STATES' FLAG.

Its Evolution.

HOW THE FLAG WAS MADE.

[See also Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XXVIII (1900), page 89, et seq.]

A Richmond (Va.) special to the New York Herald, of December 15, 1903, says:

General W. L. Cabell, formerly of the Confederate Army, has contributed an article to the official organ of his old comrades, giving a history of the battle-flag of the Confederacy, about which there has been more or less controversy. The General says: