to the unfortunute and calamitous position | important announcement is made in second in which the country had been placed during editions of the newspapers in large type. the previous war, and he added:But it would be as useless, if there were no troops within reach, to depend upon the A considerable part of our fleet was confined instructions consequent upon these teleto our ports to protect our dockyards; and thus we were obliged to do what Great Britain had grams as upon the notices in the newspa never done before, to carry on a defensive war-apers for opposing the landing of the enemy. war in which we were under the necessity of wast- We must now describe the special means ing our resources and impairing our strength, of resistance which ought to be kept in without any prospect of any possible benefit by readiness with that object. which to mitigate our distress. . . . Shame and We will distribute the invading army affliction were brought upon us by the American into four great divisions, each containing War. Was the House ready to stand responsible 50.000* men; and we will allot to each of to posterity for a repetition of similar misfortunes these divisions a separate bay for its at and disgrace? Were they willing to take upon The different vessels themselves the hazard of transmitting the dangers tempt at landing. and calamities which they themselves so bitterly approach the shore, and drop their anchors; experienced?' and the flat-bottomed landing-boats, which have been prepared for the purpose, come We are not aggressive now, any more alongside. Accommodation - ladders are than we were at that time; we wish for passed down; the infantry, who are the nothing so much as peace. Our neighbours first to land, make their way into the boats; are more restless, and they are outstripping they sit down, to screen themselves as much us a second time in the reconstruction of as possible; the commanding officer in each their navy. Their institutions are less sta boat takes his seat in the bow; and they ble, and their army is a master that they pull to land in compact order, under cover are obliged to propitiate. They have troops enough and to spare in constant readiness, and their railways may be made available, whenever the occasion arises, to convey those troops to different ports. Numerous steam transports would be found for their conveyance very soon after war was declared, and boats of improved construction for landing men on our shores. We ought not only to be prepared to repulse them on their arrival, but further to show them always a front so formidable as to prevent them from seriously entertaining the idea of an attack. A French Each great division of 50,000 men could be transported for so short a distance in vessels having two and a half miles of beach and anchorage; and an aggregate of 50,000 tons; each would require each might, with good means and appliances, be disembarked with guns and stores in 12 hours in fine weather. Out of the 27 000 When the British troops landed in Egypt in 1801, 17,500 men in 200 vessels reached Aboukir Bay on the 1st of March, but were detained by bad weather till the 8th March. At two o'clock on that morning they commenced operations; 5500 men were placed in 150 boats, and they pulled for the shore at French troops who were then in Egypt, 2000 lined 9 A.M. under a heavy fire. the beach, flanked by 12 guns on one side and the We will suppose, then, for the sake of castle of Aboukir on the other. The boats reachargument, that we are at war with France, ed the land in admirable order: six minutes afterand that the French have made arrange-hour 5000 men were established on the heights wards the force stood in battle array, and in an ments for an attack upon us in great force, beyond. The remainder of the force was landed while we have, at the same time, been get- under their protection. ting ready to receive them. The British army, of about 30,000 men, was confleet appears off Plymouth, and a British veyed to the Crimea in 1854 in 84 vessels, 34 for fleet proceeds thither to attack it. great battle is being fought there, the apart, and did not occupy a mile of anchorage. French move down their troops upon their They were miserably supplied with the means of seaports, and, embarking them in the course landing guns and horses, and a platform upon two of the evening, they direct them at once boats, which was extemporised for the purpose three or four points of the coast be- from the Minna' and Brenda,' and other small soon broke up. Their principal aid was derived tween Brighton and the Thames, that they steamers, from which the troops stepped ashore may reach their respective destinations across a smaller boat. They landed their infantry early on the following morning. Men on in one day, but the surf impeded their further horseback gallop to the nearest telegraph-field-pieces, and 2900 horses and mules, in less than operations. The French embarked 29,000 men, 68 stations as soon as the flotilla is caught sight 100 ve-sels. They carried over large flats on the of from various points; telegrams are sent outsides of those vessels, with bows opening like a to Whitehall and Pall Mall, to the private ferry-boat, each capable of supporting half a batresidences of the Ministers and the Com-tery. mander-in-Chief, and to the naval and mili-stracted vaisseaux de débarquement of a superior Besides large transports, they have of late con tary commanders in the vicinity; and the description. artillery and their horses. These were anchored on While a the 14th of September, in six lines, at half a cable upon · of a heavy fire from the fleet and from any Five of the coast, on the shortest notice. thousand men would be an ample force to secure the coast against any one of the four great divisions of the invading force above referred to; and, indeed, any attempt at landing in the face of well-trained men, amounting to only half that number, would probably be unsuccessful. One-tenth of these should be cavalry, two-tenths artillery, one-tenth engineers, and six-tenths infantry. If invasion were imminent, camps would be formed in convenient localities, and moveable brigades kept ready for immediate service, composed of various troops, according to circumstances. On the first alarm of the approach of an enemy the Coast VolA comparatively small force will suffice unteers would be called out for active serv. to check each of these attempts, if it be on ice, and would repair to the threatened spot, the spot, and if it be well posted before the where they would be posted by their officers boats leave the ships; but it must after- (in combination, of course, with all the regu wards, to be of any avail, be increased in lar troops which could be brought up in such proportion to the time that has been lost. an emergency) in the disposition most suitBefore the adaptation of steam power to na able to the nature of the ground as the atval purposes, the portion of coast to be guard- tack was developed. During the progress ed against attack on a large scale was very of the enemy's boats from his vessels to the much smaller, and there was not, therefore, shore, their principal object would be to the difficulty that now exists in defending it. pour upon them the most destructive fire In 1804 a movable brigade was formed at that could be made available, from shot, Shorncliffe, for the protection of the coast shell, and rifle bullets; to sink as many of of Kent, and was rendered highly efficient the boats as possible; and to disable the under General Moore during that and the greatest number of men out of the crowded following year, by its equipment, discipline, masses in the remainder. Rifled guns and and tactical instruction, and by its being muskets will be of great advantage in this ready to move at a moment's notice. This part of the operations. The guns will be brigade afterwards formed part of the Light placed under cover from the fire of the ships, Division in the Peninsular War, and its thirty or forty feet, as nearly as may be, services in that capacity were no doubt above the level of the sea; the riflemen will owing in a great measure to the high train- be scattered along the shore, behind rising ing which it then received. When we are ground, sand-hills, breast-works, and any nanext threatened with invasion we shall want tural or artificial cover that can be procured; a number of brigades of this description, and all must be dispersed as much as possistationed as near as possible to the places ble, to diminish the results of the enemy's at which their services are likely to be re-fire, and to obtain a converging or a cross-fire quired; and, in aid of such a force, it will upon his boats. The cavalry will be placed be desirable to employ as many Coast behind any natural cover near the beach that Volunteers as are found ready to undertake is available, or behind banks of earth thrown the duty, and can be maintained in a condi- up for their protection, to keep them safe and tion of efficiency. They would be made ready for duty at the moment when their well acquainted, by constant practice, with services are required. the defensive capabilities of the assailable portions of the coast in their immediate neighbourhood, and would be organised more especially with a view to their de fence. They would throw up field-works, and might in some cases be advantageously provided with works of a more permanent character for the protection of those bays and beaches near them which offered pecu liar facilities to an enemy; and they would remain ready to defend those works, and to assist in protecting other threatened parts If a cool and accurate fire has been maintained by the defenders upon the boats during their progress towards the shore, the enemy will be in no condition afterwards to resist a close attack upon gaining the beach. They must be assaulted vigorously as they do so. Their gang-boards must be knocked away from the boats if they attempt to use them; and if not, they must be charged by infantry and cavalry as they struggle out of the water. A soldier up to his waist in the sea, after jumping out of a boat, is a most helpless animal, and the first detachment | venting more heavily-protected vessels from will probably fall an easy prey to well-train-running into them, and doing an infinity of ed and determined men; but if it be other-michief in them. Floating batteries will wise, they must be charged again and again, be of still less use, because they cannot be and, if possible, either taken prisoners or made so strong for defence, nor so powerful destroyed before their supports arrive. A for offence, nor so steady for accurate firing, similar course must be pursued towards each as shore batteries, or batteries constructed succeeding detachment, if the attempt to land be persevered in. Should it be so, and should the defenders be obliged to retreat, they must still continue to keep up as hot a fire as they can upon their assailants, and to harass them to the utmost, with the knowledge that reinforcements are being despatch-rams, to act in concert with the most powered to their own assistance with all possible speed. upon solid foundations. Until we can pro cure larger and stronger guns than have yet been constructed, which shall crush in the sides of an armour-plated vessel, we have no other means of protecting these import ant places than by stationing at them steam popu ful batteries that we can give them; but we can in this manner place them in a greater It will thus be seen that, supposing our or less state of security according to their fleet to have suffered reverses, or to be out position, their relative importance, and their of the way, or to be unable for any other liability to attack. These ports are already reason to act against a hostile expedition partly supplied with Volunteers (as well as threatening our coast, our security depends with batteries), in proportion to the energy, upon whether we can collect on the threat- wealth, number, and patriotism of the ened spot a sufficient number of men and lation in their respective neighbourhoods; guns to repel an attack at the moment of its and those Volunteers are, many of them, in being made. Five thousand men is, as we a highly efficient condition, and prepared to have already stated, the greatest number do good service in case of attack. Besides that we should require to have in immediate perfecting themselves in drill, discipline, and readiness for this purpose upon the most con- shooting, they will do well to practise defen venient bay or the most tempting beach. In sive movements and operations against an other places 500 would suffice, and in others, enemy supposed to be landing in their neighagain, 50 would be more than enough. We bourhood, who may endeavour to spike the want readiness and efficiency rather than guns in their batteries, or to destroy their numbers. If we can rely upon having in shipping in dock, or to set fire to their storetime of war as many efficient soldiers at each houses, or to levy contributions, or to take assailable part of the coast as are required advantage of any particular source of weakfor the defence of that part, we shall then ness which their locality may present. In be in a condition of security as far as our thus gaining additional experience as to the coasts are concerned. If we cannot do so, best modes of acting in their own defence, then we shall be liable at such a time to in- they will not only render themselves more sult and loss on those parts of the coast valuable, but will also acquire increased in which are not so defended. This will be a terest in their military labours. They would glorious object for the Volunteers to keep in remain at their homes, or in the midst of view in further perfecting their organisation. their neighbours and friends, amongst whom Acting in aid of the regular forces and mili- they would be billeted, if necessary, even tia, they will be able to do very much to in time of war, when they could not with wards preserving British soil from insult. advantage be taken away for any other du Those who dwell on the coast and near it ties. They would want nothing but their will be, of course, and indeed have already been, the first to undertake duties of this description. food uniforms, arms, ammunition, and accoutre ments. They would be able to procure and all necessaries, including medical attendance, as in time of peace, or at any rate without difficulty, in the places in which, or near which, they were in the habit of residing. The defence of our rivers, harbours, and commercial ports, will become a difficult matter in any future wars with maritime powers possessing iron-plated steam-rams; The VITAL POINTS to which we have re and the measures to be adopted for the pro-ferred are the Royal Dockyards and Arsentection of the Mersey, the Tyne, the Clyde, and other centres of commerce, will require se rious consideration. Coast batteries at the mouths of the rivers, or the entrances to the harbours, though securing them against the entrance of smaller craft, will be of little avail by themselves in some cases for pre als, with Dover and Portland. The Dock. yards and Arsenals ought to be rendered secure at almost any cost from sudden at tack or bombardment by sea, as well as from assault by land, in the event of an enemy being able to gain a footing in the country. Besides being required for purposes of con water, be a most valuable port to an enemy. Its anchorage is secure, it is easy of access, and it would be defended by him, if he obtained possession of it, with comparative facility. For these reasons it has now been strongly fortified at moderate cost. struction, they are more especially necessary invading force that could obtain possession during war as places of refuge for disabled of them. 2. It would afford a valuable devessels, as secure rendezvous, and as bases of pôt for assembling fresh troops or collecting operations for the fleet. Volunteer forces, a useful entrepôt for stores The efficiency of the Navy could not be and munitions, and a place of refuge upon possibly maintained without docks and ba- which any body of men inferior to the enesins for repairing, re-coaling, and refitting my in numbers might retreat for a time. the different vessels of the fleet in security 3. It is a strategical fortress in advance of from time to time. Skilled mechanics must the metropolis, from which movements could always be ready in such places, with spare be made upon the flank of an enemy disemmachinery and all requisite materials at their barked either to the east or the west, to disposal. Without such appliances, which check his advance and impede his communiare far more necessary in these days of cations. Portland would also, with its insusteam than they were before, our fleets would lar position, its fine harbour, and its breaksoon become useless; and they also want safe anchorages, in which to ship provisions, stores, and ammunition. It is further essential to our commerce that there shall be localities in which convoys of merchant vessels can safely assemble, and in which those vessels shall be able to find refuge when they The Government will no doubt complete are pursued by an enemy's cruisers. The the fortification of these vital points with as question as to how such places ought to be little delay as possible; and when this has protected from attacks by sea is a difficult been done there is no good reason why their one, and is still undecided. Some would garrisons in time of war should not be almost protect them by forts, others by ships, and exclusively composed of Volunteers. They others again by a combination of the two; would require 20,000 men for Portsmouth and this last is the method recommended by and the Isle of Wight; 15,000 for Plythe Defence Commission. If security is to mouth; a like number for the Thames and be obtained against steam-rams and iron- the Medway, including Woolwich, Chatham, plated vessels, it will be necessary to com- Purfleet, Deptford, and Sheerness; 8000 bine this compound system with solid artifi- for Pembroke; 6000 for Dover; and 3000 cial obstructions. Such obstructions were for Portland-making a total of 67,000 men used with good effect by the Russians during out of the 160,000 of which our Volunteer the Crimean War, both at Sebastopol and force is composed. This includes also a in the Baltic. In applying them, the chan- garrison of 1500 men for a work which the nels to be defended should be narrowed, as Defence Commission has properly recomfar as is consistent with other objects, and mended to be constructed, but which has hostile vessels should be compelled to pass not yet been decided on, at Shooters' Hill, at slow speed within close range of the forts for the protection, not only of the establishand batteries. These will of course be armed ments at Woolwich, but also of the metrowith the heaviest guns that can be construct-polis from that direction. The Volunteers ed, and perfectly protected, by armour-plat- are a most valuable acquisition for garrisoning or otherwise, from the fire of the ships. ing these fortified places; and it is a duty In any case it would be reversing the proper order of things to employ the fleet for the protection of the dockyards, instead of the dockyards for the repair, assistance, and security of the fleet. for which a portion of them are peculiarly well adapted. When so employed they will be lodged partly in bomb-proof and other barracks, and partly in billets. They will be near considerable towns, and will have no difficulty in procuring anything that they can require. Tents or huts could be supplied by contract on short notice; stores and ammunition the Government must keep in readiness on the spot. But it is not so much the sea defences as the land defences of these places that we have now to deal with. It is of the utmost importance that they should be well fortified and well garrisoned, and it is scarcely less necessary that Dover and Portland should These, and other measures which we have also be secure. The former is a stronghold already considered, will all have, indirectly, opposite the nearest part of the coast of a most important effect upon the defence of France, which must be held for three rea- the metropolis. The Channel is of course -1. Its naturally strong position, our first line of defence, guarded by the fleet. which has been fortified at great expense, The coast is the next line, which may, and and its harbour, would, in combination, be indeed must, as we have shown, be intrusted of great advantage as a tête-de-pont to any in a great measure to local corps and Vol sons: be done towards strengthening them after the enemy had appeared off the coast, and while he was landing; and the work would proceed with increased zeal and greater confidence after he had so far developed his plans and given indications of his probable lines of march. If he were successful in making good his landing, he would then of course be harassed day and night, and con fined as far as possible to the ground on which he stood. Every impediment would be thrown in the way of his advance by such troops as could be employed for the pur pose; each point would be disputed, and be would be continually compelled to clear the way before him. No chance would be missed of annoying him by demonstrations on his flanks or in his rear. Every available man would be summoned by telegraph, conveyed by railway, and hurried to the scene of action; and by the time he reached the third line above indicated, both men and works would be in a condition to receive him. unteers. The commercial ports and vital | Thousands of 'navvies' and other workmen points may also be principally protected or would be at once employed upon them under garrisoned, as far as land service and coast- the guidance of the Engineers. Much might batteries are concerned, by the Volunteer force; and the regular forces and militia will therefore be most of them liberated for active duty in the field. Under these circumstances no invading force of less than 200,000 men would venture into the country; and the metropolis would be the undoubted object of its attack. We do not believe in the feasibility of the projects that have been put forward for the simultaneous advance of the different divisions of such a force from the Avon and the Exe and other points; nor should we expect it to come from the Humber, or even from the coasts of Norfolk and Suffolk. To have any chance of success it must be landed in three or four divisions on the south or south-east of the country; and these divisions must march in support of each other upon London without any unavoidable delay. This march upon London (if it ever come off) will not occupy many days; and, as long as there is any chance of its being undertaken, we ought to be prepared with prompt as well as vigorous measures for its prevention. Any attempt The Volunteers would render important on the part of the enemy to land separate aid in these proceedings. Those who found expeditions destined to converge upon Lon- themselves in rear of the enemy, or on his don would be to our advantage, as we should flanks, would close upon him as opportunity then, with our admirable means of internal offered, and add to his difficulties to the best communication, be in a good position to of their power. They would surprise his beat them in detail. As the coast between outposts, cut off his stragglers, and keep up Portsmouth and the Thames is that which a distant fire from all sides upon any ought to be most carefully guarded by coast of his men who became exposed to it on the corps, so also the positions between that march or in camp; and the long-range wea coast and London are those which should pons of the present day would enable them receive the most serious consideration. The to do this with advantage. Those who were railway junctions form important strategical brought up in front would assist in checking points which would be attacked, and ought his advance upon the positions which were therefore, as far as possible, to be protected. being prepared to stop it, and in destroying The coast being the second line of defence, or carrying off anything that might be of as above explained, flanked by Dover and use to him. The Engineers would assist in Portsmouth, it follows that Canterbury, Ash-blowing up the bridges and viaducts in his ford, Tunbridge, Red Hill, Guildford, and front, would superintend the throwing up of Reading would be upon the third line, and intrenchments, and, while utilising all obsta Chatham and Stroud (or Shooters' Hill), cles favourable to defence, would level buildCroydon and Norwood, Kingston and Wind-ings, walls, bridges, and all other cover w sor, on the fourth line. The first great bat- would be likely to favour his operations. tle would be fought, probably, not far in The artillery would pour shot and shell upon advance of the third line; and the enemy him from any heights available for the pur would in no case, we will hope, be in a posi- pose, and would occupy the batteries pretion to force the fourth line, even if he were able to attempt it. Although we might not have time to drill an army, as Mr. Cobden proposes, while war was impending, and while the final preparations for an invasion were being completed, yet we should have ample means and opportunity during that period for throwing up temporary works in front of these positions. bodies which pared for their reception. Those riflemen who were not fit for more active exertions would man some of the intrenchments in which it was proposed to make a decisive stand with a view to a general engagement. But the Volunteers who would do these things effectually must be prepared to remain in the field. Their active service against the enemy would not probably ex |