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of franchises, the Magna Charta, in aed in its views, and when adequate motives broader sense than ours, of the Turkish for individual exertion are brought into empire. The various provisions it contains may be severally classed under the following heads:

I. Confirmation of beneficial ordinances already proclaimed.

II. Extension of previous concessions. III. Removal of existing abuses.

IV. Security for the observance of new

measures.

V. Improvements of a material kind.

The field, it must be allowed, is a wide one, and surely in its compartments there is no want either of liberality or of apparent sincerity. A system of reform, which aims at the removal of all abuses, the perpetuation of all franchises, the fusion of all classes, the development of all resources, the entire liberty of public worship and of private conscience in religious matters, the extension and security of civil rights, and an enlarged intercourse with foreigners, can hardly fail to engage our sympathy, and considering the difficulties which, in a country like Turkey, surround it, to command our admiration and hearty concurrence. We boast too much of the spirit of our age to be indifferent to one of its greatest and least expected achievements. Our free institutions, our Protestant faith, our commercial enterprise, our skill in manufactureall these sources of our national greatness are deeply interested in the triumph of such principles over bigotry, ignorance, and corruption, in one of their strongest and most extensive holds.

It is obvious that our Mussulman allies are now in a truly critical stage of their political transition. What they most stand in need of is a more complete application of these new principles, with an earnest enforcement of corresponding measures. Unfortunately fresh obstacles occur at this point. The Sultan looks to his ministers; the ministers look to each other. Some of them are restrained by the fear of responsibility, some by their personal interests; others have to contend with false impressions contracted in their youth, and others again with an indigenous love of ease and habitual self-indulgence.

Among those statesmen at the Porte, who admit the necessity without promoting the progress of reform, no allegation is more common than the deficiency of suitable agents. There is, no doubt, truth, but there is also much exaggeration in this plea. Men of sufficient ability are seldom wanting for the public service when the authority under which they act is clear and determin

play.

It will soon be forty years since the present era of Turkish reforms began. A new generation has sprung up within that period. The young men of Sultan Mahmoud's time have now attained the experience of age. Those, who were only children then, have already overstepped the halfway road of life. It would be strange indeed if there were none among them whose natural intelligence had taken the impress of the time-none who felt that, in serving a reformed government with zeal, they could best fulfil their public duties, and consult their own interests. Their minds have ripened in the warmth of new ideas; they have had access, in maturing, to broader avenues of knowledge than were open to their predecessors, who, nevertheless, sent out from their ranks the earliest instruments, the most active pioneers of reform. Between the two classes, the elder and the younger, a sufficient supply might surely be found, if not for giving full effect to all the ministerial functions, at least for conducting the principal departments in a creditable manner, and setting an example of vigour and consistency to other branches of the government. A Turk with good manners, who can talk French, who has visited the chief cities of Christendom, and has some acquaintance with European literature, is no longer, as in the last century, a phoenix or a black swan. The Greeks have ceased to monopolise the main channel of communication between the Porte and the foreign. ambassadors at Constantinople. The functions of Chief Interpreter are generally performed by a Mussulman.

What serves to counteract the natural tendencies of so important a change is favouritism, which is still but too often the arbiter of public appointments in Turkey. This evil may be traced to three distinct sources. The candidates for office receive their education in general either at the Porte or in the Seraglio.*. Their first appointment is made on the recommendation of some influential person at one of those two seats of power. Their promotion is frequently the result of a similar exercise of patronage. The relations of patron and client, which formed so strong an element of public life in ancient Rome, survive to a certain degree at Constantinople. The great man is at times sustained by his political dependents, who, in turn, look up to him for the advancement of their fortunes.

similar to that elsewhere between the Palais and *The distinction between Porte and Seraglio is the Chancellerie, the Court and the Government, the Household and the Ministry.

Official establishments, though of late curtailed, are still expensive, and the majority of the incumbents have little but their salaries and their expectations wherewith to support themselves. Debts are consequently incurred, and the bankers, who lend, employ their credit, which is considerable, in keeping or reinstating in office their respective debtors. Hence a routine most favourable to misconduct, incapacity, and corruption; hence a discouragement of those who seek to rise by honest means and honourable exertions; hence an assurance that no amount of disgrace will permanently exclude the most undeserving character from office and power. Such Pashas as Riza and Saffiti must laugh at being dismissed, since, however clear their delinquency, they are allowed to keep their ill-gotten spoils, with the certainty of returning to office at no distant period, and with the enjoyment, meanwhile, of colossal pensions,

official appointment is made; no act of administration, no decision of council, no sentence of criminal justice, is carried into effect. The laws against malversation, bribery, and corruption are stringent, and to every breach of them a penalty more or less severe is attached.

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In aid of the Sultan there is a Privy Council, a Cabinet for Affairs of State, whether internal or foreign. There is also a more comprehensive council, having judicial as well as deliberative powers, and comprising, together with the Grand Mufti and others of the Ulemah, most of the principal functionaries. To these may be added Board of Reform, whose president is a member of the administration; and occasionally, under urgent circumstances, a Council of Notables, convened by supreme authority from the provinces, and in part elected there. Moreover, in each province there is a separate council for local affairs under the presidency of the respective pashas. In these assemblies the elective principle is in some degree employed, and a representative of each nonMussulman community sits among the members.

There is much, we must confess, in these abuses to dishearten the advocates of Turkish revival. But they are not irremediable, and other countries have succeeded in throwing off the same impediments to progress. Even here, in our own country, the struggle The pashas are no longer invested, as of of private interest with public spirit was old, with plenary powers. They are now long and anxious. It survived both the little more than civil commissioners. The Reformation and the Revolution. It hung troops are placed under a military commanas a cloud over our expanding prospects der, and the provincial revenue is administerin the last century.. It required the reso-ed by a separate authority. No capital senIntion, the integrity, and the genius of a Burke to check its progress; and even now there are statesmen who seem to fear its renewal, and to look for its death-blow to the more than doubtful experiment of competitive examinations.

If, in this respect, we are better on the whole than those who went before us, what securities have we against the dangers of a relapse? The answer is obvious. We are less exposed to temptation, and we act under. the control of public opinion. The servants of the State, whatever their rank or denomination, are regularly if not abundantly paid, and an act of peculation brought home to the delinquent would at least be stamped with ignominy and hopeless dismissal from office. Appointments also are made in the public service on sounder principles and under a stricter responsibility. The Turks, it is true, have no parliament, and still less a parliament composed of individuals responsible to a popular constituency. But they have a sovereign whose power is absolute, whose interest it is that the empire should be honestly served, and who has no aristocratic, municipal, or party combinations to manage. In fact, without the immediate sanction of the Sultan, no issue of money, no

tence can be carried into effect without a special order from Constantinople. This new distribution of power, though doubtless in some respects useful, has the drawback of leaving too much in the hands of the council, whose leading members are men of influence in their neighbourhood, swayed by local interests, indifferent, if not hostile, to the imperial policy, and capable at times of giving law to the pasha.

A surer and stronger link is wanted between the supreme Government and the provincial authorities, and such a link might perhaps be found without disturbing the present divisions of the empire. The existing pashaliks might be grouped into clusters determined by territorial conformation or by local convenience, and each of the clusters might be superintended by a governor-general or lord high commissioner, representing the Sultan, and enjoying the full confidence of his Government. Examples of this kind of delegation are to be found in Turkish history. One of them has lately been given in the person of Fuad Pasha, who, under peculiar circumstances, was invested with extraordinary powers for the restoration of order in Syria. Another took place a few years before, when the two adjacent provinces of

to remove financial abuses and to render taxation more productive stand foremost in the line of reform. Retrenchment and economy are the best, and indeed indispensable starting-points. They alone can at present obtain, for any security the Porte could offer in raising money on loan, that confidence which might re-open the money-markets of Europe to her proposals. The pump must have

Thessaly and Epirus were united for a time under the administration of a single pasha, who in earlier days would probably have received the appropriate and well-known title of Bey-ler-bey, or Lord of Lords. There would be little difficulty in arranging a sufficient control for the exercise of so high a trust, and the body of Turkish statesmen would not be required to supply more than twelve or fifteen individuals capable of ful-water to make it work. The first remedial filling its duties, and giving thereby a general and uniform effect to the Sultan's beneficent intentions.

The execution of such a plan might in time be greatly assisted by opening a wider field of instruction to candidates for public employment. The first step has been taken in this direction. A college, founded by the Government, exists in the principal suburb of Constantinople. The students are partly Christian and partly Mussulman. They are brought up together on equal terms. The institution was originally a School of Medicine. It has been expanded into larger proportions, and may now be said to contain the rudiments of an university. No principle stands in the way of its further extension. As a model for similar foundations in the chief provincial cities, its importance can hardly be overrated.

We have already intimated that in our opinion the Turkish army, far from being too large for the wants of the country, stands in need of a considerable increase, with reference at least to the numbers actually enrolled. The objections are not entirely of a financial character. The conscription operates on the Turkish population alone, and the supply from that quarter is not equal to the demand. This deficiency has been felt for some years, and it is to all appearance a growing evil. How is it to be supplied from within the empire if not by recruiting among those portions of the people who, on religious grounds, have hitherto been exempted from military service? This idea has been adopted by the Porte, and made acceptable to the Christians by substituting a war-tax for the degrading Haratsch, and levying it on all religious classes alike. But the egg has been somewhat addled in the hatching. The Christians complain of the new tax as pressing unfairly on them; and, as no arrangements have yet been made for placing them, as soldiers, on a proper footing, the army is still dependent on its one declining source of recruitment.

operations in finance would be attended with a partial abandonment of the customary expedients, and it is difficult therefore to imagine how the curative process could be effected without a temporary accommodation by loans. Ten years ago this harbour of refuge was closed to the Porte by traditional scruples, which subsequently gave way to pressure, as other mistaken notions will also give way to a similar force of circumstances.

On this, as on other points, much, no doubt, is wanted. But the resources, be it observed, are natural, the obstacles conventional. Opinion works in such manner as to bring out the former, and to test the latter by their actual utility. Things deemed impracticable have come into preparation for every-day use. The progress of improvement is scarcely less rapid than extensive.

It was during the Crimean war that strangers commissioned by foreign governments were first allowed to take part in the Porte's financial deliberations. They had to contend with much jealousy and many prejudices. They were often baffled in their researches; and if they succeeded in doing any good, it was all but limited to the prevention of evil. The Porte has now accepted the services of two gentlemen who are actually clerks in the British Treasury, and to them, in honourable reliance on a friendly government, the mys teries of Turkish finance are said to be fairly unfolded. Even to those who have watched at home the course of events in Turkey, such changes appear little short of miraculous. They are earnests of further advancement, and seem to forbid the surrender of a single hope.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that nothing has yet been done except on paper. In every department some practical steps have been taken, more or less, in the right direction. Progression languishes rather from moral than from material causes, less from want of will in the Government than from the temperament of individuals. The 'hawl-of-all,' so well known in our navy, Whatever may be hereafter the composi- the strong pull, long pull, and pull altogetion of the army, its numbers cannot be in-ther,' so potent in a British rowing-match, have creased without a corresponding increase of expense. On this account, as well as on others, it is evident that measures calculated

still to be impressed on our Ottoman friends. In every great enterprise, energy, method, system, concurrence, are needed for success.

In Turkey, as now circumstanced, and more perhaps than elsewhere, these qualities of every great national movement have to be sustained, if not inspired, from without. Happily for the Turkish empire sufficient means and motives for giving, in a friendly spirit, the requisite impulsion to its endeavours are no longer out of reach. The principal States of Christendom are solemnly pledged to support the integrity of that empire, and to regard it as a member of what is rather affectedly called the 'great European family.' When acting together under mutual self-restricting engagements they are capable of urging their joint counsels on the Porte without that danger to its independence which might accompany the single interference of any neighbouring power. Supposing their views to be honest, and their recommendations to agree with the Porte's declared In these high matters, to which the princìprinciples, the pressure thus exerted would be pal Powers of Europe habitually and necesno less safe than useful. Were interested sarily direct their attention, although the motives to prevail in secret with one or more interest, the legitimate interest, is common, of them, the vigilance of England would not and the right equal, our own Government go to sleep, and the Porte's position would occupies a peculiar position, comparatively not be worse than if it were one of political advantageous, but also in proportion to the estrangement and insincere profession. The advantage responsible. The causes of this union, moreover, of its advisers, though per- are evident. Of all the Powers, Great Britain haps a mere show, might be reasonably ex- has most to lose by the inertness and decay pected to repress any tendency to foul play of the Ottoman Empire, and least to gain by by making the exposure of intrigue more its dismemberment. Though her course of discreditable and offensive. The advice of policy may at times give umbrage to the our own Government, in particular, would be Porte, the circumstances in which she is tendered with the two-fold advantage of in-placed, and the character of our institutions, spiring confidence as British, and commanding attention as European. The treaty of peace, which guards the Porte expressly against foreign interference as between the Sultan and his subjects, would be anything but satisfactory if it were held to preclude the Sultan's allies from insisting on the enforcement of those reforms which have been adopted freely by him as of vital importance to his empire. Who will deny that the continued neglect of that duty exposes them more and more to the perils and sacrifices attendant, under their existing engagements, on the empire's dissolution, whether it were brought about by force or by intrigue?

even the mysteries of Turkish finance at headquarters, have likewise in turn been subjects of European deliberation. We know not how soon, or where, a fresh massacre or an insurrection may necessitate further interference.

It were well to bear in mind that such occasional meetings have also their portion of inconvenience and risk. Their failure is discreditable; the effect of their success at best transient and partial. The evils they are meant to correct are themselves the offspring of one pervading evil, the source of which is Constantinople. In cases of sickness, consultations are not of good omen: but at times they cannot be avoided, and then it is usually thought best to call them where the patient resides, and not on the spot where his fever was caught, or his leg fractured.

Granted that the prospect of a diplomatic conference authorized only for definite purposes at Constantinople is by no means attractive. Still, the advantage, or, it may be, the necessity of resorting to such an expedient, when weighed against its inconvenience, will be found to preponderate. Meanwhile such conferences as are intended merely to patch up a local or passing disturbance abound. We are but lately relieved from one, the prolific parent of numberless protocols in Syria. The affairs of Montenegro, those of the Danubian Principalities, and

exempt her from mistrust. Others may be more feared, and consequently more favoured, by the Turkish authorities; but confidence and goodwill depend in reality less on fear than on hopes and sympathies.

The subject in hand is so large, its bearings so multiplex, and the questions it embraces so momentous, that, even in this rapid sketch of its principal bearings, there may be enough to weary, if not to bewilder, the most patient of readers. We never pretended to bring the totality of its elements within so narrow a compass; and at this stage we aim at nothing more than a very light notice of two or three outstanding points which ought not to be entirely overlooked.

Authors, in seeking to explain the decline of Turkish power, have noticed two practices, in particular, as helping greatly to accelerate it. One, to which we have already alluded, is the debasement of the coinage. The other is the exclusion of the Imperial princes from all share in public business.

The discredit, uncertainty, and temptation to fraud, which attend the former immoral and illusive expedient, have at all times and in all countries produced more or less the same deplorable effects. Our own history

may be quoted to confirm the truth of this remark. A prominent example is offered by Froude in his account of the financial embarrassments which occurred under the protectorate of Somerset. Some of us can personally remember with what determination Parliament on the report of the Bullion Committee in 1816 enacted at every hazard the renewal of cash payments at the Bank.

With respect to the princes, it stands to reason that the restrictions to which they are condemned must operate with two-fold venom upon the state. The jealousy, which keeps them spell-bound in the Seraglio, hoodwinks their understandings, and renders the want of knowledge an heirloom in the ruling family, at the same time that it confirms their imperial keeper in those habits of indolence and self-indulgence which the dread of competition and popularity on their side might otherwise counteract. It tells with unusual force in a country where so much depends on the personal acquirements of the sovereign, and at a period when every government is expected to give proof of qualities commensurate with the wants of its people and the progress of its rivals. A word would suffice to remove this nightmare from the palace, and its consequences from the empire. But that word must be pronounced by the Sultan himself; and he cannot with reason be expected to pronounce it, until he is brought to comprehend the injustice and real impolicy of the established practice.

object would be overpaid by its results, and a real economy, such as now, it would appear, is in progress, followed by other productive reforms, and sustained by the concurrent action of friendly Powers, would go far to revive the credit and open the resources of the Porte to an indefinite extent.

We ground our hopes, in this respect, on measures which appear to have been adopted by the Sultan's Government within the last few months. A sweeping reduction of the household establishment, the adoption of a less extravagant scale of salaries and pensions, more than one attempt to moderate the profits of usury, the contraction of paper issues, advances made from the sovereign's private treasury in payment of arrears due on public account, the appointment of a special commission for the control of administrative expenses, and, above all, the admission of foreign agents to the examination of the State finances, are so many indications of a decided tendency towards improvement. Some of these measures may be incomplete, and they are all subject to curtailment and misdirection; but, on the whole, they warrant the hopes we have already expressed, and may well encourage those sovereigns and statesmen, who take an interest in the Sultan's welfare, to lend him all reasonable aid in the prosecution of his internal reforms.

Those to whom every molehill is a mountain, every redoubt an impregnable fortress, may fancy that the greatest success in these respects would have little or no effect-if any, a disastrous one--on that diversity of races, and consequent opposition of feelings and interests, which makes the Turkish empire a hotbed of internal disunion. That there, as elsewhere, difficulty and danger exist, cannot be fairly denied; but candour, while making the admission, is entitled to protest against its exaggeration. In their days of prosperity, the most enlightened of Turkish ministers might reasonably have opposed any serious relaxation of the Mussulman system. It was sufficient for the purpose that all went on as usual, and that no defeat or deficit, insurrection or calamity, was likely to throw more than a passing shadow on the stability of the empire. Turks were Turks; and Rayahs, Rayahs. Both were to move invariably in their separate spheres; and if Christian heads were exposed to Turkish sabres, it was natural that they should be occasionally cut off. But the successors of those statesmen have no such luxury to enjoy. They are embarked

The reigning Sultan was treated with brotherly indulgence by his late kind-hearted predecessor. He was allowed, in some repects, a more than usual degree of liberty; nor was he entirely shut out from the sources of Western instruction. But there is reason to believe that his access to those branches of knowledge which are essential to a liberal course of education in Christendom was of very contracted proportions; and we have never heard that he was at any time called to take part in political matters during his brother's reign. Granting him the best intentions and a sound natural discernment, it is highly improbable that he possesses either the habits or the principles which are required to give him a real control over his ministers, and to fortify him against the seductions of irresponsible power. If he is sincere in his professions of reform, and feels, as in that case he must, the difficulties which surround him, he will not be sorry to lend an ear to the counsels of his allies, and to strengthen his position by their united and sympathetic sup-on a current generated by false principles and port.

It would certainly require more than a word to redress the defects of the currency; but the temporary sacrifice essential to that

vicious errors, which threatens to sweep them into ruin,-government, religion, empire, and all! It is only by steaming or rowing strenuously against the flood that they can hope

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